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2ABSTRACT
This study examines the ways in which peasants in a village of Western
Turkey produce cotton, a commodity sold on national and international
markets. By looking at the way in which the various means of production
are procured and deployed by cotton producers, the study hopes to
demonstrate the role played by social, non-market structures such as the
village and the household in the organisation of production. The study is
based on data collected during a period of eighteen months' fieldwork in
1978 and 1979 in a cotton-producing plain in Western Turkey. Apart from a
number of subsequent visits, a further two-months were spent conducting a
survey of the households of the village during the summer of 1984.
The thesis begins by setting out the theoretical parameters within which
peasant studies have been carried out to date. The various ways in which
peasants have been conceptualised in anthropology and in political economy
are examined and the use of structural models in to create universal
analytical categories such as 'peasant' or 'petty commodity producer are
questioned. It is argued that to the extent that the village and the
household remain one of the most important pools from which inputs,
especially labour, are supplied, it is very difficult to predict production
decisions or understand the mechanisms that make the production of
commodities by peasants possible.
In the next three chapters, the social units, such as households and
neighbourhoods that make up the village are described. A brief exploration
of regional history shows the relatively recent origins in Sbke of villages
as well as of peasant production. Existing social and economic exchanges
within the settlement are shown to constitute the village as a totality
which has significance in the organisation of commodity production
undertaken by households. A discussion showing the role of the state in
establishing peasant farming of cotton is followed by a delineation of the
technological limits under which cotton production is carried out. Land
and labour are isolated as the traditional inputs which largely limit
production. It is argued that with the increasing importance of modern
inputs which can only be acquired with money, the place of land and labour
in agricultural production has radically changed. A look at the
organisation of work shows the extent to which different factors become the
factors limiting production in the different production units found in the
Söke plain.
The subsequent three chapters describe in detail the ways in which peasant
producers have access to each of the major inputs, land, cash and labour.
In this context, emphasis is placed on the role of households,
neighbourhoods and other socially significant relationships in influencing
the production process. In the last section, the mechanisms through which
capital is accumulated by peasant households are examined, and the
possibilities of expanded reproduction by small commodity producers are
explored. By including social variables In a study of economic production,
It Is hoped that broad generalisations regarding the persistence or
dissappearance of peasants under conditions of increasing commoditisation
can be avoided.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This study Is an attempt to delineate the conditions under which
peasants in a village of Western Turkey are able to produce successfully a
commodity that is bought and sold on national and international markets.
The bulk of Turkey's agricultural crops are still produced by farmers who
live in small communities which are integrated in varying degrees into
national commodity circuits. Within these communities, patterns of social
interaction between the different producers affect calculations on which
productive decisions are based. Tuz is such a community whose Inhabitants
specialize In the production of cotton. Information on social and economic
relations obtaining in Tuz village was collected in the course of fieldwork
initially undertaken between 1978 and 1979; subsequent visits in 1981, 1983,
1984, and 1987 proved invaluable for an understanding of short-term
changes, as well as for repeated evaluations of the models constructed. 1 It
is during these subsequent visits that the extent of the role of the
community in reproducing peasant farms became clearer. The impossibility
of providing an explanation of peasant production by looking at economic
variables alone lies at the root of another problem that the study
addresses itself to: the ways In which economic and social variables can be
combined to account for the persistence of small commodity production.
Below, I shall consider different attempts at theorising the relation of
economic and social factors In the context of peasant studies. I shall also
indicate the relevance of some of the concepts developed in the course of
the discussions to the study of Tuz cotton producers.
1.1 Peasant and Petty Commodity Producer as Theoretical Constructs
Attempts to construct general statements regarding the conditions of
existence and reproduction of the peasantry have long been part and parcel
of economic anthropology (Silverman 1979). Generallsations that purport to
have universal validity have proven to be one of the main stumbling blocks
of these endeavours. Universalist concepts provided by diverse approaches
to the subject have all been criticised for not explaining the particular
case studied by the author in question. Xarxist theorists have substituted
the concepts of political economy, particularly concepts such as 'mode of
11
production', 'wage', 'capital' and 'simple reproduction' for other universals
such as 'maxirnisation', 'rationality' and 'human nature' employed by
formalist discourse in economic anthropology. The particularisni inherent
in the substantivist approach has been criticised for precluding proper
comparison and generalisation. The problem of where to search for
generalities and how to incorporate specificities is an ongoing one that
incites theoretical discussion and empirical research.
Early anthropological concerns with regard to the peasantry bore the
impact of the evolutionist and culturalist approaches dominant in American
anthropology during the thirties and forties (Silverman 1979). In these
approaches, the peasant represented both a culture type named 'folk culture'
by Pedfield (Redfield and Singer 1971:341) as well as an intermediary stage
in the progression from tribal groups to the modern industrial city
(Redfield, cited in Silverman 1979), As Silverman shows, the establishment
of the peasant as an analytical category was mainly a development of the
mid-fifties. This largely empirical category included in its definition
behavioural, socio-econoinic, political, and cultural variables. Thus,
peasants were inhabitants of small rural communities mainly involved in
subsistence production. Techniques of production were backward, but more
importantly, production was determined by a set of values or traditions.
Furthermore, peasants were subordinated both economically, politically, and
culturally to other sections of the larger society of which they were a
part (Wolf 1966). The socio-political correlates for these cultural
variables have been conceptualised largely in terms of patronage/clientage
links which take specific forms in specific cultures. Thus one could talk
of 'compadrazgo' in Latin America, 'caciques' in Spain, the Mafia in Italy,
'zainindars' in India, and 'beys' in the Middle East.
The economic context within which peasant studies developed was
increasingly determined by the world-wide extension of the market.
Therefore, the integration of rural producers into commodity markets and
the latters' reaction to this process have provided the main focus of
discussion. Would peasants adopt new crops and new methods of cultivation
or would they keep to their traditional 'way of life'? The question of
rationality was at the centre of this debate. While some argued that
12
peasant opposition to commodity production could be understood as a
rational approach to objective conditions char-acterised by uncertainty
(Ortiz 1971; Popkin 1979), others stressed the role of 'tradition', or
'culture' in determining behaviour, Tradition or culture itself was
evaluated differently by different authors. According to some,
subordination accounted for those values or sets of social relations that
helped peasants protect themselves from greater exploitation by outside
forces.2 The opposite view was also propounded, namely that cultural
variables in the guise of values and norms described variously as 'The
Image of the Limited Good' or 'Amoral Familism' were the cause of poverty
among these communities (Foster 1965; Banfield 1958).
In the course of these debates, the peasant concept lost some of its
transcendental qualities as a human type. Since the mid-sixties, peasant
studies increasingly took the form of attempts to locate the emergence of
peasant communities in relation to historical processes such as colonialism
and the development of capitalism. For example, Shanin, in attempting to
formulate a concept of peasant economy that takes account of historical
changes, defines the peasant in terms of four inter-related 'facets' that
each define the social unit (the family farm), the means of livelihood
(mixed farming), a specific culture (linked to small communities), and a set
of specific social relations with outsiders (subjection) (1974:64). In
discussing the family labour farm, Shanin makes use of Chayanov's depiction
of the labour process, while his other categories owe a lot to the
Redfieldian approach as revised by Wolf and }tintz (1974:67).
It was in this context that the relevance of concepts taken from
political economy to the study of rural producers began to be discussed.
Two of these concepts, namely 'class' and 'mode of production' have had a
wide currency in relation to peasant studies and have become the focus of
much debate. Writers who, following Lenin, argued that capitalist relations
of production were being fast established in rural regions, have put a
greater emphasis on the concept of class. For these authors, the problem
has been to reject the unity of a concept of peasantry and to elucidate the
different class positions that emerged in the countryside. By contrast,
others have maintained that different systems of production could be
13
discerned in different parts of the rural world and that for this reason, it
would be more fruitful to use Marx's concept of mode of production to
elucidate the parameters of these various systems. These writers find
inspiration In Chayanov's (1966) attempt to construct a theory of peasant
economy .-
As Smith argues (1984b:60), most of the social scientists studying
rural economies agree that market relations tend to dissolve formerly
existing structures. While formalist and substantivist anthropologists
stress the changes in value orientations, Marxists concentrate on the
material bases of these changes. According to both formalists and
substantivists, change means the erosion of the community, the
individuation of the productive enterprise, and the transformation of
techniques of production and levels of consumption. For Marxists, on the
other hand, change means the emergence of either new classes in the
countryside (that is, a class of rich capitalist farmers and a rural
(semi)proletariat), or of new modes/forms of production (petty/small
commodity production). These changes, for Marxists, are contingent on the
dissolution of a natural economy comprised of a category of 'independent'
subsistence producers (Bernstein 1979) or a historically determined pre-
capitalist mode of production (Xeillassoux 1981, Kahn 1975).a
The different positions within Marxism became crystallised in the
course of debates on agrarian transformations. Although these debates were
country-specific, the extensive use they made of Marxist concepts led to
their elaboration and ref inement, The substantive Issues these debates
dealt with included questions regarding the exact mechanisms through which
rural producers are exploited, the conditions under which peasant production
is reproduced and/or transformed, the nature of the units engaged in
production, and the forms of calculation that guide their production
decisions. These are also the questions that are pertinent In an analysis
of rural cotton producers in villages of Western Turkey. It is the aim of
this study to attempt to explain the reasons why and the conditions under
which these villagers manage to produce a capital- and labour-intensive
cash crop such as cotton. In the following pages, I shall set out some of
the analytical concepts derived from the debates mentioned above that are
14
particularly useful in understanding the relations observed during the
course of field research. Next, I shall attempt to determine the most
appropriate unit of analysis. I shall argue that in spite of the fact that
many of the processes influencing commodity producers are determined at a
broader level (such as the region, the nation and the world-economy), the
village constitutes a significant unit with regard to peasant production.
1.2. The Peasantry within Political Economy
Within political economy, it was the writing of Lenin and Kautsky that
set the stage for a discussion of the fate of independent rural producers
faced with the spread of market relations and the new division of labour
that was to come in its wake (Ennew, Hirst, Tribe 1977; Kahn 1986),
Kautsky's analysis emphasized the differences between Industrial and
agrarian capitalism, and argued that a class of small landholders with
holdings insufficient to sustain them would be part and parcel of
capitalist development in the countryside. These producers would supply
the labour needed on large farms and in industry. Despite their property,
Kautsky was of the opinion that these producers would best be characterised
as proletarians. The middle peasantry, namely those able to eke out a
living from agricultural production, would only do so by increasing their
inputs of labour and decreasing their levels of consumption (Kahn 1986:48-
9). Lenin's position was similar in its broad out1ines. 	 He, too, stresses
the increasingly capitalist nature of the relations dominating agricultural
production, and the precariousness of the category of the independent
middle peasantry (Ennew et. al. 1977: 305). As capitalist relations spread,
both Lenin and Kautsky predicted that a process of differentiation would
gradually erode the conditions of existence of this middle peasantry.7
These arguments have constituted one pole of what has been called the
characterisation debate. The other pole, those who argue for the
persistence of the peasantry, have attempted In various ways to revive
Chayanov's attempts to contruct a specifically peasant economy. 9 According
to Chayanov, peasant production constituted a system of production that was
distinct from feudalism as well as capitalism (Chayanov 1966:4-5; Harrison
1977). 1
	Peasant production had a rationality specific to itself, one that
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was based on the absence of wage labour. Labour needed for production was
obtained within the family (hence the term 'family-labour farm') and the
level of production was the result of a combination of consumption
requirements and the drudgery of work. Thus, rather than factors such as
prices, It was the demographic structure of the family that determined the
quantity of labour expended. In spite of the fact that Chayanov intended
this analysis only as an explanation of the specific situation in Russia at
the turn of the century, many attempts were made to apply (Dove 1981), and
even to universalise (Sahlins 1974) this model. It was also Chayanov's
careful analysis of the labour process under conditions of subsistence
production that was used by those writers who argued that peasant
production had a distinct logic which could not be reduced to the workings
of capitalism.
1.2.1 The Differentiation Thesis
Those students of agrarian structures who stress the inevitability of
the process of differentiation, are also those who have given serious
attention to the rural class structure found in many parts of the third
world (Banaji 1977; Bernstein 1979; Roseberry 1978; Deere and de Janvry
1979). From this point of view, the major problem they faced was the non-
separation of the producers from the most Important means of agricultural
production, namely land. Since, class was based on the relation of the
producer to the means of production, It would be difficult to characterise
small commodity producers as proletarians. This, and the absence (or near-
absence) of wage labour led these writers to develop the concepts of
real/formal subsuinption that Xarx uses in his historical analysis of the
development of capitalism, and to the designation of rural producers as
semi-proletarians (Roseberry 1978). 1	According to the analysis developed
by Banaji, the extent to which producers in individual enterprises are
separate from their means of production will not reveal anything about the
nature of the production system, since the labour process or the individual
enterprise cannot provide clues with respect to modes of production: "...
modes of production are born and emerge historically before the enterprises
which sustain them have organised the process of labour to correspond to
their inherent motion" (19Tha:301). 12Accordlng to the logic of Banaji's
16
argument, independent peasant production is in fact under the domination of
the laws of motion of capitalism.' 3 Therefore, the income producers obtain
after selling their produce on the market is a 'concealed wage' and any
form of subsistence production undertaken by peasants can only be
understood as a way of reproducing labour power (Banaji 1977:34).
The main mechanism through which full proletarianisation takes place
has been identified by Bernstein as the 'simple reproduction squeeze'
defined as, "those effects of commodity relations on the economy of peasant
households that can be summarized in terms of increasing costs of
production/decreasing returns to labour" (Bernstein 1979:427). With the
incorporation of commodity relations within the reproduction cycle of the
peasant, commodity circuits will increasingly govern production decisions:
as product prices decline, peasants will have to produce more, often under
conditions of decreasing soil fertility. In this way capital will be able
to obtain commodities without having to bear costs of management or
supervision (1979:429) and capitalism becomes internal to household
decision-making. Peasants are able to sustain deteriorating terms of
exchange for considerable periods of time and therefore can "compete
effectively with capitalist enterprises producing the same commodities"
(ibid). Therefore, although differentiation is linked to intensification and
the conimoditisation of labour power, the process is not automatic and
depends "on concrete conditions" (1979:431).14
The positions taken by Banaji and Bernstein have drawn attention to
the problems of limiting analysis to on-farm processes. But by making
the logic of capital central to their analyses, they have greatly reduced
the possibility of explaining variations among small-scale commodity
producers.	 There are different degrees and mechanisms of subsuming
labour under capital. As I shall try to show, the returns to labour
obtained by Sbke cotton producers are high enough to allow them to invest
in improved means of production, while African peasants discussed by
Bernstein may at best be able to scrape together daily subsistence. The
production of subsistence as opposed to cash crops, the role of merchants
and/or state agencies may all affect the actual mechanisms through which
production is subsumed under capitalism. 17 The tendency in these approaches
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is to view differentiation as a unitary process. The way in which the
differentiation thesis has been argued in empirical cases (e.g. Deere and de
Janvry 1981) has tended to conflate three separate processes of
conminoditisation which may not be causally linked: the commoditisation of
output, of the means of production, and of labour power (Kahn 1982:9).
With regard to cotton producers in Western Turkey, I shall show that
the commoditisation of labour and the means of production has not
proceeded apace with that of output. Although wage labour has become an
integral aspect of cotton production, it is very difficult to conclude that
proletarianisation will be inevitable. In fact, for many of the Soke
producers the differences between wage labour and household labour cannot
be easily differentiated. In many cases, the wage acts as a means to
extend the use of household labour) 	 Nevertheless, differentiation and
concepts such as 'simple reproduction squeeze' are helpful in analysing the
conditions under which commodity producers reproduce themselves. In Söke
differentiation does not take the form of access to versus separation from
land, but there is differentiation with regard to access to cash and cash
inputs. To the extent that commodities are necessary in the process of
production, cost of input and level of return to labour will influence
production decisions. Whether the relationship between these variables will
produce the 'squeeze' predicted by Bernstein, depends on a host of factors
that have to be determined empirically. Finally, the fact that producers
operate within a system of generalised commodity production does not mean
that they can easily be characterised as 'capitalists', 'proletarians', or
'semi-proletarians'.
1.2.2 The Persistence Thesis
If the differentiationists can be accused of reducing variety to a few
manifestations of the movement of capital, those who emphasize persistence
show a tendency to stress the uniqueness of each empirical case they study.
Unlike differentiationists, they underplay the extent of accumulation or
dispossession. Especially in its functionalist versions, the persistence
thesis, not unlike the differentiationists, tends to explain the viability of
the small producer in terms of the needs of capitalism for cheap
18
commodities, be it labour or produce (Bradby 1975:128-9). 	 The main
thrust of the persistence position has been to try to conceptualise either
precapitalist modes of production (leading to the articulationist position)
or to the concept of forms of production as a way of analysing different
types of small-scale commodity production in all their specificity.
Advocates of the forms of production approach explain the preservation of
non-capitalist production processes in terms of the competitive advantage
these have over capitalist production in most cases (Taussig 1978), under
certain economic conjunctures (Friedinann 1978), or within certain branches
of production (Mann and Dickinson 1978; Smith 1984b).2°
The Modes of Production Approach:
Sahlins (1974), Meillassoux (1972, 1981) and Wolpe (1972) were among
the earliest writers who attempted to construct specific modes of
production on the basis of a labour process and relations of production
that were characteristic of various peasantries. The elements of these
modes of production were: units of production often composed of
families/households in which consumption and production were united, the
absence of wage or servile labour, and what can loosely be called a use-
value orientation. These attempts had a number of shortcomings. The ways
in which relations of production were conceptualised were so general that
many other modes of production could in fact be seen to share the same
characteristics. For example, Wolpe's African Mode of Production was
defined in terms of some form of communal landholding worked by some kind
of kinship unit within which resources were allocated according to these
kinship ties (1972:432),	 Sahlins' formulation of the Domestic Mode of
Production (DMP) lacked any concept of social or economic totality and
denied any importance to relations that may link the different production
units.
For Meillassoux, another proponent of the DMP, the latter was able to
develop and flourish because of Its usefulness for capitalism. According to
this view, the DMP was the result of the impact of colonial capitalism on
the traditional Lineage Mode of Production that had originally dominated
West African societies. The internal structure of the Lineage Mode of
Production remained largely unchanged, since it was geared to the
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organisation of the labour force. As a result, Meillassoux's DXP emerges as
the effect of capitalism on pre-capitalist societies. The latter, according
to this view, passively continue to function for the benefit of another mode
of production. Attention is no longer focused on the possibilities of
internal change, but on the ways in which the pre-capitalist mode of
production 'articulates' with capitalism. Although different modes of
production were constructed to account for the difference in modes of
calculation and rationality exhibited by different productive systems, the
emphasis on articulation reduced these varieties to so many ways of
fulfilling the needs of capitalism. As Foster-Carter argues (1978), because
most articulationist approaches construct a monolithic universal capitalism,
they are forced to search for variation in the pre-capitalist modes of
production. Furthermore, as shown by Bernstein, it is not possible to argue
that the only impact of capitalism on pre-capitalist societies is in the
re-direction of the flows of surplus. Capitalism cannot long remain
external to the production process, but affects production decisions
themselves through the simple reproduction squeeze.
The attempt to construct a petty commodity mode of production (PXP)
as a non-capitalist rather than a pre-capitalist mode of production has
been more rigorous and has avoided many of the pitfalls mentioned above.
According to one of the more succinct constructions, the PM? is composed of
independent and separate producers who all have access to their own means
of production. The only link they have to one another is through the
market for which they produce commodities using largely commoditised
inputs (Kahn 1980:143). 22 According to Kahn, it is the operation of market
forces themselves which produce both separation and equality, the basic
relations of production that characterise PM? (1980:203). Any Increase in
productivity would come into conflict with these relations of production
and produce a form of class differentiation (1980:148). For Kahn, it is
these structural conditions that account for the inability of producers to
raise levels of productivity, not an imputed 'subsistence ethic', that is an
unspecified drive towards producing only what Is necessary for subsistence.
According to Kahn, differentiation is not a structural necessity, and can
only be determined in concrete cases (1980:149).	 In this way, Kahn tries
to specify without any reference to the capitalist mode of production the
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internal constitution of PXP as a specific productive system having its own
rationality and contradictions; but PM? is nevertheless a mode of
production that is 'dominated' by capitalism. Having constructed PM? as an
abstract and distinct mode of production, Kahn has to turn to articulation
to understand its relations with capitalism. Again, there is recourse to
the internal operation of the mode of production to locate the specificity
of the various production systems found in the periphery of the world
capitalist system.
1evertheless, compared to Meillassoux's concept of articulation in
which the logic of capitalism provided a sufficient explanation of the
working of the domestic community, Kahn's is less functionalist since it
allows determinacy to the logic of the pre-capitalist mode of production.
The emergence of PM? itself is concomittant on the destruction of a pre-
capitalist economy, a process which is largely the result of incorporation
in the world capitalist economy (1980:135). For PM? to emerge, a
generalised commodity economy is necessary. But its own persistence is
more complex: the long-term dynamic of PM? may show a cyclical pattern, as
PMP appears under certain conditions and dissolves under others (1975).24
In spite of his insistence that it is the logic of PM? that accounts for
low productivity, Kahn also maintains that surplus is siphoned off to
capitalist sectors from PMP, especially since labour power is largely
reproduced within a subsistence economy (1980:206). This confuses the
extent to which the barrier to the development of the forces of production
can be attributed to the internal structure of PMP, since the transfer of
surplus to capitalism is said to have the same consequences.2
Articulation theories are widely used to explain the ways in which
capitalism (capitalists?) extracts surplus from non-capitalist systems of
production.	 This surplus extraction, whatever the mechanisms through
which it is effected, is the main factor that accounts for low levels of
productivity and inability to enter into expanded reproduction (cf.
Vergopoulos 1978). It Is In explaining the Incomplete proletarianisation of
wide sections of the world population that the articulation approach has
proved to be most useful (Wolpe 1972, Scott, C.D. 1976; Keyder 1983a).'
But even here, political processes may offer at least an Important part of
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the explanation for the situation in which many producers find themselves
in (Rey and Dupre 1973; Taussig 1978; Smith 1984c; 1986). The problem of
conservation/dissolution of pre-capitalist modes of production is one that
has not been adequately solved by articulationist approaches. According to
this view, nothing except the needs of capitalism explain the persistence of
pre-capitalist modes of production. In that case we need to ask the
question whether there will never be a transition to capitalism in the
periphery, or if there is such a possibility, which conditions will bring
such a transition about. Articulation becomes a relation between structures
rather than a complex set of relations involving concrete people; as a
result, the impact of the class struggle in determining the nature of
exploitation is neglected. Kahn's approach also suffers from the same
weakness: a tension between the wish to explain historical processes as an
outcome of structural contradictions on the on hand, and as the result of
concrete struggles on the other. It seems that individual or group action
and class struggle are drawn into the analysis on an ad hoc basis in
order to explain what the structural analysis cannot account for. Thus, on
the one hand there are attempts to construct general theories of
articulation, and yet the impossibility of this endeavour is constantly
reaffirmed 2
These attempts to formulate a logic to petty commodity production
have nevertheless produced valuable analyses of the processes of production
still extant in many parts of the world. These studies show that reliance
on primarily unpaid household labour produces forms of calculation that are
different from those that characterise capitalist enterprises. Village
producers calculate returns to labour rather than costs of labour; it is on
this basis that they decide whether to engage in cotton production and on
what scale. By contrast, since capitalists have to calculate a rate of
profit on the amount of capital invested, labour acquires a different cost.
Hence, the decision to cultivate cotton is based on different calculations.
However, the insistence of PXP theorists on the Inability of petty
commodity producers to enter into expanded reproduction, that is, to invest
in the development of forces of production constitutes a serious drawback.
This insistence follows from the attempt to account for the persistence of
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this mode of production. But, as the case of village producers in Söke
shows, expanded reproduction on the basis of family and/or wage labour is
possible. Expansion is a strategy that producers undertake quite
deliberately, often in order to meet a specific need such as the marriage of
a son or the purchase of an expensive agricultural machine. By being able
to differentiate between the logic of simple reproduction and that of
expanded reproduction, it will be possible to explain the simultaneous
occurrence of different strategies of production. Otherwise, it would
either be necessary to argue that different villagers are subsumed to
capitalism through different mechanisms (according to formal subsumption
logic), or that some producers are capitalist for some of the time, petty
commodity producers at other times, and senli-proletarians yet at others.
Both the differentiation and the mode of production approach take the
dynamic out of the system and affix uniform processes in order to explain
a much more complex reality. Both approaches tend to depict a particular
concrete case as the outcome of one single determinate logic, that of
capitalist penetration. The empirical case then simply becomes an end
product. In order to understand reversals in economic position and the
question of the coexistence of different production systems under the same
'external conditions, a more flexible approach is needed.
The Forms of Production Approach:
The various problems associated with the articulation and
differentiation theses discussed above have led to the development of a new
approach to the study of petty commodity production (PCP), Attempts to
grapple with the internal logic of PMP showed that, a wider economy with
fairly well established commodity flows was a necessary precondition for
the existence of PMP (Kahn 1980). This formulation resulted from the wish
to distinguish firstly the specificity of forms of calculation that could
not be labelled as capitalist, and secondly, to provide a non-functionalist
explanation for the absence of differentiation, This was in a sense an
attempt to combine the insights of class analysis with those derived from
the mode of production analysis. In her recent reformulation of the
concept of forms of production, Scott summarises the problems that a new
formulation would have to face In the following way:
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"...first how to deal with the variant and invariant
manifestations of PC??; second, how to combine the
economic with the political and the ideological in the
analysis of structure?; third, how to combine the elements
of structure and agency into the analysis?; and finally,
how to establish a form of causality that is neither
functionalist, teleological nor tautological'?" (1986:93)
Although the concept of form of production had been used for some
time (e.g. Foster-Carter 1978:75; Bernstein 1979:421, 425), Frledmann
(1980:160) was the first to provide a rigorous definition. For Friedmann,
the concept of form of production implied a double specification of the
unit of production and the social formation in which the units in question
operate.	 Smith suggests that this approach is able to account for
variation without reducing it to the effects of unique circumstances,:
"One assumes that the combination of external market
conditions and internal labour dynamics determines both
forces and relations of production as well as their
relationship to each other in any particular form. One
finds, therefore, no single 'logic' to any particular form,
such as SC?. The logic of a system is given instead by
the combination of elements within it, combinations that
are neither endlessly diverse nor lacking determinate
internal relationships, but that	 vary historically in
significant ways." (1984d:202)
Thus, in her analysis of Guatemalan petty commodity producers, Smith
(1984b) shows that the absence of differentiation can be explained in terms
of the internal mechanisms of SC? (the low level of costs of entry and of
profits) and the logic of capitalism (capitalists seeking profit would not
invest in such a branch of production). This formulation again leads to
the identificaton of capitalism as external to the production process, a
viewpoint that cannot adequately resolve the problems of articulation. In
general, the concept of form of production has been used to refer to
characteristics of production that are less encompassing than the concept
of mode of production (Scott 1986:94). But as Scott argues, there have been
no theoretical analyses that seek to determine "the elements of forms of
production in general" (ibid, Scott's emphasis).
Nost constructions of SCP are based on the notion that producers are
individual, separate and mobile, a position also maintained by Kahn (1980).
24
This formulation is used by Friedinann in order to differentiate between
peasants and petty commodity producers. For Friedmann simple commodity
production is a logical concept, "referring to the complete separation of
the household from all ties except those of the market" (1980:163). This
separation allowed Friedmann to deduce the relations that would
characterise Sc? on the basis of categories derived from political economy.
Using these concepts to include a notion of class position within the
analysis, Friedmann identifies SC? as a class of combined labourers and
property owners within a capitalist economy (1980:162) .° The conditions
in which SC? is reproduced are defined by a complete mobility of all
factors of production, including labour, Peasants, in contrast to commodity
producers, are supposed to be involved in circuits of reproduction that are
not fully coinnioditised.
There are two problems with this conception. Firstly, since the
labour inputs of sc are supposedly provided from within the
family/household which is the main unit of production, it is still
impossible to deduce the conditions under which such labour will be
available simply on the basis of deductive concepts taken from political
economy. Thus I find this distinction between peasants and simple
commodity producers impossible to sustain. Secondly, as G. Smith
maintains, in most empirical cases, inputs other than labour are also
obtained from within the household as well as from the community. To deny
the community any role in influencing productive relations is to repeat
Sahlins' mistake. Households exist and are reproduced within larger social
contexts, often composed of communities. As I shall show in the case of
Tuz cotton producers (chapters 2 and 3), the presence of the community as a
territorial, social, and (sometimes ethnic) unity, may segregate the labour
force and put restrictions on its unimpeded mobility (Smith, G. 1985:104).
Exchanges of labour and produce within the village serve to Indicate that
non-coinmoditlsed forms of circulation also occur outside the boundaries of
the household. These exchanges help to reduce cash costs of production as
well as ensure adequate supplies of labour under conditions of temporary
labour shortage. Therefore, the role of non-commodity relations both within
and between production units has to be taken Into account In order to
explain the conditions of production and reproduction of Tuz farmers.-'
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Lastly, the impossibility of expanded reproduction continues to be a
feature of theories of SCP, Scott succinctly summarises this point,: "In
essence, simple commodity production Is production of commodities without
surplus product" (1986:99),2 The point that is Interesting here Is that
political economy in general seems to substitute the notion of cultural
backwardness proposed by anthropologists in the fifties with a
technological backwardness more narrowly defined. But even so, cultural
and political backwardness are never far away: for most 'classical'
analyses, the peasantry represents an anachronistic stratum that is bound
to dissapear (Kahn 1986:49-50). Positions which argue for a careful
consideration of peasant demands (such as land reform) in formulations of
economic policies are labelled 'populist' as was the case for Chayanov and
his followers in the Soviet Union. It therefore seems that the wish to do
away with the concept of 'peasantry' informs all of the three Marxist
approaches discussed here. As argued In a review by Kahn (1985), recent
studies on peasant ideology which demonstrate the complexities of peasant
consciousness and political involvement speak against a too facile labelling
of such activity as 'progressive' or 'backward', For example, G. Smith
suggests that 'community consciousness' may be a "a from of class
consciousness appropriate to petty producers at a certain stage in the
development of the forces of production" (1986:106).
It seems that It is the wish to remain within the confines of a
'simple commodity logic' that prevents these authors from recognising the
potential for accumulation that lies in 'self-exploitation'. In a recent
contribution, Gibbon and Neocosmos have criticised this emphasis on a
'subsistence ethic', referring to any approach which imputes a distinctive
logic to peasant economy as 'peasantist' (1985:157-67). By contrast,
Gibbon and Neocosmos's approach (as well as Bernstein's revised position),
with its emphasis on class relations, includes the possibility of expanded
reproduction, leading to differentiation (1986:21). We have now come full
circle. By reducing all peasant activity to particular operations of the
logic of capitalism, we have lost all the tools that may have helped us in
the analysis of the particular Instance. The contradictory nature of the
petty commodity producer as a combination of labour and capital can only
be understood by looking at concrete cases and observing how particular
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conjunctures and struggles will resolve the contradiction. 	 It has been
recently suggested by Kahn (1966) that it may not be possible to explain
peasant ideology with concepts derived from political economy. Could it be
that to the extent that economic activities are not that far removed from
the way people think, the same applies to peasant economy?
In this study, rather than offer an answer to the question posed
above, I shall use the concepts discussed in the context of the 'peasant
question' in an attempt to explain the means through which petty commodity
production in a village of the Söke plain is reproduced. Instead of mode
or form of production, I shall use the term petty commodity production to
describe a form of economic calculation that depends on the absence of wage
as a category of costs. I shall nevertheless retain the concept of peasant
as a way of indicating the continued importance of the community in
reproducing petty commodity production. I shall show that accumulation on
the basis of wage labour and/or household labour is possible for some of
these producers. Based on such accumulation, not only are productive forces
developed, but the transformation of rich peasants into capitalists is also
effected. Thus, although petty commodity production does not dissapear,
differentiation is an ongoing process.
These purely on-farm economic processes will have to be
contextualised. The first area that I shall turn to is an investigation of
the immediate context within which production takes place: the community
(chapters 2 and 3) and the household (chapter 4). Next, I shall try to
assess the role of the state in creating the economic conditions necessary
for the perpetuation of petty commodity production in cotton (chapter 5).
A description of the labour process (chapter 6), will be followed by three
chapters showing the different mechanisms through which peasants obtain
access to the basic means of production, namely land (chapter 7), cash
(chapter 8), and labour (9). A final chapter (10) showing the dynamics of
accumulation will conclude the study.
Finally, I would like to make a few comments on the nature of the
terminology used in this thesis to describe peasant producers, The terms
'peasant', 'petty commodity producer' and 'family farmer' have been employed
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indiscriminantly in spite of the many theoretical considerations that
militate in favour of specifying these terms. Peasant as a descriptive
term indicating part-subsistence part-commodity producers in rural areas is
often associated with village studies in anthropology which have explained
the lack of 'inodernisation' in terms of peasant 'mentalities'. The term
'petty commodity producer' was introduced (Ennew, Tribe and Hirst 1977) as
a way of applying analytical concepts derived from political economy to
study rural producers more rigourously. But, as Friedmann (1980) has
argued, not all agricultural producers in the periphery of the world
capitalist system can be defined in these terms. However, as argued above,
the distinction she introduces between peasants and petty commodity
producers rests on an all too rigid definition of non-commoditised
relations. Such a 'perfect' capitalism is difficult to find empirically, and
even the wheat producers she analyses obtained one of their inputs, namely
labour, outside of commodity relations. 'Family farmer', a term coined by
Chayanov, contains all the implications of Chayanov's theory, and as such is
impossible to use in a situation where wage labour exists. Thus, each of
these concepts points to a body of literature which has provided different
answers to the problem posed by the continued existence of a peasantry in
many parts of the globe. Before I turn to a description of the setting
within which cotton production is undertaken, I would like to discuss
briefly the problem of unit of analysis encountered by most 'village'
studies.
1.3 The Unit of Analysis
Efforts to analyse agricultural production have always been hampered
by problems regarding the unit of analysis. The Frank-Laclau debate of the
early seventies has posed this problem within a )arxist context: what
should be the relative weight given to relations of production as opposed
to relations of circulation? In the latter case, the unit of analysis
becomes the world capitalist economy, an entity too large to define as the
unit of analysis. 4 'Relations of production', on the other hand, constitute
an abstract concept that cannot immediately be translated into concrete
terms.
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The revival in the seventies of the debate between Chayanov and his
Bolshevik critics has brought another type of analytical unit within the
scope of peasant studies: the farming enterprise, often synonymous with a
property-holding family/household.' Most of these studies treat the
household as a primordial unit which somehow 'remains' as a result of the
destruction of larger forms of organisation by the enchroachment of market
forces. For example, Meillassoux 's (1981) 'agricultural domestic community'
does not clearly occupy centre stage in his analysis. Since Meillassoux
gives primacy to the concept of reproduction, he is forced to take into
account the ways in which women circulate between domestic communities. A
unit wider than the 'domestic community', usually a lineage, is designated
as the social totality within which women circulate. The domestic
community, the 'minimal' lineage or the extended family functions only as
the unit of production. Since, according to Meillassoux, reproduction is
analytically prior to production, it is the former that constitutes the
basic unit, His own confusions in constructing the unit of reproduction
theoretically, however, often lead him to write of the domestic community as
the privileged unit of analysis.-
Irrespective of their theoretical orientations, a wide range of
authors dealing with rural production conceive of the family/household-
based unit of production as
	
unit which organises factors of production.
As a result, the household determines output as well as labour input. This
of course, is analogous to the privileging of the 'firm' in neoclassical
economics. In the context of peasant producers, the farm takes the place
of the firm and the household is the basic decision-making unit.7
'External' factors, are excluded from the analysis on the grounds that they
are 'given' and peasants do not have the power to influence them, As a
result, in attempts to construct patterns of economic behaviour and
resource allocation, on-farm processes are attributed an unwarranted
primacy. When these views are coupled with a biased attitude that
conceives of households as isolated and self-sufficient 'natural' units
(Harris 1981), it becomes impossible to understand those social forces that
account for the emergence and the form of households/families/productive
units.
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Many analyses which argue for the persistence of peasant/petty
commodity production locate the sources of the viability of this type of
production in the very structures of the fainily/household. 	 Viability is
the result of flexibility. Flexibility results from the sexual division of
labour according to which women's work in subsistence activities serves to
reduce the level of wages peasants are prepared to accept (Meillassoux
1981; Deere l979).	 According to these arguments, flexibility and
viability are also due to the subsistence production undertaken by the
family and to the variable way in which the latter can allocate labour to
various tasks (Melhuus 1984). In other formulations, relations of exchange
between different households that reduce the need to depend on market
relations work in the same way (Glavanis 1984). Most of these studies take
the sexual division of labour or the relation between households as given.
However, there is no necessity for the household to be the basic unit of
production, much less a flexible one. I shall try to show that households
do constitute units of production within the village economy, but that the
relations that obtain within them and between them are a result of
historical processes and cannot simply be relegated to naturalistic
phenomena such as the developmental cycle or the sexual division of labour.
By contrast, within 'traditional' anthropological studies of rural
producers/dwellers, the village constitutes the basic unit of analysis.
Early descriptions, particularly those of Redfield and his students, ". .,were
first of all, village studies and only incidentally studies of peasants"
(Silverman 1979: 49), In these approaches, cultural variables such as
meanings, values, and world-views are stressed. These values are shared by
people who constitute a community, that Is a settlement characterised by
the domination of face-to-face relations incorporating values and relations
very different from those prevalent in the wider society of which these
cultures are a part. Whether these values produce a social structure that
is harmonious and orderly (Redfield 1930) or not (Lewis 1951), the
community is identified by the nature of relations that prevail within it.
These relations are primarily defined in contradistinction to 'industrial'
society where anonymous relations predominate. Although, in time, the
constitutive elements of the concept of community have undergone
considerable changes, the concept has been retained.40
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The concept of the community has also been part of the study of
what anthropologists call 'complex' societies, localised patterns of
interaction between people of a neighbourhood or village within 'developed'
societies such as Europe and the United States. 1 Mediterranean
Anthropology which deals with such complex societies, has, especially in its
early phase, prioritised the study of the community (Gilmore 1982:184).
As clearly stated by Pitt-Rivers in his preface to the second edition of
The People of the Sierra, the type of societies which anthropologists have
found in Europe (or the Middle East) differs considerably from the African
societies studied by his teacher, Evans-Pritchard. "Armed," as he was with
"models of lineage systems and age groups" developed in the African
context, he found himself "devoid of any [models] which turned out to be
relevant to the social structure of Andalusia" (1971:xv). The community,
which Pitt-Rivers identifies as the basic unit of social structure in
Andalusia, has much in common with the Redfieldean approach. It is
primarily defined by the pervasiveness of shared values. The Andalusian
pueblo is, according to Pitt-Rivers, a moral unity, a "... unity achieved
through a lively and highly articulate public opinion" (1971:31). While an
ideology of friendship and equality characterises relations within the
pueblo, authority and power define relations with the 'outside', the state
and the ruling structure. These distinctions have allowed Pitt-Rivers to
isolate the community and trace its boundaries, without necessarily
neglecting the role of relations to wider social and political processes.
Since Pitt-Rivers wrote his monograph on Alcalà, new theoretical
orientations have given rise to a plethora of varying treatments of the
local community/village which deny it an unquestioned position of
analytical centrality (cf. Gilmore 1982:184-5). But, whether the focus is
on the workings of the world capitalist system (Schneider and Schneider
1976), regional class dynamics (White 1980), or the nature of the
subordination of women (Harding 1975), the village still figures as the
typical setting within which anthropologists are able to observe social
interaction and illustrate theoretical positions. For example, Friedmann
maintains that the village is the immediate arena of reproduction for
peasants, although not for petty commodity producers (1980:165). Keyder,
writing on the structure of agrarian transformation in Turkey, argues for
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the analytical primacy of the village on the grounds that it "... provides
an intermediate level of determination, between the household and the
relevant social formation" (1983b:35). This contention however is
challenged by Hann (1985) who points to the importance of the region.
This, according to Hann, is the level at which processes of change,
particularly in the direction of proletarianisation, can be located.
Emphasis on village units may, therefore, obscure certain dynamics, in this
case, by stressing homogeneity at the expense of class struggle.
Thus, within a study of agricultural production, the role of the
village or other relevant social groupings has to be carefully set out
rather than left assumed. Ideologies such as that described by Pitt-Rivers
which stress equality within the community, may have profound consequences
for the organisation of agricultural production. Although such statements
may not reflect the real nature of social hierarchies, they often point to a
certain grammar that may serve to restrict the commoditisation of relations
within the community (G. Smith 1986:101). In the case of Tuz villagers
described in this study, this restriction has important implications with
regard to production strategies and the reproduction of peasant agricultural
enterprises. Similarly, in spite of the fact that there are many different
forces that cut across the unity of the household, households constitute the
basic unit of accounting, in social as well as in economic terms, The
village and the household are the two important strucures that mediate the
relation of the individual to the social and economic forces that shape
his/her life. As I shall argue in the following pages, it is the existence
of these structures that has facilitated the production by peasants of a
commodity such as cotton that has no immediate use value.
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Notes to Chapter 1
1. Apart from observations in the village itself, interviews were conducted
with government officials and large producers in the town of Söke. Records
of land transactions in the Söke Land Register were consulted. Other
villages of the region were visited for shorter periods of time, and
differences between plain and mountain villages were investigated. Lastly,
a census of all village households was undertaken in 1984, and questions
regarding productive activities were also included.
2. See for example, Wolf's construct of the closed corporate community
(1957), or the approach taken by 'moral economists' during the late sixties
and early seventies (e.g. Scott 1976).
3. Variations on these general positions are important and I propose to
look at them In more detail in the following pages.
4. These authors try to construct a 'domestic' and 'petty commodity' mode of
production respectively on the basis of a pre-existing lineage mode of
production.
5. The debates in question were the Russian, the Indian, the Greek and the
much less known Turkish debate. The proponents of the former debates
wrote in the pages of The Journal of Peasant Studies, and in the Economic
and Political Weekly. For the Turkish debate, see Seddon and Margulies
(1984) and Aydin (1987).
6. Both Kahn (1986:50-1) and Ennew, Hirst and Tribe (1977:298-302) stress
the differences between the views held by Lenin and Kautsky.
7. As shown by Kahn (1986:49-51), Lenin also takes account of the fact that
capitalism might bring into existence 'a number of "new middle strata"...
again and again', Kahn finds Kautsky's position more unilinear since it
holds that the elimination of the middle peasantry is inevitable (1986:50).
8. See the discussion between Laclau and Frank over the nature of the
social formations in Latin America (Laclau 1971).
9. It should be immediately made clear that while the 'differentiationists'
acknowledge their debt to Lenin, those who argue for the persistence of
rural commodity producers do not see themselves as 'followers' of Chayanov.
10. But Banaji (1976b) argues that Chayanov was only trying to delineate a
peasant process, not mode, of production.
11. Thus, agricultural commodity producers who enter into production on the
basis of the resources available to the household may be "incorporated
within the circuits of capital and subjected to its domination" (Bernstein
1979:439, note 9). In these cases the process of production Is not directly
organised by capital and labour is not socialised.
12. Enterprises, according to Banaji, cannot be 'capitalist' or 'feudal', but
some of them may only be the 'crystallization' of the logic or 'the laws of
motion' of one or another mode of production (1977).
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13. See also Littlejohn (1977) and Ennew, Tribe and Hirst (1977) for
arguments to the effect that commodity production can only be understood in
terms of capitalist categories.
14. It is interesting to note that for Kautsky, the competitive advantage of
the small farm was an illusion since the latter only existed as a pool of
labour or a market for the capitalist enterprises (Kahn 1986:47-8).
15. This is a problem associated with the Chayanovian position and has been
extensively critised by Littlejohn (1977), and Harrison (1975, 1977), among
others.
16. Chevalier summarises this tendency in terms of "a reduction of real
variation in relations of production to so many expressions of the
essential wage-labour relationship and to the functional moments of the all
inclusive logic of capital accumulation" (1983:181, note 4).
17. Kahn (1981) and Smith (l984c) have also criticised these views for
being too general.
18. See chapter 9. The proponents of the differentiation thesis in Turkey
have almost totally restricted their attention to the forms of land
appropriation and what they consider to be the automatic effects of the
market (Aydin 1987:93).
19, Vergopoulos, who maintains that the small family farm is a creation of
capitalism and should therefore be understood as a capitalist enterprise
(1976:447) is a case in point. For criticisms, see Friedmann (1980).
20. A recent publication (Scott 1986) goes quite some way in bridging the
gap between the two positions.
21. See also Cliffe (1982) for a similar vagueness.
22. The presence of wage labour is not important for Kahn, since even where
it does exist its effects are different under PNP than under capitalism.
The important point is that under PXP accumulation of capital on the basis
of wage labour is not possible since producers are not involved in the
calculation of profits, but on getting the average return to labour (139-
140). See also Smith (l984b).
23. In this way, Kahn hopes to counteract the notion that PMP can only be a
transitory mode of production leading toward the development of capitalism
(Ennew, Hirst and Tribe 1977). Agreeing that this could be seen as the
gist of tarx's comments on the subject, Kahn maintains that Xarx uses the
argument in the course of an exposition of the emergence of capitalism in
Britain and not as a general logical conclusion on the nature of PXP.
24. Kahn shows that under conditions of import substitution
industrialisation, for example, PM? may be transcended and large scale
enterprises may be created.
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25. With regard to the Turkish peasantry, it was Boratav (1980) who
elaborated a concept of PMP which was articulated to capitalism through
merchant capital. See Aydin (1987) for a critical evaluation.
26. For example, Glavanis and Glavanis (1983:36-7) locate the mechanism of
surplus extraction in the lower wages, or the total absence of wages
received by agricultural commodity producers.
27. But it is not necessary to posit a separate mode of production to
explain the abundance of labour at times when wages are low, as the form of
production approach argues. See below.
28. In a later work (1986), Kahn draws attention to this contradiction.
29. Friedmann and other advocates of this approach use the term simple
<SC?) rather than petty commodity production. Scott (1986:98-9)
differentiates between these two terms: SC? is conceived as an abstract
term indicating production relations, and PC? incorporates the historically
specific contexts within which the former are found.
30. Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985) and Bernstein (1986) try to refine this
concept and argue that small producers operating within a context of
generalised commodity production occupy a contradictory class position.
31. In a recent publication, both Smith and Friedmann make similar points.
While Friedmann criticises herself among others for treating the family as
a black box (1986:47), Smith finds the relations between the labour process
and local communities undertheorised (1986:32).
32. There are exceptions. Chevalier (1983) says that variations in
productivity under conditions SC? can take place and Smith, in her recent
article concedes that accumulation occurs but within certain limits
(1986:33).
33. Scott's atttempt to refine the concept of SC? also results in relegating
questions of articulation, or linkage as she calls them to the status of
secondary level models which can only be refined in concrete situations
(1986). The same applies to political struggles whether within the
productive unit or within the 'social formation'.
34. Wallerstein's World Capitalist System defines various units of analyses
according to the purpose of the study. Thus, the nation-state is an
important unit of analysis in the study of political movements and class
structures; the household in a consideration of income management and
strategies of survival within a world capitalist economy. But to
understand the logic of the totality of forces that governs the present
system, nothing short of the whole globe can do.
35. See Shanin (19.71 and 1974), Sablins (1974) for attempts to apply
Chayanovian concepts to the study of 'peasantries'.
36. For other criticisms of eillassoux's approach, see Mackintosh (1977),
Edholm, Harriss and Young (1977), O'Laughlin (1977).
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37. See Ortiz (1973) and Cancian (1972). Donham (1981) provides a thorough
criticism of Chayanovian approaches which take domestic units such as
households as given.
38. The argument is based on the fact that production and consumption
decisions are taken within the same unit, This means that the household
can intensify work or decrease consumption according to need. This unity
gives the production a degree of flexibility that makes it viable under
changing circumstances.
39. This argument has been generalised by Bennholdt-Thomsen (1981) who
argues that women in centre economies and peasants in the periphery are in
a similar position vis-a-vis capital in that their subsistence activities
reduces the costs of reproduction of labour.
40. These changs have been in the direction of emphasising social rather
than cultural variables. See for example, Geertz's description of Balinese
villages as 'a set of marvelously complex social systems' (19ô7:255).
41. See Worsley (1977:335-40).
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CHAPTER 2: THE REGION AND THE VILLAGE: HISTORY AND PRESENT ETHNIC
COXPOS IT ION
Rural Turkey is a mixture of nucleated villages and small towns which
act as administrative and economic centres. 1 Having a common history,
these villages are often seen as constituting social and cultural unities
within which ties of kinship and contiguity create distinct forms of social
interaction (Erdentug 1956,1959; Stirling 1965). It Is further argued that
social change whether economic and/or political affects these unities and
the impact of this change is often seen as a force disrupting these
internal relations (Keyder 1983b, Kandlyotl 1975, Stirling 1974, Yasa 1969).
The extent to which villages can be conceived as privileged units in the
analysis of change in rural Turkey cannot be determined in an apriori
manner, The processes that account for the structure of these villages are
too diverse to allow for generalisation. In this chapter, I shall try to
investigate the historical and social processes that have been operative In
the formation of the village of Tuz. I shall argue that close ties to other
villages and to the regional capital, puts into question the image of the
isolated village community. Focusing particularly on marriage patterns, I
shall try to show that in spite of kinship and ethnicity, a notion of the
village as a significant social grouping does guide villagers' perceptions
of themselves and of others.
2.1 The Region: The Present
Söke is the name of an administrative unit, a district located In the
western province of Aydin (see map 1). The district capital, also called
Söke, is a large agro-town situated 156 kilometres south of the large port
of Izmir to which it is linked by an asphalt road. It Is also connected by
asphalt roads to the resort towns of Kusadasi in the west and Bodrum in
the south and to the provincial capital (Aydin) in the east, These roads
extend to the rest of the country, linking the region to the national
capital, Ankara as well as to Istanbul, the commercial capital in the north-
east. Good road transport facilities and the extension of telecommunication
networks have served to integrate the region fully In the economic and
political life of the nation (see map 2).
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The district is situated on the western edge of the Anatolian plateau,
along the shores of the Aegean, Western Anatolia is composed of a series
of wide flat-bottomed valleys, each separated by mountain ranges oriented
in an east-west direction. Each of the valleys is traversed by major
rivers, the Gediz, KücUk Menderes, and Buyiik Menderes (hereafter referred to
as the Meander). The town of Söke lies to the northeast of a large deltaic
flood plain created by the Meander river and flanked by mountains to the
north, east and south (see map 3). The flood plain and part of these
mountains make up the Söke administrative district. The northern Samsun
ranges (the Mycale of Antiquity) are quite high, reaching a peak of 1229
metres; the southern range is no more than an elevated plateau (65 metres
maximum), on which groups of nomads still winter in their black tents. To
the east the Samsun range merges imperceptibly with the foothills of the
Aydin mountains which, further east, rise in altitude, reaching over 1800
metres. To the south east, the area is bordered by the Bafa lake (the bay
of Latmos, filled by the alluvial deposits brought by the Meander) and the
Besparmak mountains, the westernmost fringes of the Taurus ranges, on the
southern flanks of which lie the ruins of the Carian city of Heraclela. The
area between the Besparmak mountains and the town of Söke is also a high
mountaineous plateau where there are many villages depending on a
combination of olive and animal husbandry.2
Framed by the mountains, the Meander plain lies in the middle; it is
an alluvial delta valley, covered by marshes and small ponds. These are
the result of countless diversions that the course of the Meander river
underwent over the centuries. The river has been filling up its delta so
that the ruins of Miletus and Priene, the well-known coastal cities of
lonia, are now well inland. 3 Until 1970, when the main drainage canal was
built and linked to the river, the Meander flooded its banks every year,
preventing proper crop rotation. A few patches of higher ground around
the villages of özbasi and Batmaz (the Lade islands) are the only breaks in
the flat landscape. The soils of the delta show numerous differences in
quality. Due to frequent changes of the river's course, the latter are
distributed throughout the valley in a complex mosaic pattern (oney
1975:188-9). In general, however, the eastern parts of the valley are
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richer in topsoil and consequently make better farmland compared to the
saline-alkaline soils of the delta area.
According to a number of socio-economic Indicators, Söke is one of the
most developed regions of Turkey. The level of literacy In the province as
well as the district capital is higher than the national average.& Other
indicators, such as low infant mortality, low birth rate, number of printing
houses, hospital beds per head of population also point to a relatively
advanced level of development for the province as a whole. 	 Its population
has Increased dramatically since the early fifties, fuelled by immigration
from poorer areas of the country:7
Table 2.1. Population of Söke
Years Total	 Urban	 Rural
	
Turkey Total
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
29 338
32 000
34 301
41 159
66 080
67 061
74 738
82 761
89 680
93 146
109 275
10 912
11 472
11 870
13 385
21 343
23 593
27 558
30 000
35 407
37 413
44 556
18 426
20 528
22 431
27 774
44 737
43 468
47 180
52 761
54 273
55 733
64 719
16 158 018
17 820 950
18 790 174
20 947 188
24 064 763
27 754 820
31 391 421
35 605 176
40 347 719
44 736 957
50 664 458
Source: State Statistics Institute (DIE), Census of Population, selected
years.
In effect, for the last five years, the annual growth rate of the Söke
district (3.5 %) has been above that of the national average (2.6 %) (DIE
1986:2). At present, the bulk of the national population increase Is
accounted for by the growth in the urban population (7.3 %/annum) (DIE
ibid). Turkish rural population has In fact been declining since 1980.
Söke diverges from the national averages in both respects: population
growth in Söke town is about 3.8 % per annum, while the rural population
has been Increasing at a rate of 3.2 % per annum. Until the sixties, the
rural population in the district had been increasing at a faster rate than
the urban population. The reversal of the trend since that date Indicates
population movement from the countryside to the town. The male population
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of the town is higher than the female population, while in the countryside
the opposite holds. Keeping In mind that men often migrate ahead of their
families in search of work, we can infer that rural-urban migration in the
district will continue for some time to come. Moreover, national migration
to Söke district affects rural as well as urban areas, but the villages to a
lesser extent than the town. Nomadic groups registered In other parts of
the country also continue to settle in Söke and thus Increase local
population figures.
The ethnic diversity of the population Is quite marked. The oldest
IdentIfiable group are the Yiiruks, Sunni Muslim groups of pastoral nomads
who have been settling In the region ever since the fourteenth century
(Planhol 1968:227). EvlIya çelebi describes the Inhabitants of Söke In the
latter half of the seventeenth century as "pale skinned, blue-eyed and
Turkish speaking," (1935:149), characteristics typically associated with the
Yüriik.	 In the mountain villages, remnants of ShI'Ite tribal groups, the
TahtacI (woodcutters) live alongside another group of ShI'Ite tribesmen, the
cepni, descendants of one of the original Turkmen tribes, namely the Boz
Ulus, who had originally colonlsed Anatolla (Gokalp 1980:25-36; Planhol
1968:235-7), From the southern region of MIlas, large numbers of gypsies
(ingene) have emigrated to the urban as well as rural areas of the
district. Kurds from eastern Anatolla were encountered by EvlIya celebi as
early as the 1670's (1935:149-50). Large groups of Macedonlan Turks, called
muhacir have been settled In the region in exchange for the Greek
population In and after 1923. Some of these were born in Bulgaria, others
around Salonica, Albania, and even Yugoslavia. Muhacir also vary
ethnically: there are Bosnians, Pamaks, (Muslim Bulgarians), and TikveslI's.
Lastly, within the past twenty years, Individuals and families from many
parts of Turkey have also come to settle In the villages and towns of the
Meander plain.
The town of Sbke Is a large and prosperous-looking settlement divided
by tree-lIned boulevards, dotted with pleasant parks, and luxurious houses.
Its centre boasts numerous shops and businesses, two less Inviting hotels,
restaurants and cinemas. On closer inspection, differentials in wealth and
standard of living become apparent. Housing, for example, Is varied.
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Government-built low-quality high rise apartment blocks designed for
workers and low-level civil servants are ranged near the northern entrance
to the town, on the Izmir-Bodrum highway. In the centre, the better built
apartment buildings of the local bourgeoisie and the villas belonging to
large landholders are found. The hills surrounding the northwestern part
are occupied by shanty-towns where the majority of the gypsy population
lives. To the south and the east lie the one-story village-style houses
built by Immigrants from Sbke villages. Conditions of sanitation in the
shanty town and village-style districts are much worse than in the other,
wealthier ones. The town Is divided into two by the Soke stream, a
cesspool during much of the summer months, which the municapillty finds It
impossible to clear. The stream Is crossed by three bridges, one which
dates to the late nIneteenth century.
Although the region is replete with historical sites, (Priene, Miletus
and Didyma), there is no museum In the town. Cultural activities are
limited to a few concerts a year (of the Western pop music kind and
popular Turkish music) performed in local clnemas or In the lonian
amphitheatres, low-quality (often pornographic) films shown in the local
cinemas, as well as on video-players without which coffee-shops are doomed
to lose their clientele, and to dances In the inevitable wedding-salons
(dUgun salonu) of which there are two. There are about ten mosques in the
town, one of which dates to at least the seventeenth century. 1 ° Before the
1980 coup, the National Teachers' Union had a local branch building where
left-wing literature could be read aloud and discussed. Within the town,
there are about 10 primary schools and 10 secondary schools. One of these
is a co-educational lycée which prepares pupils for higher education, and
another 4 are what are called 'vocational high schools' (meslek okullarl)
where pupils are taught specific skills such as commerce and agricultural
management. One of these is an all-girls school which specialises in the
teaching of sewing and home-economics courses. Twenty-five kilometres to
the north of Söke, near Ortaklar, there is a teacher training college, which,
before 1980, was the site of violent clashes between right- and left-wing
students of the kind that were then taking place all over the country.
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Politically-speaking, the town accurately reflects wider national
currents, as can be seen from some of the comments above. All political
parties have local branches. 1 Trade unions and student organisations of
the pre-1980 period were well represented at the local level; in June, 1975,
various left-wing political parties and trade unions had even tried to
organise an unsuccessful strike among the locally settled seasonal workers.
The abolition of the middleman system in contracting seasonal labour and
efforts to raise agricultural wages (and to equalise the differential rates
obtaining between men, women and 'children', defined as individuals under
sixteen years of age) were among the issues around which these groups
tried to mobilise labour.'	 On the whole, however, politically, the region
is rather conservative. The personal influence of Aydin-born Adnan
)Eenderes, the leader of the banned Democrat Party of the fifties, is still
very much felt. As a result, Demirel, his successor and leader of one of
the opposition parties today, commands a large number of votes.
Nevertheless, the role of Ismet InSnU, Ecevit's predecessor as the leader of
the RPP, in winning the Turkish War of Independence (1923) is also an
important political factor even today. Hence, Söke has one of the few
social democrat mayors of Turkey, a man who belongs to the new centre-left
party headed by Inönu's son.
Being an administrative seat, Söke has a Government House which
houses the local representatives of the different ministries. Within this
building there are courts, the tax office, the Director of Education, the
Agricultural Extension Office, the Directorate of Waterworks, the Land
Registry, and the offices of the kaymakam, the district governor. These
government institutions also serve the forty-seven villages which are
administratively linked to Söke. There is a large post-office with an
automatic international telephone exchange, many branches of national
banks, both public and private, offices of government-sponsored agricultural
cooperatives, as well as a train station, which doubles as a park in
summer. The station is on a branch of the Izmir-Aydin railway line, built
by the British and completed in 1866 (Kurmus 1974:64).1
The economic life of Söke is quite diversified, but its dependence on
the agricultural sector, and on the production of cotton in particular, is
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undisputable. 15 In the course of 1978, 63 % of all the value of trade in
the Sbke commodity exchange was accounted for by seed cotton and another
15.7 % by lint cotton (Söke Exchange, Annual Report, 1978.) 16 About 63 %
of all arable land in the district is cropped to cotton (Köseli 1975:62).
Consequently, there are over fifteen cotton gins in town which process raw
cotton from neighbouring regions such as Milas, Selcuk, Kusadasi, and
Germencik. Many of the larger gin-owners also act as cotton traders,
buying the seed cotton from over a wide area and selling it in the Söke
(established In 1966) or Izmir exchanges (KoselI 1975:16). There is also a
modern cotton yarn factory which has twenty-five thousand spindles and
which was founded In 1972 with capital provided by a few of the local
landholders. Cotton and agriculture in general has also allowed the
establishment of more than fifteen factories and workshops where
agricultural Implements, particularly tractor-drawn ploughs and cultivators
suited to local soil conditions are produced. Some of the larger of these
workshops are able to supply the whole of the IzmIr region. Apart from
cotton, tobacco and animal husbandry are the most Important agricultural
products of the region, followed closely by olive and olive oil production
and fish produced in two large fish farms. 18 Oil-bearing seeds have become
the basis of a slowly enlarging business sector in Söke. Olive oil had, of
course, been produced for a long time, and there are many modern as well as
more traditional presses in town as well as in some of the villages. Since
1979, the cultivation of sunflower seeds and various fodder crops such as
vetches has started to replace cotton, especially on large farms. However,
the continued entry into cotton production of small-scale peasant farmers
has, to a large extent, counteracted this movement away from cotton.
Alongside this agricultural activity, trade and services have also
flourished. The professions are well-represented, lawyers and doctors being
the most numerous. The volume of trade undertaken via the Sôke Commodity
Exchange amounted to 363 million IL in 1978 (approx. 14.5 million US
dollars). Tractor and tractor-tyre agencies are the most thriving
businesses of Söke. The repair sector associated with mechanical
agriculture is able to sustain more than one hundred workshops, all
situated in the newly established Soke Small Industry Quarter (Küçiik Sanayi
Sitesi). The bazaar area, çarsi, is full of shops selling cloth, woollen
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yarn, ready-to-wear clothing, kitchen utensils (including the latest in
Braun electric kitchen appliances purchased by the growing numbers of
middle-class professionals), furniture, and so on. Open-air markets are
held twice a week and draw into town large numbers of villagers who mainly
come to buy in bulk those vegetables that are in season. Very few
villagers sell themselves in the market which is dominated by professional
vendors who travel all around the district. Some poorer inhabitants of the
town itself, including women, occasionally sell a few items of their own
production, fresh plants, cheese, even embroidered scarves. There are also
supermarkets as well as small grocery stores, large cheese manufacturing
and selling concerns. Another sector which is expanding is tourism. The
Soke area boasts two large and well-known summer resorts, Didim, a
beautiful bay ten kilometres south of Apollo's temple, and Kusadasi, the old
Scala Nova. Many estate agents and hotel/motel/camping managers/owners
have sprung up in Soke as a result of the tourist boom.1
As a result of the social and economic dynamism of Söke, links to the
provincial capital, Aydin (Tralles to the Greeks and Güzelhisar to the
Ottomans), are few and limited to occasional business with the few
governmental offices not represented in Söke. With its government offices,
trade, markets and industry, Söke is the regional capital. Regular
transport between the villages and the town allows the integration of the
town with the countryside. Economically and socially the district is more
linked to Izmir than to Aydin. The rich move to Izmir and send their
children to school there (if not abroad), and the villagers have at least
visited the city once in their lives (especially the fair that is held in
September every year). Two hours' drive away, Izmir also offers larger and
better equipped hospitals. Local girls hope to marry (and many have done
so) into the outlying districts of Izmir, creating even stronger ties with
the city. As a result of these multi-stranded ties, it is difficult to draw
geographical or social boundaries that circumscribe the region. At best,
Söke can be identif led as the political and economic centre of a cotton-
producing plain that has an important place in the Turkish economy.
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2.1.1 The Region: The Past
In the past, Söke has not always been such a hub of economic activity.
For over four centuries or more, the plain was a malaria-infested marshland
used by nomadic pastoralists as winter grazing grounds. 2° The relative
paucity of historical documents on the region attests to this fact. The
economic 'boom' that the region has experienced Is fairly recent. A brief
spurt of activity In the latter half of the nineteenth century apart, it
dates to the introduction of tractors and the partial draining of the
marshes in the nineteen thirties; but, at this time, the Increase in
agricultural production affected only a few of the large landholding
families of the region. The 'real' boom, that which mobilised a large
portion of the population, is a phenomenon of the early nineteen sixties,
when state-backed irrigation and drainage projects managed to drain
marshes and keep the Meander river under control. State credits to large
and small farmers, government-sponsored cooperatives, buying cotton at set
prices were the main factors that created the boom (see chapter 4). In a
way, the peasantry of the Söke region can be seen as a creation of state
action, an action which, although not absent during the Ottoman period, has
really been effective only within the last forty years.
There are no clear records regarding the period and the circumstances
of the foundation of the town, but a number of authors believe that it was
founded by Turkish immigrants rather than earlier (Gökbel and Sölen
1936:246).21
 By the middle of the seventeenth century Söke was an
established market town in the	 (district) of Akcasehir.22 Already
around 1478, Akçasehir was a market-village where 48 taxpayers lived (TT
8:697), a population which, fifty years later, had risen to 68 taxpayers (TT
148). From the records in Ottoman tax registers, It seems that the area
was a prosperous one where trade and agriculture complemented one another.
The agricultural base was quite diverse, including animal husbandry
(particularly sheep), cereals, pulses, vegetables and fruit, vineyards, and
cotton (TT 148).
When Evliya çelebi visited the region in 1670, Söke was the capital
of the sancak of Sigla and the pasa of Sigla had his residence there, The
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town was divided into nine mahalle, quarters, with a total of 1100 adobe
houses, six mosques, and seventeen shops (Evliya celebi 1935:148-9).
European travelers, who, in search of the ruins of classical antiquity
visited the region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Chandler in
1765, Texler in 1835), report that the coastal area near Miletus was, on
account of its foul air, completely deserted except for a few nomads (Texier
1882:336).23
 By contrast, Soukeui (or Su Koy, water village) is described
by Texier as a big town where an agha, the commander of the district
resided (1882:345). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Söke was a
large town of more than §000 inhabitants, with three factories, 880 shops,
3 baths, 17 bs, and 5872 houses (Aydin Salnamesi 1315 (1900):305).24
The history of landownership in the area is even fuzzier. The absence
of private property in land and the allocation of land revenues to various
state officials (the timar holders) characteristic of the Ottoman land
tenure system seems to have applied to the region.2s Evliya mentions the
existence of six hundred timar holders, as well as twenty-six zaim,
administrators of large timars, all of which had a serbest gedik, that is
they did not have to share the income of their district with the district
governor, the sancak bey (ibid). By 1749 at the latest, tax farming
replaced the timar system in Söke (Gökbel and Sblen 1936:252; Kocagöz
1977:23). At this time, it seems that one family, the Ilyaszade, rose to
prominence and became the miitesellim, (collector of dues for absent sancak
bey) of the sancak of Sigla. This family is cited as one of the large ayan
families who were able to establish what Lewis describes as autonomous and
hereditary principalities derebeylik2'; the Ilyaszade ruled the sancak of
Mentese from about the middle of the eighteenth century (Lewis and
Morttman 1965:207 27
Vhat ayan rule meant in practice was that the members of the
Ilyaszade family could collect land revenue of the area over which they
held power. They also provided soldiers to and fought in the Ottoman navy
to repress a rebellion in the island of Sakiz (Gbkbel and Sölen 1936: 249).
It is probable that they also engaged in commercial activities, especially
in the sale of olive oil, in a way comparable to one ayan of the Edremit
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area described by Faroqhi (1987).28 They also must have collected taxes
(and maybe the rents of grazing grounds?) paid by nomads. The family
managed to acquire the ownership of large tracts of land after the passing
of the 1858 land laws which allowed private property in land.29
According to one of the older landholders of the region, H.P., the
çiftlik (large farm) of Balat, which is at present owned by Tan, had been
the property of the Ilyaszade who turned it over to the Kocagoz. These
latter are a landholding family whose ancestor was, in the latter half of
the sixteenth century, appointed mtisellim by the central government,° The
Kocagöz, were able to control large tracts of land in the southwest and the
northeast regions of the plain (about twenty-five thousand decares
according to S. Kocagoz). According to H.F., the Kocagoz had about eighty
to one hundred black slaves who were used as ploughmen. 31 Today, the
Kocagöz still have small amounts of land in Burunköy. Their holdings in
the south, however, were at one time apparently sold. to a Greek landowner,
Benlioglu; the exact date and circumstances of the transfer of the land are
not known. This is the same area which, after the 1923 population exchange
with Greece, was given to Tan in compensation for the loss of his çiftlik
in Thrace.
The fate of one of the çlftliks controlled by the Ilyaszade provides
further information about transfers of land in the region. Upon the death
in the 1890's of the last descendant of the Ilyaszade, the holding reverted
to the state. One of the ciftliks of the estate which measured 55,000
decares and included within Its territory fourteen villages, was then bought
for 12,000 gold liras by Sultan Abdulhamid, from whose heirs H. F. bought it
in 1340 for the sum of 55,000 liras.2
Until the middle of the twentieth century, Söke had a mixed economy,
within which the landlord-peasant relationship dominated. Its integration
into commodity markets was partial, but more advanced than that of many
other regions of the country, and trade and Industry were not unimportant.
Big landlordism prevailed: It seems that at the turn of the century, at
least four large çlftllks, two of which were in the possession of Greeks,
existed In the region. Until the fifties, large holdings were often
.. 4.
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parcelled out to sharecroppers, Turkish and before the 1923 exchange of
population, Greek villagers of the region. There were, towards the end of
the nineteenth century, efforts by Christian merchants (among whom the
British figured prominently) to establish farms which employed wage labour
(Kurnius 1977:112-4). According to Kurmus, the first land occupations by
peasants occurred in the Söke and Jazilli areas in 1883 as a result of
attempts by British landowners to dispossess them (1977::121).
Cereals, tobacco, figs, grapes and olives were the main crops
cultivated in Sóke farms.33 The more important export crops of this period
included animal products (wool and cheese), valonia (used in the tanning
industry) and liquorice root. 34 The last two did not require any special
methods of cultivation, but grew in abundance and were collected by
peasants.	 In spite of improved roads and trains, camel trains, mainly
under the control of local yuriik, constituted the main form of transport
until the late fifties.
The period between 1900 and 1950 saw significant changes in the local
population. The War of Independence fought with the Greeks, removed all
the Christian population of the region. 36 In their place large numbers of
migrants from the Balkan territories that the Ottoman Empire had lost, were
settled in the region whose Muslim population had been decimated as a
result of the long wars marking the last years of the Empire. Since the
establishment of the Turkish Republic, the sedentarisation of the
transhumant animal herders of the region has accelerated. Many villages in
the Söke region bear the name of the tribe (asiret) by which they have been
established,37 This process gained impetus in the fifties and sixties,
partly as a result of the distribution of government owned land to landless
families. But more Important was the reduction of grazing grounds in the
area resulting from land improvements and the commoditlsation of
agriculture.3 ' By the end of the fifties, a sedentary peasantry was well
established on the plain.
If the late nineteenth century was a time for the consolidation of
large landholdings in the Söke district, the twentieth century marked their
dissolution. As commoditisation Increased, land values also rose. This led
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to the minute division of estates between numerous heirs. 39 The increase
in trading activities allowed the accumulation of capital, which was then
invested in land, more as a status symbol than as a profit-making
investment.40 However, in the long run, greater income provided by non-
agricultural pursuits encouraged landowning families to sell at least part
of their land in order to acquire capital to Invest in business. 41 Lastly,
constant rumours of an intended land reform programme led many of the
landowners to sell land to the peasants who had been working it as their
sharecroppers.42 It should not, however, be assumed that these sales of
land to peasants occurred without pressure 'from below'. Landless
sharecroppers tried many methods of making their grievances known: they
formally demanded land, pleaded with landlords, refused to hand the
landlord's portion, or to cultivate the land at all.4-3
As a result of all these processes, land has changed hands many times.
The larger landholders, descendants of the ayan of the last century, have
largely moved away from the land. Initially they were replaced by
merchants who bought land and tried to consolidate estates (of course, on a
much smaller scale than their predecessors). Since the mid-sixties, the
merchants have also started to move away from the land. This time, it has
been the villagers, particularly the settled yürük, who have been buying
land, using as capital the money they receive from the sale of their
animals which they can no longer care for. Consequently, the size of the
average landholding has diminished even more.
As the table below shows, the majority of village dwellers own on the
whole more land than the town dwellers. 23 % of the land In Sóke is owned
by large landholders owning more than 1000 decares of land, and these
families represent less than 1 % of the total farming families of the
district. Middle farmers with whom this thesis is concerned constitute
about half of the total farming families of Söke, and they own only about
34 % of the total. Looking only at farming families living in villages,
middle farmers own about 45 % of the land and make up 54 % of village
farming families. Keeping in mind that peasant ownership of land in the
region was insignificant half a century before these figures were compiled,
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we can see that small-to-middle ownership has developed to a considerable
extent in the intervening years.
Table 2.2 Land Ownership in Söke District
Area	 Owners	 Laud	 Owners	 Land
	
Owners Land
(da)	 in Villages	 (da)	 in Town (da)
	
Total
	
Total
(no)	 (no)
	 (no)	 (da)
3343
	
0
2217
	
36333
1706	 68995
1435
	
104260
464
	
72844
197
	
72127
49
	
40765
57
	
119477
6125	 514801
0	 3343	 0	 0	 0
1-25	 1588	 27779	 629	 8554
26-50	 1252	 52248	 454	 16747
51-100	 1080	 78370	 355	 25890
101-200	 280	 44531	 187	 28313
201-500	 125	 45300	 72	 26827
501-1000	 18	 15360	 31	 25405
1000+	 4	 27500	 53	 91977
TOTAL	 4347	 291088	 1781	 223713
Source: Koyisleri 1981, Tables 12 and 13, pp.21,22.
2.2 The Village Setting
Tuz,44 a medium-sized village to the northeast of the Soke plain,
provides the social setting within which I shall analyze cotton production.
The relative prosperity that the village enjoys today is a recent
phenomenon dating to the late sixties, and is largely the result of the
cultivation of cotton. In this and many other ways, Tuz is a creation of
the events of this century. Apart from cotton production itself, the size
and composition of its population is the product of the events that led to
the creation of the Turkish Republic, particularly the War of Independence
fought against the Greeks. Its present economy has been created within the
last thirty-five years, largely as a result of state intervention. 	 For
these reasons, it is quite Impossible to consider Tuz a closed 'society' or
a bounded unit of analysis, unless the reasons for making such a
supposition are specified more carefully.
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Compared to many villages in the region, Tuz has a fairly short
history: it is no more than a hundred years old. At the end of the
nineteenth century about ten Greek houses stood on its present site.
The village must have been founded by Greek immigrants from Dogan, a
village seven kilometres to the east, which, until the late sixties had been
the centre of a nahiye (an administrative unit smaller than the kz&.
About one kilometre to the east of the Greek Tuz, four or five yuruk had
constructed reed and mud huts (cit dam) which they occupied only part of
the year. They spent the summer months roaming the pine forests of the
Samsun mountains. Some of these yurUk had opened up land and were engaged
in agriculture. In these cases, part of the household remained in the
village to look after the crops. This form of seasonal transhumance
continued among Tuz yiiriik until 1964, when the state, in an effort to
protect the much depleted forests, forbade access to the mountains.
The site of the village was chosen to avoid the annual floods that
occurred as the Meander before regulation, broke its banks every winter.
The settlement lies on a mountain slope, its northern borders reaching well
into the Samsun ranges. Here are found olive groves, numerous water-mills
(only one of these is still in use) and small gardens, all constructed long
ago by the Greeks. As a result of numerous fires and over-grazing, the
natural tree-cover has, in many places, degenerated into a maquis, which is
used by villagers as firewood, building material, and as a source of
medicinal plants. To the east and the west, valleys created by mountain
streams mark the village boundaries. Water from these streams is used to
irrigate gardens on the hill-slopes as well as the kitchen-gardens that
surround the houses. In order to minimise disputes, the muhtarlik employs
a villager to distribute stream water according to a strictly-controlled
system of rotation. Water fees are used to pay the the distributor's
salary.4 To the southeast, the village lies on level ground that merges
with the Meander plain and it is the cotton fields that mark the boundaries
of the settlement. The infertile area between the village and the sea to
the southwest, patched with a scrub-thorn growth, constitutes the rather
inadequate pasture-land (mera). State-owned and administered by the
muhtarlik, it is the only stretch of land used communally. 49 Due to the
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low level of the land, the sea seasonally floods the coastal plains and
leaves in its wake deposits of salt, regularly collected by the villagers.
The village is situated on the Soke-Karina-Xiletus asphalt road which
links it to the regional capital and to other villages in its vicinity. The
approach to the village from the main road brings the visitor to a central
square surrounded by shops, three coffeehouses, and the large state-built
muhtarlik building. The latter houses the office of the village headman,
the mubtar, two guest rooms, and the wedding salon. Official buildings also
include the primary school (built in 1967) and the logements for forest
rangers, There are two mosques, one of which Is disused. Village shops
include five general stores (bakkal), one barber, one restaurant, one
cotton-purchasing agency, an blacksmith, an electrician specialising in the
repair of tractor batteries, and a carpenter. Communications with
neighbouring villages are easy and frequent. Apart from minibuses owned by
the village as a corporate body and by enterprising individuals, transport
to neighbouring villages Is possible on the numerous tractors as well as
the few private cars and pick-ups. Villagers travel to the regional
capital, for many different reasons ranging from visits to the doctor,
shopping, and to attend weddings.° Relatives settled in Söke are often
visited on market days, after the day's shopping.
The village is a fairly compact settlement made up of peasant houses
(see map 4). Its immediate appearance provides clues of prosperity only to
the experienced eye. Village streets are unpaved, tortuous, and muddy (or
dusty, depending on the time of the year), buildings are small and
irregular. And yet, it is the houses that display the signs of wealth.
Most are one-story buildings constructed of plastered and whitewashed
cement bricks; many have iron doors and window bars. The majority of
houses are composed of three rooms (
	
or ) arranged around a central
sitting room (salon), 51 Most of the rooms are all-purpose spaces covered
with mats and kilims; nevertheless, there is usually a kitchen and a
washing area at the back of each house.52 Apart from the houses in the old
Greek quarter, most are situated in the middle of a courtyard where
vegetables, fruit trees and flowers are grown. Each courtyard is encircled
by walls whose height Indicates the wealth of its owner. Apart from the
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main building, the courtyard also contains a number of outhouses which
serve different functions: kitchen, garage, store house, and barn.
Electrification came in 1974, and by now, almost all the households possess
TV sets. Apart from electricity, houses boast running water: in 1981, a
centralised water distribution system was established, making obsolete the
neighbourhood fountains (and the social interaction generated around them).
2,2.1 The People
Tuz has a population of 893 souls living in 170 households. 	 The
population of the village increased in the five to six years immediately
following the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The settlement
of Balkan Turks in villages vacated by the departing Greeks largely
accounted for population growth. Since then, two new waves of settlement
have occurred around the mid-fifties and in the late sixties. The first
was caused by the influx of muhacir from Dogan. As this village declined
in importance, many of Its inhabitants emigrated to Tuz.5	Immigrants
maintain that the villagers of Dogan, many of whom are their kin, are lazy
and quarrelsome and have bad morals; they say they came to Tuz in order to
protect their daughters, who would end up by eloping with someone if they
remained in Dogan. In effect, the rate of marriage by elopement is much
higher in Dogan compared to Tuz. 5 The second wave of emigration and
settlement in Tuz were undertaken by yiiruk. Restrictions on grazing led to
the settlement in the mid-sixties of two groups (mahalle) of tribal yiirUk.
Table 2.3. Population of Tuz Village
Year 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Pop. 208	 148	 247	 311	 399	 465 665	 728	 811 993	 1177
-6	 13	 5	 6	 3	 9	 2	 2	 4	 4
Note: The drop in numbers between 1935 and 1940 was, according to
villagers, the result of the flight of immigrants from mountain villages in
Macedonia who could not support the heat and the malaria.
Until the nineteen fifties, Tuz was a small, malaria-ridden village
with a mixed subsistence economy. It was then that government began to
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drain marshes, distribute state-owned land, and actively subsidize
agricultural production, especially in areas where export crops were grown.
The resulting increases in cotton yields spurred economic activity in the
region, making many of the villages of the Meander plain economically
attractive. Population growth after 1950 was, on average, about 3.6 % per
annum, the rate that obtains for the whole district. Apart from natural
factors, a small tric\e of immigration continues to swell the numbers of
Tuz inhabitants. Dogan families continue to move east to Tuz. In a
westward movement of population, immigrants from villages In the Soke plain
and from other provinces of Turkey also settle In the village. By contrast,
the move away from the village Is limited: the village is neither rich
enough nor poor enough for out-migration to take place on any significant
scale. The departure of women upon marriage is, by and large, counteracted
by the number of Incoming brIdes. 	 Within the last thirty years or more,
only two families migrated out of the village, about 10 adult males left to
find work elsewhere and another 10 moved out on becoming civil servants.
Many of these Individuals maintain links with the village.57
The ethnic composition of present-day Tuz bears the traces of past
events. Of a total of 893 individuals I counted in 1984, about half are
muhaclr, and the rest are yiiriik. Ethnicity is defined here mainly In terms
of self-ascription. As such, it forms a component of social identity, along
with gender, kinship and residence. 55 Ethnic ascription in Tuz does not
produce bounded groups, but is effective in explaining difference among
people who perceive themselves to be similar in many ways. The inhabitants
of Tuz are all Sunni Muslims. 59 This relative homogeneity is greatly
valued by the villagers and is seen as a source of stability and lack of
politicization.50 Within the two main groups, there exist finer
distinctions which nevertheless are quite Important. Muhacir are
distinguished according to their place of origin: Macedonians, Albanians, or
Salonicans. The largest group originates from Kilkis, a district north of
Salonica. There are five households from Bosnia, three from Bulgaria, and
two from Albania.
The main distinction between the yliruk is between the eski yiirük, the
old yüriik, and the recent settlers who are locally called ei (new) yiiruk
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in contradistinction to the other group. The eski yiiruk, according to
Planhol, may be descendants of the original nomadic peoples who settled in
Anatolia prior to the second wave of migration from the east that took
place in the seventeenth century (Planhol 1958:193; 1968:238). These groups
have no memory of tribal organisatlon, nor of long-distance migrations.
The terni itself appears in eighteenth century Ottoman registers and
indicates a unification for religious or historal reasons of groups who
have no common origin (Planhol 1958:193).
By contrast, the yeni yüriik have clear tribal (asiret) affiliations;
until recently, they migrated every year to their summer pastures (yayla)
on the central Anatolian plain near Afyon, Usak and Kütahya. These groups
who claim to have originated from the Taurus ranges, had winter pastures
(kislak) In the Kirlkici hills to the south of the 1(eander plain, and only
in early spring and late autumn spent a few weeks in the Samsun ranges
near their present place of residence. The yeni yiiruk in Tuz belong to two
of the many purely nomadic asirets which still live in the Taurus
mountains: the Karatekell and the Karahacill (Planhol 1958:191-3).
Smaller subdivisions, called 	 . (groups of tents) by Planhol, and mahalle
(town quarter, a term maybe used as an extension of Its urban sense) by
the Tuz yiiriik themselves, can also be discerned among these groups. 2 In
Tuz, elderly yiiriik maintained that the Karatekeli tribe could be subdivided
in seven mahalle; two of these, the Slçmazlar and the Karnikaralar, make up
the majority of Tuz yeni yiiruk.
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Table 2.4 Population of Tuz Accoriing to Ethnicity
Men	 Voen
	
Households**
Yeni Yiiriik
	 105	 108
	
40
Eski YjirUk	 100	 104
	 41
Muhacir
	 218	 220
	 82
Others*
	 16	 22
	 7
Total
	 439	 454
	 170
* This category includes seven households that have moved to Tuz from
provinces such as Konya, Eskisehir and Denizil. These households and nine
women who married into the village do not belong to any of the ethnic
groups present in the settlement. Three of these women are from villages
within the area, but they designate themselves as yerli, locals. This might
mean they are descendants of slaves, or gypsies, or simply that they do not
(or cannot) associate with any distinct ethnic group. One woman is of
Kurdish origin. The teachers and the forestry officials are excluded from
this table on the grounds that they are civil servants and have not
migrated to Tuz out of free choice.
** Households are classified according to the ethnicity of the household
head.
2.2.2 Ethnicity in Tuz
As a result of the increasing homogeneity in their way of life, the
distinctions between these groups have largely disappeared. Differences in
speech and physical appearence do remain between yürük and muhacir. 	 The
yiiriik, apart from three households, have all sold their sheep and goats and
have turned to full-time agriculture. None live in tents. House structures,
and furnishings are almost identical except for a few hand-woven kilims
that still remain in a few of the older yuruk houses.
A more subtle difference between the two group exist with regard to
the public behaviour of women, In public, yiiruk women wear small scarves
tied under the chinfrd They feel no 'shame' (yi) walking in public
spaces, especially in front of the coffeehouses. They venture out of the
village more freely than the muhacir women, in order to collect firewood or
edible weeds, a practice which is much derided by muhacir men.65 By
contrast, muhacir women cover themselves in a larger cloth that covers
their shoulders, çarsaf. They rarely walk alone in the village square and
avoidance behaviour is more marked among them.67
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Differences that are not immediately visible can also be discerned.
Firstly, marriage practices current among each group are different and
mutually incomprehensible. The muhacir say they marry outsiders (si
gobek disardan=at a distance of seven wombs), while the yeni yiirük insist
on marrying close kin (cognates as well as agnates). This form of
endogamy is almost absent among the eski yüruk who express no special
preferences in obtaining marriage partners. Villagers say that muhacir
marry strangers, while yiirük marry among people they know. 	 More
importantly, however, yeni yiirük marriages in the older generation
approximated a form of sister exchange, a type of marriage that is fairly
widespread in the Middle East. 9 It has been argued that exchange marriage
is 'distasteful' to Turks because it implies low status at least on the part
of one of the parties involved, since it involves waiving bride-price
payments (Bates 1973:77), or because it makes women difficult to control
(Meeker 1976:412)7° However, for the yiiriik, the implication that exchange
marriage is distasteful or that it implies lower status does not seem to
hold. Among all the yiiruk, giving a daughter in marriage is one of the
best ways of obtaining a bride. But, reciprocation is not always sought
and marriages do not necessarily take the form of immediate restricted
exchange. With increasing 'modernity' however, all forms of marriage that
involve close kin, including exchange marriage, are being downgraded as
expressions of backwardness and ignorance (Sirman, forthcoming).
Compared to muhacir, yiiriik kinship ties between different households
are more clearly recognised and more frequently activated. The yiiriik are
interested in genealogies and kinship connections and readily discuss these
subjects, while the muhacir often claim ignorance about their genealogies.
As a result of their past semi-nomadic history, the eski yiirUk have a wide
range of agnatic as well as cognatic kin dispersed all over the Söke plain,
while the yeni yüriik keep in close contact with their kin in Tekeli village,
near Izmir. Muhacir often try to take advantage of the wider kin network
available to their yürük neighbours, especially in matters regarding cotton
production and marriage. Yüriik always try to maintain good relations with
their affines, a relation which often involves strong ties of economic
cooperation. Nevertheless, affinal and cognatic ties among yüriik are in
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theory subordinated to agnatic ties and a man who cultivates the former
ties at the expense of the latter is disapproved strongly.
Among the yiiriik authority and respect characterise relations between
agnates. Younger men are supposed to defer to their elders, and women to
men, Young men are expected to take the advice of their older agnates
(father, mother, elder brother, elder brother's wife) before making any
decisions of importance, and consult them in economic and family matters.
A man shows respect by not interrupting elder men, by not smoking in front
of them and by not adressing his own wife and children by name in the
presence of older agnates. Similarly, a woman is supposed to obey and show
respect to the older women in her husband's family group, especially his
mother, sisters and elder brother's wife. Based on the kinship hierarchy,
relations between households are supposed to be cooperative, a situation
which is not often borne out in reality. The dominance of agnatic ties in
defining inter-household relations reinforces the authority of the (usually
male) yUriik household head. The authority of the father is, at least in
theory, never to be contested openly, a fact which becomes quite apparent
in the organisation of work teams. While muhacir work more often for a
wage, wives, daughters and sons in yüriik households spend more time
working in their own and in their kinsmen's fields.
By contrast, conceptions of agnatic kinship are not stressed among the
muhacir. This leads to an emphasis on inter-personal relations in forming
the basis of Inter-household cooperation. Conceptions of friendship
(arkadaslik) among male household heads are overtly expressed. The fact
that friendship depends on choice and mutual reinforcement of the
relationship means that patterns of cooperation among muhacir households
are subject to frequent alteration. Cooperation between kin, whether
agnatic, cognatic or affinal carry far less importance among the muhacir
than they do among the yiirük. Muhacir assert their autonomy and
independence from kin ties, often in an effort to emphasise personal merit
in obtaining wealth and status. Consequently, relations within muhacir
households are also different. Although a certain amount of deference is
supposed to be shown to older people, respect and authority within the
household is often subject to negotiation and struggle. Unmarried daughters
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as well as young sons are able to criticise and even act against the wishes
of their elders. Thus, the competition and struggle that define relations
within and between households are expressed openly among the muhacir, but
is couched in idioms of respect and authority among the yiiruk.
Ethnic stereotyping is an important aspect of interaction between
these groups. The yurük are considered to be honest, but dirty, shameless
and ignorant. The latter are reminders of the time they used to live in
tents where running water, privacy, and education were luxuries hard to
come by.7 By contrast, muhacir are described as lazy, quarrelsome and
slanderous. The yeni yiirük are further stereotyped according to the
smaller mahalle they belong to. Thus, the Siçmazlar, the largest group in
Tuz, are said be hardworking and generous; but, it is also said that they
have bad tempers, use foul language and are inhospitable. The interesting
aspect of these stereotypes is that each group by and large accepts the
identity conferred by these characterisations. In many ways, stereotypes
are used to smooth inter-personal conflicts that threaten the stability of
larger groups. Referring to these stereotypes can, to a certain extent,
serve to restrain tempers and alter the course of disputes.
One serious dispute between two neighbours provides a case in point:
one of the women involved was Gullii, an eski yüriik whose mother was a ynJ.
yiiriik, a Siçmaz, and the other was Xeryem, a muhacir married to an ki
yiirük. The real reason behind the conflict centered around questions of
equality and reputation and involved )(eryem's husband's elder brother and
his wife, Giillii's mother's sister (see Appendix IV). GiillU started the
quarrel by shouting abuse at her neighbour from her front room window.
Next, she insulted Meryem's visitors, including myself. Xeryem ran out of
her house with a knife, but was held back by neighbours. The argument
which pacified Meryem was that Güllii was, after all, a Siçmaz and that it
was her, Xeryem's, merit that they had been able to remain on good terms
for as long as they had done. Calmed, but not satisfied, Xeryem went to
Güllü's mother-in-law to complain and to demand some authority to be
exercised over her unruly neighbour. The mother-in-law, a Siçmaz herself,
apologetically argued that it was very difficult to control Siçmazli's since
they had no respect for age or status, and that they were liable to use
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foul language. Xeryem was not completely satisfied; she wanted to cleanse
her own good name in a more efficient manner by sueing GüllU for libel.
But court cases are expensive and in the end, the public denunciation of
Güllii by her own mother-in-law 1 even if couched in general terms (that is
in terms of the Siçmaz in general, rather than Güllü in particular), was the
best retribution Xeryem could get. Using the generally accepted Sicmaz
stereotype, the mother-in-law had been able to avoid damaging Gülhi's
reputation too badly. At the same time, any rebuke from the mother-in-law
in response to Xeryem's request could have escalated things beyond control.
As it was, the two women were not on speaking terms (dargin) for a period
of six years.72
Despite these differences yUruk and muhacir live together
harmoniously. However, differences in marriage practices are sometimes the
cause of misunderstandings between the two groups. Yiiriik who attempt to
initiate marriage proceedings with the daughters of their muhacir
neighbours find that the latter will cut off all communication after such a
demand.73 For the muhacir, such an act is a breach of trust: for them it
only means that their neighbours had previously coveted their daughters who
consequently had been in danger of dishonour.74 Unformulated Ideas of
incest are also present: muhacir believe that unrelated children who grow
up together are like siblings and should therefore not marry. As can be
seen from the discussion above, many neighbourhoods (mahalle) are mixed
(see map 5) and close economic or other social relationships are forged
across ethnic boundaries as often as they do within them. Although
marriages across ethnic boundaries have increased within the last ten
years, ethnic endogamy is still prevalent.
As the Table below shows, the eski yuriik, the oldest inhabitants of
the region, seem to be the least endogamous of all Tuz inhabitants. The
smaller number of marriages between the yeni yiiruk and the muhacir is an
indication of the recent incorporation of the former into village life.
Compared to men, women tend to marry within ethnic boundaries to a larger
extent. The muhacir are more endogamous than the yUriik even when the
distinction between the two yüriik groups is ignored: 71 S eski yiirük and 76
S yeni yiiruk men marry other yüriik. Interestingly enough, it is yeni yiirük
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women who constitute the most endogamous group (97 % of all marriages are
contracted with other yiirük), while the eski yuruk women marry non-yüruk
men in 33 out of a hundred cases.
Table 2.5 Nar.riage According to Ethnicity
(As Percentage of Total Recorded larriages within Each Group)
* The marriages considered encompass all marriages for which information
exists, Since most marriages are patrilocal, many of the women whose
marriages are included in the table do not reside in Tuz. The table
includes everyone who considers him/herself to be from Tuz (Tuzlu) as a
result of birth or immigration. Following local custom, individuals of
mixed parentage have been considered to belong to the father's ethnic group.
*1 Legend: ey=eski yUrük, yyyeni yiiriik, and mmuhcir
2.2.3 Ethnic versus Village Identity
Within the last twenty years, many important processes operating at
the national level have undermined the conditions within which ethnicity
could remain the basic attribute of group identity. Common residence
(hemsehrilik), is gradually replacing ethnicity in conferring identity, a
process that is in evidence mainly among younger people. 7& It seems that
in the process of nation-building, residential contiguity Is the only form
of Identity allowed apart from the all-encompassing one of being a Turk.
It is Interesting that the young and the educated are the ones who seem to
be the least interested in finding out about their ethnic past. These
people were very critical of my efforts to do so, since as an educated Turk,
I should have been more interested in modernisation, that is in the future
rather than the past.
In Tuz, TV and school-attendance are the two major avenues through
which national culture and modernity penetrate the village. Although the
'V
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rate of literacy in the village is quite high, the TV and the radio, rather
than national newspapers are the main sources of information. In 1965
about 20 % of the population was literate (DIE 1968:99). In 1984, of a
total village population of 707 over the age of 12, more than 70 % could
read and write. The rate of literacy among women over the age of thirty is
lower compared to men, both among the yiirük and the muhacir. The
establishment of a primary school in the village in 1967 accounts for the
increase in literacy rates? 6 The school, with its centrally-determined
curriculum and its example-setting teachers is a very important factor
integrating the village within national culture.77 Young people in the
village try to study beyond the primary school level in the hope of finding
a Job in the Turkish bureaucracy. 78 The bureaucracy is attractive for
several reasons: apart from a steady income and retirement pensions, it
offers status. As a civil servant (memur), one becomes part of the state
and is able to shed the identity of villager (köylU) with all its negative
connotations (Sirman forthcoming).
As a result of these processes, 'villageness' has begun to compete with
ethnicity In conferring a sense of identity and belonging. As with ethnic
groups, a definite attribute is ascribed to each village in the region, and
people are stereotyped according to where they reside. These adjectives are
ranged In a series of oppositions: thus villages can be 'clean' as opposed
to 'mixed' or 'confused', 'industrious' or 'lazy', peace-loving or quarrelsome,
public-spirited' or not. Furthermore, villages are compared and ranked
according to the degree to which they possess the characteristic in
question. Thus, Tuz is considered to be industrious but not as industrious
as Yuva; or At Is mixed (a negative characterisation referring to At's
Tahtaci's and Kurds), but less than Sari, and so on. As communications
improve, social interaction between villages Increases, further developing,
rather than dispelling, already existing stereotypes. Comparison, the most
important way of establishing personal as well as group identity, serves
the same purpose with regard to village identity.
Nany forms of social interaction exist between villages, making it
difficult to conceive of each settlement as a closed social entity. Inter-
village economic cooperation takes place most frequently between
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neighbouring villages. Many Individuals in Tuz own land in At, Yuva and
Dogan, Some yüriik even own olive groves In the mountains near lake Bafa,
at a distance of more than seventy kilometres7 A number of Tuz families
have share-cropping relations with people from Dogan, At and Yuva. Most
importantly, enterprising Tuz villagers rely on close relations with Tan,
the large landowner of Batnos, for access to land. As a result of
population movements, many Tuz residents, the eski yürük in particular, have
kin (sometimes even brothers) whom they regularly visit In almost every
village of the Söke plain. These visits serve to disseminate news and
information; they also have the effect of further homogenlsing social life
in the region as a whole. Generally speaking, close cooperation between
individuals resident in more distant villages only develops In the wake of
affinal relations which are by far the main channels along which Inter-
village social relations are created. A look at the rate of village exogamy
serves best to dispell the image of the village as a bounded social unit:
Table 2.6 Marriage Patterns of Tuz Villagers According to Origin of Spouse*
MEJ	 VOXEI
ey	 yy	 ey	 yy	 P
Tuz	 38	 47	 43	 63	 49	 49
Dogan 8	 3	 27	 0	 0	 4
Other	 54	 50	 30	 37	 51	 47
• The table only Includes the marriages that were contracted within the
last twenty years for which Information was available. Before this date,
the population of Tuz was still In flux, with many of its present
inhabitants either living In tents, or In the neighbouring village of Dogan.
It is during marriage negotiations that questions of ethnicity and
villageness receive most attention. Compared to ethnic endogamy, village
endogamy seems to have less importance in contracting marriages. The most
striking difference occurs among the muhacir as would be expected from
their marriage preferences: while 82 % of the men marry within the ethnic
group, only 43 % marry within the village, showing that ethnicity is an
important criterion for selecting suitable spouses. Compared to men, women
generally tend to marry within the village. Marriages outside the village
conform to a certain pattern. While yuriik women marry into Yuva (14 % of
all marriages) and TekelI (10 %), yiirük men find their spouses from the
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villages of At (22 %), Yuva (19 %) and Ak (13 %)e0 Xuhacir women marry
into At (9 %), Bahce (7 %) and Yeni (7 %), their brothers obtain brides
mainly from Dogan (27 %). In general, brides also go to the villages from
which brides are obtained, creating a form of reciprocity, which in the long
term, may balance out.
These patterns are largely explained by the main guidelines that are
followed in contracting marriages. A rough equality in status between the
families is one of the most important criteria that determines the choice
of spouse. In order to accomplish this, reliable knowledge regarding the
individuals concerned is always sought. While the yiiriik solve this problem
by marrying people they know, the muhacir rely on go-betweens. Wealth,
physical and moral characteristics, standards of living, numbers of male
and female relatives are all taken into account in determining desirability.
Because these balances are difficult to strike, an affinal tie established
with a neighbouring village, is often duplicated in subsequent marriages.
Rather than reinforcing alliances, it is the ease of finding a spouse among
groups with whom social contacts have already been forged, that accounts
for this tendency.	 As a result of these different considerations,
marriages do not necessarily take place between people of equal wealth.
2.3 Conclusion
As I have tried to show in this chapter, Tuz Is a village which is
well integrated Into the social and economic networks that exist within the
region as a whole. Good communications link villages to the capital as
well as to one another. The many social and economic ties that are forged
by Individuals residing in different villages questions the extent to which
the village can be seen as a unit of analysis. Any unity that may exist
within the village is continually challenged by ties forged with 'outsiders'
on an individual basis, ties that at times cut accross village loyalties,
and at other times undermine kinship loyalties. Furthermore, the village
cannot be considered a bounded community composed of people who are
basically similar to one another. Ethnic diversity is another axis along
which village unity is undermined. Lastly, contrary to many other examples
from Turkey, Tuz villagers are not necessarily linked to one other through
their common past. Different ways of life and different experience of the
war serve to separate rather than unite the inhabitants of Tuz, And yet,
the village does constitute a significant entity in ordering production and
exchange relations. In the next chapter, I shall turn to those social and
economic relations that transform the village from an agglomeration of
habitations to a more or less unified, but open community.
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Notes to Chapter 2
1. According to official statistics, there are 36,000 villages in Turkey; not
all of these are nucleated (cf. Hann 1985).
2. See Gökalp 1980:157-168.
3. According to geographer S. öney, since the last glaciation (Würm), the
Meander has created a strip of land measuring thirty to thirty-two
kilometres in an northeast-southwest direction (1975:57).
4. Heavy rain in the early autumn could even endanger the cotton crop.
5. According to the 1980 census, the national literacy average for men is
79.8 % and for women, 53.8 %. The Söke figures are 85.5 % and 67 %
respectively. The figures for the villages in Aydin province (there are no
comparable figures available at district level) are 77.8 % and 53.8 % (DIE
1983 a:16-21; DIE 1983 b:48). Of the total number of village-dwelling
illiterates in Aydin province, B % live in Söke villages (Köyisleri 1981:58),
6. Although figures at the district are very difficult to come by, even a
cursory glance at the physical appearance of Soke is enough to convince the
observer of its relatively advantageous position compared to other
districts In the Aydin province.
7. In 1980, about 20 % of the population of the province of Aydin had been
born in other parts of Turkey, the majority coming from Denizli and Isparta
(DIE 1983:14), Unfortunately the same figure is not available at district
level.
B. I am grateful to Prof. Faroqhl for making Evliya's work available to me
and helping me to understand the old Turkish. According to Planhol (ibld),
nomad groups In Western Anatolia acquired the name Yiiriik (from yüriimek =
to walk, the walkers, or the marchers) in the fifteenth century, during a
process of increasing sedentarisation and marginalisation.
9. These terms and distinctions should be treated with care since many of
them are contested. See Gökalp (1980:33).
10. Evliya Celebi, who travelled In the region around 1670 descrIbes the
mosque in detail (1935:149). This mosque was, in 1812, rebuilt by the ayan
of Söke, Ilyas bey (see below).
11. The local leaders of the two largest national parties prior to 1980 (the
Republican People's Party (centre-left) and the Justice Party (centre-right)
were two brothers belonging to one of the large landholding families of the
region, a state of affairs that reflects the personal nature of national
politics at the local level.
12. On one large landholding (14 000 decares of cotton), local landless
workers (the majority were and still are Kurdish Immigrants) attempted to
stop the employment of migrant workers.
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13. When I first arrived in Soke in 1976 for a preliminary visit, there
were only about 1500 field-telephones in the town.
14. The Söke branch was not completed until January, 1890 (lbid:72).
15. According to the Village Inventory Surveys, Sbke accounts for 27 % of
the total cotton produced In Aydin (Koyisleri 1981:47). The district has
more than 770, 000 decares of arable land, 27 % of which Is irrigated
(Koyislerl 1981:18).
16. Trade in cereals accounted for 14 % of total value, followed by oil-
bearing seeds (4 %) which includes cotton seed, olives and sesame seed.
Tobacco, another important agricultural item in the region, is not sold on
the exchange, due to a state monopoly system. Of animal products, only
cheese figures in the exchange transactions and accounts for a mere 0,7 %
of all transactions.
17. Although fluctuations do occur, I was told by agricultural extension
officers that the proportion of cotton In the region has been approximately
the same over the intervening years.
18. One of these fish farms is the lake Bafa and the other, covering an
area close to 75 000 decare, has been formed by the activity of the
Meander; both of these, now under the management of peasant cooperatives,
were, for a long time, exploited by one of the large landholding families.
The transfer of the management of the Bafa fish farm to the peasants
resident in the five villages along Its shores has largely been the result
of peasant activism during the late sixties and early seventies. A national
left-wing party, the Turkish Worker's Party, was also involved in the
struggle,
19. This trend started in the mid-sixties; at that time the Ministry of
Tourism commissioned one of Turkey's best known sociologists, Mübeccel
Kiray, to carry out a survey in the area to assess Its touristic potential
(Kiray 1964b),
20. See Benedict (1974: 55-66) for a description of similar circumstances
in the Gökova plain to the south of the Söke region.
21. A number of hypotheses are summarised in Gun and özdemlr 1941:71-75,
According to these authors, the town must have been founded sometime in the
fourteenth or fifteenth century when the region was under the domination of
the Aydinoglu, a Turcoman principality established in lonia (Gökbel and
Sölen 1936:90). See Inalcik (1969:75-8; reprinted in Inalcik 1985) for a
discussion of the position of these principalities in the early stages of
the Ottoman Empire. One of the
	
s of another of these principalities, the
Menteseogullari who ruled the Milas district, had a mosque built in the
town of Balat in 1403, The mosque still stands. Balat Is built near the
ruins of ancient Miletus and Its name derives from a palace built there by
the Byzantines, Palatia.
22. It is often assumed that Akçasehir Is the Ottoman name for Söke town
and certainly by the nineteenth century the two names were used
synonymously (Gun and özdemir 1941:78). At the end of the sixteenth
72
century, Akçasehir had been the name of a	 which included Ayaslog to
the north, present-day Selcuk near Ephesus and Batnos, near Balat to the
south (TT 148:163). I am grateful to Prof. Faroqhi for making these
references available to me. TT stands for Tapu Tahrir, the land registers
used by the Ottoman bureaucracy.
23. The Register mentioned above also attests to the presence of nomads in
the area at an earlier date: the collection of a winter grazing tax kislak
resmi was an important part of the state revenues.
24. I would like to thank Caroline Finkel for reading this material for me.
25. See Inalcik 1969 for a brief summary of Ottoman land tenure and its
transformations in the seventeenth century.
26. According to Bowen, ayan were "... among those who were the most
distinguished inhabitants of any district or town quarter, those who
exercised political influence and were accorded official status" (1960:778>.
27. The origins of this family and the exact area over which it exercised
power are not clearly known. Kocagöz suggests that between 1765 and 1859,
the family dominated an area stretching from Torball south of Izmir to
Germencik in the east, and lake Bafa in the south (1977:21). See also
Wittek, cited by Kocagoz. The extent of the area whose tax revenue was
collected by the Ilyaszade is not known; Kocagoz suggests an area of 50,000
decares of arable land, the extent of the Söke plain.
28. According to S. Kocagöz, his ancestors were engaged in the exportation
of millet to Germany where it was used in beer brewing. A local saying
describing the sources of wealth of the large families confirms this:
"Kocagözoglu daridan (from millet), lii Halil Pasa karidan (from his wife),
and IbraMm	 aridan (from bees) zengin (rich)".
29. See Quataert 1973:38-48 for a discussion of the impact of this law.
30. I am grateful to Samim Kocagöz, well-known novelist and descendant of
the original Kocagozoglu ehmet Aga, for providing me with this
information.
31, See Kurmus (1977:109-12) for an account of slave trading in the Aegean
provinces In the late nineteenth century.
32. I am grateful to H. F. for providing me with this information.
33. Cotton does not figure in any of the inventories I saw dating to the
turn of the century. In the 1900 Aydin Salname (yearbook), cotton Is only
mentioned once (p.555). It seems that the relatively minor importance of
cotton production continued well Into the twentieth century since GUn and
özdemir, writing in 1941, mention only tobacco and figs (1941:122-6). By
contrast, the list of goods carried by rail from Sdke In 1936 includes
about forty-eight metric tonnes of cotton, a sum that today can be produced
on 200 decares of land (ibid:114-121).)
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34. Until the early fifties, meat on the hoof had been exported to Greece
via the port of Scala Nuova (Gun and özdemir 1941:26).
35. In 1879, the MacAndrews and Forbes company hired 12,000 people to
collect liquorice (ibid:160) A British firm founded a liquorice processing
factory in Söke in 1854 (there were three others in Aydin, Kusakli and
Nazilli) and the exploitation of lignite mines (Kurmus 1977:188), the
}tacAndrews and Forbes company continued operations until the 1950's. By
1941, it was owned by Americans and processed 5,000 tonnes of liquorice
root a year (Gun and özdemir lbid:27). The houses which the firm built for
its employees still stand in the quarter which Is named after the original
owners.
36. By the late nineteenth century, there were more than 11,000 Greeks
living in the region as a whole which had a population of 27,000 (Aydin
salnamesi 1315 (1900): 306). Of these 2684 lived in the district centre,
making up 43 % of its population (ibid: 305).
37. For example, we can cite Avsar, Sofu].ar, Kizilisik, Karacahayit, cavdar
(see also Gökbel and Solen 1936:241).
38, A very important source of cash for Soke landowners had been the
rental, as grazing land, of unused (and unusable) stretches of pasture to
pastoral nomads migrating over long distances. Local transhumants
preferred to deal with peasants, with whom they had closer contact.
Furthermore, they had smaller herds, a result of the fact that they were
not grouped Into large tribal units as the migrating yiirük were. Also
among the herders who rented large tracts of land were sheep drovers
(celep) who came from as far away as Konya to graze their animals before
selling them to Greek merchants In Samos.
39. S. Kocagoz maintained that of the original 25,000 decares, he only owned
250.
40. The increase in the number of land sales registered In Söke during
those years confirms this observation.
41. Nany Söke landowners own hotels In Kusadasi which has become an
important summer resort. Others have Invested in agriculture-linked
industry.
42. In the end, when the Land Reform Bill finally appeared in 1945, it had
lost much of its sharper clauses. It amounted to a distribution of
government-owned unclaimed land (See Aktan 1966). Among local landlords
who thus sold land to peasants, Tan and H. F. can be cited.
43. H. F. Insists that this is the reason for which he sold his land.
44. This is a pseudonym, as are all the names of villages in its immediate
vicinity.
45.This intervention is most felt in terms of landholding patterns and
credit facilities. These will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.
74
46. The Salname of 1900 mentions the existence of two villages called Tuz,
one Christian, one Muslim (p.30?). The Muslim section of the village was
probably no more than a few nomad huts. British Admiralty Reports
published in 1919 oniy note the existence of a Greek village on the road
from the coast to Sokia (Söke), without mentioning a Muslim settlement
(1919:395). Earlier references to the village are virtually non-existent.
Larger villages along the mountain range have a longer history. A
cadastral register of the late sixteenth century (c. 1575) mentions At, a
village with a present-day population of 2612 souls; In the sixteenth
century, it was composed of about thirty-six households (TK 167:77, 94).
European travellers such as Fellows (1840:148) also note this village.
Kelibesh, an even larger settlement to the east of At is cited by Texier
(1882:345) as well as by Fellows (ibid.) Among the other older villages in
the area, the 1575 register records Batnos, where sixty-three tax-paying
Inhabitants resided (ibid). Today, this village, with a much reduced
population, Is part of Tan's property and bears a slightly different name.
On the ruins of Miletus is situated Balat, another village with a fairly
long history.
47. Dogan was a large Greek village in the nineenth century. Its position
near the small port of Karine allowed it to dominate the export route to
the Greek islands; apart from trade, agriculture and fishing were also
Important in the economy of the village. Large two-story stone houses with
balconies edged with beautiful wrought-iron balustrades, and the many
store-houses and shops testify to the one-time glory of this village. The
Admiralty Reports describe Dogan as 'a large prosperous village' (1919:395).
Today, Dogan is more or less deserted as a result of the resettlement of
the population in a new location three kilometres south of its old site.
The move was demanded by the villagers themselves who wanted to be closer
to the main road as well as to their fields.
48. Xuhtarlik is a term used to designate the village as a corporate body,
as well as the office of headmanship. Headmen are elected every four years
and constitute the lowest rung In the state administration. The corporate
nature of the village is a result of Turkish administrative regulations:
each village has its own budget, which is administered by the headman and
the elected village council (ihtiyar heyeti).
49. A smaller communal area of about seven hundred square metres was, in
the past, used as the village threshing floor. Since cereal cultivation is
no longer undertaken on the same scale, It is now only occasionally used
for the meagre bean harvest.
50. The town of Söke is at a distance of about twenty-five kilometres and
the Journey takes twenty minutes.
51. The entrance to the house leads directly to the salon, which In former
times was open at the front and was called hayat. Many houses in Tuz were
in fact converted by closing the hayat with a wall and adding windows and
doors.
52. Since matresses are spread each night on the floor, all the rooms can
double as bedrooms. New fashions are affecting styles and for new brides,
special bedrooms and guest rooms with suitable furniture are becoming d
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rigeur. Toilets are always outside. More recent houses are larger and
composed of four rooms opening on to a central corridor, the mark of
modernity.
53. The ethnographic present Is used to Indicate the year 1984. According
to the 1985 census figures, Tuz appears to have a population of 1177. This
discrepancy might, to a certain extent, be accounted for by the fact that I
have excluded civil servants resident in the village from my survey, These
are the teachers and the forest rangers. Furthermore, the census may also
have included Tuz-born civil servants on holiday In the village. The fact
that censuses are carried out In the summer months strengthens this
possibility. During a short visit in February, 1987, I also found out that
two new households had migrated to Tuz since 1984.)
54. In 1984, the heads of thirty-one households had been born In Dogan.
55. 45 % of Tuz brides born in Dogan married by eloping.
56. As opposed to 60 Tuz women below the age of fifty marrying out of the
village, 64 women moved into the village after marriage.
57. In Turkey, civil servants are rarely posted to their place of birth.
Thus, many of these individuals retain close ties to their home village,
some own land, and spend their holidays In the village. For example, one
man who became a police officer, married a village girl and Is now resident
in Mus, a province In southeastern Turkey, about 1500 kilometres away. The
parents of both husband and wife have already been to Mus on visits. After
their child was born, the young couple had come to the village on the
traditional round of visits which are made forty days after the birth of a
child. This is the first time a child, after a ritual washing, is taken out
of the house and 'shown' (gostermek, or gezdirmek), that is publicly
displayed in the village. Gifts of small sums of money are accepted as
part of this process through which a new individual, regardless of gender,
is socially recognised.
58. The ethnic ascriptions of yürük and muhacir are widely recognised
within Turkey as a whole; the social and cultural ramifications described
below, however, are limited to the local setting and may therefore differ
from national patterns.
59, There is a young Shi'ite (Tahtaci) from At who started an electrical
repair shop in Tuz and a single gypsy, who according to Sunni Muslims have
no recognised religion.
60. This statement Is not borne out by reality. Parties on the left and the
right are represented in the village; in the general election of 1987, the
ruling right-of-centre party obtained a majorIty of the votes. At the same
time, left wing agitation could also be observed in the village during the
late seventies. See Sirman (forthcoming) for a view of Tuz political
ideology.
61. According to Planhol, these asirets, the most Inclusive social units
presently found among Anatolian nomads, are remnants of the larger Oguz
tribes that fragmented after losing their political unity. As a result
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individual asirets are now completely Isolated and maintain no connection
with one another. Planhol maintains that asiret names are totemic (?)
names, followed by the suffix 11(u), indicating origin or belonging
(1958:190). Karatekell means the people of the black billy-goat and
Karahacill, the people of the black cape.
62. Mahalle is used by Tuz yuruk for a social group composed of the
inhabitants of two or at most three black tents (kara çadir), and who,
being related to one another through some form of agnatic tie, migrate and
herd cooperatively. Bates (1973:39) suggests that mahalle is a recent
verbal acquisition and designates a group of patri-kin with no territorial
connotation.
63. The latter are lighter skinned, and many of them have fair hair and
blue eyes. Yuriik, by contrast, have a darker complexion.
64. The older women wear the yaglik, a larger scarf, often made of a
yellow-and-white chequered material which is wrapped under the chin and
tied on the top of the head. This scarf is also worn by all women on
cotton fields as it is large enough to cover one's mouth, a protection
against the dust. All women tie their hair back with an embroidered scarf
made of lighter material (yemeni) over which the outer scarf is worn.
65. On one wood-collecting excursion, one yUriik woman was almost drowned
after falling in shallow water while carrying a pack of wood on her back.
A muhacir man protested afterwards that he would rather die of cold rather
than be warmed by wood provided by his wife. He also ridiculed the
woman's husband for sitting in the coffeehouse, fattening his behind.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that muhacir women do not work outside
the home. They work in cotton fields as well as in the olive groves as
much as the latter do, but are always escorted by a male relative.
67. The fact that I lived in the main square right across the three
coffeehouses meant that I had very few muhacir women visiting me.
68, Marriage practices often create difficulties for muhacir who have to
search far afield for brides. One man expressed the problem by saying,
"How am I to know that someone fifty kilometres away has a marriageable
daughter?"
69. See Appendix I for the Incidence of sister exchange among one mahalle
of yeni yuriik.
70. Among HakkArl Kurds, in spite of statements to the contrary by the
locals, exchange marriages do not seem to be linked to bride-price payments
(Yalcin 1986:322-9). Since brideprice payments are non-existent among the
Söke yiirük, I have not been able to observe the relation between these
practices.
71. Stories about the difficulties faced by newly-married couples who are
forced to sleep in the same tents with the rest of the groom's family are
told with relish among the yUriik themselves.
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72. Another point that arises from this example is the identification of
Güllii as a Sicmaz In spite of the fact that her father is an eski yuruk. In
this ostensibly patrilineal, patriarchal culture, the Identification of a
person in terms of the mother's Identity is worthy of notice.
73. The same applies to relations between muhacir neighbours. But no
muhacir would would think of initltating marriage proceedings with a
neighbour: all marriages between muhacir that were close neighbours were
brought about by elopement.
74. These accusations account for the breakdown of relations between Meryem
and Emlue, a muhacir woman. Her husband's nephew had pressurised Xeryeni
against her better judgement to ask Emlrxe's daughter's hand in marriage.
Emine reacted very strongly and severed all links with the family. The two
women have not been on speaking terms (dargin) ever since, in spite of the
fact that their husbands still visit one another.
75. Writing about hemsehrilik in an urban context, Duben maintains that
hemsebrilik is only manifest In gurbet, being away from the homeland. In
the latter, he argues, hemsehrilik is a non-existent category (1976:440). I
think that hemsebrilik does have an important role to play In organising
social relations in the homeland as well, particularly when the latter Is
not considered to be a closed social entity. Futhermore, Duben only
concentrates on the social effects of hemsehrilik in providing aid, whereas
my preoccupation Is with social identity.
76. Since 1980, the government has also started adult literacy programmes,
and many of the women In Tuz have attended.
77. Many of the village girls imitate the style of dress and housekeeping
adopted by the teachers. The fact their style corresponds to what is shown
on TV reinforces this tendency.
78. In 1984, about 18 individuals (14 men and 4 women) had undertaken
higher education above the lycée level. Another 18 were lycée graduates
and another 23 were in the process of completing their secondary education.
79. These families spend the months of December and January harvesting
their crop and consequently forge economic relations with Bafa villages
specialising in oil extraction.
80. It is the yeni yiiriik of the Slçmaz subgroup who marry the Inhabitants
of Tekeli, a village, south of Izmir. This Is due to the fact that this
village, as Its name indicates, was founded by yUriiks who belong to the
same asiret as the Siçmazll of Tuz.
81. Exceptions are also Important. Many of the girls want to marry out to
villages that are closer to town. Therefore, very few Tuz girls marry into
Dogan and few At girls marry into Tuz.
82. For example, an eski yiirUk found a bride for her elder son from the
eski yiiriik village of öz. Her husband's sister (goriimce), also a widow, had
trouble finding a suitable bride for her son. The woman was a simpleton
and authority within the household lay in the hands of her four daughters.
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1 bride wishes to submit to such unmitigated authority from age equals.
The young man was finally able to marry the sister of the first bride only
after the intervention of his father's brother's wife. It is very possible
that in the future, one of his four sisters marries into the village of öz.
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CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE VILLAGE
In the previous chapter, I tried to establish the position of the
village with regard to the region and to the country as a whole. A
consideration of ethnic differences within the village showed the extent to
which Tuz is a community that has been recently established. In this
chapter, I shall review some of the salient aspects of village social
organisation. I shall try to show that the village does constitute a
relevant social grouping for a study of peasant production. Rather than
natural categories such as kinship, I shall argue that exchanges within the
village that reduce the circulation of money constitute the basis on which
such a generalisation can be made. Ideas on which these exchanges are
based may, in fact,produce what can be called a 'village' (as opposed to
Harris' (1982) 'ethnic') economy. Within this economy, social interaction is
based on principles that derive from two separate rationalities, that of a
commodity economy and that of kinship and community. In subsequent
chapters, I hope to show that the rationality of the market and that of
kinship and community do not necessarily always contradict one another; on
the contrary, it is the complementary nature of these two forms of
calculation that allows the successful production of cotton.
3.1 The Economy
The economy of Tuz is almost totally integrated with that of the
region. Cotton cultivation, the most important economic activity in the
village, constitutes the strongest link that the latter possesses with the
national economy. One hundred and seven out of a total of 170 households
state that cotton production provides the basis of their income (Table 3.1).
As I shall show in subsequent chapters, not only is the product fully
commoditised, but so are many of its inputs. In order to obtain these,
villagers have to contact various public as well as private institutions in
Sbke, including banks, tractor dealers, Tans (the State Cotton Purchasing
Cooperative), and private merchants. As a result, all cotton producers in
Tuz are familiar with the town and have, over the years, established lasting
relationships with many individuals there. Furthermore, many consumption
items including food and clothing are purchased from Söke shops.
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Nevertheless, there are certain goods that belong to what can be called the
subsistence sphere which are produced and circulated outside the norms of a
commodity economy.
Table 3.1 lumber of Tuz Households According to lain Economic Activity
Cotton Fishing Jianual	 Trade	 Artisans	 Otherl
Prod.	 Labour
EY	 26	 7
	
4
	
2
	
0
	
2
YY	 28	 4
	
3
	
2
	
0
	
4
M	 52	 11
	
8
	
0
	
0
	
9
Others	 1	 1
	
1
	
0
	
2
	
2
* Among household heads with different occupations, we can cite masons,
sheep and goat herders, butchers, moneylenders, minibus operators, and
teachers.
Apart from cotton, other productive activities have limited impact on
the village economy. Among these, fishing, the cultivation of olive trees
and the raising of milch cows are worth mentioning. Fishing is undertaken
on the open sea or in the 75 000 decare natural fish pond created by the
Meander delta. Open sea fishermen work individually, and need credit to
obtain the boats and nets required. The fish-pond was until 1971, under
the management of a large landowner of Sbke who rented the area from the
state. Since 1976, a cooperative of about 208 villagers from Tuz and Dogan
has taken over. The cooperative produces today over 150 tonnes of fish and
roe, the value of which exceeds fifty million T.L. per annum. The
cooperative pays a monthly salary to its regular workers and a piece rate
for fish delivered by the fishermen; it is also supposed to distribute
among its 368 members any profit made during the course of a year.- The
cooperative sells its produce to large buyers in Izmir, while individual
operators sell to small-scale merchants (kayyaf) in Soke. Occasionally,
fish will be sold in the vilage square. Rather than being a long-term
occupation, fishing is only a stop-gap measure undertaken by the newly
married until such time as they are able to enter into cotton production.
Only three households in Tuz have been relying on fishing as their main
source of income for more than twenty years.
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Other activities, such as olive growing, possess a larger subsistence
component. In Tuz, the number of olive trees owned per household is rather
limited. About ten households have more than fifty trees, the rest having
about five to ten. 3 In general, the yiiriik produced their own olive groves
by grafting on the wild variety (bot.: olea europea) found in the Samsun
ranges. Since this land is state-owned, at present many have lost access
to these trees and have bought trees from muhacir. The agricultural
schedule of olive cultivation fits very well with that of cotton. In the
spring, the trees are pruned and the area under them cleaned of thorn and
brush. Harvesting does not start until early December and lasts for a
period of two months, depending on the size of the harvest. Households
whose labour power Is Insufficient to undertake the tasks Involved, often
cultivate their trees through sharecropping arrangements. Sharecroppers
collect the fruit, and in return, receive half of the harvest, both as oil
and as fruit, An alternative way of securing sufficient labour to harvest
olives Is to invite neighbours and relatives to the harvest. These people
take home whatever they have collected. In order to undertake major-scale
pruning, a task carried out every twenty years or so, households in need of
labour may engage the labour of others in return for the dry wood. Olives
are sold to village store owners who then sell it to Sóke oil presses.
Since olive oil is the basic cooking oil, village production does not meet
the demand, and many households have buy oil in town. Very little olive
oil is sold within the village: producers prefer to exchange It for cash at
the shop, or for an item needed In the sphere of cotton production. Like
subsistence gardens, olive groves can bought and sold, harvested through
sharecropping arrangements, but they are never rented out. Thus, compared
to the sphere of cotton production, commoditisation in the sphere of
subsistence production is limited.
The raising of milch cows is a fairly recent activity in the village.
The government, in an attempt to increase milk production, extends credit
on favourable terms to prospective dairy farmers. In Tuz, about three
households have invested in this activity, buying between ten and fifteen
milch cows; but only one has met with any success. Producers maintained
that the price of milk was too low to cover the cost of feeding the
animals. Another three households raise cattle for slaughter and find it to
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be a more lucrative business, The numbers involved are much smaller: two
cows and a bull being the maximum. After fattening the animal for a year,
it is sold to Söke butchers. One cotton farmer maintained that he was able
to cover the cost of his yearly fuel supply in this fashion.
The majority of village households own a few cows and a few sheep in
order to meet household consumption needs. 4 These animals are raised
mainly for their milk, out of which yoghurt, cheese and butter are made. In
the spring, many households sell their surplus milk to a well-known
national milk company (Pinar Silt), whose buyers make daily rounds to
villages in the area. The animals are taken to pasture during the spring
and summer, but during the winter they are fed in their stalls. Many
households have to purchase animal feed, as the amount of cereal production
in the village is minimal. Pasturing domestic animals is undertaken on a
household basis, and the task often falls to young boys or to elderly
women.
In spite of important variations between households, the amount of
agricultural subsistence production is, in general, minimal, and the basic
foodstuffs, including wheat, are bought in the market.	 In the hill-side
gardens to the north, beans, cereals (wheat, maize, oats and barley), onions
and potatoes are grown on small plots of about three to ten decares.
Kitchen gardens are even smaller, at most one decare, and are used to grow
green vegetables such as tomatoes, courgettes, okra, aubergines and green
peppers. These gardens are tended by women, except for the spring
ploughing which is undertaken by men on ground where tractors or horse
drawn ploughs can be used7 There are many fruit trees in the village, in
particular, oranges, tangerines, pomegrenates, prunes and apricots. 	 Women
often 'help' one another in executing horticultural tasks. Although a
general reciprocity is the norm, there is no strict calculation of labour;
payment of any fee is out of the question. At the end of each work party,
refreshments or a meal are served by the owner of the garden. The same
type of cooperative labour can be observed in the execution of other
'domestic' tasks such as the preparation of bulgur (cracked wheat), pasta,
tomato and pepper paste. Furthermore, women borrow freely from each other
small items of consumption such as a few onions, tomatoes or fruit.
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3,1.1 The Circulation of Products
Exchange of subsistence products within the village is limited. Few
households produce any of the subsistence goods in quantities large enough
to be exchanged. Among the subsistence goods produced within the village,
dry beans, wheat and olive oil are the only ones subject to this limited
exchange. These items are not sold for cash within the village. People
argue that it is shameful (ayJ.) to sell these Items for cash to neighbours
and co-villagers. This holds true for all subsistence goods the production
of which does not require cash expenditure. Peasants argue that in such
cases the produce 'belongs' to the household whose members produced It?
On the other hand what belongs to a person cannot be sold to another with
whom one has close social ties, but can only be given. These 'gifts' are of
course, reciprocated in the long run, since, as Xauss has so well
demonstrated, to give gifts repeatedly to someone who cannot reciprocate is
to introduce inequality into the relationship.
Some people, of course can only reciprocate by offering their labour
power In return. For example, Xeryein regularly 'helps' All, her husband's
brother collect his olive harvest. In return she obtains her yearly supply
of olive oil. She did not grow sufficient quantities of any other
subsistence item to use as counter gifts. By contrast, Emine's husband
Sefer who is a fisherman, regularly uses the unsaleable small fish as
return gifts. Thus, It is only by looking at the context within which
people 'help' one other another or extend 'gifts' that the meaning of these
transactions can be understood.
The grocers to whom surplus milk, olives, or beans are sold, occupy
the point at which cash enters into the village subsistence economy.
Selling produce to grocers is still an activity that peasants rarely
discuss In public. It is similar to discussing one's debts, they say. This
task is delegated to children who are sent out early in the morning when
few people are about. In fact, grocers also act as money-lenders as well
as offering purchase on credit. As a result, villagers selling produce may
well be indebted to the grocer in question. The goods sold by grocers
include everyday consumption items such as bread, sugar, tea, cigarettes,
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biscuits, margarine and aspirin. The circulation of cash within the village
is, however, not limited to transactions with the grocer. Cotton production
involves a whole series of such transactions, which I shall analyse in
subsequent chapters. The coffeeshops and the one restaurant constitute the
other nodes for the circulation of cash. 1 ° Many travelling salesmen also
come to the village to market their wares, which range from machine-woven
carpets to tomatoes.
In contrast to the way in which products circulate within the village,
a direct return is sought when non-villagers and non-kin are concerned.
Only 'strangers', with whom by definition, no social tie exists, can be
asked to pay for subsistence goods. 11 Similarly, very little barter goes on
in the village. Excess production of any one subsistence good is either
sold to the grocer or, in an effort to reduce cash expenditures, is
exchanged for the rental of machinery in cotton production. In both cases,
the item is taken out of the subsistence sphere. Some goods are bartered
with people from other villages. Even in these cases, the exchange is often
undertaken in the guise of a gift, with the full knowledge that the required
item will be presented as a return gift when the time comes.
The exchange of subsistence products between kin living in different
villages approximates that between 'strangers' if the Interaction between
the two parties concerned Is not frequent. When, however, two related
households living in different villages cooperate in some economic activity
such as olive production or sharecropping in cotton, the exchange pattern,
approximating that obtaining between co-villagers, is based on an Ideology
of the gift. Moreover, the same also holds for households which are not
related through a kinship tie but are engaged in sustained cooperation; the
partners in suchg an enterprise become almost 'honourary fellow villagers'
through frequent interaction. The nature of inter-household exchange, Is
dependent on frequency of interaction, which itself is largely a product of
common residence rather than kinship or any other factor.
It Is thus possible to argue that the village constitutes an important
unit of analysis with regard to something that may be called the
subsistence sphere. Although this sphere is dominated by commodity
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relations prevalent in the wider economy, the goods and services produced
within it are nevertheless important for the reproduction of the peasant
household. 12 There are distinct discontinuities in the way subsistence
products circulate within this unit: a direct return is not sought and the
purchasing power of money is severely limited. Outside the village
boundary, on the other hand, cash can be widely used as a medium of
exchange. 1	In other words, it may be possible to talk of a 'moral' or
'village' economy that defines the circulation of produce within the
community. The fact that kin ties, unless activated by close economic
cooperation, are not able to generate this system of exchange strengthens
the argument made here. At the same time, the importance of being fellow-
villagers should not be exaggerated, for close economic cooperation between
people who reside In different villages creates a density of social
interaction analogous to that which obtains within a village.
Another sphere where Important exchange takes place is the ceremonial
gift-giving that accompanies festive occasions. Births, circumcisions,
marriages, and religious festivals provide the setting for these exchanges.
An instance of ceremonial exchange involves the distribution of meat after
the slaughter of animals during the Kurban Bayrami, the Feast of the
Sacrifice. This explicitly is an unequal form of gift giving since It falls
within the Koranic prescription of alms giving (zekAt). Although meat
should be given to poor households who can not slaughter animals, Tuz
villagers use this occasion to enter into reciprocal exchanges with equals,
by giving meat to neighbours and friends regardless of their economic
condition. These gifts are therefore reciprocated.
Ceremonies marking changes in the individual's life cycle provide the
only form of organised entertainment within the village. They also provide
an opportunity for fellow-villagers to activate reciprocal relationships.
In order to invite people, small sweets called okuntu are distributed to all
the houses within the village. Guests reciprocate by bringing appropriate
gifts also called okuntu, in an effort to indicate the restored equality.14
Gash is also given as a gift at these occasions, usually by villagers who
do not have a special relationship to the household Involved. The cash is
publically pinned to the clothes of the bride and groom or the circumcised
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boy during the ceremonies. Everyone notices the kinds of gifts and the
amount of money given. Although outsiders, often close kin, are also
invited to these occasions, they are mainly village affairs.
3,1.2 The Circulation of Labour
From the point of view of labour expenditure, it is subsistence
activities that account for the bulk of labour time at least where the
women of the village are concerned.	 Although many consumption items are
bought on the market, they are bought in such forms that they require the
additional expenditure of labour before they can be consumed. Thus,
villagers buy cloth rather than ready-to-wear clothing, flour rather than
bread, tomatoes rather than tomato paste. The daily domestic labour time
for a woman of a small household (comprising at most four individuals),
varies between six and eight hours. Apart from the preparation of food,
washing, cleaning, tending domestic animals and kitchen gardens, as well as
collecting firewood constitute the most time-consuming activities. Women
also make the bulk of house furnishings, such as matresses, covers, pillows,
and reed mats, as well as everyday clothing. Aside from refrigerators and
sewing-machines, there are no labour-saving domestic appliances. By
contrast, male labour in the subsistence sphere is small, being limited to
occasional tasks such as house repairs, harvesting various food crops, and
wood-cutting.
The 'moral economy' that can be detected with regard to the
circulation of subsistence products within the village, is less apparent
when the circulation of labour is concerned. The labour that does circulate
between households is more or less restricted to the sphere of horticulture,
and is limited to the women's 'helping' parties described above. In general,
everyday domestic tasks are undertaken by members of the household only.
Even so, however, women who are close neighbours will often lend each other
a hand to finish a particular chore. This form of assistance is
mutualistic and constitutes an important medium through which women's
social networks are constituted and sustained. Nen also develop similar
networks of mutual assistance as a result of which tractors are lent for
short periods, earth shifted, small repairs executed, and fruit trees
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sprayed. Children are often asked to perform small tasks for a grandparent
living on his/her own: granddaughters cook and clean and grandsons collect
wood or mind animals, Some yiiruk families also'lend' their daughters to
paternal grandparents for longer periods of time. In these cases the girls
in question live and sleep with their grandparents and perform everyday
chores, ranging from tending the animals to cooking and cleaning. The
return of these girls to their parent's household is often a difficult
process which may lead to the deterioration of relations between the
households involved.
Ceremonial occasions described above provide the setting for another
form of labour circulation. On these occasions, large numbers of people
have to be accomodated and fed. The whole village is invited, but food is
prepared only for visitors from other villages. This distinction also
serves to emphasize the fact that the whole village is seen as acting as
the host. Organising the events, preparing food, serving guests, and
keeping the peace becomes a major task on these occasions.1 7 Without the
labour of neighbours and kin, it would be quite impossible to entertain on
such a major scale. The labour of neighbours and kin is offered freely, and
is only reciprocated in the same fashion when need arises. As with
domestic and gardening tasks, these exchanges of labour are an indication
of the nature of the relationship between the individuals concerned.
Thus, the village constitutes a unit within which a number of goods
and services are produced and exchanged outside the sphere of commodity
production. Village boundaries mark the outer limits within which these
activities take place. Inside this limit, the use of money is restricted,
and labour and produce circulate as reciprocated gifts. The social domain
defined by these exchanges rarely encompasses all the inhabitants of the
village at the same time. In general, the flow of goods and services takes
place with any significant frequency between smaller numbers of people
only, and is premised on the existence of variegated social ties between
the individuals concerned. Kinship, neighbourhood and various forms of
friendship are the main links that are activated to constitute these
smaller sets.
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3.2 Social Relations: Kin and Neighbours
In Tuz, the most important social grouping of any permanence that
confers identity is the household. The life-chances of the individual,
his/her positioning within village social structure 1 and his/her assessment
of events around him/her are all coloured by membership within this group.
It is within the household that the circulation of goods and labour is at
its most dense. The individuals that compose households are tied to one
another through a multiplicity of social relations that span a number of
areas of life. These include common residence, property, sexuality, kinship,
concern with children and generational reproduction, daily reproduction and
recreation. But at the same time, very similar ties are also forged between
individuals who do not share the same household: property and the Joint
exploitation of resources (as in sharecropping) can link two separate
households together, as can kinship, concern over children and sexuality,
mutual support and recreation. Households and individuals are also tied to
one another through negative relations such as competition and slander.
These ties provide the basis on which social relations are formed within
the village, and they give rise to ego-centered networks whose composition
changes frequently. The sum total of these relations and these networks
produces the village as a social unit, or a community. This community is
above all constituted by what Bailey (1971) has called 'the politics of
reputation' according to which knowledge of others and comparison with self
are the main means of self-definiton.
3.2.1 Kinship
Kinship is one of the social relations through which extra-household
ties are forged. Many individuals within the village are linked to one
another through ties of kinship. Kin (akraba) are those people to whom one
can trace consanguinial and affinal ties.le Since genealogies are in
general shallow, at most links through the third ascending generation are
known (see Appendix 3). Kinship and inheritance are bilaterally reckoned
but, in terms of conferring social identity, agnation is clearly the
dominant principle. People are born into paternal households, take their
father's name, and are inserted Into village social networks on the basis of
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their father's position. The dominance of the agnatic tie is reinforced by
the fact that men are considered to be heads of households and that women,
on marriage, come to live in their husband's house, which is often built in
the husband's father's compound. 1 Nevertheless, cognative and affinal kin
ties are by no means peripheral. Kin ties through mothers and sisters are
considered very important for the Identity of the Individual and are traced
with as much attention as agnatic ties are. As is the case with many
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern examples, character and honour are
inherited through mothers as well as through fathers, a fact acknowledged
by ethnic stereotyping patterns described above, People of mixed parentage
are not necessarily ascribed to the father's ethnicity; ethnic ascription
also depends on personal characteristics.20 For yiiriik as well as for
muhacir, the importance of agnatic as well as cogantic ties is dependent on
frequency of interaction, a factor which is closely linked to residential
proximity.
Close agnatic relations play an important role in mens' lives. Since
marriage is patrilocal, men live for most of their lives in the company of
their agnates. For women, on the other hand, neighbourhood relations
established by the individual herself become the most relevant social ties
in spite of the fact that many women live in close proximity with their
own agnates. The practices of reckoning kinship bilaterally and the high
incidence of Intra-village marriage forge a series of cris-crossing ties of
kinship between almost all Tuz households. Except for outsiders recently
settled in the village, there Is not a single household that cannot trace
kin links with at least one other Tuz household. 21 It could even be argued
that cognatic relations are the dominant kin relations in the village, since
it Is these that link the most number of people together.
Since Tuz is not a closed community, kinship relations outside the
village are also important in constructing social identity as well as in
carrying out everyday activities. Visits by geographically distant kin
serve to enhance one's reputation as a respected person, but they also
expand the network of personal ties through which 'business' can be
conducted. 22 Furthermore, it is through the intermediary of geographically
distant kin that many of the marriages in Tuz are contracted. Marriage
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preferences account for this situation both where yUriik and muhacir are
concerned, but in different ways. Yuruk prefer marrying kin, and possess
as a result of the population movements described above, agnates who are
potential affines in many parts of the Söke plain (and some even further
afield). By contrast, muhacir prefer to marry strangers and are therefore
forced to search for brides by using the links established by Tuz girls
marrying out. Agnatic ties among the muhacir are therefore more localised,
extending at most as far as Dogan, and kin ties to the outside are
primarily cognatic and affinal ties.
Since everyone in the village has kinship ties to many other
villagers, interaction between kin becomes an important aspect of intra-
village social relations. This interaction covers many aspects of daily
life, from recreation to economic cooperation. What marks interaction
between kin is variety rather than uniformity. At best, one can say that
compared to the muhacir, yuriik kinship is more oriented towards the
maintenance of agnatic ties, which, due to marriage preferences, are also
cognatic relations. But the effect of sedenterisation on yüriik kinship
practices is reducing the differences between the two groups. It is
therefore difficult to generalise about the content of kinship or about its
behavioural correlates. Rather than producing tightly bound corporate
groups, kin relations describe an open-ended set of people who recognise
the existence of ascribed relations between them. Social Interaction among
this set of people is not necessarily more frequent than Interaction
between non-kin.	 But all kin are interested in and are knowledgeable
about each other's affairs since these have a bearing on each individual's
own reputation. On religious festivals, kin visit one another, even if this
means undertaking trips to distant villages. An Individual's total range of
kinsmen/women (or any other subset such as agnates) very rarely comes
together.24 Among kin, certain individuals may interact more frequently
and closely, regardless of the nature of the kin tie. In some cases,
affines are seen to cooperate, while in others, the XB-ZS dyad may be the
one most frequently activated. The formation of these close ties depends
on the history of the set of people concerned, on the nature of the
conflicts that may exist between given Individuals and the kinds of
alliances formed as a result of the conflict.
91
The most important agnatic ties are those between father and son and
between siblings.2s This agnatic tie embodies many relations that Wolf has
called 'strategic' (Wolf 1966:2). To share agnatic ties means at the same
time to share property, life chances, a name and a reputat1on.2
 As long
as they share common residence, close agnates are supposed to cooperate In
all economic activities. Relations of authority based on age are supposed
to be the main guidelines governing agnatic ties. 27
 Sons should obey their
fathers and show them deference throughout their lives, even after they
obtain economic Independence. Married brothers who do not share the same
household are also supposed to maintain, at least outwardly, relations of
authority and deference. They should ideally have each others' well-being
at heart and assist one another in every way possible. Men should help
their younger brothers find wives and set up a house. Economic and
financial assistance should be provided to agnates In need. For example, a
man should rent out his land (or enter into a sharecropping contract) with
a son or a younger brother In need of land; agricultural implements should
be freely lent and labour within the households concerned should be used
cooperatively. Agnates should take care of, and protect (and control) each
others wives and daughters?e
But, conflict between close agnates Is much too widespread for these
ideals to frequently conform to actual practice. Structural as well as
psychological reasons account for this, Establishing a separate household
means establishing an Independent social Identity as well as a separate
economic base.	 It is at this point that interests diverge and social
networks proliferate in different directions. Each man Is supposed to
provide as best he can for his own family, but agnates, especially brothers,
must share the fund from which the initial capital Is drawn. The period of
common residence and cooperative labour leads to claims and counterclaims
over the various assets owned by the original household. 3° Frustrated
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expectations between the parties concerned, accusations of favouritism on
the part of the parents, and the different loyalties engendered by marriage
brings all play a part in producing conflict.
The dispute between Isa and Mehmet, who at present are not on
speaking terms, involves some of these frustrations and conflicting
loyalties. During the period when Meryem was alone in the village, she was
verbally molested by a Tuz man married to Isa's wife's sister. As a woman
without a husband, Neryem immediately turned to Isa for protection and
asked for all relations to be severed between Isa and his bacanak (WZH),
which after all, is an affinal relationship (see Appendix IV), Isa tried to
appease Meryem instead of 'protecting her (and by extension his Own)
honour' by cutting off all ties to his bacanak, Hasan, who, at the time was
looking after Isa's cows. Meryem never forgot this Incident and has been
using it against Isa and his wife Sevim whenever relations between the two
households soured.
Since, in general, close economic cooperation ends with the separation
of residence, it is the particular nature of inter-personal relations that
determines how agnatically related households will deal with one another.
In general, the agnatic tie does not create a group capable of taking Joint
action. Contrary to the Sakaltutan case described by Stirling (1965:155),
individuals cannot even rely on brothers for unconditional support in case
of conflict with third parties. People are linked to agnates through
necessity, but these links can either be activated or not. Aganatic ties
exist and cannot be ignored. They can be turned into positive ties of
mutual support, but they often take a negative form involving conflict.
Ironically, it is as a result of trying to cope with this conflict that
individuals turn for economic and moral support to others, kin as well as
non-kin.31
Under conditions of village life, no one can live alone nor limit
his/her social world to the members of the his/her household, even though
it Is to the members of every individual's household that primary loyalty
is owed. Households are built upon the conjugal tie as the basic kinship
tie. By definition, the relation between husband and wife Implies
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complementarity rather than convergence of social relations. The division
of labour, interest, and space along gender lines means that men and women
have to create their own networks of cooperation in the economic as well as
the social sphere.d 2 Kinship ties further separate husband and wife. Each
owes allegiance to (or has conflicting relations with) his/her own set of
agnatic kin. Furthermore, relations between a woman and her husband's
agnates are always strained and involve greater displays of the authority-
respect pattern. The strains of this relationship are borne by the woman
rather than the man and this state of affairs creates a very important
source of conflict between husband and wife. A bride has to face stressful
relationships involving other women with whom her husband has an
emotionally fulfilling bond: her husband's mother (analik), his sisters
(gbriimce, and his brothers' wives (1±i). 	 Sons or brothers are reproached
for being too soft on their wives, or being too easily influenced by them.
The wife, referred to and addressed as gelin (meaning the one who comes),
is always considered a stranger even among yürük who marry close kin.'4
Men find it convenient to concur with their agnates in blaming the
stranger (the gelin) for what are structural conflicts. In this way, the
ideology of agnatic solidarity can be preserved.	 Compared to men, women
are therefore in a weaker structural position. Another aspect of the
affinal tie also reinforces this structural weakness, As also argued by
Meeker (1976), upon marriage the control of a woman is totally transferred
to her husband and his family. This puts a strain on the affinal tie since
any intervention by the bride's parents in the running of everyday affairs
is immediately translated into a public statement about the reputation of
the groom's fami1y.	 As a result of these conflicting positions within the
household, the latter is rarely the locus of harmonious relations.
3.2.2 Personal Networks
Rather than relying on a given set of kin, whether agnates, cognates
or affines, individuals construct their own social networks in order to find
support as well as recreation. The people among whom such networks are
constructed are, given the nature of the village, kin, neighbours or cc-
villagers. Although both men and women need to forge relations of support
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and cooperation outside the household, the structural weakness of the
position of the woman makes her the most aggressively gregarious person
within the household. Furthermore, women avoid being alone as much as they
can: loneliness is considered to be evil (Stirling 1965:173) and it
certainly demonstrates a deficiency in status and reputation. A woman who
is alone is never alone out of choice but because others have deserted her.
Women turn first and foremost to other women in the neighbourhood
(mahalle) in order to establish cooperative relations. In general, they
choose their support networks among women who have similar needs: thus
newly-married women will find other gelin whose houses are close enough to
enable constant visiting. Informality marks interaction between neighbours
(konisu), Neighbours request assistance in many day-to-day activities,
undertake together more formal visits that might involve walking to other
neighbourhoods, attend ceremonial gatherings, leave their children in each
other's care when needed, and spend a lot of time in each other's company.
These women and their children form the basis of labour teams needed
during the cotton harvest. Above all, these women talk, exchanging many
personal experiences, sharing worries; in this way, women muster the
support they need in facing the conflicts of every-day life.37
Since women also inherit property, relations between them and their
agnates continue after marriage. Although both the father-daughter and the
sister-brother relationship are emotionally quite charged, interaction is
relatively infrequent and often is restricted to the formal visits paid to
each other by düniir (in-laws that is, the fathers of the groom and bride).
The ties between married women and their female kin are more intimate and
small gifts including daily needs such as milk, oil, or yeast are mutually
exchanged. But, especially during the first years of marriage, assistance
Is provided in a not too conspicuous fashion in order to avoid disrupting
the daughter's relations with her husband's kin.38 Many women, in fact,
deny extending any help to married daughters: "once out of this door, she
Is no longer my daughter," they say. But the mother-daughter relation, or
that between sisters, may also be conflict-ridden as a result of disputes
over the division of property, or long-standing personal antagonisms, so
that the severance of ties to a married daughter may be caused less by a
structural necessity than by these more incidental reasons. For example,
95
M:eryem maintains that her in-laws have been closer and more supportive
than her own parents, in spite of the conflicts described above. She rarely
visits her mother and her brothers. Unmarried sisters are closer to their
married sisters than the mother, since their intimacy does not pose a
similar threat to the marriage alliance. They visit freely, help with
household chores and make up the constant elements of the labour pool
which women need to draw on for agricultural activities.
The fact that women have to rely for support on achieved rather than
ascribed relations is implicitly recognised, as demonstrated by the
existence of a form of fictive kinship ceremoniously established between
unmarried girls. Close friendship between unmarried girls is often viewed
with suspicion for girl friends, through their brothers, may provide the
opportunity for 'illicit', that is uncontrolled contact between unrelated
boys and girls. In general, contact between unrelated individuals of the
opposite sex are thought to lead to relations involving sexuality.
Moreover, a girl who associates with male age-mates earns the reputation of
husband-seeker and her chances of contracting a good marriage decline.
However, rather than preventing close friendships between girls (probably
because of the impossibility of doing so), parents attempt to control such
associations. To this end a special relation called ahretlik is established
between the two friends: lengths of salvar (the baggy trousers worn by
women) cloth of the same material are bought and exchanged. Clothing for
the girls' mothers, and other small gifts are also mutually presented.
Girls proclaim their newly established relationship by socialising together,
by wearing identical clothes, and by assuming duties of helper in each
other's daily chores, Visiting relations are established between the
parents of those who have become abretlik, the girls' brothers are turned
into close kinsmen, and in this way, the relation between the girls is
brought under control .
The name of this relationship provides some indication as to the
manner in which it is perceived by the villagers: ahret is the word used
for the hereafter, and the bond that is thus established between the two
girls is supposed to be eternal. In other words, it is not simply a
worldly relationship even though it may have originated in the here and
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now. It is a mutualistic bond, entered into voluntarily and carried well
into married life. Untainted by interested motives, the ahretlik relation
becomes the embodiment of sisterly affection.
In contrast to the stress on the emotional content of relations
between women, voluntary ties between men are generally based on economic
cooperation. Individuals of similar status and outlook often closely
cooperate in cotton production: they lend each other money and implements;
they jointly undertake trips to banks and to Tans, the cotton marketing
cooperative; they exchange information and may even enter into short-term
joint ventures.40 What characterises these ties is that they are perceived
to take place between social equals and that they are based on the
expectations that a more or less balanced reciprocity will be approximated
at least in the long term. Accordingly, large cotton cultivators cooperate
with other large cotton cultivators, fishermen cooperate with other
fishermen; the latters' relations with cotton cultivators are restricted to
formal agreements where the terms of the exchange are set in advance:
sharecropping, renting, or paid labour, As in the case of women, the
importance of ascribed relations such as kinship or ethnicity are not
important in determining patterns of cooperation among men. Men whose
cotton fields are contiguous seem to cooperate on a more regular basis than
others. They often undertake trips to their fields together, and help one
another during the processes of irrigation and spraying of insecticide.
Secondly, af fines, who are often chosen on the basis of social equivalence,
end up cooperating more frequently than any other kin.
Unequal relations between men are not restricted to those between
agnates. As Isa's relationship with his brother-in-law (WZH) demonstrates,
there are also ways in which men associate with individuals who are in a
better social position than themslves. 41 Although kinship is often an
important component of these relations, the element of choice and personal
obligation is paramount. Furthermore, it is difficult to generalise on the
category of kin who enter into unequal relationships. The VZH tie is often
used in this way; other examples include elder brother-younger brother, MB-
ZS, XBS-FZS. In all of these the first-mentioned individual is the one
extending assistance, Unequal relations do not in general become overtly
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exploitative, although the man in the stronger position may attempt to
derive some benefit. At most, the 'senior man' may be assured of a stable
labour force for his cotton harvest. These relations are often of short
duration, since the subordinate person may turn to others for assistance if
he finds the present relationship too degrading. Debts incurred in these
types of unequal relationships are never openly acknowledged; relations of
subordination are expressed with extreme caution in order not to further
reduce the debtor's status. The debts in question are often paid back by
offering loyalty and assistance as well as respect. Respect is often shown
by asking for advice, imparting intimate information, visits on religious
occasions, and showing respect behaviour.42
 The existence of a difference
in social age, calculated according to factors such a marriage and
establishment of a separate household, is the one factor that makes unequal
relationships socially acceptable.
Relations of cooperation between men are not very stable whether they
are established between equals or not. As a result, men attempt to diffuse
these cooperative ties: an individual may thus be sharecropping cotton with
one man, but harvesting his olives in cooperation with another; he may
borrow money from one person, but exchange information with someone else.
The higher mobility of men compared to women facilitates the construction
by the former of wider social and economic networks. Since the house is
the female domain, men socialise in the coffeshops, where they have the
opportunity of meeting almost all of the village male population. This
spatial separation reinforces the social distance between men's and women's
networks.4-' Xen rarely conduct their social life in the company of their
wives. Occasionally, neighbours or kinsmen may visit each other in the
evenings, accompanied by their wives and daughters, Grown sons are never
part of these outings.44
Bonds between men that go beyond economic cooperation are rare and
often restricted to the relation established between Individuals who have
spent their military service together. This allows the development of a
special type of friendship (askerlik arkadasi) which involves close
visiting relations including wives and daughters. 45 Whether these
friendships between men include close economic cooperation depends on the
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compatibility of their respective economic positions.	 In general, men are
competitors, and therefore relations between them are based on distance
rather than intimacy. Men strive for the respect of their peers which they
can earn by being adequate providers within their own households. This is
primarily contingent on establishing an independent economic base so as to
raise children and marry them off adequately. In order to achieve this end,
the men of the village need help from as many people as possible without
giving them cause for criticism; and this necessary distance constitutes a
bar to intimacy.
3,3 The Village as a Community
The village is a collection of Individuals who are linked to one
another through a multiplicity of social and economic ties. As I explain in
subsequent chapters, the fact of living within such a collectivity has
important consequences with respect to the long-term viability of the petty
commodity producer in the sphere of cotton cultivation. And yet, the
foregoing has not established any immediately identifiable basis for
labelling Tuz a community. Villagers have no shared history to speak of,
nor do they have common attitudes with regard to kinship or marriage.
There is almost no occasion that brings together all the inhabitants of the
village, who interact on the basis of households and neighbourhoods. It
certainly Is not homogeneous in terms of occupation, income levels, or
access to land and other means of production. Moreover, the ease and
frequency with which ties with individuals outside the village are
maintained, also puts the notion of the village as a community into
question. I would argue that the village forms an open-ended community; it
is the sphere within which reality is socially constructed. More
specifically, the village is a special collection of individuals who have
continuous social contact with one another, and as such, form each other's
set of significant others with reference to whom social identity is
constructed.
Equality between all household heads is the basic premise on which
social interaction rests. All married men are equal In the sense that they
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are members of a moral community, that is a set of people among whom moral
claims can be made. & As heads of their households, they are all
responsible individuals in the process of raising a family, and as such are
moral persons deserving a measure of respect. Yet at a pragmatic level,
inequalities in wealth, In power, and in civil status are recognised. The
whole tenor of social interaction is based on how and when people recognise
the superiority of others, what they can do to diminish social distance
between self and others. As Bailey (1971) has so aptly put it, the
Inhabitants of Tuz end up by competing to remain equal. Stirling has
labelled a similar situation in central Anatolia as a 'chip-on-the-shoulder'
society where "no one is willing to admit anyone else's superiority, let
alone an Inherited right to issue orders" (Stirling 1965:223).
The pattern of cooperation and alliance described above can only have
meaning In terms of strategies for equality. Competition and cooperation
are the two opposing axes that describe the social boundaries of the
village. These boundaries are flexible, allowing, on occasion the inclusion
of inhabitants of other villages. Increasing one's cotton fields, one's
family and one's reputation are the basic spheres within which this
competition takes place. What Is needed to compete Is information about
others' standing in all these spheres. For this reason, I describe Tuz as a
community primarily constituted by the density of information possessed by
its members about each other's lives. Information about one another's
affairs makes up the contect of daily conversation, a situation which has
led many anthropologists to concentrate on gossip and the lie (Bailey 1971;
Pitt-Rivers 1971). On the other hand, knowledge brings familiarity and the
possibility of constant social obligation which, in turn, breed a moral
commitment as well. Thus, competition has to allow for the moral claims
made by others as members of the community. The exchange of goods and
produce described above, as well as the system of labour exchange within
cotton production can only be understood within the framework provided by
the contradictory demands of competition and cooperation engendered by
membership In the communIty.7
Tuz is primarily a farming community: irrespective of actual
occupation, most inhabitants of the community (including women) define
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themselves as farmers. Thus, being a successful farmer is the single most
important activity that confers status as well as identity. Everyone is
supposed to know the most intricate aspects of cotton cultivation and is
judged according to his/her performance as a cotton farmer. Competition is
an important aspect of cotton farming. Advice regarding cotton cultivation
is rarely given or accepted unless specifically solicited. Since everyone
is trying to do better than his neighbour, people are suspicious of freely
given adviceA	 Since It is with respect to this sphere that individuals
are most clearly differentiated, cotton cultivation becomes the arena where
competition is most apparent.
Apart from farming, age and married status are the two most important
factors conferring social position within the village for another example
where age appears to be a very important factor for social
differentIation.	 It is only heads of independent households who can
compete for status. The more wealthy a person Is, the better can he peform
his duties vis-à-vis his household, and the more assured will his
independence be. But wealth without a reputation means nothing, and
reputation is something that cannot be controlled since it depends on the
opinions of others who are often competitors. It is by comparing
themselves to others and by seeing themselves mirrored in their reputation,
that individuals acquire their social identity. The measure of one's good
standing in the village is the number of people who 'call on one's door',
that is, pay their respects by visiting and by asking for advice. For a
man, a good reputation depends on his wealth as well as the nature of his
relationships with his kin and neighbours, and the behaviour of his wife
and children. Aen who talk too little or too much, who drink too little or
too much, whose wife is too outspoken in public, whose children are not
well-behaved are criticised.°
Reputation Is also the main means through which women compete and
forge alliances. The opinion of others is of crucial importance for a
woman who Is in conflict with a close kinswoman or neighbour. 61 She, like
a man, needs people to knock on her door, to listen to her side of a
dispute and to share the chores of everyday life.	 As in the case of men,
age, position within the household, and farming status, are the basic
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criteria used to differentiate between women. Personal characteristics such
as sociability, industriousness, helpfulness, good housekeeping also count
towards one's reputation. In spite of the similarity of the criteria that
make up a good reputation, women are only compared to other women, their
status by definition being lower than male status. 53 Although the social
networks forged by husband and wife are usually separate, they nevertheless
have a bearing on each other's reputation. As a result people end up by
coipeting on the basis of the household, which then emerges as the most
significant element in the structure of the village community.
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Notes to Chapter 3
1. Close clientelist relations between peasants and townsmen of the sort
described by Kiray (1964) seem to have disappeared. Merchants in Söke
asserted that in the fifties and even in the sixties peasants had been
quite dependent on particular individuals for favours and credit. "Now",
they say, "their eyes have been opened." In all areas of the economy, from
credit to consumer markets, the sheer number of competing firms in Soke
largely accounts for the change in peasant-townsmen relations.
2. Until 1984, such a distribution of profits could not take place, due to
the large debts the cooperative had to pay off. The volume of work in the
cooperative is quite large, and the agricultural interests of many of its
members mean that the amount of labour that can be obtained from Tuz and
Dogan is limited. In an effort to reduce the numbers of outside workers it
has to hire, the cooperative tries to exclude from membership individuals
who do not provide physical labour.
3. A forest fire in 1980 destroyed many of these trees which were all
planted by Greeks and given to muhacir by the Turkish government.
4. Four households raise larger numbers of sheep and/or goats as a means of
accumulating cash. Lack of pastures, however, has seriously undermined
animal husbandry.
5. In many Turkish villages, as was the case in Tuz in the past, animals
are confided to a village shepherd, who receives an annual salary. Younger
girls, particularly the unmarried, are rarely sent to graze animals, as the
desolate reed ponds and the pathways between the fields are considered to
be 'unsafe' for unchaperoned women.
6. Villagers, including women go to the Wednesday market in Söke at least
once a month. Purchases include clothing, vegetables, household utensils
and furnishing material.
7. There are only five horse-drawn ploughs in the village. Smaller gardens
are turned over with a hand hoe. See Appendix V for the agricultural
calender in Tuz.
8. Only one yeni yiiruk household produces enough tangerines to be able to
market the produce.
9. Thus, almost in a Marxist fashion, the villagers feel that something
belongs to them only if it is the product of their own labour. Although
this argument would seem to falter in the case of land (since land is not
'produced' in the same way that wheat is), peasants quite consciously argue
that land without improvement is not worth very much.
10. Cash is restricted to men only: very few women carry cash with them
within the village.
11. The fact that after a few months, I was not considered a stranger any
more was made clear to me when I began to experience difficulties in buying
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olives, olive oil, milk, yoghurt, eggs, and beans from villagers. In the
end, I had to do all my shopping in Soke. For the same reason my one bid
to buy a kilim failed dismally: the woman who had woven it preferred to
sell it to a trader rather than to make me pay money which she needed
badly.
12. 1 have unfortunately not been able to determine the exact proportion of
daily consumption that is accounted for by items directly produced by the
members of the household.
13. I am adapting to Tuz the argument developed by Harris (1982) in
defining an 'ethnic economy' in an Andean setting.
14. At marriages cloth, pots and pans are brought as gifts, while at
circumcisions, cloth, toys, clothing and other items such as watches,
fountain pens that mark the manhood of the child are preferred. Although
the value of the sweet and the gift is obviously not equivalent, the
intention of reciprocating at an appropriate date is always present. Okuntu
literally means something that has been read over. The implication is that
the object has been sanctified by the reading of a Koranic verse. No one
actually does this.
15. In this context, I include in the meaning of subsistence sphere all
activities needed to reproduce the household on a day to day basis and
which are undertaken outside commodity relations. Generational
reproduction and the reproduction of social relations are at the moment
excluded from the analysis. Cf. Edholm, Harris and Young (1977) for a
summary of these distinctions.
16. House-building always necessitates the labour of a specialist but all
members of the household assist in order to keep cash expenditures at a
minimum.
17. There are a few paid specialists whose services are required: a siinnetçi
who performs the circumcision, a hoca (a religious learned man who is often
the imam, a government-appointed official in charge of the mosque and who
leads the faithful in prayer) who recites appropriate verses from the
Koran, and in the case of weddings (and sometimes circumcisions), a band of
musicians. One Tuz woman who is known for her skills in organising large
scale cooking performs her services free of charge.
18. The distinction between akraba and hisim, whereby the latter only
refers to affines, does not exist in Tuz. See Yalçin 1986:239.
19. Thus marriage is generally patrilocal, but any dispute may lead to the
severing of ties and neolocal marriages ensue. The first years of marriage
are often spent in the husband's father's household and economic
independence is only obtained at the end of a complicated process of
separation.
20. See the case of Giillü described in the previous chapter.
21. For some of the muhacir who have emigated from Dogan, kin ties within
Tuz are restricted to cognatic and affinal ties.
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22. Villagers describe all contacts regarding cotton planting or relations
with various officials as business (1). They argue (often correctly) that
unless one manages to find a personal link (tanidik) with the official
concerned, business cannot be conducted effectively.
23. In this context, I am reminded of Bloch's attempt at defining kinship
relations In terms of their moral significance "... and their irreducibility
to perceived economic or political reward... (1973:77). In this argument,
the higher moral load of relations between kin is shown to produce long-
term relations of generalised reciprocity, relations that do not have to be
activated constantly to be sustained over time. In Tuz, on the other hand,
relations between kin are of shorter duration and depend on being
activated. Thus,, contrary to Bloch's examples, kin ties do lapse if not
activated. Furthermore, as Bloch himself points out (ibid.), morality is
Just as important a component of relations between non-kin.
24. These rare occasions are at marriages and at Koranic readings following
death (mevlut). But, these gatherings include more than kin: friends,
neighbours, co-villagers participate as well. In fact, there is not a single
occasion which brings together kin to the exclusion of other people.
25. More distant agnates such as FB's (amca) or FBS's (amcaoglu) are much
less significant since the property bond is weaker and there are too many
affinal and cognatic links that produce divergent kin networks. The FB is
not distinguished sharply from MB or any other elder kinsman; respect and
authority are embedded in all relations between elder and younger people.
See also Stirling (1965:170).
26, Shared property includes land, buildings and agricultural implements.
Women also inherit and as a result mothers and sisters are also important
with regard to these strategic resources. It is this factor which reduces
the difference between all three kin categories: an individual shares
property with his agnates, his cognates as well as his affines. But, as a
result of inheritance practices and household authority structures, it Is
between men, brothers in particular, that property becomes more frequently
contested.
27. In many ways, personal characteristics affect the extent to which
authority is exercised in this fashion. Moreover, authority patterns are
less strict among the mubacir than they are among the yUrük.
28. In 1971, Mehmet, Meryem's husband went to Germany to work, and
entrusted his wife and son to Isa, his elder brother. A year later, Mebniet
arranged for Meryem to Join him. It was Isa who took her to Istanbul and
escorted her until she boarded the plane. Their son was left in Isa's care.
29. According to Kiray, conflicts between close agnates especially between
fathers and sons are related to the disintegration of the extended family
as a result of changes in agrarian structures (Kiray 1976; Hinderink and
Kiray 1970:183-197). However, it Is very difficult to substantiate this
proposition in view of the limited number of studies of household fission
in pre-Industrial contexts in Turkey.
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30. There was even a case of fratricide in the village in 1985. In a
dispute over the allocation of funds, a man saving up for his imminent
marriage killed his elder married brother. The latter wanted to use the
income from the previous year's cotton crop to rent more cotton land while
the younger wanted to use it to build his house. Villagers blamed the
father for not exerting his authority and for leaving his elder son in
control of household finances.
31. Many writers have stressed the atomism of the Mediterranean
household/family which provides the only cooperative relations in an
otherwise hostile environment. The best known of course is Banfield's
concept of 'Amoral Fauiilism'. See also Gilmore (1982:189). One correlate
of this assertion, that is the harmony that is supposed to exist with the
household/family unit has been criticised in a number of case studies
(Gilmore op. cit.). The Tuz case also indicates that especially due to
problems engendered by partible inheritance, relations between close agnates
are competitive rather than a cooperative.
32. See also Fallers and Fallers (1976).
33. The case of Isa and Mehinet described above is a case in point.	 All
conflicts between agnates are blamed on women, who are by definition
strangers (1).
34, See also Bates (1973:92-5) for the contradictory position of the yiiriik
bride in a nomadic context. Analik in standard Turkish means step-mother
and the term connotes all the negative imagery that it carries in English.
Similarly, the father-in-law is called babalik, step-father. These are of
course terms of address. The terms of reference in both cases are mother
(n) and father (babe). These terms of address and reference are the same
for men and f or women.
35. This contradiction is actually openly recognised by villagers in the
context of 'theoretical' discussions. It is when turning to an explanation
of a specific case that the 'lapse' takes place. In line with her emphasis
on the role of economic transformation in shaping family relationships,
Kiray argues that the HM-SW conflict has only recently become an important
reason for a man to seek separation from his parent's household
(1976:264).
36. For this reason, a young bride will often be advised not to pass
information between her mother's and her mother-in-law's house.
37. Women do not directly support each other against their in-laws. In
most cases, the very fact that they can have other people to associate with
is enough.
38. Women cannot assist their daughters, even at childbirth. These
comments are especially relevant for the first years of marriage when
husband and wife are still in the process of adjusting to one another. In
the case of disputes, a woman's parents will in fact try to refrain from
interceding on their daughter's behalf. Rather than being offered support,
women are urged by their mothers (and fathers) to comply with the
situation they are faced with. Women say that marriage is difficult and
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that one should not run home with complaints. Divorce is not a good thing
according to women since it reflects badly on the personality of the woman
involved. People argue that since marriage is the same regardless of the
character of the man, a woman who could not manage (geçlnmek) in one
household will not be able to do so in any other.
39. The social identity of the persons who become aliretlik was made clearer
to me after the death at the age of fifteen of GüllU's daughter, Fadime. On
many of the ceremonial occasions involving Giillü's family, her daughter's
ahretlik Saliha subsituted for Fadiine, assuming her duties.
40, For example, close associates may fatten slaughter animals jointly.
41. Isa was helping his brother-in-law, Hasan, a landless young man who, as
the head of a newly established household, was trying to find a means of
earning a livelihood. Hasan's father was still alive and had opposed the
marriage, and therefore refused to extend any help. In an attempt to
provide the new couple with some income, Isa had lent them a cow and was
also employing Hasan and his wife as olive pickers.
42. By respect behaviour, I mean observances such as not smoking in the
other person's presence, not speaking too much, not interrupting, minding
seating positions, and so on.
43. The separate networks established by husbands and wives has led Olson
to consider Turkish families in general as having a 'duofocal' structure
(1982 :36-7).
44. There is a conspicuous difference in this respect between yüriik and
muhacir. The former bring home to dinner unrelated men more readily than
the latter and frequent the coffeeshop less regularly.
45. There Is also another recognised form of close friendship between men
called kardaslik, which litteraly means 'like siblings' or 'step-brother'.
Contrary to the abretlik relation, there are no formal exchanges that
accompany the kardaslik tie. Furthermore, I only heard one man In the
village use this term, and I am not aware of its social ramifications.
46. See Codd (1971:191).
47. Disputes which become public and of long duration are strongly
disapproved of since they threaten the image of the village as a peaceful
and harmonious community which is often asserted, especially to outsiders.
To be dargin with too many people and for too long results In an
unfavourable reputation. After a series of conflicts with his brother, some
of which I have related above, Xehmet has cut off all relations with his
agnatic kin. This very fact has cost him a serious loss of prestige within
the village, particularly among other yüruk for whom agnation has a strong
ideological meaning.
48. "Would others wish anyone to do well?" (Alem id. olmani ister JI Is a
rhetorical question often asked to express this suspicion regarding the
Intentions of other people.
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49. See also Stirling 1965. To the extent that lineages have lost their
former Importance even among the yeni yiiriik, there Is no position of
seniority within any structure larger than the household.
50. Ability to cope with state officials or private merchants in town,
knowledge in religious matters, and education also confer prestige. I have
argued elsewhere that men compete for manhood, and that the latter can best
be conceptualised as a representative (Sirman, forthcoming).
51. The word used to refer to this ubiquitous judge, others, is ale which
literally means 'the universe'. I think this usage originates with the
muhacir and has been adopted by the yürük as they adapted themselves to
settled village life, and as the importance of their lineage organisation
diminished.
52, This need is also clearly stated by both men and women: "we are
villagers," they say, "we need people" (ki.z koyliiyüz. hlze. mean lazini).
53. Some women who, as widows, are forced to undertake cotton cultivation
on their own are nevetheless praised for acting like a man. If, on the
other hand, a married woman were to do the same, her husband would have to
sustain considerable loss of face; the woman would not necessarily share
this fate.
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CHAPTER 4: THE STRUCTURE AND CONSTITUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS
The household has proven to be a form of social grouping difficult to
delineate on a-priori grounds. While some researchers have given priority
to residence as the basic criterion for defining a household (Bender 1967),
others have stressed various economic relations such as the joint ownership
of property (Goody 1976), or the nature of certain economic exchanges
called sharing' or 'pooling' (Sahlins 1974, Wallerstein et. al. 1982) as
constituting the basic bonds which structure households. These efforts are
linked with attempts to provide a meaningful explanation of the historical
and geographical variation found in households types the world over. For
example, Fortes and Goody have stressed the importance of demographic
factors in explaining diversity. The editors of a recent volume which
specifically attempts to deal with variation in households, distinguish
three separate dimensions along which households are to be compared:
morphological (shape and size), behavioural (activities performed by the
household), and cognitive (household defined as a symbolic entity, "as a
normative or cognized system" (Netting, Wilk and Arnould 1984:xxix) But, as
Yanagisako skillfully argues, an undefined notion of domesticity informs all
of the various conceptualisations of the household unit (1979:166). 1 Thus,
the household is conceived of as the locus of domestic activities, eating,
sleeping, and so on, activities, which, as argued by Harris, are "deeply
imbued with naturalistic assumptions" (1981:63). These naturalistic
assumptions have the effect of universalising the household by reducing it
to its overt (and often reproductory) functions.
In Tuz, there can be anything between 160 and 200 households,
depending on the criteria used to define them. There are 195 married
couples and a further 39 widows and widowers, 210 entries in the
electricity register, 180 separate eating and sleeping units, and about 160
units which have Independent access to means of production (whether land
or fishing nets and boats). Xoreover, the villagers themselves are often
undecided when pushed to provide a definition for hane, households. The
term itself is an Imposition by the state, which carries out censuses and
extends medical services on the basis of domestic units called hane.
Instead of this, the term	 , which in standard Turkish means 'house' is
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widely used in the village to designate a distinct domestic unit, the
separate rooms of a house, and the married couples who occupy them. The
yiiriik use the term tayfa to Indicate the group which occupies the same i,
and ocak (hearth) Is used by both yiiriik and muhacir to refer to the kind
of ties that bind the members of a house together.
It is also very difficult to prioritise at an empirical level any
single criterion (or a special combination of a number of criteria) that
can subsume all the domestic units found in the village. In some cases, all
domestic tasks, including even subsistence gardens may be separate, but the
joint exploitation of land results in a pooling of cash resources in a way
that would satisfy Wallersteln's criterion of 'householding' . (Wallerstein
et. al. 1982)	 In other cases, on the other hand, a married couple may
share the husband father's courtyard but have completely separate
production and consumption budgets. Common residence, joint access to
resources, sharing Income, the execution of everyday domestic tasks as well
as the performance of generational reproduction (including organisation of
marriages, biological reproduction, and socialisation) are only some of the
criteria that may or may not be taken into account in the constitution of
Tuz households. But, rather than looking at what households do, I would
argue that households In Tuz are best defined according to the nature of
the social relationship that binds its constituent members together.
Relations of authority and subordination are the most important way
of identifying Tuz households as a group of Individuals linked through
specific relationships. An example of the role of power relations in
identifying distinct household units was graphically provided In the
course of a discussion about the status of one particular household headed
by a young man. Yasin had been married for three years and was living In
a separate room of his father's house with his wife and two-year-old son.
He maintained that he and his father were part of the same household since
they were farming and 'eating' together. A third man, a neighbour, argued
that they already formed two separate households, since Yasin had been able
to buy a tractor and had been renting land on his own account. This meant,
according to the neighbour, that the purse was already divided and that the
son was merely 'looking after' his father. Yasin, after considering these
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arguments, insisted that they still were one household. The problem here
was that Yasin wanted to outwardly maintain the myth that it was his
father who gave the orders and thus headed the household. In other words,
the existence or not of separate households had come down to a question of
who exercised authority and to what extent. The neighbour was indicating
that Yasin had already obtained his independence, since he could already
keep separate accounts and plan his own path for accumulating wealth and
prestige. The authority of his father over Yasin was already severely
limited.
In effect, households can only be understood within a framework that
takes account of the patterns of competition and assertions of equality
described in the previous chapter. It is not simply men who enter in a
competition to remain equal, but men as heads of households. As argued by
Yanagisako, households are more than simply domestic groups: "domestic
relationships are part and parcel of the political structure of society".
(1979:191). It is on the basis of their being authoritative people, that is
men, that individuals are able to enter into competition in the 'public'
sphere. Household heads are individuals who do not easily accept orders or
advice from anyone else, and households are units structured by relations
of inequality that are modeled on kinship relations and justified by
kinship ideology. The father occupies the central position of household
head, and his wife and children are relegated to subordinate positions. Age
and gender are the main criteria that define who Is subordinate to whom;
thus, girls are subordinate to boys, children are subordinate to parents,
and the wife is subordinate to her husband. On the basis of the
definition provided above, a total of 170 households can be Identif led in
Tuz.6
4.1 Morphological Aspects of Households
In terms of composition, the majority of Tuz households approximate
the nuclear family. 58 % of the total are composed of a man, his wife and
his children, and a further 6 % composed of a childless couple.6 Kinship,
particularly marriage and relations of filiation are among the most
important bonds that link members of households to one another. Over 10 %
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Table 4.1 Population According to Kinship Relations Within the Household
Types of Households	 Jo. of fills	 Jo. of	 Ave. HR Size
People
Hils with One harried Couple
H+V
H+W+chuldren (ch)*
H+V[+ch)+HM/WX
H+W[+ch]+HF
H+V(+ch]+siblings (sib)
H+V1+ch]+HM+slb
1{+W(+ch]+HF+sib
H+W+ch+other kin
Total
10
	
20
	
2
99
	
484
	
4.9
13
	
82
	
6.3
5
	
33
	
6.6
2
	
11
	
5.5
5
	
33
	
6.6
1
	
5
	
5
3
	
17
	
5.6
138 (812 %)	 685
	
5.0
fills With One or lore harried Couples
H+W+S+SW+ch	 6
	
39
	
6.5
H+W+S+SW+ch+S's cli 	 9
	
69
	
7.7
H+W+S+SW+S's cli	 2
	
12
	
6.0
H+W+S1 +S W+S2+SW+ch	 1
	
8
	
8
H+V+S 1 +3 W+S+S2W+ch+S's cli	 1
	
14
	
14
H+W+HX+ch+B+BW+B's cli	 2
	
17
	
8,5
H+W+HX+CH+B+BW+B's ch±sib	 1
	
9
	
9
H+W+B+BW+ch	 1
	
6
	
6
Total	 23 (13.5 %)
	
174
	
7.6
Hils With Jo harried Couples
B+B	 1	 2	 2
widow+ch	 4	 21	 5.3
widower-f cli
	
1	 2	 2
widow alone	 2	 2	 1
widow+HF+M+ch	 1	 7	 7
Total	 9 (5.3 %)	 34	 3.8
TOTAL	 170	 893	 5.3
* This includes two households where the children are from the previous
marriage of one of the spouses.
The table has been adapted from the one provided by Stirling 1965:38.
Because of the confusions surrounding them, I have omitted the terms
'simple', 'joint', and 'fragmentary' used by Stirling
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of the households include the widowed parent of one of the spouses. As a
result of the age difference between married couples ) there is a greater
number of widows in the village, the majority of whom live with one of
their married sons. Only five out of 170 households include the widowed
father of the household head. larried siblings sharing the same household
comprise only 5 % of the total. In cases where the father is still alive,
the incidence of married siblings sharing a household increases to 11 %.
In 3 out of 170 households, it is the widowed mother who is able to keep
married siblings together.
Contrary to Stirling's findings in Sakaltutan, a husbandless woman and
her children, whether the latter are married or not, do form autonomous
domestic as well as farming units in Tuz (Stirling 1965:36). Consequently,
the rate of remarriage for widows is not too high. 7 Independent access to
land is an important factor mitigating against remarriage for both widows
and widowers and is usually opposed by the children. Although divorce is
relatively uncommon in the village, elder couples unable to cohabit were
able to reside with the different domestic units of their married children,8
The majority of Tuz villagers marry over the age of twenty, and women
marry slightly earlier than men. The marriage of man requires the
accumulation of considerable wealth, a factor which delays the age at which
men marry. In general, only very slight differences can be discerned
between the ethnic groups with regard to age at marriage. luhacir men
marry later than men of the other ethnic groups. The greater authority and
the larger amount of accumulated wealth within yiiruk families explains this
difference to some extent.
Table 4.2. Average Age of larriage in Tuz According to Ethnicity
Ethnicity	 len
	
Vomen
ey	 22.9
	
20.6
yy	 23
	
21.3
in	 24.3
	
20.3
others	 21.6
	
19.5
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Tuz households are not unduly large, as can be seen from Table 4.1.
The average number of individuals per household is 5.3 for the whole
village; this number decreases to 4.9 in 'nuclear' households, and rises to
14 in those composed of more than one married couple. Fertility patterns
are also comparable between ethnic groups. There Is a recent trend to
limit the number of children In spite of the fact that the latter form an
important supply of labour during the cotton harvests? As a result of the
availability of contraceptives in the village, many of the younger women
are able to limit family size. The easiest way to demonstrate this trend
is to correlate number of children with number of married years, even
though it should be kept In mind that many of the younger couples may not
have reached the end of their reproductive carriers:10
Table 4.3 Average Number of Children According to Years of Ifarriage
Years Jarried	 ey	 yy	 others
5-10
	
1.6	 2.2
	
1.8
	
1.3
11-15
	
2.6	 2.2
	
2.6
	
3
16-20
	
2.7	 2.8
	
3.5
	
2
21-30
	
4.2	 4.7
	
4.1
	
2
30
	
5.7	 6.3
	
4.9
	
6.5
As can be seen from the table, the yeni ylirlik have a slightly higher
fertility rate than the other ethnic groups in the village. This can
partially be explained by the fact that, until recently, they were dependent
for subsistence on animal husbandry which favours higher fertility rates.1
For all ethnic groups, children are valuable for continuing the family name,
or as the villagers say, for keeping the hearth alight (ocagi tütturmek
iiz). 1	Since girls marry into their husband's households, this leads to a
slight preference for boys. Nevertheless, the value of daughters as cotton
hands is also Important as a balancing factor. 1 ' To have children
irrespective of gender Is to leave an imprint on this world and
childlessness Is thought of as the greatest of misfortunes.
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4,2 ConstitutIon of Households and the Developmental Cycle
4.2.1 Marriage
The constitution of households In Tuz can only be understood as a
long-term process involving the acquisiton of a number of statuses and
resources. In general, marriage Is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the constitution of households and should be viewed as only the
beginning of the process of household formation. After marriage, the
process of household fission and the death of the parents of either of the
spouses constitute other critical stages of what has been called the
developmental cycle of the household. It is marriage and death that
crystallise the process through which wealth, status, reputation and
identity are transmitted from one generation to the next.
A separate economic base and autonomy from other kin are also
necessary for the establishment of a household. Access to means of
farming, cash and/or land, which constitute the basis of economic autonomy,
can only be acquired over a certain period of time. The acquisition of
these means of production is Intricately linked to the developmental cycle
of the household and the timing of household fission. Thus, household size
and composition are strongly correlated with the farming status of the
parental household. In cases where the latter is economically strong, the
propensity to delay separation is high; as a result, marriage does not
automatically lead to the establishment of separate households. As the
table below indicates, only 26 % of the men married within the last five
years were able to form their own households:
Table 4.4. Number of Households According to Length of Narriage of HHH
yy
3
2
8
13
14
Years	 ey
Married
1-5	 1
6-10	 6
11-20	 11
21-30	 7
30	 14
others Total	 J(arried
RHI	 Men
3	 2	 9	 35
7	 1	 16	 28
19	 2	 40	 44
18	 1	 39	 37
36	 2	 66	 48
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The table shows that the majority (60 %) of the heads of households
are older people who have been married for more than twenty years. Not all
these heads of households are men. Out of a total of 170 households, 16
are headed by women. These women are not necessarily the decision-makers,
although some are actually able to exert considerable power. It is through
the existence of widowed mothers that the economic resources of the
household are kept intact; otherwise the resources would have to be divided
between the heirs. Another four households are headed by men who, having
no other siblings, were able to take over the resources, especially the
land and agricultural implements, of the parental household without
sustaining division as a result of inheritance.
Marriage is one of the most critical stages of the development of the
household, as well as being one of the most important social events of
village life. It is a long, drawn-out process which involves the
management of power relations within the household, the accumulation of the
necessary funds, and the establishment of relations of equality with a
number of other households.	 As I showed in the previous chapter,
knowledge of the social identity of the spouse's family is crucial in
marriage arrangements. The ethnic affiliation, economic standing and the
reputation of the families concerned are investigated by the two parties
before an arrangement can be reached. 14 In general, parity in social
standing emerges as the most important principle that guides choice of
spouse.	 This standing is a mixture of social, personal and economic
attributes and the balance struck is a combination of all these different
attributes. A relatively well-off but older man may marry a divorcee even
though virginity is highly prised for a bride, a poor villager will look for
a bride among yerli, or Kurds, or gypsies, and a man with a physical
handicap may marry an orphan (bksüz). Personal attributes, particularly
those of the bride also affect the choice of spouse.1 6 Thus an effort is
made to match the personality of the bride with the social as well as
economic requirements of the household she will marry into. For example, a
large household may need a docile and submissive woman able to get along
well with people, while another may look for an efficient person capable of
managing the house and the fields.
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Most of the marriages in the village are arranged by women who are
able to supply information and mediate marriage transactions between the
two parties. Marriage negotiations are Initiated by the groom's parents,
who, having decided that the time Is ripe for undertaking this long and
costly process, let their friends, kin and neighbours know that they are
ready to seek a bride.' 7 Contracting a marriage Is a process composed of
two distinct parts. The first is the relatively secretive efforts of
locating a suitable bride. The process of bride-seeking is the time at
which women's networks are at their most active, and every woman can
display the breadth of her sphere of action. The prospective mother-in-law
hears about possible candidates through other women In the company of whom
she tries to arrange a visit to 'see' the girl.1 ' Once the future mother-
in-law approves of the bride, the intermediary (J.çi) lets the latter and
her family know of the intentions of the 'visitor' and tries to gauge from
their formalised responses whether or not they view the match favourably.
The intermediary tries to give a more or less realistic picture of groom's
situation. 1	Moreover, It is through the mediation of the go-between that
the financial arrangements are agreed upon. These arrangements include the
stipulation of the number of gold pieces required by the bride, the time at
which they are to be presented, and the provision of 'luxury' items such as
televisions, refrigerators, and furniture. These negotiations take the form
of bargaining (pazarlik) and are referred to as such, The girl's as well as
the boy's consent are also sought and it Is thought that without such
consent, the marriage will not materialise. Usually a clandestine meeting
is arranged between the future bride and groom so that they can see one
another.° If the bride's family agrees to the match, the more public part
of the negotiations can begin; If not, other candidates will be sought.
The 'public' aspect of marriage negotiations begins with a formal
visit to the girl's father by a group of men representing the groom. It is
In the course of this occasion that the bride's hand In marriage is
formally requested. As is the case with the Sarakatsanl (Campbell
1964:125-6), the men rarely undertake this visit unless they are convinced
that the reply will be posItIve. The date and procedure for betrothal Is
agreed upon during this first visit, after which regular formal visiting
between the two families begins. The time period between betrothal and the
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actual wedding may last from six months to more than three years depending
on the time it takes for both sides to accumulate enough wealth to
undertake the wedding expenses. This period of time is full of tensions
since equality needs to be established through a variety of exchanges
between the two families. The smallest misunderstanding, a default on
promised transactions, or an evil piece of gossip may disrupt and even
terminate the proceedings. Depending on the agreement between the two
parties, there will be at most two ceremonies before the wedding proper,
the 'small' betrothal (söz nisani) and the 'big' betrothal (bUyuk nisan).
These occasions, as well as the wedding proper, often take the form of
formal musical gatherings in the bride's house. 2 The bride and groom are
able to dance together in full view of all the guests, who, In recognition
of the new social unit being created, pin small sums of money on the
couple's clothes.
As I have already mentioned, a series of transactions between the
households of bride and groom accompanies each stage of marriage
negotiations. In most of the Söke plain, bride price (baslik) Is not
formally paid. However, the bride's family demands a sum of gold coins
(besyiizluk), a gold chain of varying length, and a number of gold bracelets
before agreeing to the marriage. These pieces, which represent an
important sum of money, are provided by the groom's parents and given to
the bride herself and not to her family. Once the wedding is consummated,
this gold becomes the property of the new couple; it is often the husband
who decides what to do with the gold.-	 The transmission of this gold
represents the first stage at which the wealth accumulated by the groom's
household Is passed on to the next generation. This wealth Is in fact the
product of the labour of the groom's entire household, his own Included,
For this reason, his brothers and his sisters have a say in how much he
receives and when. Usually, weddings are planned In a strict order
according to prlmogeniture, but, since marrying off daughters is less
expensive compared to marrying eons, this order may often be upset. The
strain marriage puts on family resources often creates serious conflicts
which lie at the roots of subsequent disputes between siblings over
inheritance.
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The second major investment that the marriage of a son necessitates
is the construction of a separate dwelling for the new couple. Unless the
groom is an only child, most brides now stipulate a separate house before
agreeing to the marriage. 2z Usually these houses are built inside the
parental compound and this facilitates close cooperation between the two
'houses' in the execution of daily tasks. Nevertheless, a separate house
does allow the couple some independence from parental control, and moreover
usually reduces the tensions that may arise between the bride and her new
kin. It takes the average farmer about two to three years to earn the cash
needed to construct a new house. 24 Returns from the sale of one year's
cotton crop are immediately ploughed into house construction, provided that
some unforseen debt does not arise. The gold is bought and the house is
constructed in this piecemeal way.
The betrothal period is marked by a series of prestations and
counter-prestations between the affinal households. When the marriage is
,X	 agreed to, the groom's kin visit the bride's house bringing small gifts to
the groom and his immediate kin. 	 The visit, including the gifts are
reciprocated within a week or two. As a sign of the continuing wish of
the families to go through with the marriage, these visits are repeated on
religious holidays (bayram) for as long as the betrothal period (nisanlilik)
lasts, The clothes to be worn by the bride and the groom on their
betrothal and their wedding are also provided by their respective affines.
The strict balance in this series of gift-exchanges is nevertheless tilted
against the groom's family, especially if asked to present the bride a ram
at the Feast of Sacrifice.	 Needless to say, defaults or attempted
defaults on these exchanges cause serious conflicts between affines that
may turn out to be difficult to overcome.
Compared to the groom, the bride's contribution to the wedding is
relatively small. She has to provide almost all the soft furnishing, the
bedding, the kitchen Implements, as well as some appliances that will be
indispensable to her: a sewing-machine and a refrigerator. The groom is
recently being asked to provide some of the wooden furniture such as a
living-room suite (koltuk takimi). Since girls begin to prepare their
trousseau (çeyiz) at about the age of twelve, they have a longer period over
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which to spread cash expenditures. Young men, by contrast, have to spend
large sums of money over a period of two to three years. In 1984, an
average wedding cost a man more than 1 millIon TL., while the bride could
get away with as little as a third of this sum. The high cost of the
arranged marriage and the necessity to wait for the marriage of elder
siblings leads to frequent elopements.
Personal preference has to be taken into account in the arrangement of
marriages. This necessity stems from the fact a girl can always 'bring
shame' on her parents by eloping (kaçma). 27 Love as a bond linking two
individuals is recognised as a legitimate feeling, against which no parental
pressure can prevail. Most elopements are explained in these terms, in
spite of the fact that many young girls personally known to me eloped in
order to secure better living conditions for themselves. 	 Usually, the
parents of the groom do not have much cause to complain In case of
elopements since they are in this way spared the costs of marrying off a
son. The parents of the bride, on the other hand, feel dishonoured since
the act shows that they have not been able to raise a dutiful daughter.
The strongest sanction that her parents can bring to bear on a girl who
has eloped is to cut off all relations with her and refuse to handover her
trousseau.2 This sanction is not very effective, since considerable
pressure to restore relations is put on the parents by kin and friends
after a suitable period has elapsed. Nevertheless, a bride who arrives out
of her own volition can face additional problems In her new home to which
she had not been 'invited'. Having run away, she is 'naked' (çulsuz): she
brings nothing with her, no trousseau, no clothes, and no social relations.
The constitution of a household through an arranged marriage provides
the new couple with a fund of accumulated wealth to start them on their
path to Independence. Without this fund, It takes much longer to start
farming. For example, Ibrahim, married In 1984, has continued to farm the
family's 60-decare cotton farm together with his father and his younger
single brother. In 1987, he was able to buy 15 decares of cotton land with
the 1.600.000 TL. he obtained from the sale of his wife's gold ornaments.
By contrast, HuseyIn who eloped with a girl his parents had already
rejected has had to work as a salaried tractor driver for fIfteen years
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before he could put together the necessary capital to rent land. Seventeen
years after his marriage, he is only able to rent 25 decares of land as
well as marry his daughter off (kiz çikarma) without contracting debts.
The longer a newly married couple can stay with the parental household, the
greater their chance of founding a viable farming enterprise later on.
However, in spite of this obvious advantage, there are many pressures
forcing the new couple apart from the husband's kin, as I shall show below.
4.2,2 Household Fission
Itany factors combine to determine the timing of household fission,
which, in most cases, turns out to be a traumatic event leading to the
temporary suspension of social relations between the two households
concerned. Centrifugal pressures originate from the necessity of marrying
younger siblings, the inability of households to support a growing
population, and the divergence of the interests of the newly married couple
as they begin to face the need of accumulating wealth and prestige in their
own right.° Household fission is often preceded by frequent conflicts
over the allocation of resources within the group. Young women begin to
express resentment towards the mother-in--law's supervision and intervention
in the execution of daily tasks; men's efforts to limit the authority of
their father intensify. Counter-pressures to keep the unit intact also
exist. These range from the parental household's need for labour and the
newly founded unit's inability to find alternative sources of subsistence,
to the generally positive value attached to father-son cooperation. The
actual time of separation is determined by the particular circumstances of
the households concerned, which influence the way in which these
contradictory tendencies are acted out and the ultimate decisions made.
The strains introduced by the marriage of a son begin to be felt well
before the wedding date. As soon as a man returns from his military
service, the search for a suitable bride begins in earnest. This search is
accompanied by efforts to intensify productive activities so that the cash
needed for the gold, the house and wedding expenses can be accumulated. At
this point, many households need to rent more land than they actually own
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in order to expand the scale of production. This is a risky business since
it often Involves taking on much larger debts to pay for the rented land as
well as the extra agricultural inputs. The probability of failure is quite
high, since cotton production depends on many factors that the peasant
cannot control, rains, pests, and prices being the most obvious. Xoreover,
the added land put under production can stretch the labour resources of the
household, The increased work load may cause tensions between the members
of the household, especially between siblings, in spite of the fact that
everyone within the household has a stake in staging a memorable wedding.
The scale of the wedding, the amount of gold given to the bride, the number
of animals slaughtered in the course of the celebrations are all part and
parcel of the reputation of the household and of everyone one of its
members.' 3 Younger siblings have an added stake in working for their
elders' marriage, since this gives them the right to expect the same, even
if the married brother has already set up a separate household.
In order to allow the household time to recover, a period of two to
three years has to elapse between the marriage of each successive
offspring. The newly married couple spends at least part if not all of
this time within the large household. During this period, the new couple
and the members of the original household 'eat from the same pot'.
Although this does not necessarily mean that they all sleep under the same
roof, there is only one purse and the father (or the widowed mother)
retains the final say in the allocation of resources. The married son and
his bride work on household land along with his brothers and sisters.
However, the structure of authority and the nature of cooperation between
the members of the housheold alters as the married son attempts to gain
more control over the daily running of the household. This attempt at
control, if resented by the unmarried (usually male siblings), can lead to
unsurmountable tensions within the household. By now, a younger brother
will also be preparing for his own marriage and demand the channeling of
household resources towards securing the necessary preconditions.
Moreover, depending on the economic condition of the household, the burden
of feeding more people (especially after the birth of children) may
outweigh the contribution of the son and his wife to the maintenance of the
household.
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Fission primarily means the severing of all financial ties to the
paternal household. The new household is left to its own devices where
securing income and subsistence Is concerned; labour power is not freely
made available and all household chores are separated even when residence
is contiguous. Nevertheless, financial assistance is often extended by the
senior household to the junior one, especially If the former is relatively
wealthy and if the separation has not led to a total breakdown of
relations.	 Household fission is expressed by the term ayriyiz (we are
separate); but there are also ways of further delineating the process of
fission: avrIldim (I have separated) indicates that the junior couple
instigated the separation, while the term ayirdi shows that the senior
couple undertook the step themselves at a time that did not suit the
younger one. At the point of fission, the parental household Is supposed to
give the junior couple the necessary provisions (flour, rice, tea, sugar, and
oil) to tide them over one agricultural year. No further transmission of
wealth occurs between marriage and the death of one of the parents.
Agricultural implements, household appliances, or any other form of
accumulated wealth remain with the senior household in spite of the
separating son's material contribution towards their purchase.
In general, Tuz men stay with their parents for about four years after
their marrIage.3 Not everyone, however, is in a position to expect to be
provided with a wife and a means of livelihood. Parents can die, living
under the domination of an elder brother may prove difficult and an
individual may then have to fend for himself. This kind of situation has
occurred more frequently in the life histories of individuals over the age
of fifty, and has become rather more rare today. 	 Today, the death of the
father does not necessarily lead to the dissolution of the household, which,
under the unifying presence of the widowed mother, may be able to provide
proper marriages for all its members.
As table 4.5 shows, quite a few married men still live in the parental
household and have not yet formed a separate establishment. The sixty-
three men who have not separated from the parental household are not
necessarily young men married over the last five years. Quite to the
contrary, these men have, on average, been married for thirteen years or
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more, a fact that indicates that at least a certain proportion of Tuz men
never separate from parental households .
Table 4.5. Average Number of Households According to Time of Fission
Years After	 ey	 yy
	 I.	 0
Narriage
0-1
	
14
	
14
	
22
	
4
2-5
	
13
	
5
	
13
	
3
6-10
	
2
	 9
	
13
	
2
11-15
	
3
	
3
	
1
	
0
16- 20
	
0
	
2
	
0
	
0
2 1-30
	
1
	
0
	
1
	
0
Not Sep.	 13
	
14
	
36
	
0
Before M.	 2
	
4
	
6
	
0
Orphan
	 3
	
4
	
10
	
0
In many ways, an 'unseparated' son is in an advantageous position. A
joint household provides the possiblity of accumulating wealth without
having to construct from scratch a viable agricultural enterprise. Many of
the expensive farming implements such as tractors, ploughs, harrows, seed
planters, trailers, and fuel tanks, as well as land, the most important
agricultural asset, can be obtained from the parental household as long as
one of the parents is still alive. By the time the property has to be
divided between heirs, the 'unseparated' son Is often economically strong
enough not to be unduly hurt by the division. This advantage is clearly
illustrated by the fact that married men who have not separated are on
average able to farm, although not necessaily own, larger tracts of land.
Table 4.6. indicates the close correlation between area sown and timing of
household fission:
Table 4.6. Average Area Owned and Area Sown Per Household According to
Number of Years Spent With Parental Household After Marriage
No. of	 Area Owned (da.)
Years	 ey	 yy
0-1	 23	 34	 16
2-5	 48	 20	 26
6-10	 59	 71	 27
11-20	 56	 29	 45
Not sep.	 31	 63	 56
Orphans	 35	 43	 38
Area Sown (da.)
ey	 yy
45	 34	 26
92	 30	 51
109	 87	 51
28	 13	 90
100	 83	 63
36	 60	 22
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In general, men who separate within the fIrst year of marriage own
and farm less land than other men. Those who never separate are often
among the better-off farmers. 37 Most households try to keep at least one
of their Sons within the household as Insurance against old age. The
economic advantages obtained from delayed separation lead to Jockeying
among brothers for the right to remain with the senior household. There Is
no rule nor even a slight preference in terms of seniority or any other
criterion regarding the choice of the remaining son. 3E Brothers who have
had to establish their own agricultural base themselves always feel hard
done by, and attempt to redress the imbalance at the point of the division
of the property. In spite of the fact that inheritance rules to equal
division of all property are clearly recognised, claims to settle old scores
often transform inheritance into yet another process that pulls siblings
even further apart.
4.2.3 Inheritance
Property is fully transmitd to the following generation only at the
death of its owner. Older people hold on to their land and other
registered property such as tractors and houses until the very last, as a
way of ensuring proper care when needed. 39 Selling property (or even the
threat of doing so) is the ultimate sanction that parents can use to
discipline their adult children.° Usually this measure Is rarely resorted
to, and people in general try to pass on as much property as possible to
the following generation.
Children regardless of gender inherit equally three fourths of a dead
parent's property, and the remaining one-fourth accrues to the surviving
spouse. 1 Brothers and sisters can inherit only from childless siblings.
Since all property has to be divided equally, the process of dividing the
patrimony is often lengthy and Involves the assessment of all land parcels,
houses, olive trees, animals, and other valuables possessed by the deceased.
A court order Is necessary to finalise the division before the new owners
can register their land deeds in their own name. In many cases, disputes
over the division of property lead to long court cases. But it is equally
possible for siblings to agree among themselves as to how to divide
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property which is not equivalent. Most property can be valued in cash and
each heir may obtain his or her share in the form that best suits the
needs of each individual. Thus, a sister may relinquish her right to a
share of the house in return for a larger portion of the kitchen gardens,
or a brother who has been provided with an education and therefore a secure
civil service job, may be made to donate his share of the patrimony to his
more needy siblings. Sisters married far away may sell their share to one
of their siblings, or rent the land to a brother for a favourable price
after the division of property has taken place.
Rules of inheritance can lead to a considerable fragmentation and
parcellization of land. Arrangements between siblings of the kind
mentioned above are also entered into with a view towards preventing undue
fragmentation of land. Even so, unifying distant land parcels of different
quality usually proves to be an almost Impossible undertaking. Along with
the development of a rental market in land, flexible farming arrangements
such as sharecropping or rotating the land among siblings, help farmers
overcome some of these difficulties. Houses, gardens, and other property
are more easily divided compared to cotton land.
The strict equality according to which the patrimony is divided has
the effect of reinforcing the nuclear family, particularly the unity of the
conjugal pair.42 Often, it is through the unification of the patrimony of
the wife and the husband, that households are able to have access to
sufficient farming land. Thus, the interests of the husband and the wife
override any moral obligation towards siblings. 43 An oft-repeated saying
illustrates the dominance of the bonds that link individuals to their
family of procreation rather than that of orientation: 'my house Is
separate, my path is separate' (evim ayri. yolum yr.i). Inheritance is seen
as only forming a part- but a very important one- of the economic base on
which the independence and autonomy of the household unit rests. But
inheritance also underscores the separate social identity and genealogy of
husband and wife; a woman who inherits her father's or mother's land can
stress her contribution to the household and talk about her own ancestry
with pride. In general, owning land in their own right allows women a
certain degree of autonomy and power within the household.44
0
0
17
0
15
10.2
33.3
42.7
56.6
72
23.3
16.4
53.1
46.8
42.8
7.3
15
37.8
56.7
78.7
0
65.8*
37.2
66.4
94,5
1-5
6-10
11-20
21-30
30+
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With the settlement of the patrimony, the developmental cycle of the
household is completed. The particular stages through which each household
will pass certainly change according to economic and demographic
circumstances, But in general, one can identify three major stages: a
'joint' household immediately after marriage, a nuclear stage followed by
the addition of a widowed parent, and another 'joint' stage as the children
begin to marry. A final return to a household composed only of the
conjugal couple after the separation of all chidren is also possible. At
each point of the developmental cycle, the household is faced with a
different set of problems, which affect the economic organisation of the
household. Conversely, the agricultural capabilities of the households also
change according to the availability of labour and land within the
household: as the number of adult children increases, more labourers become
available to the household and through inheritance or the inclusion of an
aged parent, more land also becomes available to it. In general, area sown
increases with married years:
Table 4.7 Average Area of Land (da.) Sown According To lumber of Years HHH
Has Been Married
Years	 ey	 yy	 o
	
average
*This exceptionally high figure is caused by one farmer who, in association
with his father and brother, rented 600 da. of land for the period of one
year. This farmer's father is the second wealthiest peson in the village
and is able to extend considerable assistance to his married Sons.
The effect of inheritance means that, in economic terms, no household
can be the exact replica of the parental household. Similarly, newly
founded households cannot occupy the same social position as the parental
household: children do not inherit the reputation of their parents as a
totality, but only acquire certain attributes that might be traced either to
the father or to the mother, Ethnicity and the set of bilateral kin are the
two most obvious attributes that children Inherit from their parents.
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These provide the individual with a personal/familial history and a sense
of belonging to the region (or the village). Personal traits such as
industriousness, dependability and even honour (namus) are also seen to be
inherited bilaterally from both parents. All these attributes form part of
individual reputation and serve to distinguish people not only from their
father and or mother but also from their siblings. For example, Sefer,
Emine's husband is a fifty-four-year-old muhacir fisherman; he is
generally regarded as a boisterous, talkative (geveze) man who likes to
flatter himself and who is therefore not entirely dependable. The fact that
he drinks too much and that he is not able to farm his twenty-decare field
and prefers to fish instead is seen as evidence for his laziness and loose
morals. He has two sons, Orhan and Xehmet who, as a result of a lack of
accumulated cash are not able to marry. In spite of Sefer's dubious
reputation and their inability to build a separate house, Emine was able to
muster the support of her women neighbours in her search for a bride for
Orhan, but not for Xehmet. In contrast to Sefer (and J'tehmet), Orhan, a
quiet and industrious person like his mother, was thought to have
sufficient good qualities for other women to risk their own reputation in
acting as go-betweens.
4,3 Relations Within the Household: The Circulation of Labour and Goods
The household in Tuz is perceived as providing the material and
symbolic capital (cf. Bourdieu 1977) needed to engage in the competitive
struggle for position and identity. The material and the symbolic fund
created by the household are perceived to be common funds, which according
to the villagers, are shared more or less equally by all members of the
household. This composite common household fund is defined by the nature
and scale of subsistence and commodity production, and by the density of
social interactions with fellow villagers. However, as I have tried to
argue above, individuals are also engaged in building up their own separate
symbolic as well as material fund. Women as wives have their own social
networks, reputations, and Identities. Children, both male and female,
struggle to define their own autonomy and individuality with a view towards
preparing the conditions of establishing their separate households.
Nevertheless, all the members of the household are dependent for their
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personal identities on the economic and human capital that exists within
the households to which they belong at any specific moment in time, The
tensions between identification with and separation from the household
provide the clue for an understanding of the nature of Intra-household
relations.
In Tuz, the majority of households undertake productive activities as
well as organising consumption and biological reproduction. As a result of
marriage and inheritance practices, the household is also the unit that
regulates the constitution of new households. As argued by Whitehead
(1981:88), the functioning of the household as a structured collectivity
capable of undertaking these activities depends on the existence of a set
of accepted procedures according to which goods and labour are produced
and circulated within the unit. Whitehead refers to these procedures as the
'conjugal contract'.' Since, in Tuz, households are founded on the basis of
marriage rather than filiation, the conjugal contract determines to a large
extent the nature of social relations within the household. The production
and circulation of goods within the household unit also presuppose the
existence of certain patterns of control over these processes. In other
words, the conjugal contract also sets out the structure of authority within
the household, and the terms under which power relations are constituted.
The conjugal contract in Tuz is based on the idea of sharing the
common material and symbolic fund created within the household. In order
to be able to qualify for a share of the goods produced within the
household, individuals are supposed to offer any asset they may
independently control: land, labour, social ties, and reputations. However,
important distinctions with regard to gender render the villagers'
assertion stressing the communalistic aspect of household relations
untenable. As I have shown in the previous section, the material capital
brought into marriage is heavily weighted in favour of the man: he provides
the house and the cash with which an autonomous economic unit is to be
constituted. This places him in a position of superiority with regard to
the allocation of resources within the household. Patrilocal residence even
in cases of endogamous marriages, also puts a woman in an unfavourable
position with regard to social ties. 4	In effect, the household is known to
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the outside world as the man's household, who in turn, represents it and its
members to the outside world. Thus, households are centralised units
within which the (usually male) household head occupies the position of
dominance and authority. The setting up of the husband in this position of
centrality is one of the most important aspects of the conjugal contract.4'
The husband, according to the terms of the conjugal contract, is
supposed to provide the conditions through which subsistence is procured,
but he is not necessarily seen as the principal breadwinner. Every member
of the household has to participate in income-generating activities
according to a social division of labour based on age and gender. 4 Women
are in charge of all domestic activities: food processing and cooking,
washing cleaning, childcare, gathering kindling, looking after domestic
animals (fowl, sheep, and cows), and kitchen gardens. Above all, they are
responsible for the day-to-day provisioning, making sure that there is
enough food for all the members of the household, But, since commodity
production is intimately tied to the household, the category of 'domestic'
work in Tuz, also includes agricultural labour performed on cotton fields.
Men, on the other hand, are responsible primarily for commodity relations
and all activities that involve the circulation of cash. In Tuz, commodity
relations are closely tied to the production of cotton, and managing the
productive enterprise is a complex operation that involves frequent contact
with townspeople, either state functionaries or private merchants. Men also
have to provide those provisions such as flour, sugar, oil, tea, and
clothing which can only be bought for cash.so
The allocation of resources within the households follows closely
along the lines of the sexual division of labour. Women control subsistence
products, while men control cash. These forms of control are closely tied
to status within the household: only households heads have the ultimate
control over cash. Similarly, only women who are the mistress of the
household (that is the wife or mother of the oldest active male of the
household), decide how to allocate any food item that is brought into the
stores of the household.51
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In most of the households of Tuz, cash income is linked to the
production of cotton and is obtained once a year at the end of the cotton
harvest. The household head, as manager of the cotton-producing enterprise,
has immediate access to this cash. Other forms of cash income derive from
the sale of any additional commodities that the household may produce:
animals, olive oil, fish, or labour. Again, the cash obtained from the sale
of these goods also accrues directly to the household head who, in most
cases, is the active negotiator in these sales, The sale of labour power
constitutes an Important exception to which more attention must be devoted.
The sale of labour power found within the household Is by and large
limited to the activities associated with cotton production. As a result of
the inclusion of the household within the cotton-producing process, the
wage received by Its members who provide labour to other households is
converted into a 'household wage'. Many mechanisms account for this
conversion. Firstly, the assignment of cash to men means that a woman who
works in someone else's field rarely gets paid directly; rather, her wage is
often paid to a man of her household, often in the coffeehouse, thereby
placing the cash immediately under the control of the household head.'2
Secondly, the practice of delaying payments In cotton production until the
end of the harvesting season results In the aggregation of all the wages
due to one household, thus again placing the entire sum of money under the
control of the household head. 	 Thirdly, labour In cotton fields is often
remunerated In kind, leading to the disappearance of cash payments
altogether. As a result of these mechanisms, individual labour is
transformed into a collective 'household' cash Income which then is
allocated within the household.
Cash earned outside the sphere of cotton production is often
controlled by the earner, but subject to the approval of the household head.
Unmarried men often keep the small cash they earn in return for the
performance of odd jobs, Young girls may sometimes be allowed to convert
their cotton wages into a gold bracelet and thus control some form of
money Independently from their father. sa But an urgent cash need within
the household always has precedence over individual control, and then cash
(or the bracelet) earned by members of the household will be turned over to
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the household head. Since it is the household head who manages the cash
economy within the household and since he has more contact with town life
and therefore more opportunities to spend money, it is his actions which
often define the nature of the 'urgent need'. These processes are linked to
the nature of decision-making within the household and to the recognised
patterns of consumption that vary according according to gender.
In spite of this rather neat division of control which assigns men to
the commodity and women to the subsistence activities of the household, the
lack of any clear division between the subsistence and the commodity
economy and the joint Interest of men and women In the well-being of the
household lead to considerable intervention of the partners in each other's
accepted sphere of dominance, Many of the subsistence items needed by a
household are bought for cash and many of the subsistence items produced
by the household can be sold in return for cash. 	 Thus, women can
intervene in the allocation of cash by demanding the provision of necessary
consumption items. Since, according to the terms of the conjugal contract,
men are supposed to bring In the goods that the household purchases with
money, women have a legitimate base for entering into arguments with their
husbands on this issue. Conversely, men can also Intervene in the
production of many of the consumption goods destined for the household,
especially of olive oil, dried beans and milk, since these In turn, can
readily be sold for cash. Women, in an effort to obtain a minimum degree
of independence from their husbands (and as a form of security especially
in households such as Sefer's and Mehmet's where the men are prone to
spending money in gambling and drinking), attempt to keep control of the
cash obtained from the sale of subsistence goods. 	 But, the cash Involved
in these transactions is often small and may only allow a woman to
purchase a few clothes for her children, or a month's supply of cooking oil
or flour.
Decision-making is a negotiated process in which the married partners
(and their adult children) participate according to their (unequal) status
within the household. What allows the participation of women as well as of
adult children In decisions regarding cotton production is the dependence
of the household on this form of production for its generational as well as
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daily reproduction. As I have already explained, individual status and
well-being is intimately tied to the manner in which a person can execute
the tasks required of him/her. A head of a household and his wife as
mother and father have to marry off their children in a manner that will
reflect their (real but often aspired) standing within the village
community. Major decisions such as entering into debt in order to enlarge
the scale of cotton production, to purchase a tractor, or to construct a
house for a son are the product of various pressures. Some of the latter
emanate from attitudes held in the society at large and others from the
needs of the individuals that make-up the household. 	 As a result, the
male prerogative of controlling cash flows in and out of the household is
undermined by the socially accepted intervention of the other members of
the household. His dominant position is nevertheless maintained since he
is often the one person who physically has access to cash. This physical
access is itself the product of beliefs and practices which make male
households heads the representatives of their households within the
community and the nation.
Consumption patterns serve to reinforce the close association of men
with the cash economy. As I have already mentioned, men spend most of
their time in the coffeehouses of the village or in town, where they not
only socialise but also acquire valuable information with regard to
productive activities and establish contacts with creditors or merchants.
These activities necessitate the expenditure of cash on a larger scale
compared to that of a woman who stays within the village neighbourhood
most of the time. The cash spent in smoking, drinking, sitting in coffee
houses, eating out, and frequent travel to town often amounts to
considerable sums. The extra-household contacts that men are constantly
engaged in, and their identity as representatives of the household unit,
mean that their dress and manner of spending has to reflect the position of
the household. 8 Forms of conspicuous consumption are even practiced by
the unmarried sons of the household, since, they, too share the world of the
coffeehouse. Therefore, men have access to money not only as managers of
the activities that bring in cash, but also as a result of their socially
necessary expenditure patterns. Fathers have to make sure that their sons
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have adequate pocket-money; sons try to earn spending-money independently
of the household budget in order to increase expenditure. And disputes
over the allocation of cash become another area of conflict that draws
father and son apart.
The consumption pattern of women by contrast is much more restricted,
because areas of legitimate 'personal' consumption are limited. Women,
particularly as wives, are perceived as having very few personal needs and
it is thought that a woman's main efforts should concentrate on the
provisioning of the members of her household. Most of the subsistence
items needed by the household are bought in bulk by the men of the
household, and processed by the women themselves. This fact serves to
restrict the need for women to have access to cash. Even so, certain needs
remain. Married women in the village need cash in order to travel out of
the village (in order to visit relatives in other villages or to go shopping
in Söke), to visit healers and ritual specialists (and for their relatively
small fees), to buy clothing, knitting wool, vegetables, or lime (used to
whitewash walls) sold by travelling merchants, or to give to others on
ceremonial occasions (such as births, circumsicions, weddings and deaths).
The fact that they need to ask their husbands for this cash means that the
latter can to a large extent control the social activities of their wives,
Preparing a trousseau (çeyiz) is the only legitimate form of personal
consumption allowed to unmarried women. A trousseau is made up of
embroidered materials needed to furnish a house such as bedding, cushions,
kilims, any number of scarves, cooking utensils, cups and glasses, and
decorative items. These are purchased and/or made over a long period of
time and mothers preside over the building up of their daughters'
trousseaux. Eo
 A few days before her wedding, a bride lays out all her
trousseau in a room set apart for the purpose and all of the women in the
village come to inspect its contents. This public viewing of the trousseau
makes it an important component of the status and reputation of a
particular household. The part played by the trousseau in the competitive
and/or cooperative relations between women and between households puts into
question the extent to which the preparation of the trousseau should be
regarded as strictly personal consumption.
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The principles according to which goods circulate within the household
are therefore based on a number of social criteria that define the nature
of the conjugal contract as well as the role of the children. Members of
the household are defined and ranked according to definitions of gender,
age and kinship, and it is these definitions which delimit individual access
to the material wealth produced. These definitions not only provide
recognised norms of consumption, but they also prescribe the nature and
conditions under which individuals expend labour.
The central position of the household head and the fact that this
position is largely occupied by the husband/father lead to the emergence of
inequalities within the household. As argued by Harris (1981:57), it is
misleading to gloss over these social determinations and assume that
concepts such as 'sharing' or 'pooling' provide adequate descriptions of
these relations,' A number of conditions set the economic context within
which Tuz households are constituted and reproduced: most (but not all) Tuz
households are important units in the process of cotton production, almost
none can produce all the means of subsistence, commodity relations are part
and parcel of the productive and reproductive cycles of these households.
The dominance of cash in this commoditised economy and the concentration
of money in the hands of men as household heads are the main factors that
define iritra-household relations of circulation.
4.4 Conclusion
Tuz households are social units that provide the individual with the
material and symbolic capital which s/he needs in order to participate in
the social relations that constitute the village community. Although the
composition of households varies, kinship provides the main criterion for
membership. Relations between husbands and wives and between parents and
children delimit the nature of the social interaction that exists between
the members of the household. But households cannot be regarded as
isolated social units. Their structure stems from and is reinforced by
norms and values emanating from the wider society. The structure of
authority that places the household head in a dominant position can only
exist within a larger social and cultural framework that reproduces those
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gender relations that constitute households. Kinship relations, the
constitution of the village community itself and state bureaucracies place
men in the position of representing the women and children of their
households.
The reproduction of households on an annual basis is based on the
productive labour spent by its members in the spheres of subsistence
production as well as in the larger commodity economy of which the village
is a part. At various points within the developmental cycle of the
household, yearly reproduction comes into conflict with generational
reproduction, as the children of the household attempt to establish their
own separate households. Villagers often maintain that raising children
and providing them with the conditions for contracting a good marriage are
the basic aims of every individual. Ironically, it is often with the
marriage of children that the dissolution process of the original household
unit begins. The income required by the household, as well as its
productive capacity is intricately linked to processes affecting household
constitution. The following chapters will clarify this issue.
Establishing a separate household depends on having access to
independent means of economic subsistence and Independent budgeting. The
production of cotton as a commodity provides the material basis for the
existence and reproduction of the majority of Tuz households. Cotton
production is organised on a household basis, and each household has to
have access to at least some of the factors necessary to undertake cotton
production: land, labour and cash. With regard to the production of
commodities, Inter-household relations are largely regulated by a
combination of market and community relations. People can 'borrow', 'help',
'cooperate' and 'share' with members of different households which
nevertheless are still considered by the villagers as autonomous and
independent. In the following chapters, I shall try to show the extent to
which households as distinct units of production rely on the existence of
multiple ties to similar units in their efforts to establish and reproduce
themselves as cotton producers. Just as the constitution of the household
can only be understood in terms of wider social structures, explanations of
the so-called viability of peasant production must consider variables other
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than those that can immediately be defined as 'economic'. Thus, the
structure of the household, as well as that of the 'community' have to be
taken into account in the study of peasant-based commodity production.
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Notes to Chapter 4
1. Goody's influencial book in which household forms are ultimately linked
to types of agricultural production is subtitled 'A Comparative Study of the
Domestic Domain'. The volume edited by Netting, Wilk and Arnould bears a
similar subtitle: 'Comparative and Historical Studies of the Domestic Group'.
2. Wallerstein and his associates have coined the term householding to,
mean "a set of practices that ensure the sharing of resources drawn from a
multiplicity of labour forms." (1982:21).
3. But see previous chapter for an analysis of the recognition of
inequalities between households.
4. The problem with this neat scheme is with regard to the relation between
mother and son after the latter has become an adult, ie, married.
5. I have counted Yasin's household separately, but included Suleyman, who
lives in a separate house but farms with his married brother and father,
within the latter's joint household.
6. I do not want to label this unit the nuclear family because of the
evolutionary overtones of this concept, which, moreover, presupposes an
isolated unit headed by a breadwinner husband and including a full-time
nurturing wife. See especially Theme (1982).
7. Of widows still at a child-bearing age, only a landless one remarried
within the last ten years. The remarriage of widows seems to have been
more frequent in the past, both among the yüruk and the muhacir.
8. Only two divorce cases were known to me.
9. According to Kagitçibasi, economic utility is not the only factor that
affects the value given to the child, not even in rural Turkey. Social and
normative as well as psychological conditions affect this value. More
importantly, with socio-economic development, it is the latter values which
increase at the expense of the former (1982:151-180). Apart from the
increasing cost of looking after children, Tuz women mentioned the
difficulties of childbirth, and the restricting effect of large numbers of
children on the mother as reasons for limiting family size.
10. For this reason, I have excluded from the table, couples that were
married in the last five years.
11. The problems associated with land fragmentation in the case of settled
agricultural populations, were probably are absent when the yuriik were still
pastoral nomads since wealth was accumulated in animals which can increase
at considerable rates.
12. See also Delaney (1987).
13. Thus, although a few couples had more than eight children in the hope
'of finding a son', the opposite is also true. In both cases, the net effect
is to increase fertility rates.
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14. Since Tuz villagers are ethnicity-conscious, they are suspicious of
people who do not belong to any one of the ethnic groups known to them.
Therefore, marriage to a yerli is not considered very proper.
15. This aim at parity is graphically pictured in an oft-repeated phrase to
the effect that only similar drums produce similar sounds: "Davul dengi
deng me".
16. According to women, men are more or less the same and their
personalities matter very little in the success or failure of the marriage.
17. According to villagers, those who have daughters can afford to sit home
and wait for a knock on their door, but it is up to the mother of a young
man to look around in order to find him a suitable bride.
18. These visits are necessary in cases where the prospective bride lives
in another village. Although, the purpose of these visits are usually kept
secret from the girl's family and neighbours, many people are able to guess
the real reason for these visits. In Tuz, such unexpected guests are given
a rather derogatory name, kasap, meaning butcher. The best way to poke fun
at an unmarried girl is to tell her that a butcher is coming to visit her.
Similarly, the young men of Tuz who complain that the best girls in the
village seem to marry outsiders are often quite angered by these bride-
seeking visitors on whom they even play practical Jokes. Where the two
parties are from the same village, some of these intermediary steps are
omitted and the more 'public' part of the marriage process become more
relevant.
19. The intermediary also informs the bride's family of the amount of gold
the groom's parents will be able to provide and the amount of time it will
take the latter to complete wedding preparations. Although the woman who
mediates is on the groom's side, she has to be as realistic as possible in
order not to lose her credibility with the bride's family who also have
their own independent network of information.
20. These meetings are supervised by the intermediaries, and consist only
of the opportunity to literally see one another. Bride and groom rarely
exchange words before the wedding.
21. A wedding salon in some of the villages and in the town may also be
used on these occasions. I was told that in the old days, the groom could
not attend these gatherings which were smaller affairs in the course of
which the groom's parents gave their prospective bride some of the promised
gold. The wedding ceremony (dugun) is comparable to these betrothals, but
often lasts two or three days. A wedding usually means dancing to music,
The bride and the groom undertake each their own wedding, with dancing and
food distribution. They each invite their own guests to their own
compounds; usually, the groom and his close neighbours are not meant to go
to the bride's wedding. The night before the girl is taken away to her new
home, a henna ceremony marks her final segregation from her family. The
taking of the bride (kiz alma) often takes place at around midday. The
groom's side comes to the girl's house accompanied by musicians and large
numbers of villagers and almost 'wrench' the girl away away from her kin.
Unfortunately, lack of space does not allow me to go into the details or
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the symbolism of these complex occasions. See also Stirling (1965: 178-
185). Segregating the dancers according to gender is no longer practiced
in Tuz. Young men attend these occasions regularly since they provide a
unique opportunity of 'seeing' eligible young girls.
22. New brides display their gold at public occasions for as long as they
can after their wedding. But inevitably, the sum has to be used for some
productive purpose. In 1984, an average bride's gold amounted to about
500.000 TL. a sum large enough to cover the first installment of a tractor
bought through government agencies.
23, This requirement is a fairly recent innovation, one that can be linked
to the increase in the general standards of living in the area. In some
cases, the youngest son of a large family may bring his wife to live with
his widowed mother, in which case the house is made over to the groom.
24. The cost of a house can vary between 300.000 TL. to more than 1.500.000
IL. depending on size and construction materials used. In 1987, a certain
farmer had already spent 3 million TL. building his son a large two-story
house, and he estimated that he would have to spend another 2 million. The
official inflation rate was over 40 % per annum over the last three years.
25. These gifts which include a set of clothing for the bride, cloth for the
mother-in-law, eau de cologne, scarves and other assorted pieces, are
carried on large tin trays borne by the young girls of the groom's
household. The number of trays are often counted by the viewers and taken
note of.
26. Ideally two gold bracelets should adorn the horns of the ram. A girl
who receives such a gift is envied by her peers and the act brings honour
to both of the families involved. Many households refuse this obligation,
since it puts an extra financial burden on the groom's finances. Nowadays,
some brides stipulate a colour television instead of the sacrificial ram.
27. Out of a total of 270 women whose circumstances of marriages were
known to me, 68 had eloped. 25 of these were muhacir, while 17 were yürük.
The majority of these women (62 %) had run away to marry men from within
the village.
28. Running away with a townsman who can provide them with a steady
income seems to be an option favoured generally by the daughters of the
poorer households. In this way, they hope to become 'housewives' (evimin
kadini, which, in this context means to be spared the dirt and grime
(rezillik) of village life and agricultural labour.
29. Elopements disturb normal social intercourse within the village since it
is believed that girls run away because they have been influenced by some
malevolent person. It is thought that the detailed plans necessary to elope
could not be elaborated without the help of such a guide who has to be
someone close enough to the family to be able to talk to the girl without
being overheard by her close kin.	 or rehber are derogatory words used
to refer to unsolicited go-betweens.
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30. In spite of the fact that Tuz kinship and inheritance can be labelled as
bilateral (more in the case of the muhacir than the yiirük), it is not
necessary to explain this divergeance of interests in terms of the logic of
the bilateral kinship system as is done by Campbell (1964:71).
31. Weddings are remembered in the village for a long time and, in fact,
serve as a way of marking time. "Ayse quarrelled with Fatma at Hasan's
wedding", or "the cotton crop failed dismally the year Huseyin had his
wedding" are phrases often heard in the village. Many men whose brides
have eloped also hold weddings.
32. The relatively smaller burden brought by the marriage of a daughter on
family resources, as well as the gendered nature of authority relations
reduces the chances of a serious conflict developing between brothers and
sisters.
33. There are cases where a father and a separated son are said to
'sharecrop' on terms particularly advantegeous to the latter. However, this
can only occur if there are no other adult sons in the parental household.
34. The yeni yiirUk on average take a longer time to establish separate
households (4.9 years) compared to the eski yiiriik and the muhacir (3.7
years).
35. Before the 1950s the higher mortality rate and the dislocation of
populations caused by the long wars produced a larger number of orphans.
Since land was not as productive and valuable as it is today, many of the
widows and widowers remarried. As a result, boys were often forced to look
after themselves at a much earlier age, a fact which was made easier by the
fact that what they could expect to inherit from their parents was rather
limited.
36. Among eski yiirUk, non-separated men have on average been married for 8
years, among yeni yiiriik, 12 years, and among muhacir 16.5 years.
37. Moreover, the yiirük are marginally better-off than the muhacir.
38. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the son who stays with his
father will not decide to separate households at some later date.
39. Although villagers maintain that looking after aged parents is part of
filial duty and that defaulting from this duty brings shame, many admit
that this added incentive is often necessary. Sons as well as daughters
try to get their aged parents to live with them so as to be able to farm
their land. See chapter 7.
40. A man whose daughter, his last unmarried child, ran away to marry, sold
all his land and is now trying to make a living herding the six goats he
still owns. The disowned children tried without success to prove in court
that their father was not fit to manage his own affairs and thus reverse
the sale. Starr, writing of a village 100 kiloinetres south of Tuz, reports
similar accusations of Insanity in a case where a woman was disputing the
sale of land to her siblings by her aged parent (1984:107).
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41. See also Starr (1984) for a description of similar practices.
42. In Sakaltutan, where In the 1950s female inheritance was only a rare
occurance, the decline of the power of lineages as well as the influence of
urban values was beginning to make it possible for women to demand and
receive their patrimony (Stirling 1965:131). As suggested by Scott
(1986:101), transformation in the structure of production may account for
change in the transmission of productive resources.
43. Starr documents a case of a woman, with the help of her husband,
successfully sueing her brother for her share of the patrimony (1978:213-
23), Similar cases were also related to me in Tuz.
44. Conversely, lack of inheritance does have a negative effect upon the
position of women within the household.
45. Vhitehead defines the 'conjugal contract' as "the terms on which
husbands and wives exchange goods, Incomes, and services, Including labour
within the household" (1981:88). Thus, It Is within the terms of the
conjugal contract that she locates the sexual division of labour, which she
defines as "a system of allocating the labour of the sexes to activities,
and highly importantly, a system of distributing the product of these
activities" (1981:90).
46. Having to live within the household or the compound of her husband's
father, the bride is immediately brought under the surveilance of women
related to her affinally. Her contact with women in other households can
and often is controlled by her HI'! and HZ's.
47. The Turkish Civil Code which states that the husband is the head of the
household and that women have to live where their husbands reside and can
enter into gainful employment only with the husband's consent, provides the
legal backdrop of this conjugal contract and reinforces the dominant
position of the male household head.
48. By contrast, the Turkish Civil Code does expressly state that the
husband should be the main provider. In Tuz, households which do not farm
are more dependent on the breadwinning activities of the man, but even
then, the other members of the household cannot expect to provide nothing
towards the common subsistence fund.
49. As I explain In Chapter 9 the reciprocal exchange mechanisms through
which labour is recruited for the cotton harvest means that many women
work on fields owned by other households as an extension of 'domestic'
tasks.
50. As argued by Whitehead, the fact that women are responsible for feeding
members of the household, particularly the children, means that she has to
compensate through her own labour for any default by her husband in
carrying out his share of the contract. For example, Xeryem was often
forced to work In the cotton fields of the village shop owner in order to
pay for debts contracted during Xehmet's long illness.
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51. In fact, it is only this woman who can take out the flour needed to
make the daily bread and the oil used. According to Yalçin who reports a
similar situation among the Kurds of Hakkâri, a recognised title
distinguishes the mistress of the Kurdish household from the other women
(1986:95-9). No such title is found among the villagers of Tuz.
52. Villagers often found it difficult to pay my wages: I did not have a
male representative to whom payment could be made.
53. Men, as managers of cotton enterprises, record the amount of work
performed by hired labourers according to the name of the household to
which the latter belong. Men do not often know the names of the younger
boys and the women of a household and may simply note them down in their
ledgers according to their social status within their household: girl (kjz),
bride (gelin), small boy (kucUk oglan).
54, Married women are rarely able to keep cash earnings from cotton
production since they often only work in cotton fields (their own or not)
when it is strictly necessary for the reproduction of the household.
Married women also have access to very small amounts of cash received from
the occasional sale of home-produced dairy products (milk, yoghurt, eggs)
or from the sale of an item of clothing. Many women are speclalised
einbroiderers and some are known for their skill as dress-makers. These
services can be rendered either in return for cash, or may be paid in kind.
55. Olive oil production is a case in point, illustrating the latter
possibility.
56. Often by keeping the transaction secret for as long as possible.
57. Women in general have detailed knowledge regarding the cash flows
required within the process of production. They know current input prices
and the amount of cash borrowed from various sources. The farm survey
that I carried out in 1984 is in fact based largely on information provided
by the women of the household.
58. Thus men often wear ready made clothing which are more expensive than
the home-made baggy trousers that women wear; in public, rather than
smoking the cheaper Turkish brands, they carry Marlboro cigarettes in order
to impress people. See Kiray (1979:364-8) for a similar account of
patterns of consumption in a small Black Sea town.
59. It is interesting that men oppose the expenditure of cash on ritual
specialists. Conflict among women is usually accompanied by accusations of
witchcraft. Misfortunes or unresolved conflicts between members of the
household are thought to arise from black magic (etki or magiya according
to the muhacir) performed by a specialist at the instigation of an enemy
(düsman). Women resort to the services of a specialist, usually someone
who can read the Arabic script, to find out the culprit and to protect
themselves and their kin. Men give the impression that they only tolerate
these activities which are 'backward' and useless.
60. Discussion of patterns for the various embroidered items of the
trousseau is one of the main topics of conversation among women and
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unmarried girls. Women are always busy knitting, crocheting and
embroidering, and the exchange of the various patterns used constitutes an
important aspect of social interaction among women.
§1. The fact that villagers use these terms to describe intra-household
exchange relations should not be accepted as an adequate description of
reality.
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CHAPTER 5: PRODUCTION OF COTTON IN SöKE: CONDITIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
The production of cotton constitutes the principal source of income
for the majority of the inhabitants of the Soke region today, whether they
work as self-employed independent producers, agricultural labourers, or
workers in cotton-related industries, Agricultural production is still the
most important sector of production in the Sbke district and the main form
of income for the village dwellers who make up 60 % of the area's
population (DIE 1983a:3). Cotton occupies a privileged place in Söke's
agriculture with more than half of the total arable land cropped to cotton.
The share of land under cotton shows minor yearly fluctuations (see Köseli
1975:64) and has registered a net decrease in the past five years as other
crops have been able to compete with cotton more successfully. However,
the producers who are able to effect the switch away from cotton are large
capitalist landowners who use hired labour for all the operations needed in
cotton production. Parallel to this dominance of cotton, the major portion
of all agricultural income (75% in 1973) was generated through cotton
production (Köseli 1975:57).
Cotton production in Soke is undertaken by a number of different types
of agricultural enterprises which vary according to their organisation of
production: 1) amount of land under production which to a large extent
determines output, 2) 'type' of labour employed (by which I mean the extent
to which household labour is used for various labour processes), and 3)
cropping patterns. The most important difference between the different
enterprises is with regard to what I call the strategy of production: the
extent to which capital as opposed to labour constitutes the major factor
of production in the organisation of the entreprise.
The most important similarity among producers of all kinds is with
respect to the productive forces. In other words, all kinds of productive
units employ (with slight variations) similar cultivation technologies and
use labour in comparable ways. This means that all producers cultivate
land with a tractor and none of them use any form of mechanical harvesting
and hoeing. The flexible substitution of mechanisation for labour or vice
versa to suit the needs of particular enterprises is not possible beyond
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certain limits. Vithin these limits, it is possible to increase yield by
increasing labour input, or by increasing capital input (in the form of
added fertilisers, better irrigation, or the purchase of better land). But,
it is the similarity in production techniques rather than the difference
which is the most striking aspect of cotton production in the S6ke plain.
In this chapter, I aim to delineate the economic setting and
technological constraints of cotton cultivation, thus concentrating on the
similarities of the cotton producing process. In the subsequent chapters, I
shall discuss organisation of work and access to land, to labour and to
money capital in order to indicate the variability in the way these
different factors are combined in the production process. I shall try to
show why it is that larger production units, to the extent that their
dependence on household labour diminishes, are forced to switch away from
cotton production. At this point, I shall demonstrate firstly that
production of cotton requires considerable levels of technological inputs
which are purchased on the market, I shall argue that state intervention
in agricultural production is responsible for the availability of these
inputs to the small producer. Secondly, I shall show that labour
availibility, under conditions of partial commoditisation, constitutes an
important factor limiting area cropped to cotton. Thus the availability of
cash and labour to a large extent determines both the extent of the area
under cultivation and the size of yields (in terms of kilogrammes per
hectare).
5.1 The Commoditisation of Cotton Cultivation in Turkey
Cotton is produced in Turkey today both as an export commodity and as
an important raw material for the most developed sector of Turkish
industry, namely textiles. As such it has been at the forefront of two
types of development strategy promoted by successive governments: import
substitution industrialisation and export promotion. Although the effects
of these policies on the direct producer are different in many respects
(particularly in terms of prices received by the producer), both
necessitated an extension and commoditisation of cotton production.
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Today 98% of cotton production is marketed. The produce is
categorised into nationally-recognised grades on the basis of the colour,
moisture and length of the lint. All land suitable for cotton production is
now being utilised so that any increase in production now depends on
intensification of production. State intervention in the production process
has beeen greatly responsible for this increase in production. State
intervention has mainly affected the producer through pricing policies,
although state subsidisation of input markets was also important and
widespread. State subsidies In inputs were mainly geared to Increasing
fixed capital assets (such as mechanisation and Irrigation) and extending
the use of 'modern' Inputs such as chemical fertilisers and insecticides and
above all improved cotton seed.
The commoditisation of inputs varies according to the type of
production unit involved. The majority of cotton producers increasingly
have to purchase the 'modern' (as opposed to 'traditional' land and labour)
factors of production thus augmenting the proportion of commoditised
inputs. Nevertheless, the extent to which land and labour are commoditised
vary according to the nature of the production unit. In peasant farms, land
and labour are by and large less commodItised than the other inputs. The
extension of state credit and price supports have been identified as the
most important factors responsible for the Increasing Involvement of
peasant producers in commodity cycles (Keyder 1983a; Xargulies 1985). In
this section I shall briefly trace the developments of cotton production in
Turkey from an export-oriented crop produced by large landowners, to one
primarily intended for domestic Industry and largely produced by 'small'
enterprises.'
Although cotton and cotton textiles had been produced commercially in
Turkey since at least the middle ages (cf. Faroqhi 1979; 1984) 2 , it was not
until the 'cotton famine' of the Lancashire mills during the American Civil
War that technological Improvements were Introduced in order to transform
the process of production. The cotton cultivated was of the Indian variety
which produces a short lint unspinnable In factories. Until 1865, the
production of this local (yerli) cotton in the Ottoman Empire had,as a
result of competition from America, slumped dramatically from the high
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levels it had achieved at the beginning of the century when Turkey had been
one of the main suppliers for European textile factories (Novichev 1966:67).
Largely through pressures from mercantile interests in Istanbul and Izmir,
the government attempted to subsidize cotton production through a variety
of measures in order to meet British demand (Quataert 1973:282).
Improvements such as the dissemination of American and Egyptian cotton
seed (both of which have long, mechanically spinnable lint) the
encouragement of better production techniques and the importation of tools
and machinery for growing as well as cleaning cotton were among those
measures designed to increase production and improve quality. Free
information on growing techniques and short courses to train farmers were
part of the governments's efforts to encourage the production of cotton.
These were furthermore accompanied by a number of tax exemptions and other
privileges (Quataert 1973:273-295; Kurmus 1974:78).
The extent to which peasant producers on the one hand, and large
landowners on the other, took advantage of these measures and became
involved in the production of cotton as a cash crop is not very clear.
According to one economic historian, both cotton cultivation and the
production of textiles until the first world war was largely for domestic
use, and hence (it is assumed) on a small scale (Pamuk 1984:106-7). Until
the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, it seems that efforts to
commoditise and extend cotton production responded to world cotton prices
and were spearheaded by Izmir and Adana merchants (Quataert ibid:279-280).
Although the main source of this production seems to have been the Adana
region, where large scale production was prevalent (International Institute
of Agriculture 1926:158; Novichev 1966:68), it is possible that a certain
proportion of smaller-scale cotton production, mainly by peasants, did also
reach international markets. The national market in cotton textiles on the
other hand, to the extent that can be inferred from indigenous textile
production trends, contracted sharply during the course of the nineteenth
century, from a pDstion of near self-sufficiency, to near total reliance on
(primarily British) imports by 1914 (Pamuk 1984:114). Thus, during the
last century, exports of raw cotton to some extent indicate the degree of
commoditisation of cotton production: while the commoditisation of peasant
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production was undergoing a decline, there was an increase in large scale
production of cotton destined mainly for exports.4
Although the modernising effects of the American Civil Var for Turkish
cotton production (or indeed In establishing Ottoman Turkey as a main
supplier of cotton for Europe) were rather limited, certain Important long-
term consequences did follow. The first and perhaps most crucial was In
the direction of seed selection, especially through experiments to adapt
American Upland cottons to local conditions. Secondly, It was primarily as
a result of these efforts that Adana and Izmlr began to specialize In the
production of cotton (Quataert 1973:290; Kurmus 1974:90). In the Aegean
region two commercial banks speclalising in long-term loans to small
farmers started to operate in order to encourage cotton production (Kurmus
1974:87). Modern methods for ginning and pressing cotton introduced In
this period were still In use In the early fifties (Dunn 1952:54).6
Although the extent to which small farmers and peasants switched to the
production of cotton is not known, there are Indications that large farmers
were Increasingly doing so7 As a result of the destruction of the
indigenous textile Industry, until the establishment of the Republic cotton
production was mainly for exportation, (Pamuk 1984:103-125; Quataert
1973:290).
Important transformations in the structure of Turkish agriculture did
not take place until the changes in government and policies after 1950.
This applies both to the rates of commoditisation of production and to
technological improvements. Until then Turkish agriculture remained
generally technologically backward. The majority of farmers produced wheat
for their own consumption.6 Cotton production, to the extent that one can
surmise on the basis of rather scanty evidence, remained in the hands of
export oriented large farmers. The area cropped to cotton increased
steadily, but remained low in comparison to post-195O developments.
Between 1932 and 1983 area cropped to cotton Increased by 76 % and yields
increased by more than 80 %:
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249
239
235
264
251
309
474
758
716
744
863
1932
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1983
20.2
52,2
77.1
54.3
118.4
157.0
192.0
325.0
400.0
480.0
500.0
522.0
158.1
209.9
324.6
231.4
448.4
625.0
621.0
685.0
527.7
670.0
671.6
605.5
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Table 5.1 Cotton Production in Turkey
Years
	
Area	 Productionl-	 Yield *4
(000 ha.)* (000 pt***)	 kg./ha.
* ha.= hectare = 10 decare.
** According to lint rather than seed cotton
*** mt= metric tonnes
source: DIE selected years; Kaymak and Someren 1981: 980.
The major change that affected the marketing of cotton was the
development of a domestic textile industry, which, replaced exports as the
motor behind the expansion of cotton cultivation particularly after the
depression (Singer 1977:66-7; Tezel 1982:218). 	 These developments have
been largely explained by students of the Turkish economy prior to 1950 in
terms of a switch in state economic policies from one based on exports of
mainly agricultural commodities to one of import substitution
industrialisation. Textiles held an important position in both strategies.
As a result of a change in state policy, evident in the mid-thirties,
the increasing role of the state in the economy began to direct Turkey's
development strategies. Direct intervention in the economy was becoming
the basic principle of state regulation (Eraip 1983:126-140>. By 1950, the
state had become heavily involved in industrial production. This
involvement largely took the form of state ownership and management of a
number of important Industries: textiles, iron, steel, sugar processing,
mining and construction. The share of public (state) enterprises was
substantial in all of these branches of industry, in which state and
private enterprises collaborated to increase Turkey's output (ibid). To
illustrate the position of the state in the late 1940's, it is interesting to
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note that 46% of all workers in 'large' enterprises at that time were
employed by the state (Tezel 1982:429).
Among the different industries mentioned above, textiles were the
largest in terms of output as well as capital investment (Singer 1977:40-1;
Dunn 1952:19; Tezel 1982:426). This was true of both the public and the
private sectors (Singer 1977:66). Textiles, in particular cotton cloth ana
yarn, had been the single largest import item in the early years of the
Republic and with diminishing foreign reserves (largely due to the world
depression), Turkish industrialists attempted to exploit domestic raw
materials and capital for an Item which had an established demand.
External trade figures between 1923 and 1950 show important reductions in
the percentage of textiles in Turkey's total imports:
Table 5.2 TurkIsh Imports and Exports of Cotton as Feren tage of Total
Exports and Imports
Tears
1923-1929
1930-1938
1939-1945
1945-1949
1950
Exports
cLint)
6.6
6.0
4.0
4.0
27.0
laports
(Cloth*)
31
21
10
11
7
Imports
(Yarn*)
3.0
7.5
6.6
10.5
6.0
* These figures unfortunately Include wool as well as cotton.
Source : Tezel (1982:108-9).
Therefore, although etatiste policies In general supported industry rather
than agriculture (Tezel 1982:413; Birtek 1985), cotton production was
nevertheless protected as a strategic raw material whose output had to be
increased (Tezel 1982:232).
As mentioned above, state Involvement in the encouragement of cotton
production prior to 1932 remained largely indirect. The Increases realized
were due to favourable cotton prices in world markets; but more
importantly, they were due to what Keyder calls an 'aggressive' policy on
the part of cotton traders (1982:62). It is after 1932 that the state
became more involved in the conditions of cotton production. During the
151
1930s and early 1940s, the Ministry of Agriculture commissioned a number
of studies detailing the conditions under which cotton was produced and
asked its experts to suggest ways of increasing quantity as well as
improving quality. I shall briefly outline these conditions as a way of
providing a basis to assess later developments. A number of problems
delineated in these reports, especially those regarding the supply of
labour, continue to persist today.
The reports presented to the Ministry of Agriculture on the state of
cotton production focus not only on technological innovations designed to
increase yield, but point to a number of economic policies that could be
implemented by the state to make cotton production more attractive to the
farmers so that they might increase the area under production (Ziraat
Vekaleti (ZV) 1935 and Turgay and Bailleux 1940). The different experts
reporting to the ministry approached the problem in terms of profitability
and hence productivity. If cotton production could be made more productive
in terms of return to area of land, then it would be more profitable in
terms of return to Invested capital and more farmers would undertake its
production. Productivity, in turn, was mainly seen as a technical Issue
which nevertheless had economic and social corollaries that could be
regulated by state intervention.
The main cause of low productivity singled out in these reports was
the type of seed planted. This was the closed-boll Indian cotton which
with its short lint made it unsuitable for the factories that were being
planned. The bulk of Turkish cotton could therefore only be used to spin
yarn for manual looms which produced coarser cotton fabrics. A number of
factors, especially shortage of labour, mitigated against the wider
acceptance of American strands (ZV 1935:38).b0 The technological aspect of
this problem could be solved through the development of improved seeds
adapted to local conditions. However, the economic and social problem of
labour shortage was more serious. Increasing wage rates seemed one way to
attract more seasonal labour for hoeing and harvesting, the two operations
which could not be easily mechanised. Wages, however, could only be
increased if the price received by farmers for the better quality cotton
was set well above that received by the inferior product. Thus, farmers
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would have the incentive not only to produce the better quality crop, but
would also be able to pay harvesters a wage that could attract them in
sufficient numbers (ZV 1935:38,42). h1 The report also urges the state to
take a more active role in the organisation of the labour market in
agriculture (ibid).
Another expert reporting in the same publication brings out a
different structural problem to account for the small area under cotton
production. In his opinion, it is the structure of land ownership in those
regions most amenable to cotton production that should be transformed. As
a result of large landownership, vast tracts of potentially fertile lands
remained uncultivated. In Adana, where 1000-1500-decare holdings were not
infrequent, sharecropping seems to have been the dominant form of land
tenure (ZV 1935:118).12 This, according to the writer, reduced the rate at
which innovations and technical improvements were accepted, although it did
solve the labour problem to a certain extent. Adana, even with its large
proportion of unused land, still attracted thirty five to fourty thousand
seasonal labourers during the cotton harvests (ZV 1935:145). The solution,
according to this expert, lay in a large-scale redistribution of land that
would break up the large estates thereby creating peasants who would
produce cotton. The use of family labour would solve the labour problem
and the income derived from cotton production would raise the standards of
living of numerous families. Finally, this would result in a more efficient
form of land use (ZV 1935:145-147).
Apart from problems relating to land and labour, the reports point to
a number of 'technological' inputs that needed to be improved to achieve the
output targets that were demanded by new industrialisation programmes.
Seed selection and ways of preventing the degeneration of good quality seed
were at the top of the agenda. In the Aegean and Adana regions, a number
of state farms experimenting with breeding varieties adapted to local
conditions were established at this time, but had not been in operation
long enough to have a significant impact on production practices. Noreover,
irrigation was rarely practiced In spite of the location of large rivers in
areas of cotton production. It required an infrastructure that most farmers
could either not provide by themselves, or would not provide on the basis
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of existing cotton prices. Fertiliser use and pest control were virtually
unknown.
On the marketing side, things did not look so good either. The
standardisation of Turkish cottons was far from being achieved so that the
quality of the crop could never be predicted. Furthermore, there was no
national, let alone international standard of crop classification to
facilitate marketing.
On the basis of these reports, it is plausible to conclude that
although cotton might have been produced for a national and international
market, 13 conditions of production and marketing Indicate that in actuality,
the crop was commoditlsed only to a limited extent. Inputs were not
commoditised and markets were not uniform. It is Interesting to note that
these reports advocate different strategies with regard to the solution of
the problem but they both see the state as the main agent In changing
conditions of production and marketing. The first expert suggests the
commoditisation of production on the basis of wage labour and 'capitalist'
farmers while the second advocates the establishment of family labour
farms. The predominance of small peasant farmers in Söke's cotton
production can be explained in terms of state Intervention in Input and
output markets. Credit extension to producers allowed them to purchase the
necessary technology (at subsidised government prices) and price support
policies created a stable product market.' 4 By contrast the state did
little with regard to land distribution' 5 or the organisation of the
agricultural labour market. I shall now turn to an examination of these
policies.
Since the establishment of multi-party politics In 1950, agrarian
policies have attained an Increasingly political significance in a country
where the population continued to be largely rural.' 6 Regardless of the
composition of the ruling party, growth In industry rather than agriculture
has been the object of successive governments. Even during the 1950's,
when large landowners constituted an Important faction of the ruling party,
growth in the rates of GNP shows that industry surpassed agriculture. This
trend was enhanced after the setting up of a State Planning Organisation in
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1962. Thus agriculture provided more than 80% of the GNP before 1950
compared to 36.5% In 1975. The rural sector has nevertheless not been
allowed to stagnate for a number of often contradictory reasons. The
creation of a home market for the expanding industries at times coincided
with political calculations designed to attract votes resulting in large
subsidies for agriculture. At other conjunctures, the need to keep down the
price of raw materials and food produced opposite measures. Export
products faced different constraints according to the item in question)7
Whatever the reason, state intervention in agriculture has been substantial
between 1963 and 1980.
Mechanisation has been the most important area of intervention with
regard to inputs. In the early fifties, the government was greatly
influenced by numerous American experts who arrived in Turkey in the wake
of the extension of Marshall Aid to cover Turkey. These experts advocated
a programme of increasing on-farm fixed capital assets in order to increase
agricultural output. This, in the first instance, meant extending and
facilitating the use of tractors which between 1950 and 1960 came to
symbolise the capitalisation of Turkish agriculture (Singer 1977:199). The
immediate impact of these tractors was to expand the area under
cultivation. This expansion was mainly achieved through the opening up of
new lands and pastures rather than by switching away from the wooden
plough. The entry of tractors into Turkish agriculture immediately produced
large increases in agricultural output (Margulles 1985:148-152). Other
consequences, particularly with respect to structural features (such as land
tenure) were also felt, although it is difficult to assess the importance of
one factor on a process which is long-term and dependent on a number of
different factors. 1	It was only after the mid sixties that tractors
started to displace the wooden plough, thus altering productivity structures
for the majority of farmers. It was also at this time that larger numbers
of small peasants began to get access to tractors, mainly as a result of
government credits. 19 Without corresponding measures to spread its
adoption, the impact of the tractor remained limited to large landowners, as
is shown by the fact that tractors for a long time were concentrated in the
Adana and the Aegean regions (Margulies 1985:129)20.
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The state also attempted to make available to farmers commoditised
yield increasing inputs such as improved seed, fertiliser and chemical
pesticide. With regard to cotton, improved seed was already widespread by
1952, accounting for 90% of all planted cotton (Dunn 1952:38). The
government prohibited the use of seed which had not been developed by the
cotton breeding stations (ibid.). By 1980, 98% of cotton seed used was of
the American Upland variety and government certified, an increase of 24%
over a period of sixteen years (Kaymak and Someren 1981:984). Fertiliser
use, which had been negligible in cotton production before 1950, became an
integral part of the production process. Since 1963, government policies
took the extension of fertiliser use in Turkish agriculture seriously; both
Imports and domestic production rose rapidly. Xoreover, state subsidies
kept the price of fertiliser well below cost price as well as world prices
(Kepenek 1983:321). By 1971, government agencies such as the Agricultural
Supply organisation and various credit and sales cooperatives, were
responsible for 92% of total retail sales (Aresvik 1975:64,69). Government
policy, according to Nargulies, was the determining factor in the increased
consumption of fertiliser (1985:245).21
It was also after the nineteen fifties that the state started to put
more emphasis on irrigation, both large scale (involving the construction
of large dams) and smaller projects. Private irrigation schemes were also
stepped up, often involving substantial funds from the Agricultural Bank,.
However, progress in this area has been rather slow and by 1980 only 12%
of the total land cultivated in Turkey was irrigated (DIE 1980:210). As
with fertilisation, a substantial portion of irrigated land is cropped to
cotton.23 It has been suggested that fertilisation combined with irrigation
increases yield per hectare by fifty percent (Dunn 1952:61-2). Statistics
on yield improvements show that increases in cotton yields were
accomplished at the same time as the wider adoption of the inputs
mentioned above; by the end of the seventies, yields had increased more
than 60% In relation to 1955 yields.24 This period coincides with the
spread of Improved technology. It would thus appear that improved
technology and increased yields are closely connected.
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The increased use of commoditised inputs necessitates larger
expenditures of cash prior to the harvest. This means that unless the
producer has savings from the previous harvest, s/he will have to borrow
the needed cash. It is in this area that state credits have been
instrumental in the wider adoption of modern inputs. Since the early
sixties, state intervention has allowed larger and larger numbers of
producers to receive an important part of their investment needs in the
shape of state-subsidised credit, although the state still only supplies a
portion of total need (Margulies l985:274_276). 2s Through various channels
such as the agricultural banks and the credit and sales cooperatives, the
state distributes three forms of credit: short term in cash and/or in kind
(fertiliser, seed,etc.) to supply yearly inputs such as fertilisers, seed and
pesticide, medium term credit given for a period of three to five years to
purchase machinery including tractors and motor pumps for irrigation, or to
set up irrigation sytems, and finally, long term credits of up to twenty
years with which producers are supposed to be able to buy land. The
majority of producers have largely been able to obtain only short-term
credit. Assessments of the role of the state in agricultural credit
markets vary. While some maintain that state credits have been
instrumental in consolidating small independent family farming (Keyder
1983a), others argue that state intervention has benefitted only large
farmers, especially where crops such as whaet are concerned (Areevik
1975:82; Ulusan 1980:139; Singer 1977:205; Mann 1980:209). One study
concentrating on the late 1960's has shown that 92.5 % of institutional
(that is bank and state) credits were used for operating expenses and that
non-institutional ( private merchants and 'friends') loans were used for the
bulk of fixed capital expenditures. On the basis of this data, it has been
urged that middle and long term credits be expanded (Blalock 1969:32) •26
Price support policies have been even more important than the
distribution of credit in providing the incentive to adopt technological
innovation. The state has subsidised wheat growers since the 19305.27
Dther crops such as tobacco and tea were subjected to state monopoly
purchasing at a government determined price during the 194 Os. Export
crops such as hazelnuts, figs raisins, and cotton were included in this
policy only after the 1960s (Margulies 1985:297). Today, private merchants
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are also able to purchase these crops. The government declares a floor
price for the various crops, usually at harvest time, and designates Its
agents to purchase the product directly from farmers at the specified
price. These prices have been Instrumental In establishing a nationally
uniform market for all major crops grown in the country (Margulies
1985:298). One of the other Important aims of these policies has been to
curtail the sale of agricultural produce to private merchants below the
costs of production. This, In turn, depends on the extent to which
merchants can be excluded from the credit market.
Although these pricing policies have repeatedly come under attack from
various quarters/positIons 2 , they have to a large extent created a fifteen
year period of expansion during which the agricultural producer has been
protected from extreme fluctuations In product markets. Even today, It Is
still on the basis of these stable prices that producers are able to
undertake Investments that would otherwise have been imposssible. All
crops and all farmers have not been affected In the same way and to the
same extent. In general, those producers who have more to sell have become
the main beneficiaries of state policies. Thus, cotton growers have had a
better deal than wheat growers (since these, until recently were mainly
producing for their own subsistence). Moreover, larger producers with more
land to show as collateral and more produce with which to benefit from
subsidies in kind, fared better than the small producer (Xerkez Bankasi
n.d.:17). According to the figures supplied by the State Planning
Organication cotton and cotton products' share of Turkish exports over a
period of 10 years is as follows:
33.8
33.0
28.3
29.4
21.0
23.6
31.7
21.6
23.8
19.4
18.1
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
2160.6
3008.3
3265.4
5417.7
4960.0
4742.0
9835.3
6757.9
13201.0
14709.9
39168.1
6313.2
9090.0
11875.9
18037.4
22197.3
20075.0
30755.4
31338.5
55357.8
75743.7
221498.1
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Table 5.3 Exports of Cotton
Years	 Total exports	 Cotton Exports	 Cotton as %
(pillion TL)	 ( pillion IL)	 of total
Source: Kaymak & Someren 1981:979.
Cotton price supports can only be understood in relation to the
position cotton has come to occupy in the Turkish economy since the mid-
sixties. Industrial production of cotton textiles and yarn Is the largest
and most developed branch of industry, employing the largest numbers of
workers and accounting for 13% of total value added by industry (DIE
1983:261>. Turkish cotton textiles are mainly aimed at the domestic market
where 70-80% of all clothing is cotton (Kaymak and Someren 1981:978).
Since the early 1970's exports of manufactured cotton products started to
occupy an important position in total export earnings and have been
subsidised by the state through significant tax deductions (Xerkez Bankasi
n.d.:15). Total cotton exports, Including raw cotton, yarn and textiles,
make up about 20% of total exports.29 By contrast, importation of cotton
textile and yarn is now negligible. About 35-40% of all raw cotton is
exported, which shows that the major portion of production is now consumed
by domestic manufacture, a reversal of the situation at the turn of the
century (Xerkez Bankasi n.d.:6).
Cotton therefore produces an income for labourers in all sectors of
the economy: agriculture, manufacture, and- through sales -in services as
well. But in addition, cotton constitutes a basic Item of consumption.
Moreover, it has increasingly begun to provide the raw material for two new
areas of production: cotton seed provides cooking oil, and the seed after
1970
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1977
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1979
1980
180000
270000
312000
269000
312000
271500
277000
309564
241700
380742
150356
277995
150619
181296
400000
480000
474927
574874
475000
476207
446471
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the removal of its oil content serves as a nutritious animal feed. During
the last years the latter has also been exported.
Table 5.4 Production, Consumption and Export of Turkish Cotton
Tears	 Production	 Domestic	 Exports
Consumption
(it)	 (it)	 (it)
Source: Asena 1981:223.
State support prices for cotton reflect the increasing importance of
the crop for the Turkish economy. Although since the 1950s government-
backed sales cooperatives have been purchasing cotton at prices favourable
to the producer, it was not until 1966 that governments started to fix
prices. Until that date, domestic cotton prices had been comparable to
world prices (Dunn 1952:58).° The stated aim of cotton support policies
is to increase the producer's income and effect a balanced inter-sectoral
redistribution of Incomes as well as keeping consumer prices low (Ergiider
1980:171). The need to keep exports competitive and cotton manufacturers
contented add to the pressures faced by governments in meeting these
rather contradictory alms. Moreover, a number of powerful interest groups
including the Agricultural Chambers' Association which is dominated by
large farmers from the Aegean and Adana regions, lobby the government each
year before prices are announced. In addition to the demands voiced by
this Important pressure group, the government considers world prices and
stocks, as well as national and international levels of production (Berk
1980:259).	 During the 1970's support prices were well above international
prices, and at times, also above prices of production (Xerkez Bankasi
n.d.:11; DPI 1976:63). As a result, sales cooperatives which buy cotton at
government-determined prices sustained heavy losses. This also dealt a
blow to these cooperatives' resources and affected their ability to purchase
the cotton offered by needy producers (Berk 1980:259) 32
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Table 5.5 Government and Karket Prices for Seed Cotton
Tears	 larket	 increase	 Government increase
kg./TL.)	 Gg./TL.)	 %
1967	 2.223
	
2.23
1968	 2.117	 -4.8
	
2.33
	
04.5
1969	 2.054	 -3.0
	
2.33
	
00.0
1970	 2.622	 28.0
	
2.75
	
18.0
1971	 3.626	 38.0
	
3.29
	
20.0
1972	 3,639	 00.4
	
3.64
	
10.6
1973	 6.320	 74.0
	
5.80
	
59.0
1974	 7.148	 13.0
	
7.80
	
34.5
1975	 6.945	 -2.8
	
7.80
	
00.0
Source: Xerkez Bankasi n.d.:11.
Cotton production has in general been rather responsive to changes in
support prices (Merkez Bankasi n.d.:2; Kepenek 1983:339). This
responsiveness has been accentuated by the development of a high-yield
variety of wheat which has become a highly profitable alternative to cotton
in many areas (Berk 1980:249). Thus, the years following a favourable
cotton price have witnessed an increase in the area cropped to cotton,
while in years of low prices, the area under cotton cultivation will
contract. On the other hand, the ability of producers to respond to
differences in price levels depends on a number of attending factors so
that responses to changing prices have been anything but uniform. Apart
from the possibility of cultivating another crop and amount of investment
on the land itself, production strategies are the key variable affecting
response to changing prices. Where productive activities mainly constitute
a return to labour, cotton will continue to be produced even in the face of
falling prices.
Even small producers, have, however, been affected by pricing policies.
Net income has increased for all producers (Berk 1980:260). This is
clearly shown by the level of investment that has been undertaken: thus in
years following good prices, in areas such as Tuz (that is where small-
scale farming is dominant), farmers have been purchasing tractors and other
machinery, undertaking land improvements, or extending area cropped to
cotton (see chapter 10).
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State agricultural policies have therefore been very effective in
regulating and commoditising cotton cultivation. Particularly after 1962
when economic planning was instituted, the main changes in cotton
cultivation have been with regard to increasing yields rather than
extending area under production. Increased yields were primarily due to
the increase in irrigated land and secondly to factors such as
mechanisatlon and fertilisation. In all these areas, the state had a
decisive impact (cf. Berk 1980). Apart from direct intervention in the
form of distributions of fertiliser and seed and the construction of
irrigation works, the main form of state intervention in agriculture was in
the form of credit provision and the organisation of output markets. Other
forms of intervention, such as tax exemptions, have also been important.
Since 1945, agriculture has not been taxed significantly (Bulmus 1981).
Land distributions have also been effective in bringing empty state land
under production, but have not led to an egalitarian distribution of land as
was initially hoped. Nevertheless, in certain regions such as Söke, these
distributions of state land created the conditions in which small household
based commodity production could flourish. Thus, contrary to what has been
argued by Birtek (1985) for the early fifties, from the 1960s onward, the
state has been instrumental in making the small family farm able to
compete with large landlords as producers of cotton. 3 Production of
cotton has meant that the small farmer became totally integrated in input,
cash, and output markets. Integration into labour and land markets,
however, remains incomplete, and this largely accounts for the persistence
of the family labour farm in the sphere of cotton production.
5.2. Botany of Cotton
As I tried to show in the previous section, the 'Green Revolution' in
Turkish cotton production started in the early sixties, and began to affect
small-scale producers a decade later. Improved seeds have necessitated the
adoption of a package of new inputs: irrigation, fertlisers, pesticides, as
well as increased amounts of labour. The process of production is
therefore strongly determined by the nature of the new cotton plant itself.
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Cotton (genus Gossyplum, family Malvacea) is a tropical and semi-
tropical small subshrub or tree in appearance and habit. Although many of
the thirty or more known species are perennials, the most widely cultivated
commercial kinds are annuals or are treated as such. The fibres for which
cotton is grown are produced on the surface of the seed coat, their length
and quality depending on variety as well as environmental conditions and
cultural practices. The lint and seed are in capsules which are called
balls. The aim of commercial cotton cultivation is to produce as many of
these boils as possible on a per hectare rather than per plant basis.
The plant itself is made up of a main body on which vegetative and
fruit bearing branches develop. Soon after sowing, seed germination takes
place, providing environmental conditions are favourable. A shoot first
appears about 8 to 10 days after sowing. The plant grows through the
elongation of the central stem. At each node of the stem two buds develop
but only one grows out to give a lateral branch, In the lower part of the
plant the developing buds are monopodial and purely vegetative, while in
the upper part of the bush the buds that grow out form fruit-bearing
branches (sympodia). In American Upland varieties (G. hirsutum L.) the
numbers of vegetative branches are between one and four, the rest carry
flowers. The nodes on these flowering branches produce flowers one at a
time; this gradual process ultimately affects harvesting practices since the
crop on even one cotton bush cannot mature simultaneously. Flowering
occurs approximately 24 days after the first appearance of the flower bud.
Flowering is a consecutive process, each bud opening about 6 days after the
previous one and each successive branch flowering after the one below it.
The number of flowers produced is a good indicator of yield since it is
these flowers which produce the lint-bearing boils.
Boils begin to form immediately after fertilisation, a process which
takes about 25 days for complete maturation. The opening of the boll needs
another 30 to 40 days. However, not all buds produce flowers and not all
flowers produce boils. Flowering and frultition is also under the control
of an abscission mechanism whereby flowers and fruit are shed unopened.
This is known as shedding in cotton cultivation and accounts for
considerable loss in yields. It is most pronounced if the soil is too wet,
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thus turning irrigation, necessary for branch growth, into a process which
has to be constantly supervised. Other environmental conditions such as
the presence of sunlight and activities of various pests also affect the
rate of shedding.
The fruit consists of a dry capsule, the boll, which has three, four,
or five loculi, each loculus containing about eight similar lint bearing
seeds. Environmental conditions in the boll maturation period determine
the ultimate lint length as well as the degree of maturity of the lint.
Boils may develop on the same plant at anything up to twelve weeks. When
the boll opens the lint fluffs up, and, drying on exposure, becomes the
white seed cotton lightly held by the dry carpels (longitudinal segment) of
the boll. The lint is the spinnable unicellular outgrowth of the seed coat
and can be up to 4 centimetres in length. The Upland cottons cultivated in
Turkey produce middle length lint of about 24 to 28 millimetres, actual size
depending on environmental conditions and cultivation practices, responding
positively particularly to irrigation. The fuzz is the shorter hairs of
the seed coat which are not spinnable; they can, however, be used as
stuffing for upholstery or in the production of cellulose, applications
which are not well developed in Turkey. The seeds are rich in edible oils
and, after pressing, can be used as cattle cake. The production of both of
these cotton products is becoming important as an area of investment.
To sum up: the cycle of cotton growth takes about 150 to 210 days to
complete depending on strand and environment:
From sowing to emergence of the shoot.............8-10	 days
Emergence to the appearance of flower buds.......40-50 days
First budding to flowering.......................20-25 	 days
Flowering to fruititon...........................50-60 	 days
Harvest..........................................30-60 	 days
Total...........................................148-210 	 days
Cotton is a delicate plant with a number of enemies. Xany
environmental conditions restrict the areas where cotton can be
commercially cultivated. Humidity and high temperatures, the two most
important factors for plant growth 1 limit the distribution of cotton
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cultivation. In general, cotton can successfully be cultivated in areas
where for a period of five to six months, temperatures do not fall below 18
degrees centigrade and where ground frost is absent. Furthermore, during
the period of maturation, temperatures must be constantly rising, reaching
25 degrees centigrade at the period of plant growth, flowering and
fruitition. Falling temperatures in the early autumn are beneficial since
they stop plant growth and allow for the maturation of the fruit. Although
cotton can be cultivated without irrigation in areas of high rainfall, rain
distribution is rarely optimal and yields are therefore low. Too much
rainfall causes plant growth but does not allow fruitition. Furthermore,
the numerous cotton pests and diseases have a tendency to increase under
over-moist conditions. Rainfall when the bolls are open damages the lint.
Sunlight is also fundamental for the development of fruit branches, the
maturation of the fruit and for the prevention of disease. Winds which are
quite beneficial when they bear moisture, cause shedding when they are dry
and strong. Thus, cotton cultivation is restricted to areas with a
relatively long summer, where fields can be protected from strong winds and
where irrigation can be practiced without much difficulty. In the Söke
plain, although most of these conditions obtain, strong winds and
unexpected early rain at harvest time can cause a drop in yields.
Cotton needs light soils, rich in nitrogen, phosphorous and potash.
On sandy soils, widespread in the lower Söke plain, yields are much reduced
and fertilisation and irrigation become imperative. The soil has to be
frequently ventilated, thus necessitating repeated hoeing (mechanical as
well as manual). Fertilisation allows for speedy plant growth and the full
development of fruit bearing branches. About one half of the nitrogen and
phosphorous anc one fourth of the potash consumed by the plant is go to
the lint and seed. The remainder of these nutrients are distributed into
the branches, leaves and bolls. However, much care needs to be taken in
the application of fertilisers and, ideally, each field has to be analysed
before the exact amount needed can be ascertained, a process which is
rarely undertaken by peasant producers. Too much nitrogen leads to the
overgrowth of vegetative parts, hinders fruitition and retards maturation.
Phosphorous speeds up maturation and increases yields and improves the
quality of the lint. Potash is rarely applied in Turkey since most soils
165
are fairly rich in this nutrient. Irrigation which enhances germination and
plant growth also impoverishes soils very quickly, thus making
fertilisation imperative.
Yields are also affected by a number of cotton pests and diseases.
These vary with the strand of cotton cultivated, the environmental
conditions and cultivation techniques. Application of chemicals such as
DDT and special cultivation techniques are used to limit the damage caused
by these factors. In Söke, some cutworms (of the genus Agrotis) which
destroy the roots of the young shoot, and the pinkboll worm (Pectinophora
gossypiella) ,whose incidence increase with irrigation, cause important
damage. Chemicals sprays, applied when and where the pest is encountered
are used to fight the spread of these pests. Sterilization of seeds and
cutting and burning the stalk after the harvest are among preventive
measures which are now widely applied in Söke. Other pests such as the red
spider have largely been eradicated through the activity of the State
Agricultural Extension Office. As I shall show below, farmers have now
been able to reduce their requirements of pesticides considerably. Weeds,
however, are still an important problem. Rather than use chemical weed
killers, farmers weed by hand, turning ventilation, weed control and spacing
into one operation. Manual labour which is needed for spacing can, in this
way, be made more productive. Wilting, due to a fungus (Verticulum Albo-
artum) which propagates under cool and moist conditions is a root disease
which can destroy the plant. At present, it still causes problems to
cultivators in Sbke. Farmers fight this disease by sowing strands which
are resistant to the fungus as well as by changing methods of cultivation.
Due to the problems that I have attempted to outline above, cotton
cultivation requires the constant attention of the farmer from the time it
is first sown until all the harvest is collected. Moreover, under
conditions of salinity such as found in Tuz, a second crop (nitrogen-
bearing pulses are usually recommended in a program of crop rotation
involving cotton since it consumes a lot of this nutrient) cannot be sown
and fields have to be kept under supervision during the winter months as
well. One of the largest landowners in Söke compared the cotton farmer to
a worried parent: "cotton is like a sickly child: it can only reach maturity
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with a lot of money and attention" (Usual 1982). This statement was made
in order to emphasize the need for abundant and cheap credits for the
successful cultivation of cotton at a time when state-funded credits to
agriculture were being reduced. The reduction of state credits has meant
that producers have not been able to procure the necessary inputs,
particularly fertilisers and pesticides, and consequently sustained
considerable loss in yields. As a result, those farmers who were able to
switch to other crops did so, and, after 1980, the overall cotton product in
the Soke region decreased. Those unable to effect this switch are the
peasant producers of the lower Meander plain who, due to the type of soils
and to the 1 structure of the entreprise, are locked into the production of
cotton as a monocrop.
5.3 Stages of Cotton Cultivation
There are five major stages in the cultivation of cotton: 1)
preparation of the field, 2) sowing, 3) spacing, hoeing and weeding, 4) 	 '
irrigation, and 5) harvesting. These correspond to the five-stage life
cycle of the cotton plant: germination, plant growth and flowering,
fertilisation, fruition, and, finally, maturation. Each of these stages
requires certain environmental conditions to be present so that maximum
yields can be achieved. Apart from temperature which s/he cannot control,
the cultivator has to supervise all the remaining environmental factors,
that is, soil conditions, nutrients, moisture, pests and weeds. These
activities begin before the crop is sown and continue until the beginning
of the next cycle of production, even though the field is empty during the
winter months (from the end of November to the following May). At present,
both manual and mechanised processes, as well as 'traditional' (that is,
land and labour) and 'modern' (artificial fertilisers and irrigation,
improved seed, chemical insecticides,and aechanised cultivation) inputs are
used in comparable combinations in all of the Söke farms. Thus, the
complicated steps of cotton cultivation are undertaken by all farmers of
the area in more or less the same fashion.
The aim of production is to produce as much good quality cotton from
a particular field as possible. Quality is measured according to whether or
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not the lint has been exposed to rain prior to the harvest. According to
the amount of rain spots on it, cotton is classified in terms of four
internationally recognised grades which are uniformly applied by government
agencies as well as private buyers. Rain soiled cotton fetches a
proportionately lower price in all markets. This makes time the most
crucial factor determining production decisions. The crop needs about five
months to reach full maturation, and in Western Turkey, the dry and hot
summer suitable for cotton cultivation lasts about six and a half months.
The winter rains stop towards the end of March, but farmers need to wait
for the soil to dry before they can enter the fields. Preparation for
planting takes at least fifteen days so that sowing can, under normal
circumstances, not be undertaken before the first week in May. Harvesting
can thus begin around the first of October; depending on the weather, it
takes forty-five to sixty days. Autumn rains begin in November and
therefore the third harvest is often rain-soiled. Any delay in this
schedule may endanger the second and even sometimes the first harvest,
causing the ruin of the farmer. Timeliness is the single most important
and limiting constraint In the production of cotton under conditions
prevalent in the Söke plain. Due to the precise time period required for
each of the stages of plant growth, it is at harvest that producers become
most pressed for time and labour. During the five months or so that the
crop is In the field, cultivation activities follow one another without
respite.
5.3.1 Preparing the Field
The valley floor on which most of the cotton cultivation takes place
is composed of sandy and alluvial soils, the product of the Meander river
which has filled up its delta over the centuries. In the lower reaches of
the river, the quality of the soil deteriorates considerably, salinity being
the main problem. As saline soils are detrimental to plant growth, fields
have to kept under water prior to cultivation, in order to push the level of
salt to where the roots of the plants cannot reach. This precaution
produces viable fields for one season only, and the same time precludes
doubble cropping. Before this 'washing' process, fields have to be
carefully levelled and drainage ditches constructed. Failure to do this
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reduces yields considerably, producing a plot with bare patches where the
salt seeps to the surface. Levelling, an operation which constitutes a
substantial investment, provides uniform plant growth in any one field
since it also allows all plants to derive maximum benefit from
fertilisation and irrigation. Uniform fields also make all other
cultivation tasks, including harvesting easier and faster. Levellers,
expensive tractor-drawn implements, have to be utilised the first time this
operation is undertaken; in subsequent seasons, the relatively common and
inexpensive plank roller can be used for minor adjustments. Canals of
about 2 meters in depth are dug around the field to allow the salty water
pushed down by the pressure of the sitting fresh water to escape without
damaging other fields. These canals are later used as irrigation and
drainage ditches. The water level has to be constantly checked to ensure
evenness; these activities require frequent trips to the fields during the
winter months.
At the end of a harvest, the cotton stalks remaining in the fields
have to be burned to exterminate pests. Following necessary repairs to
ditches and canals, the field is ploughed and, where possible, 'washed'.
Preparations for sowing begin during April depending on the accessibility
of the field. The subsoil has to be ventilated and dried out without losing
any nutrients and without making the soil too dry or clumpy. Firstly,
nitrogenous fertilisers are scatterred on the surface of the soil. The
field is then ploughed, turning as much soil out to the surface as possible.
Harrowing and raking pulverises big clumps of earth and allows quicker
dessication of the soil. A plank roller is passed over the field in order
to seal moisture and nutrients into the soil. The field is then ready for
sowing.
Depending on weather conditions, these activities may take a week to
ten days to accomplish. A 30-decare field of medium density soil can be
ploughed in about six hours using a three-blade tractor-drawn metal plough.
Harrowing, raking and sealing usually take less, about three to four hours.
A few days must elapse between each activity, thus bringing the time
necessary for the preparation of the field to a fortnight. Time, as I have
indicated above, is a pressing factor and skill and experience are crucial
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for these activities to be completed in time. An experienced tractor driver
can, on his own, undertake all of these operations.
5.3.2 Sowing
Cotton seed is sown towards the last days of April or at the
beginning of Xay, when the winter rains end. Rainfall within the first
week after sowing prevents germination and makes it necessary to plough
the field a second time and plant all over again, an eventuality that occurs
frequently. This retards the harvest considerably and increases costs.
Today most of the farmers use a tractor-drawn cotton seed planter where
depth and frequency can be mechanically adjusted. Mechanised planting also
produces even rows without which subsequent operations that require the use
of a tractor cannot be undertaken without damaging plants. Nevertheless,
farmers plant more seed than required to compensate for loss during
germination or destruction of pests such as cutworms. It takes about seven
to eight hours to sow a 30-decare field. Two workers are necessary, one to
drive the tractor and the other to operate the planter. The pace of
activities is feverish at this period; so much so that most of the planting
is done at night. The whole of the Söke valley is then alight with tractor
headlights. But all this haste may not suffice to guarantee a successful
harvest.
5.3.3 Spacing, Hoeing and Weeding
A week after sowing the green cotton shoot begins to show in the
fields. The plant can then develop, providing the temperature is not below
20 degrees Celsius and there are no freak rains. A fortnight after sowing
the farmer can already gauge the amount of cotton s/he can expect at
harvest. During the following 45 days before the beginning of irrigation, a
number of activities to enhance plant growth have to be undertaken.
Following a period of 25 days after sowing, soils have to be ventilated to
ensure proper root growth, This is now done using a tractor-drawn
interrow metal hoe. Although this implement can also be used for weeding,
it can only be effective for those weeds that grow between the cotton rows.
Weeds growing within each row have to be hand-hoed. Hand hoeing also
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roughs the neat furrows made by the tractor during sowing. These furrows
ironically make it easier for cutworms to get at the roots of the young
shoots and this pest can easily destroy entire cotton rows. Hoers moreover
have to space the shoots. As will be remembered, the latter are too many
in number for any single row as a result of overcompensation at sowing
time for possible losses.
Hand hoeing, the second largest labour consuming process of cotton
production, is done by gangs of five to twenty usually female workers. An
average plot of thirty decares can be hoed by 10 labourers in one day using
a wooden handled metal hoe. The time required to complete this operation
depends on the conditions of the field, on the weeds and on soil type.
Weeding has to repeated at least three, usually four times since the
fertilisers that are applied also benefit weeds, some of which can stick to
the lint and thereby affect the quality of the final produce. Often a
second application of a mixure of nitrogen and phosphate based fertilisers
is necessary after the first hoeing, which, when applied with a cotton
planter, takes about four hours on a thirty-decare field. Since the crop is
constantly under inspection at this period, any pest that may appear will
also be immediately dealt with. Both diseases and pests are counteracted
according to their incidence rather than by an a priori application of
insecticides. Spraying of various chemicals on the crop can take six to
eight hours depending on the stage of development that the crop has reached
at the time of application, as well as on the type of implement used.
5.3.4 Irrigation
Preparating the field for irrigation involves building ridges in a
checker-board pattern so as to form smaller plots of 2.5 square meters.
Water that is pumped to the field will thus be directed to each patch at a
time and the ridges will ensure that the water is maintained at a uniform
level throughout the field. These ridges may be built by hand In about
four days or In three hours using tractor-drawn mechanical ridge-makers.
Nevertheless the mechanised ridges can only be built in one direction since
the motion of the tractor would destroy those that have already been built.
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Thus, mechanised ridge-makers can only be used to construct those parallel
to cotton rows and the rest must be built by hand.
Water is pumped to the fields from the main canals using two to three
tractor-powered pumps to direct the water. The number of these pumps (and
therefore the numbers of tractors necessary) varies according to the
position of the field in relation to the water source. Iron pipes which
help to set the direction of the water flow have to be laid out according
to the number of pumps employed. Setting up the pumps and pipes usually
takes three to four hours. Once the water begins to flow, it takes up to
twelve hours to fill the ridges in a thirty-decare field. At least two,
sometimes more workers are necessary to accomplish these tasks. While one
person supervises the distribution of the water in the field and controls
the strength of the ditches, another has to remain at the pump to check the
flow of water. Laying down the heavy pipes is a task that requires at least
two persons.
As with hoeing, irrigation has to be repeated two to three times at an
interval of fifteen days, and each time, the process will take less time
than the previous operation since the soil becomes more and more saturated.
The whole process of irrigation may take about a month to complete. By the
beginning of September at the latest, water is withdrawn to allow the boils
to mature.
5.3.5 Harvest
Harvesting is a manual process In all farms in the Söke area, although
in other parts of Turkey, notably Adana, mechanised harvesting Is practiced,
albeit on a very small scale. Xanual harvesting is found throughout the
world in areas of cheap labour (Berrie 1977:139). As the bolls mature, the
lint dries out and can be hand-picked, leaving the dry carpel on the stalk.
Hand-picking can be carried out at intervals allowing for the different
rates of maturation of the crops and therefore results in higher yields.
Aechanical harvesting, on the other hand, is undertaken as a once-over
operation. The crop is usually defoliated by chemical treatment to allow
harvesting by stripping or spindle picking (Ibid). This necessitates
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different cultivation methods, using strands which can mature
simultaneously. Nechanical harvesting is also possible in areas where time
is not such a crucial factor, thus allowing all the crop to mature before
harvesting. The fact that the dry season is longer in Adana compared to
Soke has made experiments with mechanical harvesting possible in that
region .
In Söke as well as in all areas of Turkey the harvest is the
bottleneck of the whole production process. Shortage of labour, made even
more acute by the time factor, is the main reason for this bottleneck. As
with hoeing, harvesting is undertaken by groups of workers whose numbers
vary widely according to availability. This process requires approximately
twice the amount of labour needed for hoeing. Depending on the condition
of the crop and the skill of the pickers, It will, on average, take ten
labourers about three to four days to collect the first harvest of a thirty-
decare plot. Labourers can then work in another field until the first one
is ready for a second harvest. Alternatively, a family comprising of five
labourers cultivating thirty decares can harvest their own cotton by
working for two months on their own fields only. Farmers cultivating large
tracts of cotton employ numerous gangs of labourers for the entire harvest
period. Successive harvests need at least an Interval of fifteen days to
allow the maximum number of boils to open. Although progressively less
cotton is picked at each successive harvest, the time needed Is
approximately the same since the cotton is less dense and the dry stalks
of the previous harvest hamper activities. The larger the work group, the
quicker the harvest and therefore the greater chance of a larger proportion
of the harvest to be of the first quality.
Harvested cotton is hand-packed into jute sacks in which it is either
sold or stored according to the circumstances of the producer. Cotton that
is sold to the sales cooperatives has to be taken to the buying stations
which entails the immobilisation of tractors and trailers as well as
personnel for long periods of time. This is due to the long queues which
form in front of the state buying agencies which, not having suffcient
personnel, take a long time in buying up the cotton. Furthermore,
formalities such as settling of accounts with the state cooperative are
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undertaken at the same time, lengthening the whole process. Xerchants buy
the produce in the village but charge the producer for transport costs.
Apart from indebtedness, considerations of time have been important in the
sale of produce to merchants.
As the scale of production increases, so does the magnitude of the
operations described above, necessitating proportionately more inputs of
cash in order to purchase those means of production that are consumed
within one production cycle. Changes in the scale of production also entail
differences in the organisation of production, particularly in the
organisation of labour. I shall now turn to a discussion of the different
inputs in order to demonstrate that cash and labour are the most important
factors limiting production.
IV. Irrigation
Pipe laying	 (3-4x2)x3
Irrigation	 (12x2)x3
Ridge-building (hand) 	 15x1
Ridge-building (tractor)3x1
Total labour Tine:	 99-111 hours
V.Harvesting	 10x60-80*
Total Labour Tine:	 600-800 hours
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Table 5.6 Time Schedule and Labour Time Required to Cultivate a 30-decare
Cotton Field
Activity
I .Pleld Preparation
Ploughing
Fertilisation
Harrowing
Raking
Sealing
Total Labour Tine:
II .Sowing
Total Labour Tine:
III.Plant Cultivation
Hoeing
Fertilising (tractor)
Ventilating
Hand weeding
Pesticide spraying
Total Labour Tine:
Labour Tine
(Hours x no.
of labourers
6x1
2x2
4x1
3x1
2x1
19 hours
7-8x2
16 hours
(lOxlO)3
4x2
(1x3)x3
10-15x2-5
6-8x1
343-370 hours
Cotton Day
Day 1 to 15
Day 15 to 16
Day 30 to 75
Day 75 to 110-125
Day 125-180
* Harvesting has been calculated in the following way:
Labourers can pick about 60-100 kg. of seed cotton a day depending on the
actual individual, the state of the crop and weather conditions. It is
assumed that each working day comprises 8 hours, corresponding to the
number of daylight hours at this season. Thus:
1st picking 4 days 10 labourers = 320 hours
2nd pIcking 3 days 10 labourers = 240 hours
3rd picking 1 day 10 labourers = 80 hours
Total = 640 hours (an approximate figure).
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5.4 Agricultural Technology and Constraints
As in most forms of agricultural production, land, labour and cash
(with which all of the commoditised inputs are purchased) are the principal
factors of production. Of these factors, it is labour and cash, rather than
land, which are the scarce factors that impose limits on the scale of
production. A comparison of family labour enterprises (such as those in
Tuz) and enterprises based on hired labour shows that, in the former, cash
is the limiting constraint, while, in the latter, labour constraints limit
the area cropped to cotton. Since the beginning of cotton production in
Söke, cash has been gradually substituted for labour through the adoption
of improved technology. This substitution is limited by the cash available
to each production unit and the amount of credit its members can obtain.
Consequently, it has been the large town-based producers who have been able
to adopt improved technology more easily. As the improved technology
becomes widely accepted, it also becomes cheaper and accessible to peasant
producers. Under present conditions, a complete substitution of technology
for labour is nevertheless impossible so that labour is still the single
most important factor limiting production for all types of producers.
Among producers in Tuz, variations in output correlate significantly
with area under production. This shows that most of the producers use
comparable levels of investment per decare in land improvements,
fertilisers, irrigation, labour and machinery. Such a conclusion is also
consistent with my observations.30 In order to increase output, it is
therefore necessary to acquire more land, rather than to alter the
combination of the factors of production. More land means a proportional
increase in all inputs, except cash which rises more than proportionately.
Some amount of extra cash, however small, is necessary to acquire more
land; but more importantly, as area cropped to cotton increases, the labour
required surpasses that provided by the household. Expenditure on wages
increases with the amount of land cultivated. In the following chapters, I
shall look into forms of access to these factors of production and the
social relations that they entail. At present, I shall consider the
technological implications of these inputs, particularly with regard to ways
in which yields can be controlled.
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5.4.1 Land
Land is the only factor of production that is relatively adundant.
Large tracts of land that belong to the state are still waiting to be
distributed, as are drained marshlands near the Meander delta, Peasants
from nearby villages (including Tuz) are able to Improve and cultivate
these lands without too much interference from the state. They hope to
gain legal ownership of the fields they cultivate in the event that the
state sells or distributes this land. Land is also available through the
rental market as well as through sharecropping mechanisms. The presence
near Tuz of a large landholding (28.000 decares) whose owner is ready to
take on sharecroppers or rent out land is an important factor that
increases land availability. Land, however, to be productive must be
improved, and therefore needs considerable inputs of labour and cash.
Soil conditions affect production in a number of important ways. To
the extent that soils deviate from the Ideal, more and more Inputs of cash
and labour are necessary to undertake production. In the lower reaches of
the Meander where Tuz lands are situated, salinity Increases costs of land
improvements and prevents double cropping. Yearly crop rotation Is the
only way of allowing the soil to recover and to acquire needed nutrients.
Although a few farmers will plant summer wheat for one year in five to six
years, price structures result in the cultivation of cotton year after
year. This means that production can only be possible with more and more
reliance on fertilisers.4 Land Improvements and other technological
requirements make cotton production an expensive process. Costs of
production have also risen but at a much slower rate making the application
of fertilisers and other modern techniques desirable for most producers.
According to a study conducted by the World Bank in the Adana region, land
improvements led to a 53 % increase in yield (measured In kg./decare)
(quoted in Bark 1980:253).
Soil density and access to water also affect the technology selectedas
well as yields. Light soils are more easily cultivated, reducing the cost
of fuel as well as labour time. Moreover, they lose moisture more quickly
and can therefore be cultivated earlier in the cycle than dark, heavy soils.
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This also implies that the harvest can begin earlier, with less risk of
damage from rain. However, light soils contain less nutrients and
therefore, produce smaller cotton bushes with fewer bolls: yields are
therefore comparatively lower.
Access to water is very important for irrigation, without which cotton
cannot be cultivated. The main source of irrigation is the Meander river
and the draining canal constructed by the state in 1967 (Köseli 1975:31).
Fields closer to sources of water can be irrigated for a lesser outlay of
cash and labour than those situated further away. 41 On the whole, however,
access to water is not very problematic in the region and does not
constitute an Important factor limiting production. This is also due to the
fact that there is a high water table and wells can be constructed out of
which water is drawn with electric pumps operated by tractor generators.
Wells only constitute 5 % of all sources of irrigation in the plain (Köseli
1975:31) and only about five farmers in Tuz rely on this method.
The distribution of the various soil types is related to the activity
of the Meander river and to proximity to the sea. Soils in the eastern
parts of the valley are of better quality, yields are higher. In these
parts, moreover, a state-built irrigation system which allows better water
regulation makes cultivation more efficient and less costly. In the
western parts, the main difference between soil types is in terms of light
versus heavy soils and proximity to water, salinity being the constant
problem faced by all producers to a greater or lesser degree. All these
factors are taken into consideration in the evaluation of a particular field
for various transactions such as sales or rentals.
5.4.2 Labour
The demand for labour in most farms in Söke has been considerably
affected by the adoption of new technology. The most important effect of
the new technology is to reduce the demand for unskilled labour employed in
many stages of production, including hoeing and the preparation of the
fields for irrigation. These trends have affected the demand of both male
and female unskilled labourers. Labour for which demand has increased as a
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result of improved technology is of two kinds. Firstly skilled labour
needed to operate the tractor-drawn equipment is now needed in greater
numbers, and young men have to learn these skills even if they do not have
access to land. Secondly, to the extent that such technology has increased
yields, demand for the manual labour to harvest it has proportionately
risen. Consequently, the demand for female labour has increased in
magnitude, adding to the already acute problem of labour supply.
Most of the activities in the cycle of cotton cultivation are
mechanised and therefore require relatively small labour inputs (see Table
5.6). Time constraints make it impossible to cultivate cotton without a
tractor. Whereas a team of horses could plough about one decare of land a
day, a tractor reduces that time to about ten to fifteen minutes.
Furthermore, while traditional ploughing necessitates the labour of two
individuals, tractor ploughing only needs one person. Various tractor-drawn
implements such as ridge makers and inter-row cultivators specifically
designed in Söke for the purposes of cotton cultivation have gone a long
way toward reducing labour demand. Inter-row cultivators and chemical weed
killers reduce labour needs for hoeing. Mechanised ridge makers, levellers,
land shifters, and electrical pumps have more than halved the labour needed
for irrigation, while seed planters and mechanical sprayers have
considerably facilitated sowing and the application of fertilisers. Labour
needed to complete these tasks is therefore limited and availibility does
not pose a problem. Depending on the organisation of the enterprise,
household labour and/or hired labour can be found without great difficulty.
However, not all producers can purchase these labour-saving
implements. This produces a complex pattern of exchange of tractor-drawn
machinery between different households. Cash, labour, produce and other
items having nothing to do with the process of cotton production can be
used to acquire the services of the machine needed. Relations of
cooperation and exchange based on kinship and residence as well as
'friendship' are also used to obtain machinery. Whether an equivalent is
demanded during these transactions depends on the pattern of interaction
that is part of the total social relationship between the households
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concerned. It is the rationality of community relations rather than
economic considerations that explains the nature of these transactions.
It is during the harvest, and, to a lesser extent, for hoeing, that
there is a heavy demand for labour. Large quantities of labour are needed
for a relatively short period of time in all parts of the plain
simultaneously. Local recources are insufficient to supply labour
especially for the cotton harvest and about 40,000 migrant labourers come
to the plain each year to pick its cotton. Hoeing, which is partly
mechanised, takes less time than harvesting: depending on the condition of
the crop, one labourer can hoe about two to three decares in a day, while
the best cotton picker can only average about half the yield of one decare
of cotton (130 kg. per day). Therefore, only those landowners who have
more than 100 decares cropped to cotton employ migrant labour for hoeing,
and Tuz Inhabitants can meet most of the demand for labour during the
hoeing period.d2
For village enterprises, there is a strong correlation between the
amount of paid labour used by households and land under cultivation.
With increased land under cultivation, labour needed for hoeing and
harvesting increases, while labour needed for the mechanised processes
remains constant. In the case of town-based producers, labour demand
increases even more, since, along with manual labourers for hoeing and
harvesting, these producers also have to employ farm managers, tractor
drivers, cooks and watchmen, and provide them with food and living
quarters
In spite of the labour shortages outlined above, labour is still the
factor of production that Is the most easily available to peasant producers.
The basis of peasant production rests on the possibility of substituting
labour for other scarce resources, cash in particular. Peasant producers
try to provide as much of the labour needed for hoeing and harvesting as
possible from within the household, thus substituting money capital with
'unpaid' labour. Household labour is, moreover, more productive compared to
'paid' labour, thus making this substitution desirable. This way of
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reducing cash costs is one of the main reasons that accounts for the
prevalence of household-based producers in cotton cultivation.45
Labour can be substituted for machinery and therefore, and by
extension, for money. This type of substitution is limited to the more
expensive labour-saving tractor-drawn equipment that has been developed
recently. Thus, the application of fertiliser can be accomplished with a
cotton planter rather than a special implement which most of the producers
in Tuz cannot afford to purchase. This increases the time necessary to
accomplish the task, but Is still within the limits posed by the schedule
of cotton production. Rather than use mechanised ridge-makers, farmers can
construct ditches with an axe and a shovel. Hand operations can be
substituted for the mechanical application of insecticides and the chemical
eradication of weeds. Nevertheless, some of the Jobs performed by the more
expensive machines cannot be done manually and farmers must then forego
the benefits that may accrue through their use.45
The lack of sophisticated machinery can to some extent be compensated
f or through larger Inputs of labour at the hoeing and particularly at the
harvesting stages. Although repeated weeding can Increase yields
substantially, it is the pattern of harvesting that most significantly
augments yields. Cotton bolls continue to mature as long as they are left
standing in the field. Thus producers for whom labour has no money costs
can continue harvesting beyond the point at which producers paying a wage
leave off.
Another way through which labour can be substituted for machines is
through the exchange system briefly mentioned above. Labourers of a
cotton-producing household may work on a neighbour's fields without any
remuneration In cash In return for the construction of ridges, or the
ventilation of their own field. In these instances, the owner of the
implement usually uses his own tractor. This is necessary where larger
instruments are used, since they necessitate more horsepower than is needed
for routine cultivation. In cases where tractors are not part of the
exchange, the borrowing of the Implement is done on the basis of a wider
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pattern of exchange according to which any item of daily life is lent to
one's neighbour, friend or relative (see chapter 3).
Land can also be acquired in return for labour, thus further reducing
the money cost of production. To a certain extent, sharecropping can be
seen as such a mechanism. A landless head of a household can get access
to land through such a mechanism in return for the labour power that is at
his/her disposal. This transaction is made easier when the household head
is also a tractor owner. Thus with the much reduced outlay of capital
required to purchase a tractor compared to the purchase of land, a landless
household can enter into production. Certain types of 'rental' agreements
also serve the same purpose. Many large landowners rent land in return for
a specified amount of produce in kind, rather than asking for cash.
Reliance on unpaid labour lies at the root of both of these ways of
obtaining land.
There are however important limits to the extent to which labour can
be substituted for other inputs. All households do end up paying a certain
amount of wages. Inputs such as fertilisers, seed and insecticides have to
be purchased with cash even though this involves the mediation of credit
mechanisms. Fuel can only be purchased with cash and all producers have
to pay for irrigation fees. This means that without access to a certain
amount of cash, cotton production cannot be undertaken.
5.4.3 Cash
Within a generalised commodity economy, cash occupies a special place
in production as well as in other spheres of life. To the extent that it is
needed to purchase the means of production, it acts as capital. Cash is
also the medium through which a large part of the means of consumption are
purchased. In Soke, the extent to which production and consumption are
commoditised varies according to each household, but no family is totally
severed from commodity circuits and hence from the need to obtain money
capital whether through sale of a commodity, or through credit mechanisms.
This means that cash (or, in other words, accumulated capital and/or
credit) will affect the quantity and quality of production in both peasant
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and capitalist production. Thus, the situation that I describe for Söke, is
one which deviates from the ideal-typical models of capitalist or peasant
production, since in the former accumulated capital, and in the latter only
land and labour determine limits of production.
Credit mechanisms are the major ways through which most of the
producers in Söke obtain cash. The ability of the state to meet cotton
producers' demands for cash has, in the past, been largely responsible for
extending the area under production as well as increasing yields. Today,
all inputs needed for cotton production can be purchased, making
accumulated cash one of the most important prerequisites of production.
State credit policies have reduced this amount by providing short-term
credit with which to purchase seed and fertilisers, To a lesser extent,
state credits have also provided for longer-term Investments such as
tractor purchases and land Improvements.
To the extent that producers hold land through Inheritance or land
distributions (see chapter 7), cash Is not required to get access to land.
Nevertheless, in order for cotton production to be undertaken at all,
investment in land improvements and irrigation makes the accumulation of a
certain amount of capital indipensable. Tractors are the most important
machines in cotton production. A number of other implements associated
with tractors (ploughs, trailers, rakes, disk harrows, seed planters, inter-
row cultivators, pipes and electrical pumps) are also part of the minimum
investment. Other machinery, particularly the more expensive specialised
equipment, can be rented for specific tasks. There is also a rental market
in tractors where those producers who have recently purchased a tractor
rent it out to meet payments. However, costs of renting, time constraints,
and the fact that most tractor-owners are also cotton producers, renting a
tractor can be a risky business. Nost of the tractorless landowners prefer
therefore to lease out land or to enter into sharecropping arrangements
rather than rely on the rental market to undertake production themselves.
Circulating capital, that Is Inputs which are consumed within one
production cycle, are also Important sources of cash expenditure. Seed,
fertilisers, fuel, insecticides, irrigation expenses, and labour are the main
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items in this category. Credit is the basic source for these expenses and
very few producers can complete a production cycle without incurring debts.
The amount of debt is proportional to the area under production. Larger
producers, to the extent that their production process is successful, have
greater chances of paying back these debts after selling the produce.
However, the amount of credit available through public institutions such as
state cooperatives and banks, or else by private individuals is limited.
Thus, the availability of credit can limit area under production. Credit
shortages are most troublesome to those producers who have to pay a large
amount of wages. Most of the credit necessary for the other inputs can be
obtained in kind over a period of five months as the need arises (see
chapter 8). But, labourers are required in large numbers over a relatively
short period of time, and the system of advance payments without which
migrant labour can not be procured, means that cash requirements for wages
are Immediate and large in amount; this applies particularly to the larger
farms. Credit shortages can therefore limit production seriously for those
producers who rely totally on wage labour, whereas those producers for whom
labour is not fully commodltised have more chances of survival.
5.5 Conclusion
Conditions for producing cotton In the Söke region indicate that cash
and labour are the main factors which limit production. A number of
different types of enterprises compete in the production of cotton, and
under conditions found between 1978 and 1984, family farms seemed to be
the more successful competitors. The production of cotton requires a
substantial investment of cash, a factor which, during the fifties and early
sixties meant that cotton production could be undertaken mainly by large
landowners who were able to capitalise their assets. During this period,
capitalisation was made possible by transformations in the Turkish economy
in the direction of the establishment of a home market and the
commoditisation of land and labour. However, since then, state policies
have been crucial in establishing family-labour farms as successful cotton
producers. State Intervention in the promotion of cotton production in the
Sôke region has taken four basic forms: extending peasant landownership
through land distributions, improving yields through large scale Irrigation
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and drainage projects (which peasants cannot undertake on their own),
supplying peasants with improved technology, and ensuring stable product
prices by intervening in credit and product markets.
These policies have ironically contributed to the many factors that
hinder the establishment of perfect markets in land and particularly in
labour. In certain parts of Turkey such as Söke, peasants have remained
tied to their land, creating regional shortages of labour. The relative
immobility of labour means that such regional shortages cannot be easily
alleviated. Cotton producers in Söke depending on wage labour have been
adversely affected by the structure of the labour market. Labour demand in
cotton production exacerbates these conditions: relatively little labour is
required for much of the production cycle. However, for the period of one
month in July and two months in October and in November, large numbers of
workers are needed. Under these conditions, peasant farms for whom the
supply of labour is less of a problem compared to capitalist farms, have an
important advantage over the latter.
The structure of cotton production therefore depends on the conditions
under which labour and credit are supplied to the farm, conditions which
are largely determined by the structure of the Turkish economy. When
credit is relatively cheap, as it was in the late seventies, peasant
production of cotton increases. In spite of the withdrawal of state
subsidies since then, the high international price of cotton has been able
to sustain peasant production. To better understand the factors that allow
peasants to produce such a capital-intensive crop, it is necessary to look
at the structure of peasant production in more detail.
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Notes to Chapter 5
1. Aggregate statistics available in Turkey define a small enterprise In
terms of land ownership as well as area cultivated (thus including rental
and sharecropping contracts). A 'small' enterprise Is thus one which has
less than 500 decare under production. However, it is often difficult to
identify differences in types of production on the basis of cultivated area
alone. Therefore, the qualitative data supporting the contention that
cotton production is Increasingly being undertaken by small producers has
been derived from fieldwork. In Söke, the second largest cotton production
centre In Turkey, the use of household labour is the crucial factor
differentiating between various types of cotton producers. Since, in Söke,
household labour is utilised by producers cultivating farms smaller than
500 decares, aggregate statistics can provide a rough guide. It should be
borne in mind, however, that conditions of production in other parts of
Turkey may not conform to the pattern observed in Söke.
2. Braudel says that for pre-industrial societies, It is possible to find
sources of Information on trade but not on productive activities. The
Ottoman Empire is no exception. Very little research has been undertaken
with respect to the conditions under which different crops were produced in
the Ottoman Empire, and the majority of existing studies is devoted to
wheat since It was the basic of subsistence as well as export. Faroqhl's
study, the only source I have been able to find, concerns itself with cotton
production only In an Indirect way. The aim of her study Is to ascertain
the role of trade and manufactures in the development of Anatolian towns
and markets during the 16th and 17th centuries. In this context, cotton
and textiles are two of the commodities she discusses. According to her
findings, It seems that cotton textiles were not only exported to Europe
(clandestinely during much of the 16th century since the exportation of
cotton as well as cotton textiles was prohibited), but also were an
important item of domestic trade. The Ottoman military establishment,
which was one of the most important sources of demand, needed cotton cloth
for clothing soldiers as well as for sails used by the navy. According to
Faroqhi, until the first half of the 17th century, the Ottoman
administration regarded cotton and cotton thread as war material (1986:373-
4). Cotton produced by peasants could be sold on the market either
directly by the producer or through the mediation of tax collectors and
merchants who were able to appropriate cotton since a large proportion of
taxes were paid in kind. According to Faroqhi's findings, Venetian
merchants in the 17th century were able to venture In the countryside of
Izmir and buy cotton directly from producers, a practice which allowed them
to pay a lower purchase price as well as lower customs duty (1986:373).
The volume of external and domestic trade in cotton varied greatly during
the 17th and 18th centuries, mostly in response to governmental and
European demand. Furthermore, Izmlr's rise to prominence as a port during
the 17th century seems to have been strongly related to the growth of
agricultural exports, of which cotton was a major item (Faroqhi 1984: 120,
127; 1986:373-4). See also Issawl 1966: 311-2 for exports of raw cotton
from Izmir).
3. According to a source quoted by Jovlchev, before the war, male and
female wage labourers were used in both areas for cotton production. The
low level of wages received by these labourers Is also mentioned (1966:68).
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4. According to a land survey carried out in 1912, 46 % of all agricultural
enterprises in the Aydin and Adana regions were larger than 50 decares,
while in the other provinces, the proportion was 25 %.
5. As an interesting aspect of these developments, one might mention the
efforts of the British in the Aegean and later those of the Germans (in
Adana, especially) to establish cotton plantations using wage labour. The
British in Izmir also attempted to produce other export crops such as figs
and raisins. However, these efforts failed, mainly due to the difficulty of
finding wage labourers (Kurmus 1974:144-5).
6. Kurmus quotes the British diplomatic agent In Izmir reporting that there
was not a single gin in the area prior to the involvement of British
interests in Turkish cotton (1974:78). It was also at this time that
agricultural machinery began to be imported, first by British landowners
and subsequently, by the Turks (Pamuk 1984:97).
7. The 1912 land survey does not provide information with regard to land
size according to crop cultivated. It is therefore difficult to know
exactly how much cotton was produced on small-scale (peasant?) farms and
how much was produced by large landowners using wage labour. It is also
difficult to determine whether large farms in this period used primarily
wage labour or else sharecropping arrangements for a labour-intensive crop
such as cotton, Novichev, for example, refers to the use of wage labour for
hoeing and harvesting cotton in both the Aegean and in Adana (1966:68).
Pamuk, on the other hand, maintains that there were important differences
between the two regions. In the Aegean, large and small farms operated
side by side. Although Pamuk does not indicate what the small farmers were
producing, the larger ones were primarily geared toward the cultivation of
export crops on the basis of sharecropping contracts with 'free' peasants
rather than on the basis of wage labour. The Adana region, however, had a
very different history. This region became an important agricultural centre
after 1870, when the excess water in the plain could be drained. However,
this area was not affected by the 'cotton famine' as much as the Aegean
primarily because of its very low population. As a result of political
upheavals, the local Armenian population was forced to leave the region, and
local grandees appropriated large tracts of abandoned land belonging to the
Armenians. Forcible sedentarisation of pastoral nomads greatly alleviated
the labour problem and, by 1913, Adana, where the greatest number of large
holdings were to be found, became the most commoditised region in the whole
of Turkey. See also Hinderink and Kiray (1970) and Soysal (1976) for a
history of settlements in the çukurova and Yuregir plains of Adana. The
majority of farms on these plains were producing cotton for exportation
(Pamuk 1984:96-100). See also footnote 4.
8. According to students of early Republican economic history in Turkey
(Birtek 1985, Keyder 1982, Singer 1977, Tezel 1982), two different state
strategies with respect to agriculture can be discerned. Between 1923 and
1929, the state tacitly supported large landowners who produced mainly
export commodities (among which cotton had a very important place). This
support took the form of indirect subsidies such as the abolition of the
tithe in 1925 and easy terms for exporters of cotton and Importers of
agricultural machinery which, at this time, was purchased by large
landowners only. The onset of the Big Depression altered this policy.
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Self-sufficiency in food crops (which, in Turkey, comprise mainly of
cereals, wheat being the most important) was actively promoted by the
government. This meant that policies were now designed to encourage the
commodltisatlon of the small peasant enterprise which was, by far, the
dominant locus of cereal production in Turkey at this time. Thus, the
peasant had to be induced not only to sell his produce, but also to produce
more. New institutions, such as the Agricultural Bank (which gave short-
term credit to wheat producers) and the State Agricultural Produce Office
(responsible for purchasing cereals at government-set prices) were created
to ensure stable Input and output markets. The government steadily fixed
cereal prices above the level of world prices. At the same time, a number
of other institutions set up by the government were responsible for the
creation of a political and ideological climate that favoured and indeed
praised the virtues of the Anatolian peasant. These virtues, that is the
prudence, diligence, and restraint of village life were propagated as a
model for Turkish identity and economic policy. Thus, Turkey managed to
stay out of the Second World War, curb Inflation, and control spending,
while engaging on a path of steady economic growth, and accumulating
foreign reserves. The rate of economic growth was slow as the state
undertook the 'modernisation' of the nation as a whole through various
social reforms. Changes In social life, such as in education, and the rate
of urbanisatlon were faster In pace compared to transformations in the
economy. The rate of Industrialisatlon In particular seemed to lag
dangerously behind. Thus, the period between 1932 and 1948 is known in
Turkish historlography as the atIste period and Is praised by many
contemporary economists as the only time when Turkey ever experienced real
'Independent' development (in A.G. Frank's sense). See Eralp 1983, for an
assessment of these views. The majority of the Turkish rural and urban
population, however, remember this period as a time of austerity and
hardship, a view which largely explains the deposition of the ruling
Republican Peoples Party in the first 'free' elections that took place in
Turkey in 1950. By then, world politics and economics had also altered
considerably so that a new set of policy alternatives faced the new
government. See Stirling (1965:280-2) for the way a village In central
Anatolla experienced these elections. See also Birtek and Keyder (1975) for
an account of the agricultural policies during the period of tatism, and
Trimberger 1978 for an evaluation of this period as exemplifying what she
calls 'revolution from above'.
9. AccordIng to Keyder, increases in cotton output, largely encouraged by
favourable export prices, were relatively high in the first years of the
Republic when the level of cotton production was already 18 S over the
highest pre-war levels (1982:60). Until 1932, 40 5 of all cotton was still
being exported (Keyder 1982:62). This rate is comparable to export rates
obtaining today but under circumstances which are very different: while a
high rate of export at the beginning of the twenties shows the relative
backwardness of domestic textile Industries, by the early seventies, when
the textile industry was already well-established, they Indicate high levels
of domestic production. Before the 1930s, the cotton manufacturing sector
was made up of largely small-scale enterprises and textiles (Including silk
and woollens) constituted 18 S of total Industrial value added. During the
same period, 18.7 5 of the total work force was employed in textile
manufacturing, the second largest branch of industry (Tezel 1982:256). The
few large-scale textile factories in operation had to Import cotton yarn
188
since the short-f ibered indigenous cotton could not be machine-spun. Yarn
manufacturers in Adana who used local cotton provided yarn for the
numerous hand looms in operation in this region. The output of the Adana
hand looms amounted to half of all the cotton cloth in use in Turkey (Hines
et. al., cited by Keyder 1982:82)
10. As I discussed in the previous section, the American strands have an
open boll which exposes the lint to the environment. The lint can thus be
easily damaged by wind and rain. To percent this, the cotton has to be
harvested as soon as the plant matures. This leads to repeated harvests.
In the early thirties, 40 to 60 days were spent harvesting in the Adana
region (ZV 1935: 17,18,37). This is still the case today. Local strands,
called yerli, have closed boils which have to be opened after the harvest In
order to pull out the lint. For this reason, these varieties are more hardy
and can be harvested all at once when the whole standing crop has matured.
The labour necessary to open the boils could be found locally since time
was no longer crucial after the harvest was completed.
11. At this period the wages amounted to 10 % of the sale price of cotton,a
ratio which is still roughly similar today (see chapter 8). Moreover, it
seems that domestic cotton process were on average 30 to 35 % higher than
world prices for comparable cotton (ZV 1935: 38,131).
12. In the Aegean, farms seem to have been smaller (between 300 and 400
decares) and labour problems less acute (ZV 1935:150,157).
13. Rates of marketing for cotton In this period are conjectural. Most
studies assume that the bulk of cotton would be soiled (Tezel 1982:331).
This is obviously logical for large landholders who produce large amounts
of cotton. It has been argued that these large producers were the dominant
forms of producing cotton before the nineteen-sixties (Birtek 1985:436-7).
However, smaller landholdings on which cotton might have been grown mainly
for household use may or may not have existed. Since very little is also
known about non-market arganisation of spinning and weaving, It is
difficult to estimate the importance of non-commodity cotton production
until the 1950'ies when statistical censuses were improved.
14. It has been argued that the state was the crucial agency responsible
for the general commoditisation of Turkish agriculture after 1950.
Margulles (1985) specifies three areas where the impact of the state was
most felt: inputs, credits, and marketing of produce. Although my data does
not allow me to validate this contention which applies to wheat producers
in particular, it does show that cotton production has benefited from all
these three areas of state Intervention (see chapter 8).
15, As shown in chapter 7, the land distributions that took place in Sbke
as well as in other regions (see Tarakli 1976) involved only state lands.
Large estates were usually left intact. This was partly the result of a
policy by which the owners of large estates sold part of their property to
members of their own families. Records in the land registry office in Sóke
reveal such 'sales' by the leading landowners of the district during the
early sixties. Apart from such Immediate reactions, large farmers
organised effective campaigns against land reform programmes from the
moment they were conceived during the late 1930s. Political conditions
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during the fifties, particularly the reaction against étatism, made these
campaigns largely successful. Nevertheless, land distributions in Söke were
instrumental in the establishment of small peasant farming.
16. The urban population of Turkey has been steadily Increasing since
1950. At that time 75% of the total population lived In settlements of
less than 5000 (the figure which is used In Turkish statistics to define a
village). The same figure In 1975 (the last census for which figures are
available) was down to 58%. Although these figures can serve as a rough
guide, they do not necessarily indicate the number of people who derived
their livelihood from agriculture, since a number of rural crafts were and
still are well-developed. Carpet weaving and construction- on a seasonal
or permanent basis- are the most Important of these non-agricultural rural
occupations. See Stirling (1965), Aydin (1980), and Ayata (1982) for
examples of regions where such non-agricultural occupations form an
Important part of rural Incomes.
17, I do not propose to analyse the political economy of development
strategies or to go into the numerous debates these strategies have
generated among academics, Intellectuals, planners and politicians in
Turkey. It Is necessary to point out that the major part of aggregate
information with regard to macro-economic developments has been published
by state Institutions which are concerned with the politics of the various
policies rather than with 'abstract, academic' concerns. Furthermore, all
the groups mentioned above have had direct Influence on planning at various
political conjunctures. See XETU 1981 for some of the issues in these
debates and the professions of the different contributors.
18. For example, some authors such as Kiray argue that the tractor was the
single factor which caused the consolidation of large estates hitherto
cultivated through sharecropping, since its extensive adoption by large
scale landowners led to the expulsion of the landless sharecroppers.
Increases in urban population through in-migration are often used to
substantiate this claim. TekelI (1975) opposes this rather simplistic view
but nevertheless sees the process of urbanlsation in Turkey as largely
shaped by transformations in agriculture, particularly as a result of
Increasing commodltisation of the countryside. )targulles, on the other
hand, argues that the 'push factor' in urban growth has been over-
emphasised in Turkish debates since the majority of migrants to the cities
during the fifties were peasant landowners rather than the landless
(1985:160).
19. The number of tractors in Turkey has increased from 2000 in 1948, to
42,000 in 1960 and 490,000 in 1983 (Singer 1977:200; Kepenek 1983:322; DIE
1983b:236). The largest concentration of tractors is found where crops
such as cotton and sugarbeet are grown. It is also In these areas that
small farmers are able to own tractors. In these areas, forty one percent
of farmers cultivating between one and twenty decares, and 77 % of farmers
cultivating between 21 and 50 decares of land own tractors (Varlier
1978:142).
20. See Robinson (1952) and Hinderink & Kiray (1970) for accounts of the
Impact of tractors In the cotton producing Adana region. As has been
Indicated above, some of their arguments, particularly those with regard to
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the creation of a landless proletariat as a result of the penetration of
tractors 1 have to be taken with a pinch of salt.
21. Between 1971 and 1976, the area cropped to cotton on which artificial
fertilisers were applied increased from 56 % of the total to 90 % (Merkez
Bankasi n.d.:22). Fertiliser consumption (in kilogramme per hectare)
increased from 3 to 243 (Singer 1977:230; Kepenek 1983:322. See also Berk
1980:255-6). 44% of total area cultivated in 1980 was fertilised,
industrial crops (of which cotton is one of the most important) showing the
highest incidence of fertilisation (Varlier 1978:139).
22. Of the 22 million decares irrigated in 1975, 13 million were irrigated
with government funds. Among these state irrigation schemes just over
half were large-scale, involving the construction of dams (Hale 1981:182).
23. In 1967, cotton was cultivated on one fourth of the total irrigated
area. This represented 56 % of the total area cropped to cotton. By 1970,
almost half (48,5 %) of all irrigated acerage was cropped to cotton
(Xargulies 1985:244). Four years later, 78 % of all cotton was irrigated
(93 % in the Aegean, see Xerkez Bankasi n.d.:4).
24. Until the 1960s, growth in agricultural output in Turkey was accounted
for by the extension of area cultivated, a process which was largely due to
the increasing numbers of tractors used (Hale 1981:178; Aresvik 1975:77,192;
Singer 1977:202). It is only in the 1970s that increases in yields become
the main variable explaining increases in output. Increases in cotton
yields become more marked after the mid-seventies (table 5.1), coinciding
with the Implementation of these state policies.
25. For example a survey carried out in 1954 by the Political Science
Faculty of the University of Ankara shows that 93 % of farmers purchasing
tractors had borrowed funds to achieve this investment. 95 % of these
funds were provided by the Agricultural Bank (Slyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi
1954:119,121). Farmers borrowed between 50 and 20 percent of the total
cost of a tractor (ibid:120). Regional variations in these figures indicate
that the Adana and Aegean farmers borrowed less than farmers in the rest
of Turkey. The higher levels of self-funding are usually seen as
indications of larger landownership and greater commoditisation in these
areas (ibid). See chapter 8 for a discussion of various sources for
funding tractor purchases in Söke.
26. The majority of cotton producers receive operating (short-term) loans
in cash and in kind from agricultural credit and sales cooperatives.
Sales cooperatives, as I show in chapter 8, are an important source of seed
and fertiliser as well as providing some cash. Credit cooperatives, to a
lesser extent provide cash to purchase agricultural machinery. Both of
these institutions are organised according to principles laid down by the
state and are funded by the Agricultural Bank. Direct loans by this bank
to farmers have been mainly extended to cereal growers (Xargulies
1985:260,270).
27. See Tezel (1982:361-363) and Birtek and Keyder (1975) for the impact of
price support policies on wheat production prior to 1950.
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28. Assessing the effects of these price policies on agriculture and on the
economy in general has generated heated debates among those concerned
with Turkey's economic development, particularly at a time when a number of
these support schemes are being gradually withdrawn. In general, it is
argued that these policies were detrimental to all sectors of the population
including peasant producers because they were the main reason for creating
inflation (Erguder 1980:171; Bulmus 1981). According to the same arguments,
support policies moreover exacerbated inequalities between agricultural
producers (Bulmus 1981; Ulusan 1980:146). Among macro-economic indicators,
intersectoral terms of trade have been used to indicate the extent to which
these policies have benefited agriculture. In spite of the fact that
economists disagree about the calculation of terms of trade indeces, these
studies argue that prices were in favour of agriculture during the 1970s.
See IJiusan (1980) and Margulies (1985) for various aspects of this
controversy.
29. This reduction in total cotton exports is attributed to the increase in
domestic demand as well as to problems with the EEC, the main purchasers
of Turkish cotton products (ibid).
30. Birtek (1985:436-7) maintains that sales cooperatives after the change
in government in 1950, purchased cotton at prices higher than world levels
and sold it to cotton manufacturers at lower pices. The state thus bore
the cost of the expansion of agriculture-based industralisation.
31. Berk shows that the prices demanded by the farmers are higher than the
government price because of different estimates of production costs. The
State Planning Organisation (SPO) maintains that the prices officially set
each year more than cover the costs of production. According to Berk, the
difference between the two calculations stems from the fact that farmers
include land rent as a cost of production while the SF0 calculate rent as a
return on investment rather than cost. It should be noted that the farmers
who are able to make these demands are organised within the framework of
the Chamber of Agriculture and are predornlnantly 'large' landowners who do
not employ any family labour. The ways in which they calculate costs do
not necessarily apply to those producers with which this thesis is
concerned.
32. Government prices for seed cotton stabilised fluctuations in the market
price which to a large extent reflect international price movements. In
some years, the increase in the government declared floor price was far
above changes in the market. Such divergences have been interpreted as
indicating the Influences of non-economic (that Is political) factors in the
setting of floor prices (ErgUder 1980; Hale 1981:188; Aresvlk 1975:100-1).
Many commentators agree that, until the mid-seventies, agricultural
subsidies have not been effective in redistributing income between sectors
of production, or between different classes of producers within the
agricultural sector (Ulusan 1980:143-4). According to these writers,
inflated prices may have even been one of the main factors accountlung for
the high rates of inflation obtaining during the second half of the
seventies (Ulusan 1980:134). See also Ergüder (1980:171-2) and Kepenek
(1983:332-7).
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33. Smaller producers can have access to only small credits and therefore
have to rely on merchants. Delays in payments made by the cooperatives or
pressing debts cause the producer In difficulties to sell to a merchant at
the current market price. Larger producers, on the other hand, can stock
their cotton and thereby take advantage of changing market conditions.
They can sell to cooperatives when the price is right and therefore are In
a better position to take advantage of state support. Under certain
exceptional circumstances, villagers may also benefit from the normal
increase In prices a few months after the harvest. In 1983, high market
prices led most of the villagers to pay back their yearly debts on time.
After the following year's harvest, a large proportion of villagers were
able to withold cotton sales until January 1984, thus receiving more than
50 % over the floor price.
34. In 1984, a sales tax of 7 % was Imposed.
35. According to the 1980 Agricultural Survey, 1 % of total landholdings
producing cotton are large (that is larger than 500 decares). This
proportion is slightly larger than average in Adana (1.5 %) and slightly
smaller in the Aegean (0.7 %). Noticeable is a continuity in the relative
predominance of larger holdings in Adana, a trend which was set at the
beginning of the century.
36. Both are also largely but not entirely commoditlsed as I shall show in
subsequent chapters.
37. Soviet-built harvesters better adapted to the row width prevalent in
Turkey and which can havest the same field repeatedly using an aspiration
method may, In the future, alter cotton production dramatically. For the
time being, the high cost of the machines means that they are only used in
limited numbers by state farms. Increasing labour scarcity and cost, may
result in the use of these machines on a rental basis similar to the one
now in operation for combine harvesters to harvest wheat. For the
development of a rental market in agricultural machines, see Margulies
(1985:137-8).
38. I should make clear that my data Is not detailed enough to allow me to
correlate each of the factors of production with output.
39. One farmer who decided to plant wheat in what turned out to be an
election year, calculated that he made a loss of four million Turkish Liras.
40. Application of fertilisers Is difficult and each application has to be
fitted to the soil conditions found in one particular field. In many parts
of Turkey, producers over-fertilise. According to one suggestion, the added
nutrients benefit the crop that is planted after cotton so that productivity
Increases have to be calculated for the total production cycle (see Berk
1980:253). In Söke, where such crop rotation is not practiced, agricultural
extension officers complained often that producers used fertilisers
randomly and therefore increases in productivity remained low.
Nevertheless, the impact of fertilisation on cotton production is very
important: in many instances, yields have increased by more than 20% (Dunn
1952:62; Berk 1980:252,255).
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41. The costs of irrigation on distant fields can be so high that some
fields which can only be irrigated with the help of four pumps may not be
cropped to cotton.
42. Until recently, all farmers in Tuz were able to undertake hoeing without
depending on migrant labour. The extension of area cropped to cotton in
Tuz over the last eight years explains the increasing use of migrant labour
for hoeing as well as harvesting.
43. Correlation between paid labour employed and amount of land under
cultivation gave an r2 value of 0.85.
44. It is generally calculated that one tractor can plough 500 decares of
cotton but no farm of that size could undertake operations with only one
tractor: tractors are used for transportation as well. The large landowners
whom I interviewed also maintained that they paid the insurance
contributions of all their labourers, thus adding considerably to their
labour costs. See chapter 9. I doubt very much that this is true in the
case of migrant labourers, although it may be valid with respect to
permanent employees. Evidence on this matter is very difficult to come by.
45. This labour does of course have costs other than money as shown by
Chayanov. In chapter 4, I have argued that these costs cannot simply be
measured in terms of 'drudgery' but have to be considered in the context of
the totality of the relations that make up 'the household'.
46. Thus, a sub-soil ventilator, which cuts furrows of almost one metre in
length, cannot be substituted for by any other more labour intensive
operation. Most of the producers do not use this ventilator, and those who
do, maintain that they improve yields substantially.
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CHAPTER 6: ORGANISATION OF WORK
In this chapter, I shall consider the way labour is organised in the
process of cotton production. In any system of production, labour demand
is a function of the labour process and the organisation of work. Theories
regarding the structure of petty commodity production have, to a large
extent, ignored the problem of labour demand. This omission is largely a
result of attempts to construct a universal theory of petty commodity
production (G. Smith 1986), As I argued earlier, such attempts have led to
a rejection of the category of peasantry and are informed by a reaction to
the 'subjectivism' of Chayanovian approaches which conceive of the
determinants of labour use as a function of the degree of drudgery
producers are willing to accept (Ennew, Hirst and Tribe, 1977; Littlejohn,
1977). In order to stress the structural aspects of petty commodity
production, the role of macro economic variables in determining the
structure of production has been given priority at the expense of other
variables, even at the level of the entreprise. Concepts such as 'simple
reproduction squeeze' and 'disguised proletarian' have been formulated in
order to show that it is commodity circuits rather than personal
preferences, or indeed, any other variable at the level of the entreprise,
which determine the magnitude and organisation of the labour input.
Implicit in these formulations is the assumption that the agents of
production are owner/producers, that is, small producers who supply their
own labour in order to produce commodities the sale of which will allow
them to reproduce their conditions of existence. These approaches do not
take into consideration the fact that many forms of petty commodity
production require labour inputs of different magnitude and quality at
different points of the productive process. In other words, often more
people than simply the owner take part in the process of production. The
conditions under which this 'other' labour Is supplied varies greatly, and
access to labour involves the deployment of market as well as non-market
principles and networks. In many parts of the world, petty commodity
producers need to regularly mobilise labour that is outside the boundaries
of the household and/or the family (Smith 1984b; Friedmann 1980).
Moreover, presently existing theories of petty commodity production cannot
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conceptualise the conditions under which labour is supplied to the
entreprise; they merely assume that such labour is unproblematically drawn
from the household. As a result, the household becomes the privileged unit
of labour supply, but a unit which has to remain beyond the theory, a black
box.
The problem of the organisation and supply of labour in Sbke farms
shows that household and community structures have to be taken into
account. Cotton production requires the cooperation of varying numbers of
workers with varying qualifications. Therefore, the organisation of work in
cotton production is a process that has to be carefully planned and
executed and cannot be treated as a natural extension of the level of
technology available to the producers. In Söke, where at harvest-time
temporary shortages of labour are widespread, it is by adapting the
organisation of work to the structure of the household and the community
that small scale producers are able to survive. The careful management of
the labour available to any given household, and the ability to substitute
it for cash, are complex processes that pre-suppose the existence of a set
of social relations. In order to understand the dynamics of the production
system, it is therefore important to analyse the organisation of work and
structure of labour demand that it generates at the level of the entreprise.
As I showed in chapter 5, the nature of cotton production dictates
the performance of a number of specified tasks without which current
varieties of cotton cannot be grown. However, the fact that many
variations are possible means that many different types of entreprises can
undertake cotton production, each with their specific form of organising the
process of production. In any form of production, the technical features of
the labour process are to a large extent dominated by the social context
created by the dominant form of production. While in capitalist production,
this context is determined by the separation of the workers from the means
of production, petty commodity (or peasant) production is characterised by
an absence of this separation. This distinction results In different
combinations of labour and technology and different relations between the
workers and the owners. The structuring of labour demand therefore depends
on the type of entreprise under consideration.
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In petty commodity production, the owner of the means of production is
the head of a household from the ranks of which a considerable portion of
the labour power is drawn. Thus, the conditions under which agricultural
labour is performed are largely governed by relations that obtain between
members of the household and the community. These relations which are not
a product of the production process, have to be taken into account in order
to understand the quantity and the nature of the work force required as
well as the relations between the owner/manager and the rest of the
labourers. In capitalist entreprises, on the other hand, the separation
between capital and labour creates very different forms of control and
supervision and thus structures the labour force differently: the existence
of intermediary levels of control produces a different hierarchy of workers.
The same factors also determine the structure of labour supply which I
shall consider in chapter 9.
Both in capitalist and petty commodity production, the nature of the
social division of labour, a key aspect of the organisation of work, cannot
be reduced to economic necessities and has to be accounted for separately.
This Is particularly the case when we consider the division of labour based
on age and gender. Social meanings, differentials in power, and
particularly gender definitions, are attached to particular tasks, and
therefore shape the kind of labour that Is required for the different
operations (Wailman 1979). Thus relations that individuals hold vls-a-vis
each other within social structures such as the household and the community
are transferred to the process of production. In other words, In petty
commodity production, labour (and produce, as I argued in chapter 4) Is
allocated according to rights and obligations defined as much by status as
contribution to and position within the labour process.' I shall therefore
pay special attention to the social definitions of and implications for
social identity of the different forms of labour required during the process
of production. As I shall argue in subsequent chapters, through the various
social mechanisms at their disposal, peasant producers are able to redefine
the nature and meaning of wage labour; and it is this ability that largely
explains their relative success in securing the necessary work force.
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In this chapter, I shall argue that the major distinction between
types of entreprises can be identified in terms of the relationship of the
labour force (in particular of manual labour) to the total production
process and therefore, to the final product. Social rights and obligations
established between the labourers and the owners of the means of production
are important in determining organisation of work, particularly in
structuring forms of control and supervision. The social distance that
exists between these two positions within the labour process has important
consequences for the organisation and control of the labour process. It is
to a discussion of these technological as well as social components of the
organisation of labour in the different entreprises that I shall now turn.
6.1 Types of Entreprises
An initial attempt at categorising the production units encountered in
the Söke plain is now necessary. As I shall show in this chapter, many of
the aspects of the structure of production show important variations
according to type of entreprise involved. However, the differences between
units of production are not immediately apparent to the casual observer.
As I have argued in the previous chapter, due to the nature of cotton
production, the technology used by the different enterprises engaged in it
is so similar that a distinction on this basis does not exist. It is only
through a consideration of strategies of production that enables us to
construct such a typology. These strategies of production can be examined
through a consideration of contrasting forms of organising production and
the ensuing differences in division of labour. Such considerations will
also lead us to an analysis of the structure of labour demand generated by
each type of enterprise and therefore help us in answering questions
regarding the long-term viability of each type, in particular. of the
peasant family farm.
Another variable that I shall consider in order to distinguish between
types of enterprise is the degree of reliance on non-market exchanges and
networks for access to means of production, labour in particular. On this
basis, two polar types can be hypothesised: on the one band, the family
labour farm which derives all the inputs from within the household (or
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through non-market exchanges within the community) and, on the other hand,
the capitalist producer who obtains land, labour and credit mainly through
commodity circuits. In terms of this dichotomy, labour will emerge as the
problematic factor for 'capitalist' enterprises (under conditions of an
imperfect national market for labour), while, for peasants, cash becomes the
factor of production most difficult to obtain. None of the actual
production units conform to what must be an ideal typology: in reality, all
units obtain means of production through a combination in various
proportions of market and non-market circuits. Below, I shall construct a
typology of the actual units of production in the Söke plain on the basis
of production strategies and the extent to which inputs are comnioditised.
6.1.1 Village Based Family Farms
These units, which I call peasant farmers, petty commodity producers
as well as family farmers, are owned and operated by individuals whose
lives and by extension, agricultural practices, are inscribed within a
network of social relations that create a village community. They operate
within a largely capitalist economy that is characteristic of the Turkish
social formation and therefore are subject to the laws of operation that
dominate this economic system. They produce commodities, largely on the
basis of family labour, on land which is their property, using commoditised
inputs obtained through market as well as non-market relationships. As has
been argued by Bernstein (1979) for peasants and by Friedmann (1980) for
petty commodity producers, such cultivators are enmeshed not only in output
markets, but also in factor markets. Subsistence production is undertaken
at a very minimum level so that producers are also tied to the market for
items of their own consumption, including wheat, the basis of the Turkish
diet.
It is important to note that peasant farms are not a homogeneous
category: they differ in terms of area under production, extent of
dependence on wage labour (as opposed to family labour), access to credit
and cash, magnitude of cash accumulated in instruments of production, and
income derived (see chapter 10). The feature characteristic of these
enterprises is the fact that the family/household members of the owner of
199
the land provide the core of the labour force. Depending on the task and
on the particularities of the individual household concerned, all members of
the household including the women, act, in varying degrees, as decision
makers and organisers of labour as well as performing other supervisory
roles required by the labour process. Such units need non-household labour
for the manual processes of hoeing and harvesting according to household
size and area under production. It Is the profusion of mechanisms used to
procure such labour which will show the extent to which community relations
are a precondition for the existence of these production units.
As I have already argued, the amount of cash producers are able to
control, determines extent of inechanisation, and ability to utilise modern
inputs, factors which influence inputs of labour and output per decare of
land. Consequently, many of these peasant farms are locked into capital
markets. Farms with less than 25 or 30 decares under cultivation approach
the 'pure' family farm type since they may manage with household labour
only; but they are often unable to provide the socially necessary level of
subsistence. The upper limit is the 350-400 decare mark after which a
number of social as well as purely economic or technical factors make
household based production Impossible. As the level of cash necessary for
the running of the enterprise increases, the farmer has to become involved
in the social as well as the economic life of the town, Constant contact
with merchants and bankers means that the farmer begins to spend more time
cultivating those ties at the expense of those that tie him to the village.
This results in the loss of those community ties which characterise a
peasant enterprise, a process which finally leads to the migration of the
whole family to town, the farmer's greater Involvement in mercantile
activities, and, through schooling, the separation of his children from
agriculture (see chapter 10).
Nost of the peasant farms are tied to the production of cotton as a
monocrop. The amount of cash available to these farms does not enable
them to undertake, on their own, land improvements which would allow double
cropping or crop rotation. It is the income derived from the high price of
cotton that allows the reproduction of these units. The cultivation of
other crops, such as wheat or sunflowers, yields a lower level of net
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income (disregarding labour costs) in terms of money per decare of land.
More importantly, the salty soils in the lower Meander plain does not allow
the successful cultivation of any other crop apart from cotton. This land
is not very productive, and the only way of increasing output is to invest
more labour in the construction of Irrigation canals, and In the hoeing and
harvesting, as well as more supervision In monitoring the progress of the
plant, the condition of the land, and the labour of the workers.
Although household labour characterises peasant households, the
technology of the cotton harvest requires the mobilisation of labour that
is beyond the boundaries of the household. The type of labour utilised in
the manual stages of the production process is usually a function of the
area under production. Smaller farms use household and village labour
exclusively, while the larger units have to resort to migrant labour in the
face of the shortage of seasonal labour that Is characteristic of the area.
Furthermore, the smaller the amount of land under production, the greater
the likelihood of gaining access to forms of 'unpaid' labour. Access to
unpaid labour requires the deployment of household labour so as to
participate in as many of the exchange mechanisms available within the
village as possible, and the activation of ties that derive from areas of
life that are outside the production process: in other words, to participate
fully in the community life that defines the village. Paid labour is not
totally excluded from peasant production and many of the medium sized
farmers employ migrant workers for at least a part of their harvests
alongside labour recruited from the household and the village. To the
extent that the larger farms operate on the basis of paid as opposed to
unpaid labour, they resemble 'capitalist' farms. Consequently, the
difference between the two types of production increasingly becomes located
in the structures of management and the form of mechanlsed labour utilised.
The last area where distinctions can be drawn between types of
enterprise is with regard to the strategies of production and the forms of
calculation that guide production activities. Peasant farms aim to produce
as much cotton per decare as possible. In this way, they hope to utilise
'unpaid' labour to Its maximum limits, They rarely engage In capitalist
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cost accounting, since a large portion of the labour input has no cash cost.
Very few of these producers calculate costs of production, even excluding
labour. They enter into production on the basis of aggregate costs
calculated in terms of net revenue.
6.1.2 Capitalist Farming
The distinguishing feature of 'capitalist' farms is that none of the
manual, mechanical and supervisory tasks are performed by members of the
landowning household. On all capitalist farms, waged employees of varying
status are employed for the execution of these tasks. Capitalist farms
show great diversity with regard to their history, relations with village
populations and involvement of the landowner within the labour process.
The landowner may be an absentee, or may be living in the town of Söke
where other business interests keep him occupied. Some of these large
farms are located on land under the Jurisdiction of a single village, with
which the owners often have a history of complex relationships. Others are
not attached to any particular community. Farms also differ in terms of
their origin. 3 A number of large farms in Söke are the remnants of large
estates dating from the Ottoman period. These large estates have
diminished in size as a result of inheritance practices and land sales. For
the families who hold title to these farms, agricultural activity has become
a side occupation as many of them have invested in industrial or trading
ventures. Other capitalist farms have been constituted as a result of the
investment in land of merchant capital. This process, characteristic of the
late fifties and early sixties, has now, slowed down considerably since
agriculture, especially the cultivation of cotton, does not allow the
realisation of profits possible in other sectors of the economy.
The majority of these farms are situated far away from any settlement.
Their owners therefore have to construct sleeping areas for their permanent
labourers, and separate farm buildings to store equipment and produce.
Thus, it is possible to identify these farms just by looking at the physical
lay-out of the plain: large stretches of fields with at most one wooden
shack indicate the incidence of peasant farms, while a cluster of a few
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concrete buildings, sometimes enclosed by a concrete wall, signal a
'capitalist' farm.
Land size and cropping patterns on these farms, although quite diverse
in themselves, show marked differences from the peasant farm. The area
under production in these farms ranges between 500-2000 decares.
Cultivation of cotton is undertaken only on a portion of this land, the rest
being devoted to wheat or to fodder plants such as sorghum and vetch, or
cropped to sunflowers. A systematic rotation of these crops, followed in
order to maintain the productivity of the soil, results in cotton being
cultivated only in alternate years. This form of rotation is possible
because most of these holdings are located In areas that are protected from
the winter floods created by the Xeander river. Land improvements,
including the construction of flood walls and the proper draining of the
fields, are systematically undertaken, since access to cash does not pose
the same problems as It does for peasant farms.
Organisation of labour and the consequent structure of labour demand
varies very little In capitalist farms. The basic characteristic of these
farms Is that absolutely no labour in whatever capacity Is drawn from the
family or household of the landowner. The latter acts as a coordinator of
operations on a yearly basis and supplies the financial Input necessary to
undertake cultivation. The more specific planning and execution of
activities Is left to a manager-cum-overseer. The wage is the main
structure through which both mechanised and manual labour is recruited.
However, due to the fact that a uniform market in labour Is not established
in rural Turkey, the offer of wages is often not sufficient to recruit all
the manual workers needed for the cotton harvest. Farms which are
historically linked to a settled village are somewhat at an advantage in
securing all categories of workers, but they too face a shortage of manual
labour for the harvest. Given the situation, even capitalist farms have to
deploy non-market mechanisms in order to obtain the necessary wage labour.
The basic advantage that these farms hold over peasant enterprises is
their relative ease in getting access to cash. Profits accumulated in
agriculture as well as in other economic activities constitute the main
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source of this cash. Many of these landowners have invested in sectors
such as tourism and transportation, as well as in industry, not only in
Söke, but in many industrial areas of Turkey, including Izmir and Istanbul.
In Söke alone, there are two large flour mills, a modern cotton spinning
factory exporting cotton yarn, numerous cotton gins and olive presses which
are owned by such farmers. Many landowners have moved into the
professions and work as lawyers, doctors, and pharmacists. Furthermore,
the owners of these farms have a better chance of obtaining credits from
the state as well as the private sector since they have large tracts of
land as well as other assets to show as collateral. The fact that they
reside in town also helps them in forging social links with members of the
bureaucracy and the mercantile and industrial bourgeoisie. Many of them
are also involved in politics, both at the national and the local level.
In contrast to peasant farms, the strategy of production in capitalist
farms is based on profit making. Costs of production on a per decare
basis are calculated for each period of production. Labour has a monetary
cost, since there is no 'unpaid' labour and therefore profit calculation is
possible. It is as a result of such calculations that a number of these
large farms have, in the past six years, switched away from cotton
production and into areas of agricultural production which require much
less manual labour.
Continuing to invest in agriculture in the face of a decrease in
profits is nevertheless not uncommon among these farmers who explain this
'Irrational' behaviour In terms of the pull of the land and other
particularistic excuses. Often, those who give these excuses are the
descendents of the large land-owning families of the region, who as a
result of Increasing commodltisatlon, have had to ratlonalise their
holdings. These people are thus recent recruits into the class of
capitalist farmers, with a background In operating farms of a rather
different nature. It is to a consideration of these non-capitalist large
farms that I shall now turn.
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6.1.3 Jon-Capitalist Large Farms
The last type of enterprise that can be encountered in the Söke plain
is the extensive holding (çiftlik) which, in the period before 1950, made up
almost 80% of the total arable land. This area used to be cultivated only
on the basis of sharecropping arrangements with dependent landless
peasants. Through a variety of mechanisms, of which state intervention is
the most important, landless peasants have largely dissappeared (see
chapter 2>. Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult for the
owners of these large holdings to keep land under production. Furthermore,
the development of a market for land has enabled landholding families to
sell land for a good price and invest their proceeds in more profitable
sectors such as trade and industry. It is the presence and importance of
one of the largest of these near Tuz village that makes a consideration of
such holdings imperative.
The most important characteristic of such enterprises is that they
control land that Is too extensive to be farmed as a single enterprise.
Unproductive land, lakes, and sometimes whole villages, lie within their
boundaries. Consequently, the part that is directly cultivated by the
landowner amounts to only a small portion of the holding. The rest either
lies untilled, or is cultivated by villagers on the basis of various
sharecropping and tenancy arrangements. Often half of the arable land is
left fallow, for technological as well as economic reasons. The sheer size
of the holding necessitates forms of management and calculation that differ
from the two other types of enterprises discussed above. On the portion
that is directly cultivated by the landlord, organisation of work, division
of labour and structure of labour demand are comparable to forms exhibited
by capitalist farms. Similarly, the part of the estate cultivated by
peasants is organised according to principles applicable to family farms.
It Is the combination of these different labour processes that gives these
holdings their distinctive character. Through relations of dependence
established between the landlord and the peasants, the former obtain labour
for their own enterprises and help the latter by sharing some of the
monetary costs of production.
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The existence of non-market exchanges between the owners of large
holdings and villagers with little or no access to land provides the former
with certain advantages in terms of access to labour. Links with villages
make the landlord part of a village community and therefore situates
him/her within a system of reciprocal rights and obligations that have a
rationality other than that of commodity relations. Furthermore, most of
these large landholders have, during the sixties, sold land parcels to
villagers and helped them to acquire tractors and other agricultural
implements. This aid has created permanent ties to the recipients. As a
result, the landlords are able to obtain their permanent labour force
(tractor driver, guard, cook etc.) as well as their managers through non-
monetary obligations which bind certain families to them. The fact that
landlords have multi-stranded relationships with their employees (who often
may also be involved in sharecropping arrangements with their boss) means
that there is an extra element of trust between the respective parties.
Jevertheless, under present-day conditions, short-term labour demand for
the hoeing and the harvesting of cotton often exceeds the labour which can
be provided by villagers. The latter, it should be remembered, also are
after all also in need of labour at the same time as the landlord. Thus,
these landlords often have to resort to migrant labour in order to
undertake the manual tasks of cotton production.' Today, they are
restricting their own cultivation of cotton and encouraging peasants to
cultivate cotton on a renting or sharecropping basis. Alternatively, the
holding is being cut down in size through sales and inheritance and the
owners are losing interest in agricultural production.
The basic strategy that is followed by large non-capitalist farming
enterprises is therefore correspondingly different to the two types of farm.
This strategy can be understood as an effort to maximise land under
cultivation rather than return on invested capital, or the use of 'unpaid'
labour. The best way to do this, is to rent land out to peasant producers,
who on the basis of the labour power they control, cultivate cotton on
smaller tracts of land. The landlord demands that the rent be paid in
kind, an arrangement that suits cash-poor peasants as well as the
landowner. Apart from providing a return on land that would otherwise
remain unproductive, this allows the landlord to appropriate surplus labour
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as well as rent. It is by setting a higher than normal rent, or what
Friedmann has called "'precapitalist' rent" (1980:172) that the landlord is
able to effect this appropriation. The land rented out to peasants in this
fashion is often marginal land that requires a lot of labour in order to
provide satisfactory yields. The only limiting factor faced by such a
strategy is the willingness of peasants to submit to these conditions.
Sharecropping does not produce the same level of return per unit of
land. Firstly, the landowner has to share the peasants' risks and bear the
burden of any loss in yields. To minimise such risks, land of better
quality, suitable for sunflower production, is more often handed over to
sharecroppers. Secondly, the landholder has to share In the costs of
production and therefore Invest a certain amount of cash which of course
has alternative uses. Two factors explain the persistence of this form of
sharecropping. Firstly, in economic terms, it is often more profitable to
invest a certain amount of money and to have access to cotton, than to let
land lie idle. Landowners undertake direct production of cotton to the
extent that is feasible, given the structure of labour demand, Where
landowners are left with land that they cannot cultivate with the labour
available to them, they are faced with two alternatives, They can either
leave It untilled, or they can decide to take the risk of letting it to
sharecroppers. The main reason why they are willing to take this risk is
the nature of the market for cotton. The price of cotton often rises
considerably during the months following the harvest and these landowners
can take advantage of higher prices, since indebtedness does not force them
to sell the product immediately after the harvest as Is the case for
peasants. This also explains why rents in kind are demanded of tenants.
Thus, profits derived from cotton speculation makes cropping land to cotton
under whatever arrangement a risk worth taking.
The second factor which explains the persistence of sharecropping, is
the nature of the extra-economic relationships that obtain between the
landlord and the sharecropper. Often, the former is obliged to provide
sharecropping land as a function of historical ties, the rationality of
which has to be sought In those community ties rather than in
considerations of profit. Tan, the landholder near Tuz, enters into tenancy
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relations only with members of villages other than Batnos where he,
himself, lives. To those Batnos villagers with whom he has established
long standing rights and duties, Tan is obliged to provide land on a
sharecropping basis. A series of non-economic exchanges often lubricate
the exchange that accompany the sharecropping contract. An ideology of
mutual dependence, close to patron-client ties is part of this
'precapitalist' enterprise. Tan's wife, for example, is called 'mother' by
the women of Batnos families that are close to Tan, and she often
participates, however briefly, in important family occasions, such as
births, deaths and marriages.
The agricultural units of the Söke plain thus show marked differences.
For the moment, I have roughly designated them as small scale commodity
producers, capitalist and pre-capitalist enterprises. The point to note is
that within a largely capitalist context, where land and labour are largely
commoditised, and where an extensive credit market subsidised by state
policies operates relatively uniformly, more than one type of enterprise is
able to operate. The differences in strategies of production are a
reflection of the characteristics of each of these enterprises.
Furthermore, an interesting symbiosis exists between peasant farms and pre-
capitalist holdings.
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Table 6.1 Typology of Enterprises on the Xeander Plain
Type of
Entreprise
Size (da.)
Crop
Cropping
system
Permanent
Labour
Seasonal
Labour
Strategy
of prod.
Limiting
Factor
Jedium
Peasant
50-150
cotton
monocrop
single
crop
no fallow
household
labour
household
community
)taximising
unpaid
labour
Cash
Large
Peasant
150-500
cotton
monocrop
single
crop
no fallow
waged
driver
household,
community,
migrants
Iaximising
unpaid
labour
Cash
Capitalist	 Ion-Cap.
Farms	 Farms
200-3000	 1000+
cotton, vetch	 cotton,
sunflowers,	 sunflowers,
wheat, sorghum olives
crop rotation	 single crop,
double crop	 half of
no fallow	 area left
fallow
waged	 waged
manager,	 manager
drivers,	 servants,
cook, guards	 drivers, cook,
guards
sharecroppers
& tenants
migrants,	 migrants,
local landless sharecroppers
labourers	 dependents
)Eaximising	 Naximising
capital	 land under
production
Labour	 Labour
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6.2 Social and Technological Aspects of Labour Demand
There is a three-fold division of labour within the process of cotton
production: manager (çiftçi/k&hya, tractor driver (sofor), and labourer
(ample). This division corresponds to different degrees of skill 1 use of
machinery, control, and access to the final product. In other words,
implicit in this division of labour, is a hierarchy of status as well as
labour. The structure of this labour hierarchy and the demand for skilled
as well as for manual labour differ according to the type of enterprise
involved. Each has a particular way of combining these functions, this
giving rise to a distinct and separate division of labour. Yhile village
based farmers often merge into one the roles of driver, planter, mechanic,
supervisor and manager, thus reducing the number of workers, town-based
capitalist poducers employ different individuals to undertake these
different tasks.6 Peasant producers operating on a large scale often
combine the role of manager and driver in the person of the latter. The
manager-driver-supervisor of the peasant production unit is also the head
of the household while in capitalist farms, he is often a trained employee
who represents and is responsible to the owner of the farm, an individual
whom the majority of the workers rarely see. Such differences in the
social division of labour alters the nature of labour demand and authority
relations within the labour process as well as the division of the final
product.
Scale of operation, as well as type of enterprise, affects this
division of labour. As the area under production increases, even village
based producers may require additional drivers, especially during the
initial stages of cotton cultivation. Xagnitude of operations also affects
the number of manual labourers needed to hoe and harvest as well as the
structure of supervision for which additional labour has to be employed.
The most important variable that affects the organisation of manual labour
is the nature of the labour force: migrant labour requires a structured form
of supervision and record keeping which can be dispensed with if village
labour is employed. For the medium-sized family based farm, the main form
of labour required is manual labour and one (sometimes two) coordinator(s)
of activities. Notwithstanding the added labour needed for organising
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migrant labour, large scale peasant producers are able to undertake
production by simply hiring additional drivers on a seasonal or permanent
basis. Town-based capitalist cotton production, on the other hand, requires
a manager, a number of permanent workers (drivers, mechanics, cooks,
guards) as well as seasonally employed manual workers and their
supervisors.
As described in the previous chapter, the process of cotton production
involves the use of both mechanised and non-mechanised labour. Tractors
undertake most of the stages of production from the preparation of the soil
to irrigation as well as the transportation of workers and produce. This
extensive utilisation of the tractor has, on the one hand, led to a demand
for skilled tractor drivers and mechanics who are able to operate the heavy
equipment. On the other hand, the increase in yield resulting from
mechanised and irrigated cultivation, has also increased the amount of
manual labour required for the harvesting of the cotton plant, while
reducing the demand for non- mechanised labour In other stages of the
production process. Time Is the most Important factor that structures the
demand of both mechanised and non-mechanised labour in all enterprises.
Timely inputs of labour particularly during the sowing, irrigation and
harvest determine the quantity of output. The level of experience,
expertise and knowledge of environmental conditions on the part of manual
labourers as well as of tractor operators also affect yield considerably.
Such skills are also a necessary component of farm management, which
involves the planning and coordination of numerous agricultural activities
as well as supervision. In addition, a farm manager has to negotiate with
state bureaucrats, merchants, fellow-villagers and labourers.
6.2.1 Farm Xanagement
The farm manager plans and organises the various processes of cotton
production. His/her main task is to be able to meet the many requirements
of the cotton plant, using the market and non-market mechanisms available
to him/her. Seed has to be purchased and transported to the field,
fertiliser has to be obtained, tractor drivers found and sufficient fuel
made ready. This involves contacts with a series of individuals with whom
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the farmer has diverse, often multi-stranded relationships. Thus, s/he has
to buy seed from the village merchant, his/her neighbour, as well as from
the state cooperative, Tans, where the official in charge may also be
his/her close or remote kinsman/neighbour. S/he has to purchase fuel, often
on credit and make sure s/he has access to all the various tractor-drawn
implements necessary. These tasks require frequent visits to town and a
wide network of contacts ranging from bank managers and state institutions
to neighbours and friends. It is also through such constant contacts that
managers learn about new implements, improved fertilisers and insecticides,
explore their potential contribution to the process of production, and
assess modes of adoption.
Above all, farm management means close contact with the process of
production and the making of all production decisions. The manager has to
be attuned to the particular needs of his/her field and provide for them
without jeopardising the overall success of the enterprise. Thus, s/he has
to make frequent trips to the field and observe the growth of the cotton
plant in order to make correct assessments. For example, insecticides, a
very expensive item, may or may not be applied, depending on the conditions
of his/her field as well as the neighbouring fields. The process of
irrigation has to be be under constant surveillance since, as I explained
earlier, too much water can delay the harvest while too little water causes
a drop in yield. Thus, experience of cotton cultivation, and knowledge of
soil conditions are indispensable assets that managers must possess. Even
the simplest variation in production practices, for example, a change in the
frequency of ventilation, or in the amount of seed or the timing of sowing,
may have grave consequences.
Apart from being responsible for all production decisions, managers
also have to keep track of the financial aspect of production. Keeping the
books, paying wages, recording the amount and price of the various inputs
utilised, and settling debts are among the routine activities of farm
managing. This requires at least a modicum of literacy, and the ability to
deal with figures. However, many managers do without knowledge of
sophisticated mathematics or economics, since, as I shall argue elsewhere,
very few of them engage in detailed profitability calculations.
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In the majority of village-based farms, the owner of the field (or the
tenant) acts as manager. In cases of sharecropping, the functions of
management are shared beteween the owner of the field and the sharecropper
according to the particular relationship between the individuals involved.
Often it is the tractor owner, rather than the landowner, who makes the
major decisions and controls production. Landowners who live in town and
who do not rely on family labour, usually hire as manager (kahya) an
experienced and trustworthy person and entrust him with the bulk of the
operations. It is the manager who then hires the remaining labour force,
assesses the needs of the farm, and supervises productive activities, while
the owner effects the financial and bureaucratic arrangements. The owner's
contribution to the running of the operations depends on his/her
involvement in other economic activities, and also vary according to place
of residence, gender, training, and inclination.
Farm management is in general a male job. The only female farmers
that can be encountered both in town and in the villages are widows who
still attract a lot of attention when they go about their business in town.
1t is thought that contact with officials, usually men, as well as the
constant supervision required in the fields makes the job inappropriate for
women. The job takes women out of the female sphere, into the town and the
fields at any time of the day and the night: they have negotiate with
officials, offer them drinks, and in the fields they have to be present
during the sowing, ploughing and the irrigation, activities often undertaken
at night when it is cooler. However, the main reason for the association
of farming with men is that, far from being merely a job, farming is a
gender-specific status, and one which is still highly ranked and respected.
The influential and respected individuals of Söke are the descendants of
the old large land-owning families and it is also these people who hold
important economic and political positions. Farming involves the ownership
of land, which, until recently, was the source of all wealth in the region;
it confers on its owner the power to give orders to others. It is the
latter aspect of the definition of the status that is most incompatible
with prevalent notions of womanhood and a woman will rarely call herself
çiftçi, farmer, even if this is what she actually does. Farming is in fact
one of the most important components of male gender identification.
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The status of farmer has lost a lot of its former importance in Söke
itself as a result of the spread of commerce and industrial activities.
Wealth as well as status are no longer seen as a function of landownership
as they used to be; formerly, merchants and traders bought land not only as
a profitable investment but also as a means of acquiring status within the
town. To the extent that Söke is no longer a community of farmers, the
term itself has lost some of its former significance and is now
increasingly being applied to the overseer-cum-managers who are in charge
of these large farms, the khya. The term kAhya denotes an employed
person, unable to take independent action. It is this independence that is
really defines the status of çiftçi. Thus, rather than being an ascribed
status, training, experience and connections with landowners are now
sufficient to secure the position of kâhya. Many of the retired state
agricultural extension officers work as managers for large landowners.
Villagers with little or no land can also find such Jobs, employing their
wives as cooks and children as tractor drivers.
By contrast, it is in the villages that the older meaning and status
is still attached to the occupation of 'farmer'. As I argue in chapter 2,
inhabitants of Söke villages now call themselves çiftçi, and the community
itself is seen by its members as a community of farmers. This is very
interesting in view of the fact that not long ago, these people saw
themselves as peasants, köylii, implying a much lower status and a general
inferiority to town dwellers (cf. Stirling 1965:283-4). To become a farmer,
one needs to own land or to have enough savings to rent land or buy a
tractor. To the extent that farming operations are successful, the
individual will be defined as a farmer by himself and by his co-villagers.
The status of farming, thus, becomes one of the axes along which
competition between men in the village is waged. Therefore, the position of
manager is not simply an aspect of the occupational differentiation that
accompanies specialisation in a particular branch of production; in other
words it is not a position created only by the social division of labour.
One cannot hire a çiftçi; one is a çiftçi who may hire a driver.
214
6.2.2 Nechanised Labour
Today, the basic steps of cotton cultivation consist of mechanised
processes which require the utilisation of a tractor to which a number of
specialised implements are attached. Tractors are also the main means of
transport, whether of implements, labourers, or produce. Furthermore, they
provide the source of power for the pumps used to irrigate fields, The
area that can be cultivated using one tractor only, can vary from 200 to
500 decares according to the lay-out and location of the fields. This
means that one experienced tractor driver can undertake most of the process
of cultivation, except for sowing and the application of fertilisers, tasks
which require another person to operate the tractor-drawn seed drill. As
the area under production increases, it is the tight schedule under which
cotton producers operate which necessitates the use of additional tractors.
The task of tractor driver incorporates the performance of all these
operations and therefore is a skilled job which requires training and
experience. A driver has to work in close cooperation not only with the
labourers, but also with the manager whom he represents to the rest of the
work force. As I shall show below, drivers often act as supervisors of
manual labour and almost never perform manual labour. They are often
responsible for the maintenance of the tractor and the tractor-drawn
equipment. The preparation of the field and the sowing is a tiring job, and
it is the conditions of the field and the schedule that dictate the hours of
work rather than any other arrangement. Depending on the area cultivated,
the driver may have to work for two or three days and nights in order to
complete the task on time. Between the planting and the irrigation, the
pace of work slackens: drivers then transport hoers to the field, provide
them with water, supervise the workers, ventilate the soil, and control the
condition of the irrigation canals and drainage ditches. Work picks up as
the crop grows, needing water, fertilisers and insecticides, which it is
again the driver's job to provide. When the harvest begins, the driver's
main occupation consists of the transportation and supervision of the
workers. His Job does not end with the harvest: he has to transport the
produce to town and wait in long queues to deliver the crop to the state
cooperative and plough the field for the last time. Unless there are other
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agricultural activities, this period marks the end of work for the driver
until the next season, four to five months later.
Thus, the main farming tasks are actually carried out by the driver
under the constant supervision of the manager, who, in relation to the
driver, represents (or is) the landowner. Thus, a relation which requires
the greatest cooperation becomes also a relation of subordination; the
driver has to ultimately submit to the authority of the manager. This
relation creates considerable antagonism between the two, an antagonism
which expresses itself differently in the different entreprises. In family
farms, the manager-driver relation is subsumed within the father-son
relation. Many of the smaller farmers who can do with the labour of one
adult male (his own), nevertheless employ their son(s) within the labour
process in the position of driver. This is more a function of the
definition of household head/farmer, than a situation that arises from the
nature of the labour process. As I argued above, to be a farmer is part of
the identity of the household head; a driver (sof or), on the other hand, is
someone who has not attained this position, but is in the process of doing
so. The occupation of tractor driving is as much tied to a particular
status position within the household and the community as that of farmer.
Married men who have no means of organising production independently have
to accept this lower status when they work as drivers for other people.
Women, by definition, are excluded from mechanised labour." If the status
of çiftçi corresponds to 'mature, independent man', driver means 'dependent
young man'. The former status precludes the performance of any form of
labour, the latter, manual labour. In fact, many unmarried youths identify
closely with their tractors which they care for, decorate, and even use for
courting their fiancée. They begin to learn the skills of tractor driving
from the moment they are incorporated into the labour force, usually at the
age of twelve when they leave primary school.
In large peasant farms (or in households where adult males are not
available) drivers from outside the household have to be recruited. The
nature and duration of this form of employment varies according to scale:
while on medium sized farms, tractor drivers are hired for a particular
task only, large farms have to employ them on a permanent basis. If they
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are not forced to rent or share their land out, landowners without access
to the labour of young men engage in production by renting tractors along
with their drivers; if they own tractors, they employ individuals for
specific tasks only. On large peasant holdings, usually one hired driver
who also acts as manager (k&hya) is employed on a permanent basis, the
rest being hired whenever the farmer is pressed for time, While the owner
attends to financial aspects, the manager/driver is responsible for the
coordination of most farming operations, and therefore must be an
experienced cotton planter. Supervision by the owner varies according to
the qualifications of the driver, length of the contract, and the nature of
the relationship between the particular individuals concerned.
On these farms, the relationship betweeen the owner and the driver is
in fact less strained than that between father and son. There is much less
reason for conflict: quarrels over inheritance or over the establishment of
an independent household do not arise, and if the parties are not content
with the relationship, they can always break their contract. Driving jobs,
as well as drivers themselves, can be found in the area with relative ease.
Therefore, to the extent that the owner-driver relationship is regulated by
market forces rather than by kinship ties, the structure of authority
inherent in it does not lead to serious conflicts. This does not, of
course, mean that non-market considerations are absent from the
relationship which, in some ways, can be compared to a form of patronage.
This aspect is somewhat reflected in the terms of address used by the
individuals concerned. The owner is called	 a term of respect which
means elder brother, as well as important or influential person (Benedict
1974:76-8; Xeeker 1972:238; Stirling 1965:105,136,174).8 The	 who,
according to Xeeker, represents the ideal model of authority of Ottoman as
opposed to Republican Turkey, ideally is a paternalistic benefactor who
demands service in return for favours. Although the wage nexus dominates
the relations between owner and driver, these implications are not totally
absent in the Söke setting either.
In capitalist farms where the owner and the manager are two different
people, the driver is directly under the authority of the latter. It is the
manager rather than the driver who represents the owner: the driver has no
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other position than that of a salaried employee. Therefore relations
between manager and driver are strained: the driver has little direct
contact with the landowner and often becomes the scapegoat for an
incompetent manager. Often, more than one driver is employed, the number
depending on the scale of the enterprise. There is a frequent turnover of
drivers on these farms and the length of employment is, on average, two or
three years. Drivers are employed on the basis of verbal contracts, with
little or no guarantee of duration of employment. Tractor driving on
capitalist farms is nonetheless seen as secure job, since drivers are among
the few agricultural labourers who are formally registered as workers at
the labour exchange, and can thus have their social security contributions
paid by their employers. Drivers are only in charge of the execution of
mechanised operations, for which they need to have the necessary skill, but
they carry no decision-making responsibility. They do little or no manual
work; some supervision of manual workers is required of them, as is the
distribution of water to hoers. They form a part of the permanent farm
staff, often eating and sleeping on the farm compound. Their families are
usually left in their own villages where they may have land of their own
and to which they return during slack periods.
6,3 Manual Labour on Peasant Farms
Despite increasing mechanisation, manual labour is still the most
crucial factor determining the process of cotton production. The main task
for which labour is needed is harvesting. As I have shown in the previous
chapter, cotton is still manually harvested regardless of scale and type of
entreprise not only in Söke, but in all areas of Turkey where cotton is
planted. Manual labour is also required for other procceses in the
production of cotton. In decreasing magnitude of amount of labour required,
these are: hoeing, weeding, digging irrigation canals, contsructing earthen
irrigation dams and transporting and setting up irrigation pipes. As I
have indicated earlier, improved technology increases the amount of manual
labour required for the harvest, while simultaneously reducing that needed
for the other tasks mentioned.
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Compared to the other processes of production, the organisation and
supervision of manual tasks is more complicated since it requires the
coordination of activities performed by a larger number of people. Yorkers
have to be recruited and transported to the fields on tractor-drawn
trailers, a journey which takes at least half an hour. Food is never given
to the workers but water carried in tanks is regularly distributed.
Depending on the nature of the task and the size of the fields, gangs of
three to fifteen young men are employed for the construction of canals and
dams. Work parties for the weeding, hoeing and harvesting are larger and
require more detailed supervision and coordination. Harvesting is a manual
process, the only implements needed being cloth aprons and sheets with
which to collect and transport the picked cotton. Some workers, especially
those who come from other regions as migrant workers, use straw baskets.
These items are provided by the labourers themselves, as are the picks and
shovels used in digging canals and the wooden handled metal hoes used for
spacing and ventilation.
The organisation of the labour process for the various manual tasks
mentioned shows certain variations to which I shall now turn. The task of
constructing canals and dams for irrigation is strictly a male job. It
demands considerable physical strength and the expenditure of energy for
long periods of time under a blazing sun. Young men work under the
supervision of one of the representatives of the landowner with a pick and
shovel, shifting earth for about ten hours a day. The task does not usually
take more than a couple of days to accomplish. Fewer people are needed to
lay out the pipes to carry water from the canals and into the fields.
Consequently, labour is often not hired specifically for this task, since
one or two men will suffice: on non-peasant farms this is the Job of the
driver(s) and maybe one other permanent employee, while on peasant farms,
it is carried out by the owner of the field and/or his sons and neighbours.
Contrary to canal digging, this is an activity closely associated with the
management of the entreprise, and therefore not perceived by the farmers as
'manual labour'. It is seen as involving skill and experience, since it is
important to know when the field is satiated and when it needs more water.
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The tasks of harvesting 1 hoeing and weeding make up the bulk of the
manual labour required for the whole of the process of cotton cultivation.
The sheer number of workers employed requires quite a different scale of
organisation, control and supervision, a scale which nevertheless varies in
proportion to the area cropped to cotton. It is in this process that the
various advantages of the peasant farm over other types of entreprises
most clearly emerge. For this reason, I shall describe these processes in
detail starting from the organisation of manual labour on peasant farms,
and indicating where appropriate the differences observed In the other
types of entreprises.
The process of hoeing is more carefully organised and supervised than
harvesting: in the former instance, workers are paid a daily wage, while in
the latter remuneration is in terms of a piece rate. After having
transported the labourers on tractor-drawn trailers, the owner of the field
or his/her representative remain in the field for the whole day, in order to
control the quality and the pace of the work and to distribute drinking
water to the workers. The labourers are assigned cotton rows by the
supervisor; about three or four hoer-s work side by side adjusting and
regulating each other's speed. Co-workers as well as supervisors make sure
that the spacing is adequate and that the roots are well-ventilated. Every
individual worker is encouraged in different ways to keep up with the
majority of the workers, and slackers are reprimanded as much by co-
workers as by the supervisor.
The working day is long and marked by a series of breaks. Including
the journey, the working day lasts from dawn to dusk, a period of ten to
twelve hours in July and about six to eight hours in October and November
when the harvest takes place. The five rest periods vary from fifteen
minutes to an hour and a half. The longest break is taken at lunch time,
when the sun is at the zenith and the heat too strong. The breaks are
organised in the following way:
8:30 a.m.	 food break, thirty minutes
11:15 a.m. rest, fifteen minutes
1:00 p.m. lunch break, ninety minutes
3:15 p.m.	 rest, fifteen minutes
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5:15 p.m.	 rest, fifteen minutes
At the signal of the supervisor, all workers stop and then resume work
simultaneously. It seems that the working day in Adana is structured in
approximately the same way as in Söke, except for the fact that workers
receive food from the landowners, a practice which is absent in Söke
(Soysal 1976:110; Seker 1986:119-120). With slight variations, the
structuring of the breaks is the same in the two regions. According to
Soysal, the Adana customs having been established in the 1830'ies, remain
largely unchanged down to the present day. There is no other legislation
in Turkey that regulates working hours, or even wage rates when it comes to
seasonal agricultural work.9 The regulation of the working day, which
according to Soysal and Seker, also encompasses the wage rate and the
timing and form of payment, had been originally been established by Ibrahim
Pasa, son of Mohammed Ali of Egypt, who for a period of eight years,
occupied the çukurova region. Thus, informal mechanisms originating in the
distant past and in forms of social organisation which have largely
dissapeared, still regulate the conditions under which 'outside' labour is
employed.
Contrary to the organisation of hoeing, the harvesting day is not
divided into similar formal breaks. The workers often have to provide
their own drinking water. The labourer is left to his/her own pace, with
occasional control of the quality of work. It is the piece rate that fixes
the pace of work: the fastest workers average about 120 kg. of cotton per
day. The quicker the workers, the less time it takes to complete the
harvest and ensure the highest possible yield. Too much haste, however,
results in considerable waste. Skill and experience also improve the
quality of the harvest considerably: the better workers know which boll is
ready to be harvested and which is diseased. Moreover, a good harvester is
able to pick all the cotton that is on one boll without dropping part of it
on the ground where it gets soiled. A well picked cotton field is the
colour of dried wood, whereas a badly picked one is littered with white
dots. Supervisors also make sure that the cotton picked in the morning and
still heavy with dew is well dried before it is taken to be weighed. The
owner/supervisor works at harvesting himself until the first of the cotton
is checked in. At this point, he begins packing the cotton delivered by the
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harvesters into jute sacks, ready to be sold or stored, a job which usually
extends well into the night.
As with hoeing, each labourer is assigned one or two rows, and
workers pick the cotton in groups of four or five working at their
respective rows. The work is hard and painful: workers are often bent over
the plants and the dry carpals of the bolls scratch hands and fingers.1°
Each labourer has an apron into which the harvested lint is gathered. When
the apron becomes too heavy, its contents is emptied into a large sheet
which belongs to each individual worker. If groups of people, for example,
members of one family cooperate, they often put their harvest on the same
sheet, which when full, is taken to the weighing station where the
owner/supervisor records the amount of cotton delivered by each worker or
group of workers. These sheets, when full, take more than 100 kg. of
cotton, which the worker herself is supposed to transport to the weighing
point, causing loss of working time as well as damaging health.
6.3.1 Social Aspects of )tanual Labour
To the extent that manual labour is equal to female labour, it has an
ambiguous position within the labour process of peasant farms. On the one
hand, manual tasks are said to be the most difficult and their critical
contribution to the total production process is recognised. Consequently,
the work of women is positively valued, with men praising them for their
skill, speed and stamina. On the other hand, women's contribution to the
labour process is also devalued by being classified as an extension of
'domestic labour'. Compared to the knowledge required to control a tractor,
or the shrewdness needed to handle prospective creditors, it appears as
'unskilled' fob. But this definition does not rest on purely technical
factors. Nen argue that women are by far better pickers than they
themselves, because their fingers are small and can 'naturally' work fast.
Men from the village, in fact, often pick much less cotton in a day
compared to women, a fact which interestingly enough cannot be observed
among migrant workers. Migrant men and women pick about the same quantity
of cotton in one day, a quantity which amounts to thirty to fifty percent
less than that picked by local workers. In other words, picking cotton
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well is a product of long years of training as well as position within the
labour process. As I shall argue below, local labourers do not even need
close supervision, and work in the fields proceeds as part of the social
relations that exist within the vilage. But the training necessary to make
good cotton pickers becomes, as argued by Elson and Pearson, socially
invisible, and skill is attributed to 'nimble fingers' (Elson and Pearson
1981:151). In contrast to the situation in harvesting, it Is generally
accepted that men are better hoers than women. This superiority is
attributed to men's greater physical strength, which allows them to hoe
faster and deeper than women. Consequently, hoeing teams are formed
according to sex, men forming separate hoeing parties and receiving a
higher wage.1
However, manual labour, particularly that of harvesting, Is more than
just an extension of domestic labour: it is in fact closely linked to the
gender definitions of womanhood, and especially of the unmarried young
girl. Although most of the members of landowning middle peasant
households, Including the male household head, spend at least some time
harvesting and hoeing, this identification Is so strong that many of the
young men of the family deny having ever picked cotton. Contrary to work
at home, work in the fields is performed publicly and as such it can be
judged by others. The manner in which a girl works reveals to villagers
quite important information about her personality. In fact, future mother-
in-laws are often only interested in the working habits of a prospective
bride. To be hard working (or lazy) and compliant to authority (or else
refractory) are the two very important components of a girl's identity,
and, until she as a married woman lives in her own household, not many
other aspects of her identity are revealed or are indeed considered to be
of any consequence. Being under public gaze also engenders considerable
competition between girls of similar age and status; to finish the hoeing
of three rows while your friends can only tackle two Is an important
element of prestige, as is of course picking the largest amount of cotton
in a day.
Work In the fields, from the point of view of the young girls, can be
seen as an occasion to exhibit their virtues. But it is also a time when
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all women can escape the strict rules of conduct that they have to observe
within the boundaries of the village. Considerable freedom of expression
is allowed even to unmarried girls: they can laugh and shout in public, sing
songs and choose friends with whom they can work side by side. Joking and
taunting, which may have serious implications in terms of social
relationships, is a permanent aspect of work in the fields. It is a time
when women, particularly younger ones, are spared the authority of senior
members of their own households, the most bothersome of which are brothers
or sons. On the basis of shared secrets as well as shared work, they can
form friendships which may last a lifetime (ahretlik). The close
association of two young girls is usually viewed with suspicion, especially
if one of them has an eligible brother. Elopements are in fact often
arranged through the mediation of women, after negotiations that take place
in the fields where one can talk without being disturbed or overheard.
Working in groups of age-mates is also common among older married women,
so that In the fields, it is people of similar age and status that
cooperate. Rather than reflecting group relations organised in terms of
kinship, in the fields, it is Individual relations on the basis of equality
that flourish and, when transferred to the social space of the village, may
often become relations of mutual help and solidarity.
The identity of of Söke girls as cotton pickers is one which is widely
recognised. In a similar way that in another region, girls may be known
for excellence In weaving or dancing, the girls in SSke villages are
associated with cotton picking throughout in the whole Aegean region. They
define themselves and are seen by others as being 'cotton girls' (pamukçu
kizlar). There is in fact a statue in Aydin, the capital of the province,
depicting girls picking cotton with their characteristic aprons tied to
their waists. The statue is next to that of Yiiruk Ali, the legendary hero
of the province who, being a sort of Robin Hood figure, proved his loyalty
to the new Turkish state by fighting against the Greeks in 1922. The
edifice, whose counterparts can be found in most of Turkey's provincial
capitals, reflects the identity of the region, by explaining to the visitor
something about the character and history of the province, of the Aydinll
identity. The girls are aware of this identity and proud of their
reputation.
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The attitude of the women themselves to work in the fields is
contradictory. On the one hand 1 they enjoy the atmosphere of freedom as
well as the knowledge that this work gives them of the production
process. 12 Participation in the work process also helps in the power
struggles within the household 1 since women are not only labourers, but are
also providers of other labour: manual labour is recruited on the basis of
women-centered networks, Women are proud of their expertise, a fact which
they often stress when comparing themselves to migrant labourers. This
pride is also reflected in their comportment in the fields: girls have a
particular way of tielng their scarves that identifies them as local cotton
pickers, and a particular way of relaxing on the handle of their hoes
during breaks. Xoreover, all unmarried girls make a point of crocheting
during rest periods, thus showing their confidence in themselves, and their
ability to do two things at once. Crocheting also emphasises the gender
definition of the hoer. These almost ritualistic forms of behaviour are
exhibited on a much smaller scale by married women.1
On the other hand, the work is hard and all the domestic tasks at
home still have to be done after a ten hour working day. Xany of the
unmarried girls resent having to work in the fields for most of the summer.
WheD field work is undertaken for the young girl's household, the
opportunity of working with different people decreases and the pleasure of
working away from parental authority is foregone. Working for one's own
household also reduces the opportunity of earning or controlling money. In
this sense, agricultural work on household fields appears to the worker to
be an extension of domestic labour and a duty attached to a particular
position within the household. Furthermore, work outside the home denotes
low status, and agricultural labour is widely associated with being a
peasant (köylii). It can immediately be noticed from the colour of one's
face and hands. Most of the girls wish to marry out of the village and out
of cotton picking so that they can be housewives (ev kadirti).
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6.3.2 Forms of Supervision and Labour Control
In the absence of established legislative or economic sanctions, the
structure of supervision that can be observed is largely dependent on
social relations between the labourers as well as the immediate relations
of authority and control that emerge within the process of production.
Members of the household and the village are obviously tied to one another
through multiple links, while often only economic relations that last for
the duration of one harvesting season are established with migrant
labourers. Thus, the relation of supervision in peasant farms employing
village labour is mediated by relations that constitute the village as a
community. This relation is binding on both sides: the
landowner/supervisor cannot demand too much from his/her workers, who, in
turn have to perform according to village norms that define 'good' work. In
other words, on both sides, judgements have to made 'in the round', that is,
by taking into account the total personality of the person being judged,
rather than judge the worker 'instrumentally', that is, only in terms of the
work performed (Bailey 1971:7). The landowner thus cannot increase the
pace or extend the hours of work without the prior consent of his/her
workers. This consent, however, can be obtained with relative ease. Thus,
if the hoeing of a field needs an extra hour for completion, the workers
are often willing to stay without asking for extra pay. Conversely, the
farmer whose plot is hoed before the end of the working day, pays for the
whole day. Since the workers are often themselves members of cotton
producing households, they will have to behave in the same manner when it
is their own field being hoed. A team of especially hard-working labourers,
are, moreover treated to various beverages as a way of expressing thanks.
The group that is seen receiving such 'treats' is noted in the village and
is often specifically preferred by prospective employerss.
On peasant farms, the function of supervision is widely distributed
among the workers according to the degree of closeness to the owner of the
land. This is as much the consequence of the nature of gender
relationships that obtain within the village, as of the rights and duties
that govern inter-household relations. Where the owner is a man, his wife
and daughter(s) who are part of the labour force, often encourage and/or
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reprimand others, and by working harder, try to set the pace of work.
Other female relations, such as the owner's sisters, brothers' wives and
children, as well as neighbours' daughters may also assume this role,
depending on circumstances and the nature of the relationship between their
respective households. According to the intensity of cooperation that
exists between different households, these women act as if the final
product were theirs, Hard work and this assumption of responsibilty is
also a means of establishing alliances between women, as well as being a
way of declaring publicly to others the existence of such an alliance.4
By virtue of the fact that the women in supervisory positions are
themselves participating in the work process, they are physically closer to
the other labourers and can keep track of their performance more easily.
Furthermore, they can also be more outspoken in their criticisms of other
female workers. Men, according to rules of decorum, cannot be seen to
watch unrelated women too closely and, by virtue of gender relations
prevalent in the village, cannot assume authority over women who are not
members of their own household: this behaviour would indicate a closeness
that cannot exist between them. Thus, in his relations with women workers,
the owner of a field has to operate through the agency of his wife and
daughters who, as a result, share the functions of management.
Sanctions to work well emanate from other directions as well. York
patterns and interaction with fellow labourers form part of the social
relations that obtain within the community. Concern for a good reputation
and the competitive atmosphere that exists between young girls of
marriageable age, produce a labour force that requires relatively little
supervision: self-regulation of working practices is the norm. Thus, the
assessment of other workers, whether these latter assume the responsibility
of supervision or not, also regulates the quality and pace of work of the
individual labourer. The groups of four or five workers who hoe or harvest
together often help one another to keep up by working on each other's row.
People will avoid working together with anyone who falls behind
consistently. In this way, the slow are forced to work harder on pain of
being ostracized: no one likes working alone without anyone to talk to. The
way work is performed in cotton fields is an important component of the
total social identity of the individual. Opinions formed in the fields
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about individual workers circulate widely within the village and become a
permanent feature of the person's identity.
The fact that many of the labourers come from households which are
also cultivating cotton, is another factor that reduces the amount of
supervision required. There are two ways in which this factor operates.
Firstly, being owners of the same means of production themselves, these
labourers know the whole process of cotton production and are aware of the
importance of the work in a way that a migrant labourer cannot be. They
can assess the damage caused by incompetent hoer, or by sloppy pickers;
they know how delicate the cotton plant is, and they appreciate the effort,
the money and the hope that each field is invested with. Secondly, as a
result of the importance in peasant farming of labour exchange mechanisms,
hard work on other people's fields ensures an equivalent return. Thus
working with co-villagers and fellow cotton planters produces structures of
authority and supervision which differ considerably from those obtaining in
the other entreprises of Söke.
6.4 Xigrant Labour: Comparisons
It is the use of migrant labourers that largely accounts for the
divergences observed in the organisation of work on large farms. These
divergences become most pronounced on capitalist farms, whose forms of
labour organisation I shall now describe. Forms of organisation on farms
using migrant labour are affected by the social distance that separates the
manual labourer from the owner of the means of production. Xany factors
such as residence in different communities, ethnic identity, geographical
separation, and the absence or presence of intermediaries in recruitment
create this distance. Thus, when labourers from Eastern Turkey are
recruited through the mediation of a middleman, the distance between owner
and labourer is at its greatest. In the section above, I have argued that
gender definitions as well as rights and obligations that originate in
intra- and inter-household relationships, help to structure and control a
labour force consisting mainly of fellow villagers. Consequently formally
recognised intermediary positions of supervision are not necessary to
structure the labour force. By contrast, with the use of migrant labour,
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intermediary positions of organisation and supervision become indispensable
due to the lack of mechanisms that ensure auto-control.
The most important aspect of the migrant labour force is that it is
recruited and organised by a middleman (dayibasi) rather than by an agent
of the owner of the means of production. The middleman is in an
intermediary position between capital and labour. In his relationship with
the landowner, he represents the labourers, and, vie-a-vie the labourers, he
is more an agent of the former. The large numbers of workers needed to
hoe and harvest farms over one hundred decares necessitate the division of
the work force into smaller teams (posta) of ten to fifteen labourers who
are under the supervision of an agent of the middleman. This man, called
postabasi (team leader), assigns cotton rows to each labourer and controls
the pace and the quality of the work. The postabasi who is directly
responsible to the middleman, his employer, performs little manual labour,
but distributes water to the labourers during the hoeing. At harvest time
he walks around making sure that waste is kept at the minimum level
possible. Workers carry their harvest to the weighing point at the end of
the day, where the postabasi, and sometimes a weigher (tartici) assesses
and records the amount of cotton delivered. Special labourers are also
hired to pack the harvested cotton into jute bags. These labourers, the
balyaci (packers), like the postabasi, are also employed by the middleman
rather than the landowner. The latter's only represenative is the tractor
driver, who transports the workers to the fields and stands by the weighing
station to make sure the records are in order. In this way, a number of
specialised jobs are created within the labour process, considerably
increasing costs of production as well as distance between the labourers
and the owner.
The work performed by migrant labour is of a lesser quality than that
performed by local labourers: they are more sloppy hoers and harvesters,
and in terms of yields, they can reduce the productivity of land by one
fifth compared to what it would be if local labour were used. One migrant
labourer can pick at most 75 kg. of cotton per day, while the locals
average 120 kg.. Many of the factors that account for the high standard of
work among local labourers are absent in the case of migrant workers. As I
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have already argued, relation to the labour process is the most important
factor that explains this discrepancy. Iligrant workers are only involved
as 'unskilled' manual labourers in a process of production which they have
no other interest in or knowledge about. Therefore, they occupy the lowest
status within the whole production process.
For many of the migrant workers who come to Söke, cotton hoeing and
harvesting is devoid of the social content I described above. Wany of them
describe themselves as peasants rather than agricultural labourers. This
characterisation is based on the fact that they also own means of
agricultural production in their own villages, although on a scale which
does not allow reproduction of the household without the added income wages
provide. 5
 Having other means of livelihood which they define as their
primary source of income (whether fictitiously or not), means that their
personal identity is not intertwined with work in the cotton fields.' 	 If
anything, the constant pressure, reprimands and criticisms that are levelled
at the workers by their supervisors serves to eliminate the hierarchy of
age and gender that exists within the group of migrant workers, a factor
which causes a loss of identity. Although the majority of migrant workers
are also women, migrant labour is not thought of as being women's work as
work in the cotton fields is regarded in the case of local labourers. There
is an absence of gender specification in the attitudes of the migrant
labourers with regard to the tasks of cotton picking or hoeing. Pride in
their own work is markedly absent, as is the competition that characterises
manual labour among locals.
Rather than being seen as an extension of social life, for these
labourers the time spent in the cotton fields is a time of exile, (gurbet)
when normal social interaction is suspended. Living conditions and the
rhythm of daily life is altered to such an extent that this feeling of a
separate existence is quite justified. Often labourers are housed in tents
or in large garages or storehouses, where overcrowding does not allow the
privacy that people are used to. They have to eat and sleep in large
groups under conditions which are far from healthy: they sleep on the damp
earth, and have to drink stale and scarce water. It is ironic that their
capacity to endure these conditions which are themselves a product of the
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organisation of work in Söke, is In turn used by local townspeople to prove
the migrant labourers' inferiority as human beings: they can live in such
conditions because they are naturally dirty, promiscuous and untrustworthy.
Migrant labourers are isolated from any other social group in the region
both physically and often in terms of ethnic identity as well, since many
of the labourers are ICurds from the East or gypsies çingene from the South.
This feeling of social isolation and marginality is somewhat
alleviated when migrant labourers are hired to work on peasant farms.
Rather than work for townspeople who are their social superiors in every
aspect (wealth, way of life, education, etc.), working for peasant producers
means working for people with whom one has many beliefs and values in
common, and with whom one shares the experience of living In a village. On
peasant farms, migrants are housed within the village of the landowner
rather than close to the fields and are often invited to participate in the
social events that go on in the village. In this way, they are re-
integrated Into a community, even though this Is not their own village;
after all, births, deaths, marriages and religious holidays are celebrated in
comaparable or at least understandable ways in many villages all over
Turkey. Establishing such ties with the owners of the means of production
and the members of his/her community goes a long way to improve the work
standards in the fields. Cotton is picked and hoed at a quicker pace, and
more care is taken to accomplish the job well. In other words, the quality
of the work approximates that of local labourers.
Apart from the impersonal pressure exerted by the middleman and the
supervisors, structures of authority that correspond to community and
household statuses are also operative In controlling work among migrants.
But the ways this control functions are different from the forms of control
that household and community ties produce among local labourers. Contrary
to the pattern of work among the locals, the organisatlon of work teams
(posta) follows closely along lines tb of family and kinship. These teams
are composed of people who either live within the same household, or people
who are related through a close kinship tie. They not only work together,
but they also share food and sleeping quarters. )tembers of the same
household often pool the product of their labour so that they receive a
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collective wage at the end of the season. These groups are headed by an
adult male who is responsible to the supervisors for the whole group. He
is also responsible for the workers vie-a-vie the head of their household
if the latter is not present.1 7
Within these work teams, cooperation is accompanied by considerable
coercion. The existence of such groups means that the individual labourer
does not have to face the supervisor too frequently, whose harsh words to a
slow worker may either be cushioned or avoided altogether by different
members of the group covering up for mistakes or for lost time. But at the
same time, these groups are organised along the same patterns of hierarchy
and authority that structure normal social existence. Members of the
household still work under the authority of the father (or his
representative) who disciplines the members of his family, so that the
freedom from parental authority that village labourers experience during
agricultural labour is absent. The postabasi, who in terms of kinship
relationships, may often be a 'stranger', is forced to use the mediation of
the household head in dealing with individual workers. In other words, the
structures that control the migrant labour force emanate from two distinct
spheres: the 'private' sphere that comprises household/family relations, and
the 'public' forms of authority that accompany the structure of the labour
market. The combination of these forms of supervision does not, as I have
tried to explain, produce as efficient and well-disciplined a labour force
as do the social factors operative in the case of local labourers.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tried to show that most of the farms on the
Söke plain use comparable forms of organising productive activities, a fact
that results from the comparable level of technology used. The greatest
difference between the farms emerges at the point where manual labourers
must be employed. The utilisation of migrant labour for hoeing and
harvesting considerably alters the structures of labour organisation and
supervision. On the other hand, the use of local, especially village labour,
reduces the need for supervision, thus helping to lower costs, and at the
same time, improves the proddctivity of the soil by reducing waste. A
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difference in the status of the two types of manual labour accompanies
these distinctions. On peasant farms, manual labour is associated with
women and its value, being closely tied to the gender identity of women is,
at most, ambiguous. In the case of manual migrant labour, however, the
ambiguity dissapears and the work is devalued in economic as well as in
social terms.
The organisat ion of work on peasant farms collapses some of the forms
of labour required in town-based capitalist production. The
owner/manager/supervisor is one and the same person. The division of
labour on peasant farms corresponds to structures of authority within the
families which own these farms. The manager/supervisor corresponds to the
role of father/head of household. The position of driver is filled by the
unmarried son(s), while the manual labourers are found among the women and
children of the household.
233
Notes to Chapter 6
1. The opposite, that is the transfer of status positions acquired in the
process of production to other areas of life, has been already described
and elaborated upon see the literature pertaining to the effect of
commoditisation on the position of women in society (Vellesley editorial
Comittee 1977).
2. I have made this statement on the basis if an interview with the local
agricultural extension officer and I do not possess data to prove it.
3. See Akçay 1985 for a description of the history of different large farms
in the south and east of Turkey.
4. Before the extension of cotton production to peasants, a process which
dates to the early seventies, these landlords were able to undertake cotton
production with locally available labour. Tan, the large landholder near Tuz,
did not until 1975 need migrant labour to harvest his cotton: the labour
power necessary was available to him within the village of Batnos. Until
1971, Tan was the sole owner of all the arable area surrounding Batnos
whose inhabitants were totally dependent on him for access to land.
5. In households where the head is a woman, it is her adult son who usually
performs all these tasks.
6. These activities include hoeing, ridge-making, canal construction, land
levelling and so on; hoeing is interesting in that new machinery has
further reduced the numbers required even in the last two years.
7. There was no case in the village of a woman cultivating her own fields.
Once however, two sisters whose brother was away on military service
started to drive their father's tractor in the village, transporting produce
from the fields home, but were unable to continue in view of the very
strong criticism voiced especially by other women: their parents had in
fact been the main target of the criticism.
8. The term Is applied to a wide set of relationships, ranging from the
large landlords of the East who control not only the land but also the
Inhabitants of large numbers of villagers, to leaders found along the Black
Sea Coast, to settlers of disputes in southern Turkey or simply to traders
as In the western Black Sea coast (Meeker, ibid).
9. Since 1973, a minimum wage is declared and, at least in Söke, is more or
less adhered to (see chapter 9).
10, Girls wear gloves that leave their fingers bare with the aim of
protecting their hands from the sun rather than the carpals: white hands
are a sign if status, since they Indicate absence of field work.
11. This practice Is also observed in In the çukurova region (Seker
1986:12 1).
12. In fact many widows are able to continue cultivating on the basis of
their experience and expertise as manual labourers.
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13. Yalcin reports similar behaviour among women in Hakk&ri, who negotiate
sharp slopes carrying milk in pouches on their backs and knitting socks
all at the same time (personal communication).
14. Xany women feel the same responsibility towards people who are not
their social equals, and particularly disadvantaged households enjoy this
attention from a wide range of women. For example, Cavit, who had been
orphaned at an early age, and who,by virtue of his diligence and good
behaviour, had earned the compassion of many of the village women, is a
case in point. Women hoeing or harvesting the twenty-five decares that he
had rented would constantly urge each other to work harder and better.
Young girls who worked more slowly were reprimanded much more severely
than was normal; in this case, hard work was almost a religious duty, an
act which would earn divine recognition, (sevap). Conversely, failure to do
one's best was concieved as ayip, shameful.
15. See Aydin (1980) and Bazoglu (1984) for a description of some of the
conditions of existence and reproduction of peasants who work as seasonal
labourers on cotton farms in Adana and Hatay.
16. In fact, I would imagine that even in cases where income derived from
seasonal labour outstrips that derived from their own agricultural
activities, it is this identification as peasants which prevents them from
recognising their dependence on wages.
17. Many young people come to work in Söke attached to a group with whom
they have close kin ties: a married sister may come with her brother, or
with her husband's brother, or an unmarried young woman may attach herself
to her married brother's household. Women workers are never found alone
and, although socially more acceptable, it is also rare to find men who
work on their own.
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CHAPTER 7: CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO LAND
Land, one of the three most important factors of agricultural
production, is increasingly losing its dominant position in the process
of cotton cultivation to accumulated cash. Nevertheless, access to land,
whether in the form of landownership or not, still constitutes the basis
of independent household formation. For this reason everyone in the
village strives to achieve access to land, As I shall show below, the
major change that has accompanied increased commoditisation is the
greater availability of land for sale or rent. The penetration of cash
has produced a number of different renting and sharecropping
arrangements which facilitate access to land. Frequent changes in
farmed plots have produced greater interaction between cultivators both
within and between villages, broadening the scope of social networks
peasants are involved in. Cash has also intervened in disputes
regarding inheritance, making possible certain solutions such as the
division of proceeds from the sale of assets. At the same time, the
availability of cash has also raised new problems.
The majority of households in Tuz have direct access to land in the
form of private ownership. The distribution of land among Tuz
households is uneven, pointing to the inadequacy of models which
conceive of peasants as relatively homogeneous social strata (Tables 7.2
and 7.9). Land is acquired through inheritance, purchase, government
distributions and usufruct (zilyedlik). Land ownership is individualised
and recognised legally through the acquisition of a title deed which is
registered in the Town Hall. Land can also be owned in shares, for
example when, after the division of a small estate, or one which
includes land of different qualities, it is not practical for
individuals to own separate plots. Ownership established on the basis
of deeds drawn up by a notary public is recognised in courts; such
deeds, however, cannot be registered officially. Lastly, ownership can
be established in courts by proving usufruct rights. For this the
testimony of knowledgeable villagers who can testify to continuous
cultivation for a period of twenty years is needed. The incidence of
this form of access to land is insignificant with regard to cotton land
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but quite important in the case of olive groves situated in the
mountains. All unused and unclaimed land belongs by law to the state.
Some land is legally owned and administered by the village as a
corporate body. The village also owns pasture land which it can rent
out, but contrary to arable land, such pastures cannot be sold to
individuals.
The majority of land transactions, however, are not carried out
officially, and the records in the Town Hall are far from reflecting the
actual patterns of ownership. Many individuals have socially recognised
access to land which they farm without having a legal title to it and
many others hold titles to land which they do not and cannot farm.
Land distributed by the government which is not supposed to be sold, is
often 'transferred' from one individual to another on the basis of deeds
drawn by a notary public. In cases where land is disputed by legal
heirs, sales also take place through such informal channels. Often sales
or divisions of land after inheritance settlements are undertaken in the
presence of two witnesses from the village only. The difficulties and
cost of travelling to town repeatedly and of obtaining official papers
often lead individuals to rely on the force of 'common knowledge' to
sustain claims to land. The fact that, until 1984, no cadastral survey
of the Söke plain had been undertaken, added to the problems of
obtaining legal titles as well as obviating the necessity to do so.
In Tuz both women and men hold individual titles to land. The
concept of private property is quite an established principle, but it
does not necessarily lead to the individualisation of property. The
household as a social and economic force intervenes in the relation
between an individual and his/her property. Individual ownership of
land contradicts the oft-stated principle that all resources are jointly
exploited by the household as a whole. Current views concerning the
unity of the household serve to increase the tensions between individual
property and the indivisibility of the joint household fund.
Furthermore, gender ideologies also affect patterns of landownership.
Thus, while privately owned land in Tuz can be acquired by inheritance,
government distribution or sale, women obtain land mainly as a result of
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inheritance. For men, on the other hand, government distributions and
purchases are the main channels of access to a land title.
Table 7.1: Land Ownership According to Form of Acquisition Among
hart-led Men and Vomen in Tuz
Government Inheritance Purchase 	 Landless
Men
	 81	 67
	
61	 57
Area (Da.)
	
2913	 1086
	
2107	 -
Women
	 7	 79
	
11	 117
Area (Da)
	
60	 1297
	
82	 --
Note: Any one individual man or woman may own land from more than one
source.
In this chapter I shall discuss these various forms of access to
land in order to show the extent to which commoditised and non-
commoditised forms of access to land are intertwined. I shall also
argue that access to land through these various channels allows a large
number of farmers with different assets to engage in cotton production.
After analysing conditions of ownership, I shall discuss the way
sharecropping and renting operates to widen access to land.
7.1 Individual and Joint Access to Land
Although occupations other than farming are by now available in
the Söke region, land still constitutes the basis of independent
household formation in Tuz in social as well as material terms. Every
man aims to contract a marriage and establish a new social unit, the
members of which will be his 'dependents', that Is, individuals who will
ultimately have to recognise and submit to his authority. One of the
most important prerequisites of the formation of such a unit is the
immediate or future availability of an income generating asset such as
land. Through sharecropping and renting mechanisms, the ownership of
land guarantees Income even when there is no labour or capital
available. Moreover, despite important differences stemming from
disparities in size of landholding, ownership provides an equality of
status. Each land owning head of a household describes himself as a
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farmer and considers himself the social equal of all the men of similar
description. Those household heads whose main income derives from
other sources, are not seen as belonging to the same league as it were,
and cannot therefore take part in the same ranking system.
Although ownership is individualised, that is only one person holds
the legal title and can theoretically dispose of land independently of
any other person, it is in practice the members of the immediate nuclear
family and/or members of the household that have Joint rights over it.
Action without the consensus of this group leads to serious disjunction
in the normal flow of social relations and everyday activities. 1 It is
more usual for men who are heads of households to hold titles to land.
Within any one household, the (often male) household head will try to
have monopoly on land titles as an all important adjunct to his
authority. However, it is also quite common that other members,
particularly the wife, mother or sister of the household head, own land
of their own. The land owned by the individuals within a household is
farmed jointly under the management of the head of the household. The
act of living within a particular household means that its owner has to
offer the usufruct of personal property to the household as a unit;
assets owned by the members of the household become part of the
household fund in return for a right to subsistence.2
In spite of the fact that land is seen as the prerequisite for
independence, there is no relation of identification between a particular
plot of land and one household, family or larger kin group. The
relatively short history of settlement In the region precludes the
formation of strong links with the land. 3 Integration with the national
commodity economy has also made for a faster turnover of plots in the
hands of any one producer, weakening any association of land to a social
grouping. Lastly, inheritance practices lead to the fragmentation of
estates and to considerable exchanges of particular plots in order to
divide the patrimony equitably. Thus, although land is an important
factor for the constructon of the household, It does not necessarily
define it or symbolise It.4
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The head of a newly created household has to create for himself
the conditions of land ownership. Although inheritance is important, it
can only provide the basis for further enlargement of the cultivated
area, except for a few cases where the inheritance is large and not
divided among many children. Thus access to land (or landlessness) is
not determined by inheritance alone, but is perceived to be the result of
a longer process shaped by individual action. If by the time a third
child is born, or by the tenth marriage anniversary, the household head
is still not farming, he will not become a full-fledged member of the
community of farmers that makes up the village.
Access to land in the form of ownership is the only form allowing
total independence, since no other individual, apart from 'dependents'
living within the household, can have any say in the administration of
the land. Compared with sharecroppers and, to a lesser extent 1 with
tenants, landholders are much freer in making decisions regarding
cultivation. This does not mean of course that total freedom is ever
possible. Pressures from others in the form of criticism and gossip are
quite effective in shaping decisions. There are also important
pressures from within the household: these come from children as they
grow up as well as from wives and elderly parents living within the
household.
In spite of the centrality of farming in the social ranking of the
village community, in 1984 18 % of all households did not own land and
22 % did not farm any land:
Area Owned
da.
0
	
0
70
	
1.1
1137
	
17.4
2514
	
38.4
1104
	
16.8
830
	
12.7
130
	
2.0
766
	
11.7
Households
Area (cia.)	 no.
Average (da/lih)
(da.)
0
	
30
	
17.6
1-10
	
10
	
5.9
11-30
	
49
	
28.8
31-60
	
54
	
31.8
61-90
	
15
	
8,8
91-120
	
8
	
4,7
12 1-150
	
1
	
0.6
150+
	
3
	
1.8
0
7
23.2
46.5
73.6
103.7
130
255.3
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Table 7.2: Number and Percentage of Households According to Land Owned
in Tuz, 1984
TOTAL
	
170
	
100
	
6551
	
100
	
38.5
About a third of village households (37.8 %) have a source of
income other than cotton cultivation.5 A large number depend on fishing
and construction work for their livelihood, while still hoping to be able
one day to enter into independent cotton production. Thus, they rent
land to cultivate cotton and aim for a return large enough to allow them
to continue renting land; ultimately they hope to purchase a tractor.
The latter is a decisive step towards becoming a farmer, for it allows
more flexibility In action and the future possibility of buying land.
The trend can however be reversed at any moment. Failure or success
depends on a number of factors which I shall analyse in chapter 10. In
Tuz, 18 % of the non-farming households have been established during the
last ten years and are In the process of acquiring land, while 23 % are
composed of elderly couples who rent out and/or lease out land due to
unavailability of labour and inability to manage. The final 13 % are
families who have migrated to the region from Central Anatollan
provinces in the hope of finding work. Some of them have a specialised
occupation such as electrician, house builder and carpenter, while others
work as labourers In fishing and in cotton production.
Table 7.2 represents the distribution of land in 1984; it is
important to realise that this Is not a stable situation. Firstly,
individuals themselves are not fixed in their position of owner/non-
owner. As I have argued above, non-ownership has to be seen in the
long-term in order to become a permanent characteristic. OwnershIp, On
-2
-4
-3
+7
+5
+7
+3
61.5
941
1655
1269
1157
1562
1667
8
41
36
17
11
11
7
63
993
1822
795
630
547
1090
10
45
39
10
6
4
4
-1.5
-52
-167
+474
+527
+10 15
+577
1-10
11-30
31-60
61-90
91- 120
121-150
150+
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the other hand, does not always correspond with being a farmer, since
many landowners rent and/or share their land out. However, the fact of
owning land is a more permanent status fixer than non-ownership.
Secondly, land pressure on the Söke plain is still relatively
insignificant and Tuz villagers can easily extend the land which they
cultivate through mechanisms of sharecropping and renting. The
possibility of expansion means that everyone in Tuz can ultimately be a
farmer and 1 to a lesser extent, a landowner, Furthermore, access to land
does not always involve the mediation of money capital, and non-market
relationships are also responsible in facilitating access to land that is
not owned. Comparing the pattern of land cultivation in 1984 with that
of 1978, we can see that such an expansion has taken place.
Table 7.3 Comparison of Land Cultivation in Tuz: 1978 and 1984
	
1978
	
1984
	
Difference
Area	 hh da.	 hh
	
da.	 hh	 da.
Total	 158 5940	 170
	
8312.5
	
+12
	
+2372.5
Within the six years covered, twelve new households have been
established and more than 2000 decares of land have been put under
cultivation by Tuz villagers. Since it is not very probable that the
newly established households have been able to farm 200 decares each, it
is clear that the expansion of cultivated land Id due mainly to the
activities of established farmers. The table moreover shows that it is
the number of middle and large cultivators that have increased in
number, while the number of households cultivating less than 60 decares
has decreased. There has been an expansion in cotton production in
spite of the immigration of a few households of labourers. I shall show
In chapter 10 that this expansion was largely due to the favourable
conditions of the cotton market during the years under discussion and
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that, under different circumstances, the trend could very well be
reversed. The possibility of becoming a farmer and indeed of increasing
the scale of one's farming operations, is therefore an expectation that
up to 1984 largely corresponded with reality.
Despite the expansion of land under cultivation, about 36 % of all
Tuz households (62 households) do not own, and 38 % (65 households) do
not farm sufficient land (at least 20 decares), making other forms of
income-generating activities indispensable. Not all of these households
hope to ever produce cotton in significant quantities. In fact, some sow
cotton as a supplementary form of Income, one that will allow them to
receive state credit, while earning a livelihood from other sources.
Several grocers and fishermen are in this position. Conversely, those
that live off cotton cultivation have other income-generating activities,
of which fishing Is the most important. However, It can still be argued
that cotton farming is the most prestigious activity and the one that
dominates village life and social structure, making land the single most
Important asset people desire. Almost everyone in the village has
planted cotton (or has attempted to) at some point in their lives
whether in their father's household or independently. While some,
especially the women, hope never to see a cotton field again, others
struggle hard to succeed as cotton farmers. Therefore, everyone 'knows'
how to cultivate cotton and villagers are 'at heart' farmers.
7.2 Inheritance
Inheritance, following government distributions, is the second most
Important source of landownership among married men and the single
source of landownership for women in Tuz. Contrary to other case
studies discussing inheritance In Turkey (Stirling 1965:120-5; Aewad
1978:475), the tenets of Turkey's Civil Code are broadly followed in the
Soke region. In chapter 2, I have argued that this system of
Inheritance has certain advantages from the nuclear family's point of
view, namely the possibility of enlarging the household's patrimony by
the addition of the wife's inheritance. I have also attempted to show
that the inheritance system has made the nuclear family the dominant
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household unit even for those villagers who, as nomadic pastoralists,
had, until recently, lived within very different social groupings.
The smooth transmission of the family patrimony, including its
name, reputation as well as material assets, to at least one successive
unit is the goal of every household. There exist no practices indicating
that any single one of the children is ever designated as the 'real'
successor to the original household. However, personal characteristics
and the history of intra-family/household struggle can and often do
determine a 'favoured' child. Nevertheless, discrimination between
children is not socially or legally condoned. As a result, every child
expects and believes that s/he has a right to an equal division of this
patrimony, particularly of the land. This right is often expressed in
terms of the contribution, especially in the form of labour, of every
child to the increase of the material well-being of the parental
household. Certain mechanisms do exist whereby parents can disinherit
all or some of their children. Registering a plot of land in the name
of a favourite son or daughter, and selling one's land, can effectively
be used by an individual to control the process of inheritance (see
chapter 4). A large number of land sales and purchases are therefore
the result of calculations that have nothing to do with the logic of
cotton production. Rather, they are based on the dynamics of kinship
and household formation.
Unless some arrangement is reached between the interested parties,
siblings in general obtain equal shares of the available land. The
division of the inherited estate in most cases is a negotiated process.
Women acquire land if they live in Tuz or in neighbouring villages and
if their husbands are also interested in farming; if not, they receive
some payment in cash. The legalisation of the settlement often takes a
long time, but people start to farm land that is due to them without
waiting for official confirmation, As a result, the titles of ownership
rarely reflect the actual state of affairs and, in the case of a dispute,
proof of legal ownership through inheritance is often difficult to
establish in court. Furthermore, individuals will have often farmed a
plot before the death of its legal owner whenever the latter resides in
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the former's household. This makes it difficult for an emigrant sibling
to construct a good case for him/herself, since public opinion in the
village, which usually is the only form of proof available, often sides
with the person who has cultivated the land and/or looked after the
deceased. Due to virilocal marriages, women usually, but not exclusively,
find themselves in this position. Thus although women are thought to
have an equal claim on land, in practice, it may be more difficult for
them to sustain this claim. Women married within the village have a
much higher chance of getting land rather than a money equivalent if
they so wish.
Women's access to land is a difficult issue to investigate. Unless
questioned and unless they have a special reason, women will not specify
whether the land owned by the household is registered in their own name
or that of their husbands'. In general, the only land registered in
their name is that which they have inherited from their own family.
Land bought in the course of a marriage is usually registered in the
husband's name. However, many women try to own land which they see as
a form of insurance. Living in a daughter-in-law's household becomes
more tolerable when the older parent feels s/he is contributing to the
household In material terms. In fact, siblings of either sex frequently
compete for the care of an elderly land-owning parent In spite of the
fact that such three-generational households are commonly seen as a nest
of trouble. Thus land-owning women emphasize their landownership only
when it has become an important aspect of their existence and when they
have waged a struggle to obtain such land. Otherwise, talking in the
general Idiom of the unity of the household, individual titles to land
are rarely specified.
Women inherit mainly from their parents (usually the father since
before the present prevalence of cotton cultivation, land was not such
an important asset and female land ownership was not an issue) and from
their husbands. In the course of these processes of inheritance, they
enter Into conflict with their siblings and their children. A woman who
marries far away from the village of her parents finds it more difficult
to assert her rights to her father's inheritance than in cases where she
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and her husband live close by, and can fight for their rights. Brothers
often try to buy their sister's share; failing that, they aim to rent it
from her for a nominal sum, hoping that they will be able to buy it in
the long run. The final sale or purchase will depend on the fortunes of
the households involved, so that a sister, married into a better-faring
household, may end up by buying most of her parents' lands. Renting
and/or sharecropping a sibling's share of the land is a frequent
occurrence in Tuz. An option much less favoured is dividing the income
generated from fields over which even an informal agreement has not
been reached. In certain instances, siblings take turns in farming such
undivided patrimonies. The risks involved in cotton farming and the
necessity of entering into long-term yield-increasing land improvements
force producers to seek security and permanence in their relation to
land.7
Children may also try to deprive their mothers of their legal share
of land. They may attempt to reduce their mother's patrimony in the
course of the official procedure or openly ask her to renounce her
share. Often this is the result of a conflict over land between siblings
rather than one between mother and child. Since the lands of all
individuals living within one household are farmed as a joint enterprise
under the management of the head of the household, the land of a
resident mother will automatically be under the effective control of only
one of her children. The greatest fear of the remaining children is the
possibility of the mother (and/or father) registering the land in the
name of the child looking after her/him without the knowledge and
consent of her other children. Every child has to watch out for this
possibility; and the mother has to decide whether or not she will be
better looked after with or without her own land, These problems befall
elderly women rather than men as women frequently survive their
husbands, the latter In general being considerably older than their
spouses
Widows do not necessarily relinquish their status within the
household at the death of their husbands. There were 14 households in
Tuz in 1984 which were headed by women. The other widows had gone to
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live under the authority of a son who already had a viable farm and an
established household. Women often become heads of households as a
result of the death of their husbands at an early stage of the
developmental cycle of the family/household: that is, at the point when
there are grown sons who are not yet married. In such cases, the
presence of the mother and the absence of points of fission act to keep
the household together as a functioning unit. The father's patrimony is
often kept intact until the eldest son has married and sometimes beyond,
until the marriage of all the children in the family. Without adolescent
or adult sons, however, it is very difficult to keep the household as a
viable cotton-producing unit. The actual authority wielded. by a temale
household head depends to a large extent on her personality and not
simply on her structural position. Thus of the fourteen women who were
heads of households, only four were involved in most decision-making
processes while the remainder relied on their eldest sons, intervening
only when conflicts between brothers threatened the unity of the
household.
From the data available, it is clear that Tuz women inherit amounts
of land comaparable to those inherited by men:
Table 7.4 Numbers of Tuz Ken and Women According to the Amount of Land
They Inherit
Land (da.) 1-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Total
Women	 22	 26	 8	 8	 4	 2	 2	 2	 74
len	 26	 18	 13	 5	 3	 1	 -	 1	 67
Total land inherited by 74 women: 1297 da. (Average: 17.5 da.)
Total land inherited by 67 men: 1086 da. (Average: 16.2 da.)
The gender-based disparity between the incidence of landownership
(see Table 7.1.) is due to the fact men acquire land through other
mechanisms than inheritance. In fact, the latter accounts only for one-
third of the land owned by men. By contrast, 80 % of female
landownership derives from inheritance. In general, inherited land
accounts for a little more than a third of all individually owned Tuz
lands (2383 out of a total of 6551 decares). The amounts inherited are
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often small and are not sufficient to provide adequate subsistence. 9 But,
in a context where the average landholding is just over 35 decares,
inheritance is important enough to fight for, since it can provide the basis
for entering into cotton production and of becoming a fully-fledged farmer.
7.3 Land and the Role of the State
The state has played a major role with regard to Tuz patterns of
landholding, to a certain extent determining the quantity as well as the
quality of land owned by peasants. The distribution of land by the
government to various categories of villagers and efforts towards land
improvements have already been mentioned in chapter 5. Both of these
measures have been quite effective in the Söke plain and in Tuz itself. As
shown in table 7.1, government distributions account for 38 % of all the
privately owned land in Tuz.1 C) Land distributions in Tuz have been the
result of two different state policies: the settlement of Turkish emigrants
from the Balkans during the twenties and the attempts during the fifties
and sixties to create a stable peasantry. The effects of the manner in
which land distributions were undertaken has added to the tension between
individual versus group ownership: the first resulted in the increase of
individually held titles, while the second reinforced the unity of the
household.
Attempts by the state to improve land in the Söke plain have
concentrated upon efforts to regulate the Meander by building dams and
flood walls, constructing irrigation and drainage canals, draining
marshlands created by the yearly floods, and combating salinity in the
lower reaches of the river. 	 As for the villagers of Tuz and the
surrounding area concerned, the most important among these projects has
been the construction a large drainage canal in 1967. This canal not only
prevents flooding, but it also provides the main channel of irrigation for
the majority of Tuz fields. Pumps and small reservoirs also help to
regulate the flow of water in the Meander as well as in the canal. With
the construction of this canal, a total of sixty-one thousand decares of
land, including fields owned by Tuz villagers, can be irrigated (Köseli
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1975:39-40). A large swamp to the east of the village was also drained in
the fifties, and distributed to villagers in 1960.12
Land distributions have been a continuous feature of the Turkish
Republic since its establishment in 1923. 	 The movement of population
between Greece and Turkey after the war of 1921-1923 still constitutes one
of the largest land distributions undertaken by the Turkish state. The
agreements regarding the exchange of populations as part of the Lausanne
convention signed by Turkey and Greece in 1923 stipulated the appraisal of
all immovable property of those individuals who had been displaced as a
result of the war. Equivalent grants of land and property were to be made
in the new country. But as Ladas argues, appraising the property of over
four hundred thousand small landholders was not a task that the Turkish
government could undertake with the limited resources at its disposal and
only large landowners were able to benefit from the clauses of the Lausanne
convention (1932:457,714). Between 1923 and 1934 a total of 99,709
families received 122,937 decares of land according to the terms of the
Lausanne Convention (Barkan l946:455).'
A number of laws promulgated in 1924, 1929, and 1934 also contained
clauses allowing the distribution of land to recently settled nomads and
refugees, as well as making the sale of state owned land to needy farmers
possible. 15 Since the establishment of the Republic, attempts had been
made to prepare a comprehensive land reform programme with a view towards
rationalising the distribution of land in the country as well as making it
more equitable. 16 In 1945, amid much controversy and public debate, a Land
Reform Bill (çiftçiyi Toprakiandirma Kanunu) was finally passed in
Parliament, This law was supposed to provide 'land to the tiller' by
distributing state land to peasants and also by limiting the land of large
holdings. According to a number of observers, the effect of the law, rather
than execute a land reform, was to bring under production wide tracts of
unused state-owned land and therefore increase gross agricultural output
(Cohn 1970:1,4; Tarakil 1976:275). 17 Until the law was repealed in 1972,
more than twenty-two million decares of land, the majority of which had
been state-owned, was distributed to 432,000 families (Tarakli 1976:110,
118). 15
 After 1960, land distributions were stopped, at first to carry out
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surveys to see if there was more land to be distributed. However, the
political situation had changed, the drafting of a new law was begun but
was never completed, and finally the 1945 law was repealed in 1972.
The 1945 Land Reform Bill was implemented by commissions that visited
villages, surveying land use and ownership, establishing titles, and
processing applications for land. Recipients were required to cultivate the
land for a period of twenty-five years, during which they were prohibited
to sell or sharecrop. 19 Heirs could not divide the land, but had to farm it
jointly (Tarakli 1976:95). The distributed land was meant to provide for
the subsistence of a family (Tarakli 1976:67). Subsistence was defined in
terms of the amount of wheat a family of five needed to produce or purchase
over one agricultural year in order to assure its reproduction. Peasant
families farming in excess of this amount could be dispossessed if the
amount of state land was not sufficient to cater for all the applications.
The Land Comissions had to adapt these general rulings to particular
conditions, depending on crop produced and quality of land. 2° The village
headmen (muhtar) were often put in a decisive position, since the
commissions often dealt with them rather than talk with a large number of
villagers. Thus, local power relations must have influenced the manner of
distribution considerably.
Land distributed by the Commission was registered in the name of the
household head (hane reisi) (Tarakli 1976:57). Married children living with
parents were also considered to be a separate household, but in many
instances (Tuz included), local beliefs influenced the process of
distribution so that the latter did not receive land, Although the
household head was, on paper, the owner of the land, it was on the basis of
households that the distributions took place. These measures as well as
the prohibition to sell or divide the land, served to further reinforce the
joint ownership of land and isolate the household as the basic unit of
agricultural production.
By contrast, the government officials who devised the land grants
following the settlement of population in the early twenties, based their
calculations on the individual rather than the group. Every person,
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regardless of age or gender, was granted a fixed amount of land deemed to
cover minimum subsistence needs. In Tuz, this amount was fixed at 12-15
decares of land, depending on quality.21 This amount was considered to be
the individual's property, and household heads could not dispose of the
right (hk) to land of their dependents. 22 These measures reinforced the
individual right to own property and, in the case of women, allowed them
the first chance to own property separately from any male kin, whether
brother, father, or husband.23
In spite of the large numbers of emigrants settled in villages
formarly inhabited by Greeks, today, the significance of muhacir land
grants in Tuz has decreased as a result of inheritance and sales. 24 )tany
of the original settlers sold their land to yiiriik families in order to join
kin settled in other parts of the country, or as a result of problems of
adaptation to the hot climate, In Tuz 69 individuals living in 54
households still hold a total of about 1500 decares (20 % of total owned
land) granted to them or their parents following migration.28
Land that accrued to Tuz villagers as a result of the Land Reform bill
constitutes a larger portion of the land owned by Tuz farmers. Two
separate land commissions, one in 1952 and one in 1960, distributed land in
the lower Söke plain. According to the records of the Aydin Land
Commission, 601 decares were distributed in Tuz by the first commission,
and the second one distributed another 1276 decares to a total of 100
households. A further 4000 decares of land were registered as common
pasture land, A few eski yuriik families who had been cultivating state
lands were dispossessed and their fields made over to needy villagers.26
The 1960 commission calculated that 30-35 decares were sufficient to
provide subsistence and each household received land totalling that amount
(including land already owned). 27 As a result of these successive
distributions, households established prior to 1960 were made the owner of
at least 30 decares of land per household. On average, 21-30 decares each
were received by 76 households in the period 1948-1960.
The net effect of government intervention in the ownership of land has
been to create a rough equality of landownership, at least for the time in
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which the distributions took place. Although this equality no longer holds,
state policy has nevertheless played a crucial role in establishing
landholding patterns. Even today, eighteen Tuz households own only the
land once distributed by the government. Moreover, many others have
accumulated cash on the basis of the land they received as a result of the
distribution programmes, and have used these resources to purchase further
land.
Table 7.5 Size of Land Distributed to Tuz Villagers Between 1948 and 1960
Area (da)	 lo. of hh	 Total Land (cia)
1-10	 13
	
92
11-20	 18
	
295
21-30	 25
	
702
31-40	 18
	
660
41-50	 2
	
95
Total	 76
	
1844
7.4 Land Sales and Purchases
In the Söke area land has been a commodity ever since the middle of
the nineteenth century. Until the nineteen-fifties, however, most of the
land sold belonged to large landowners who were divesting themselves of
their estates in favour of merchants and traders. With the increase of
cotton production, smaller amounts of land began to yield large incomes and
the increase in costs of production has led to the 'rationalisation' of land
sizes?8 The commoditisation of land owned by peasants is, by contrast, a
more recent phenomenon and can be traced to the expansion of the
production of cotton as a commodity. The total amount of land bought or
sold in Tuz before 1950 is minimal compared to the numbers of transactions
and amounts of land involved in exchanges after that date:29
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Table 7.6. Amount of Land Bought and Sold and Number of Transactions
Trans.
(no.)
20
3.1
19
Involved
Years	 Bought
(da.)
pre-1950	 797*
1951-60	 945
1961-70	 392
1971-80	 587
1981-84	 393
Total	 3114
Average Sold	 Trans. Average
(da.)	 (da.)	 (no.)	 (da.)
?	 623*
146	 8	 18
20	 393	 13	 30
19	 126	 6	 21
21	 85	 6	 14
1373
* The amount of land sold and bought by Tuz villagers is not equivalent.
This is a result of the fact that transactions in land are not necessarily
carried out exclusively with fellow villagers.
The limited extent to which land was cominoditised before the
nineteen-fifties is also made clear from the fact that the eski yiiriik of
Tuz, when they settled in the area, had been able to obtain access to land
without having to purchase it. The land was often barren and the property
of the state, When the Land Commission arrived in 1952, these yürük were
able to register at least a portion of it in their own names as a result of
the usufruct law. In Tuz, two of the original eski yiiriik families who had
settled in the village sometime during the last century were able to
accumulate considerable amounts of land on the basis of usufruct. One of
these householders, Mehmet Au Akilli, had about 600 decares which he 'sold'
to his two sons at a nominal price. 30 Another five eski yiiruk had acquired
in the same manner about 90-100 decares each. Before 1950, the bulk of the
land sold in the village was in general alienated by muhacir, who were
either trying to leave the district, or who did not have the necessary
means of production • 1
Since the sixties, the land market in Tuz has been quite active. Table
7.6 shows that in general the amount of land changing hands in any
individual transaction has been relatively small (about 25 decares on
average).32 Nevertheless, a total of 2188 decares of land owned by Tuz
villagers have been purchased. The bulk of this land has been bought by
yeni yuruk, who, since they had sold off their herds of sheep and goats,
had access to the cash necessary to buy land. Thus, land purchases account
for 37.5 % of the land owned by eski yiiriik, 67.6 % of the land owned by
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yeni yuruk, and only 16.1 % of the land owned by the muhacir. Buying
agricultural land is still one of the most important forms of investment in
the area, and surplus cash is transformed into land whenever possible,
regardless of the size of the plot purchased.
Apart from considerations related to processes of inheritance, Tuz
villagers sell land either because they lack the means (cash or labour) to
turn it to productive use, or as a result of some urgent need. Selling
small parcels with a view towards purchasing a tractor, or paying debts
contracted as a result of marriage expenses, are among the reasons for sale
explicitly mentioned by Tuz villagers. Conversely, attempts to ensure a
larger income and provide children with a bigger estate constitute the main
impetus to buy more land. Farmers who buy land often do so in order to
cultivate it themselves, rather than rent it out or engage in land
speculation. As long as labour costs are born by the producer, the
production of cotton is the greatest income-generating activity in the area.
Moreover, in a context where the status of farmer is still the most highly
valued, buying land also has implications with regard to the social identity
of the individual.
As a result of the commoditisation of agriculture, both land prices
and the activity of buying and selling are closely related to the specific
conditions of cotton production and the economic climate dominant on a
national level. The rate of inflation is often reflected In land prices.
Between 1973 and 1983, land prices in the Söke area have increased more
than ten-fold, while prices have shown a rise of more than fifteen-fold.
Moreover, the prices of cotton fields In the Söke and Adana regions show
parallel increases. 3 The market price of cotton also affects the price of
land. When cotton fetches a good price and when the villagers' harvests
are abundant (as was the case in 1987), demand for land Increases, and
prices rise accordingly. Furthermore, the prices of particular plots vary
according to yield.35
0
0.7
13.3
19.9
15.3
13.9
18.8
20.1
100
22.9
4.7
24.1
21.2
10.0
6.5
6.5
4.1
100
39
8
41
36
17
11
11
7
170
0
7.7
22.9
46
74.6
105.2
142
238.1
48.9
0
61.5
941
1655
1269
1157
1562
1667
8312.5
0
1-10
11-30
31-60
61-90
91-120
121- 150
150+
TOTAL
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7.5 Access to Land Through Sharecropping and Renting
As shown in table 7.3, Tuz villagers own a total of 6551 decares of
land. A look at the amount of land they farm shows the extent to which
land is appropriated through mechanisms other than ownership:
Table 7.7 Amount and Percentage of Land Farmed by Tuz Households
Area	 Households	 Area	 Average
(da.)	 no.	 da.	 (da/hh)
In each land category, the amount of land owned differs considerably
from that farmed. Renting and sharecropping are the two mechanisms used
to obtain access to land, and they account for about 44 % of land
cultivated in Tuz. Contrary to the forms of land appropriation discussed
above, renting and sharecropping are not based on the legal ownership of
land but depend on a contract between the legal owner and another person.
Both renting and sharecropping contracts allow an individual to farm land
that s/he does not own. In the case of sharecropping 1 the cultivator pays
for the use of the land by offering his/her labour power, while cash is
used to effect the return in the case of renting. Sharecropping moreover
involves the owner of the land in the risks of the process of cultivation,
and the returns to land are unpredictable. By contrast, renting involves
the setting up of a fixed return to land at the outset; the owner of the
land is totally separated from the process of production. However, a closer
look at the ways contracts are drawn up shows that, in fact, the
distinctions between these two forms of land appropriation are not as great
as it seems at first glance.
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Sharecropping (ortakçilik) contracts in Tuz are often verbal
agreements which define the terms according to which the costs of
production and the product are to be distributed. Generally 1 the landowner
provides the land and the seed 1 while the sharecropper is held responsible
for the implements, especially the tractor, and the labour needed for the
mechanised processes of cultivation.36 All other cash costs arising from
irrigation, fertilisation, pest control, hoeing and harvesting are shared
equally between the partners (ortak) 	 At the end of the harvest, the
product (or sometimes the cash) is divided equally. The terms of this
contract often vary according to the particular needs of the two partners,
the conditions of production on the farm, the length of the contract, and
most importantly, the nature of the relationship that exists between the
two partners.3 The contract is the result of a process of negotiation and
each cost-incurring item is considered separately. In some cases, the
landowner may undertake to share the fuel costs, in others Irrigation costs
are borne by the sharecopper alone (ortakçI). Household labour provided by
the sharecropper may, at times, be considered as part of the sharecropper's
labour contribution, while at other times, all hoeing and harvesting labour
costs may be split equally. Although the landowner Is Involved In the
costs of production, the extent of his/her control over the process of
production depends on the structure of the landowning household itself.
By contrast, renting (kiracilik) removes the landowner from the actual
production process. The landowner transfers the use of his/her land in
return for a fixed sum over a specified period of time. The majority of
rent agreements are entered into for a short period, usually one, but at
most three years. The landowner gets his/her rent before the beginning of
the production process. The level of rents varies according to fluctuations
In the market price of cotton and is usually set at a little less than a
tenth of the gross Income derived from the land. 39 But, as with
sharecropping, variations on the leasing contract do occur. Payment of
cash in advance, encompassing all or part of the rent constitutes the most
common arrangement. In this case, the contract is subject to revision each
year and the rent fixed according to changes In price levels. A second
form of leasing land consists of a longer-term relationship involving
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hitherto unproductive land. The tenant accepts to improve the land in
return for a fixed rent and the use of the land for four to five
consecutive years. Rent levels in these contracts are considerably below
the market level of rents for already Improved land, and the landowner
cannot Increase the rent for the duration of the contract.4° Lastly,
payments In kind are also possible. The landowner asks for cotton the
amount of which Is set in advance, and the tenant has to deliver this
fixed amount at the end of the harvest regardless of the total amount of
cotton produced.
These variations In sharecropping and leasing contracts show that the
distinctions between the two forms of appropriating land can be explained
in terms of the contribution of the two parties to the process of
production. In the most extreme form of sharecropping, all costs (except
those connected with the land Itself) and all income are shared equally.
As the contribution of the landowner decreases and a fixed return per
decare is expected, the return expected by the landowner also decreases and
arrangement takes on the form of leasIng. 	 The actual form that the
contract takes depends on the power relations between the parties to the
contract. As the landowner becomes more powerful, s/he obtains the
stipulated half of the product in return for less in the way of material
contribution. Thus landowners in general, in order to maximise their return
from the land, prefer to sharecrop.42 Sharecoppers and/or tenants, on the
other hand, prefer to rent land, because of the greater income as well as
the freedom of action that this brings.43
Apart from purely economic considerations, demands and obligations
arising from kinship and community relations also determine the nature of
the leasing and/or sharecropping contract. A son In need of Income may
rent his mother's land for a nominal sum of money, or, If the economic
situation of the son allows it, he may 'sharecrop' the land, but in actual
fact, turn over to his mother a bigger proportion of the income compared to
prevalent rent levels. Conversely, the pressure of sons and/or daughters
established In separate and poor households, may force a person to 'rent'
them his/her land, thus foregoing the higher income s/he would receive if
s/he were to sharecrop it to an established farmer. 44 Villagers try to
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establish good relations with their tenant and/or sharecropper in order to
control the management of their land. For this reason, fellow-villagers
and/or kin are often preferred. As a result of kinship and community ties,
the negative effect of sharecropping and renting on the productivity of the
land is minimised.
Vith a few exceptions I shall discuss below 1 sharecropping contracts
in Tuz are established between equals. This equality is a product of the
fact that in spite of differences in wealth, there is no class difference
between the two partners.46 Both are involved in the contract as owners of
means of production, and divide the product according to their
contributions to the process of production. Most importantly, both parties
are peasants, often kinsmen/women who at the same time, can exercise a
considerable amount of choice in determining partners and are not
necessarily obliged to let their relatives use their land. The power that
each party can wield over the terms of the contract varies in each case.
The head of a large household who owns a tractor and farming equipment is
often in a very good position to set the terms of the contract. Conversely,
an old man with no adult son who owns a lower-quality piece of land often
has to accept the terms set by his sharecropper. 47 In many cases, the
ownership of tractors provides greater advantage compared to the ownership
of land.48 However, there is considerable variation, for the wider economic
context, as well as demographic (position in the developmental cycle,
availability of labour power) and economic (amount of accumulated cash)
circumstances within which households may find themselves, together
determine the over-all balance of power between landowners and tractor
owners.49 But, most importantly, there is no class of landowners in Tuz
who are able to live on the basis of land rents. The majority of the
individuals who share or rent land out own between 30 and 80 decares of
land and they only have a single tenant or sharecropper. The amounts of
land rented and sharecropped in Tuz are therefore small, and landowners
interact with their sharecroppers and tenants on the basis of equality.
1
	
10
1
	
12
3
	
99
3
	
116
3
	
240
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Table 7.8 Leasing and Sharecropping in 1984 According to Number- of
Household and Size of Land
Area	 Rented in	 Rented out	 Shared in	 Shared out
(da)	 hhs da.	 hhs da.	 hhs	 da.	 Mis da.
1-10
	
4
	
31
	
3
	
19
	
1
	
8
11-20
	
14
	
231
	
3
	
48
	
5
	
68
21-30
	
14
	
383
	
5
	
127
31-40
	
6
	
195
	
3
	
111
	
4
	
156
41-50
	
3
	
142
	
2
	
96
	
2
	
95
51- 100
	
5
	
467
	
1
	
53
	
5
	
370
100- 150
	
7
	
950
150+
	
3
	
600
Total	 56	 2999	 17	 454	 17	 695 11	 477
The table above shows that Tuz villagers are able to rent, on average,
53 decares and sharecrop about 40 decares. }tuch of the rented land above
100 decares is farmed jointly by two and In one case three households, in a
way that resembles sharecropping contracts: all costs and all income are
shared according to a specified arrangement. Furthermore, the table also
demonstrates the overwhelming predominance of renting over sharecropping.
But most rented land is obtained from individuals outside the village, since
only 454 out of a total of 2999 decares of rented land belongs to Tuz
villagers. Tuz landowners are able keep control over their land and usually
manage to employ sharecroppers rather than rent it out.5°
A large portion of the land obtained from outside the village through
renting and sharecropping contracts belongs to three large landowners in
the area. The nature of the contract and the conditions under which these
contracts are drawn up shows that in these cases, the peasants are
confronted with a class of landowners. In these instances the equality
inherent in contracts between peasants is distorted in favour of the
landowner. Tan's 32,000-decare estate to the south of Tuz is a major
source of land for villagers in the area. &l The large amount of lana
available to Tan allows him to enforce terms of sharecropping and renting
that are clearly to his advantage. The majority of his sharecroppers come
from the village of Batnos where his land is situated. In the contracts
with these villagers, Tan provides a considerable proportion of the inputs
and shares the costs of hoeing and harvesting. He stipulates the time and
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manner of ploughing and planting and determines when the fields are to be
irrigated. His main advantage in using sharecroppers is to reduce the
costs of management and above all, the costs of securing and controlling
labour.52 The contracts Tan makes with other villagers differ considerably
and depend on the pre-existing relationship between Tan and the villager.
Tan's material or managerial contribution to the production decreases
according to the personal relations between him and the villager. 53 The
usual form of contract established with villagers from distant localities is
a form of leasing, where Tan provides the seed and in return demands a
fixed amount of cotton per decare sown.5'
To summarise the observations set out so far, we can roughly divide
leasing and sharecropping contracts into three forms, using power relations
between landowner and cultivator as a basis:
1. The landowner is powerless and the tractor-owner can determine the
terms of the contract. In these cases the former often owns a small amount
of land (at most 30 decares) and is not able to farm it due to lack of cash
or lack of labour. Elderly couples and/or widow(er)s are often in this
position. Contracts are often leasing contracts.
2. The landowner and the cultivator are equal in status and economic power.
The majority of Tuz landowners are In this position, and the main reason
for employing a sharecropper is lack of mechanIsed labour within the
household, Cash by contrast is usually available and allows the landowner
to stipulate the terms of the contract, which often takes the form of
sharecropping.
3. A small peasant producer enters into a contract with one of the large
owners mentioned above. These contracts approximate the cases described
for Turkey by Keyder (1983a) and Aydin (1980). 	 The nature of the
contract depends on the economic circumstances and the social distance
between the two parties. Rent in kind is the most widespread form of
contract. As argued by Pearce, in these cases surplus is appropriated by
the landowner in the form of his share or else of rent (1983:53).
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7.6 Inequalities in Access to Land
As a result of the processes of commoditisation, landownership is no
longer the most important precondition determining production capability.
Accumulated cash (needed to rent or buy land) provides one of the important
means through which land is allocated among farmers. The households that
take in land through sharecropping and leasing contracts own between 4 and
196 decares of land, fact which shows that ownership of land is not a
significant factor affecting ability to enter into production. Nevertheless,
in a community where farming is the most highly valued occupation and
where identity is intricately bound up with scale of farming, land
ownership is still an important factor differentiating between individuals
(and households) within the community. In tables 7.2 and 7.7, I had shown
that slightly less than one fifth of the households in Tuz are landless, but
that slightly more than this number do not farm any land. A consideration
of the amounts of land owned by Tuz households shows that great
inequalities do not prevail. 	 The majority of villagers own between 31-60
decares: 38.4 % of the land is owned by 31.8 % of the households. Tuz land
is concentrated in the three middle brackets (11-90 decares) and those
brackets comprise 69.4 % of the households in the village.
Nevertheless, the number of landless households (17.6 %) and the fact
that 1.8 % of the households own more than 10 % of the land (each
household owns more than 150 decares) point to a certain level of land
polarization. These inequalitites will, to a certain extent, be leveled off
as a result of the developmental cycle of these land-owning households.
Inheritance will serve to break up some of the large estates. E7 However,
fictive land sales to sons may also serve to transfer at least part of
these large estates to a few chosen heirs. The final outcome is, as I have
already explained, a product of relations between parents and children.
Conversely, many of the landless will inherit (albeit small portions of)
land on the basis of which they may in the future engage in cotton
production. Of the thirty landless Tuz households, only ten do not stand to
inherit any land, five of them being emigrants from other parts of Turkey.
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The addition of land through sharecropping and renting alters this
distribution of land considerably. Many of the small owners are not able
to farm land while the larger landholders can extend the area they
cultivate. Except for the smaller brackets and the very largest owners
(11-60 and 150+), renting and sharecropping serve to increase the average
size of the holding in each land bracket. 	 The numbers of farmers In the
largest brackets increase and the land that they farm Increases
correspondingly. Twenty percent of the total farmed land as opposed to
11.7 % of the land owned is now in the 150+-decare bracket.) The result is
a more unequal pattern of access to land:
Table 7.9 Cumulative Percentage of Land Owned and Farmed by Tuz Households
Area Sown	 Laud Owned
	
Land Farmed
(da.)	 % hhs	 % laud
	
% h]is	 % laud
We can see from the table that small owners (less than 90 decares)
make-up about 93 % of Tuz households and these hold 73.7 S of Tuz property.
By contrast, producers farming less than 90 decares make-up 83 5 of Tuz
households and these in total have access to only 47 5 of the land farmed
in Tuz. As a result of sharecropping and renting, it is the medium to
large landowners who are able to Increase the scale of their operations.
7.7 Conclusion
A consideration of the patterns of landownership and cultivation in
Tuz shows that although the majority of the farmers are owner-cultivators,
more than 44 5 of the total land cultivated Is obtained on the basis of
sharecropping and leasing contracts. Land is largely commoditised and
rental and sales markets allow a frequent redistribution of land between
producers. The high incidence of land purchases and sales, especially
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within the last ten years, also indicates the extent to which land is
regarded as an alienable commodity. In spite of this, concepts of
individual property are often overshadowed by ideas regarding the
solidarity of the household as a land-owning unit of production.
Government distributions and the idea of a common subsistence fund have
made these attitudes towards the joint exploitation and ownership of land
endure in the face of Increasing commoditisation. As a result of these
pressures, the sale of land has ramifications beyond the economic realm
narrowly defined, and affects the nature of social Interaction within the
village.
The pattern of land distribution indicates that the majority of Tuz
cotton growers are small-to-medium farmers cultivating between 30 and 100
decares, The area cropped to cotton by each Tuz household shows variations
over time, as I have shown In Table 7.3. Since access to land is not
restricted to indivldualised ownership, farmers have the possibility of
adapting the scale of their production and hence their income to the needs
of the Individuals within the household. A combination of market and
kinship/community relations allows flexibility in the allocation of land.
The strategic inclusion of Individuals (parents, siblings) within the
household, the careful determination of household fission, the activation of
kinship and community ties to obtain favourable contracts of tenancy and/or
sharecropping make up the basic mechanisms through which households are
able to obtain land. This flexibility is nevertheless dependent on the
broad limits of cotton farming Imposed by the economy at large, and
especially on the intervention of the state. By affecting land productivity
through Its irrigation policy and by subsidising credit and sales markets,
the state is able to influence the Income levels derived from cotton
production.
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Notes to Chapter 7
1. For example, when Xeryem's father sold all his property including his
land, house and shops, his wife and all his children cut off all relations
with him. Xeryem maintains that, by acting without his family's consent,
her father had broken up the family and had renounced his right to be
looked after and respected.
2. Exceptions do occur, An elderly woman was able to rent her land in
return for cash while her son and his wife were looking after her. They
did not have the means to put her land under production. The son turned
the cash income from the rent over to his mother, but It was understood
that she would give him back a large portion of it.
3. As nomadic pastoralists, the yiiruk have a very different relationship to
land even after they settle.
4. Silverman (1968) shows the exact opposite to be the case among Central
Italian peasants where the same family may cultivate a farm for
generations. Du Boulay describes a case where the land and the house are
part and parcel of a farmer's social identity in spite of land fregmentatlon
caused by inheritance (1974:32-40),
5. Apart from the 22 % of village households which do not cultivate any
land, a further 15,8 % farmed less than 20 decares, and needed income from
a supplementary source in order to meet subsistence needs,
6. For a comparison of land owned and land cultivated, see table 10.1
7. In cases of sharecropping and renting arrangements, knowledge of the
limit of the contract makes such long-term planning decisions easier to
arrive at.
8. It Is mistakenly thought that since a man Is used to managing his
holding and since he has much greater authority than a woman, he will not
allow his son total control, The elderly mother Is seen to be more easily
manipulated by a 'favourite' child than the elderly father. In fact, elderly
women know how to protect their own interests and look after them quite
well.
9, The two men who inherited more than 50 decares have no siblings and of
the women involved, six were widows whose husband's estates had not yet
been divided,
10. Considering the fact that inherited land is also largely government-
given, the state accounts for about two thirds (4330 decares) of all
individually held land in Tuz.
11. See äney (1975:245-56) for a detailed account of some of these efforts.
Similar efforts are reported by Soysal (1976) for the Adana plain.
12, many other projects are either being completed or still waiting to be
approved. The construction of irrigation canals in a checker-board pattern
covering the whole plain has progressed quite far, but these canals have
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not yet reached the Tuz area. Combatting salinity on a larger scale is a
more difficult problem and needs large scale investment that has as yet not
been forthcoming.
13. Distributions of land in order to regulate the settlement of various
sectors of the population have been a major policy of the Ottoman Empire as
well. While this method was a major component in the conquest and
colonisation of the Balkans in the early years of the Empire, it later
became a way of controlling production for tax purposes, particularly where
the settlement of nomads was concerned. See Barkan (1949-1950). Forced
movements of population and resettlement were also used to suppress
political unrest (Orhonlu 1963).
14. At this same period another fifty-eight thousand refugee families not
covered by the Lausanne Convention received over four million decares of
land (ibid.).
15. The sale price was calculated according to the market value of the land,
but payments would be made over a period of ten years (Barkan 1946:455;
Aktan 1966:319).
16. Barkan (1946:455) states that until 1945, eleven to twelve million
decares of land, about 8% of all the cultivated area, had been distributed
to peasants as a result of the various laws passed.
17. Very few large landholders were actually dispossed as a result of the
law, which had already lost some of its more radical implications by the
time it was promulgated. See Barkan (1946). Margulies (1985:230) argues
that land distributions amounted to a consolidation, if not a creation of a
class of small peasants. An American observer for AID is more explicit and
maintains that this was the overtly stated aim of the Land Reform
legislation (Cohn 1970:3). By contrast, Tarakli argues that the main goal
of this law as implemented by successive governments was to increase total
agricultural production.
18. Common pasture land in excess of the needs of a particular village was
also given to villagers. A quarter of Turkey's pasture land was converted
into private property In this fashion.
19. Xany in fact did both, using deeds drawn up by notary publics.
20. Farmers already possessing land were also included In the distributions
provided that their Income fell below the specified limit. Farms producing
crops other than wheat were assessed in terms of the amount of cash the
sale of the produce would bring.
21. I do not know the reasoning by which officials arrived at this figure.
22. Thus, in some households today, the wife and husband are administering
their own hk. separately.
23. Older muhacir women in Tuz often mention how important it was for them
to become landholders in their own right, and many have defended their
property from encroachments by other household members. One woman of
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sixty, has stopped performing domestic labour for her husband, who sold her
land without consulting her. The man pays for a neighbour to cook and
clean.
24. A total of 6630 families were settled in the Aydin province immediately
after the end of the war; the majority concentrated in the Söke plain.
25. Only 21 were direct recipients. Olive groves are not included in these
calculations. At present, the majority of these holdings are quite small:
Area (da)	 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60+
Individuals	 18	 33	 7	 3	 5	 2	 1
26. Expropriations of large landowners were very limited in the Söke plain.
One large farmer lost 7438 decares in the course of the 1952 land survey.
27. Earlier, when more land was available, up to 50 decares per household
had been distributed.
28. Other considerations have also led large landowners to sell land.
Investment in commercial activities, moves to large cities, and adjustments
resulting from inheritance are among the most important reasons for selling
land. The sale of land to peasants or to family members in an effort to
minimise the effects of the land reform bill also accounts for a
substantial portion of land transactions. See chapter 2, section 2.
29. Data regarding land sales and purchases have been compiled from the
transactions recorded in the Land Registry and the answers given by
villagers to questions in the 1984 survey. These figures may not reflect
all land transactions in the village since a large proportion of the land
involved is government-distributed land which villagers were not supposed
to sell.
30. At his death, the man still owned 100 decares and his three sons and
three daughters inherited 12.5 decares of land each, the remaining 25
decares going to the young wife he had married a few years before his
death. This example also demonstrates the thin line that separates the
inheritance and sale of land.
31. In order to establish the settlers as self-sufficient agricultural
producers, the state was also supposed to provide seed and draught animals.
In the majority of cases, however, this aid did not materialise and
migrants were left to their own devices.
32. Even the largest landowner of Tuz, a yeni yuruk, over a period of twenty
years, bought a total of 350 decares of land from a number of different
sellers in parcels of about 10-20 decares.
33. Villagers often express a feeling of special attachment to land in
general though not to any specific field or holding. One villager stated
that a visit to his fields made him feel good and that as a person working
the land (rençber), he could not imagine selling his land and moving to the
city.
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34. Between 1979 and 1985, land prices in Adana rose from 30,000 TL/da to
over 300,000 TL/da (Seker 1986:20-1). The Tuz prices were, respectively,
20,000 TL/da and 200,000 TL/da. The difference in value is largely
explained by the fact that the Adana plain is better irrigated than the
Soke plain.
35, Many of the barren fields in the southern parts of the plain even in
1985 only fetched a price of 50,000 TL/da, when the average selling price
of one decare of good land fluctuated around the 150,000-200,000 TL/da
mark. In 1986, the state irrigation system was extended to cover the
southernmost portion of the plain and land values rose. These same plots
were valued at 600,000-700,000 TL/da in 1987, an increase which was also
exacerbated by the high selling price of raw cotton.
36. The increase of cash costs in recent years, resulting from greater use
of pesticides and fertilisers, has led to the equal sharing of all cash
expenditures, including the cost of seed.
37. In Tuz, as well as in Turkey generally, the term ortak is used for all
sorts of partnership, including business ventures.
38. The conditions of production are considered in detail before parties
reach a final agreement. If the land has to be ploughed many times before
the seed can be planted, the sharecropper may demand that the landowner
meet fuel costs. Or, if more than one tractor is needed to pump water into
the field, the second or third tractor often has to be provided by the
landowner.
39. In 1984, rents fluctuated between 4000 and 8000 TL/da., while the 1979
levels were around 1000 TL/da. By 1985, they had risen above the 10,000
TL/da. mark. The 1985 Adana figure provided by Seker (1986:20-1) is 12,000
TL/da. On average, land rents are about 10 % of the price of land.
40. In many of these cases the tenant ultimately ends up buying the land.
41. Somewhere in the middle of these two extremes is the possibility of
sharing the costs of the hoeing and harvesting of the first picking and
leaving the cost as well as the income of the second and third pickings to
the sharecropper.
42. In cases where the landowner also has access to unpaid labour within
his/her household, sharecropping becomes even more advantageous.
43. Sharecroppers in Tuz argue that they end up by working for the
landowner. When asked why they did not rent land, 72 % of Tuz
sharecroppers stated that they could not get the landowner to agree to a
leasing contract, and the rest said they did not have the cash needed to
enter into a leasing arrangement. A saying illustrates the attitude of
sharecroppers: Ortak eu köpek hil yemez, not even a dog eats shared meat!
44. The 'separateness' of households does allow the owner to choose a
sharecropper and/or tenant. One man, for example, refused to lease his 30-
decare plot to his son-in-law because he did not want to risk losing a
good sharecropper. But these refusals do lead to serious disruptions in
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social relationships. A few years after this incident the man in question
lost his wife and his daughter refused to look after him.
45. See Robertson (1980:412) and Pearce (1983:47) for discussions of the
reduced incentive to undertake land improvements on land that is leased or
sharecropped.
46. The differences in wealth and status between the parties of a leasing
contract are more pronounced than in the case of sharecropping, since
ability to farm is a function of accumulated cash. Only those landowners
who do not have accumulated cash to contribute to the production process,
and who, therefore cannot stipulate a sharecropping contract agree to rent
it out.
47. In fact, he will often have to lease his land out.
48. Most of the sharecroppers in Tuz are tractor owners and the majority of
the landowners involved in sharecropping contracts (20 out of 28) entered
into these contracts because they did not own tractors.
49. For example, the price of cotton may determine the number of
individuals able to buy tractors and therefore the extent of the competition
for land between tractor owners; this competition may tip the contract in
favour of landowners.
50. Tuz landowners do not necessarily lease or share their land out
exclusively to Tuz villagers. Kin and friends living in nearby villagers
act as landowners and tenants/sharecroppers to Tuz villagers.
51. A 2000-decare farm owned by a sheep merchant and a 1000-decare farm
owned by an At man involved in business in Izmir are the two other sources
of land In the region. Under the technical conditions prevalent in the Söke
plain, the impossibility of planting more than 3000 decares of cotton
forces Tan to rent or sharecrop about 10,000 decares of his land every
year. Similar cases of sharecropping of cotton land on the large estates
of the Adana region have been reported by Hinderink and Kiray (1970:29)
prior to mechanisatlon. These authors argue that mechanisation in Adana
has led to the disappearance of the sharecropper. In Söke, by contrast,
sharecropping between large landowners and small peasants has continued up
to the present.
52. Not all the Inhabitants of Bathos enjoy good relations with Tan. During
the sixties, some of them had claimed his land and forced him to turn a
part of his estate over to the villagers. These individuals as well as
their descendants are not able to receive any land from Tan.
53. Tuz villagers who marry a girl from from Batnos, for example, are often
provided with better contracts compared to other Tuz villagers.
54. These contracts may leave the peasant in grave difficulties. Any
unforeseen loss during the production process is borne by him/her, while
the landowner receives the specified sum whatever the circumstances.
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55. See also Pearce (1983) for a discussion of sharecropping in other Asian
contexts.
56. The gini coefficient for land owned in 1984 equals 0.489. See Appendix
VIa and VIb for Lorenz curves illustrating the extent of inequality with
regard to access to land and landowneship among Tuz farmers in 1984.
57. One of these large farmers has eleven children and owns 196 decares of
land, Two of his (male) children may give up their claims since one is a
schoolteacher and the other is an established shop owner in Söke. Even so,
after deducting their mother's share, the remaining nine children can only
inherit 5.4 decares each (196x0.25+9).
58. See the sixth column of Tables 7.2 and 7.7. Looking at the inequalities
in land farmed, as opposed to land owned, the Gini coefficient rises to
0.571.
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CHAPTER 8: ACCESS TO AND CIRCULATION OF CASH
In a an economy relatively well integrated into commodity circuits the
importance of cash cannot be overlooked. As I have shown in chapter 5,many
of the means of production needed in the process of cotton growing have
long become commoditised, and can be purchased on the national market.
These means of production can be considered in two categories: those which
represent a longer-term investment and which can be used in more than one
production cycle, and those that are consumed in a single cycle of
production. I have prefered to label this investment 'cash' rather than
'capital' because of the descriptive level at which the discussion is
carried. To the extent that cotton production by peasant households is
undertaken in a commodity economy, this cash functions as capital.1
Tractors and other tractor-drawn equipment make up the bulk of the first
category, while the latter consists of inputs such as seed, fertiliser,
pesticide and fuel.
In practice however, this distinction between long-term and short-term
investments proves to be difficult to draw in the context of a peasant
economy where many of the inputs are obtained through a combination of
market and non-market mechanisms. A host of bonds linking peasants
creates a series of 'lending' and 'helping' networks through which inputs
can be obtained without expending cash. Furthermore, the intervention of
the state in input and output markets also affects the conditions under
which peasants obtain tractors, fertilisers as well as cash itself.
Moreover, many of the inputs that at first glance seem to be annual needs,
such as fertilisers and pesticide actually can be used over a period of two
to three years; others can be used outside the process of cotton production.
Tractors are a good case in point. They are means of transportation (of
goods as well as people), of power (as when irrigation pumps are attached
to tractor engines), and also symbols of prestige and identity.2
Cash is also an indispensible aspect of the reproduction of peasant
producers. As pointed out in chapter 3, subsistence production in the
village is rather limited and many of the items of daily consumption have
to be purchased on the market. The extent to which Tuz households have to
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spend cash in order to ensure daily reproduction varies from case to case,
but none is totally self-sufficient, Generational reproduction adds a
considerable burden to the cash requirements of the household. To sponsor
weddings and to prepare the conditions for marriage is, as explained in
chapter 4, a long and costly process, especially for men. To the extent
that the reproduction of the peasant household (including its personnel and
the relations that structure their interaction), can also be considered as
the reproduction of the unit of production, many of these expenditures have
to be seen as productive expenditures?
The village producers of SSke have a number of alternative sources of
cash at their disposal. The bulk of this cash is obtained in the form of
credit from state institutions, from the numerous private banks and
merchants of Söke and from neighbours and kins(wo)men. The sale of cotton,
and other agricultural commodities (olive oil, meat on the hoof) as well as
the sale of labour power provides the remaining source of cash available to
village producers. The cash obtained from these various sources forms the
capital required in the production of cotton. This capital is used to
finance productive activities: land, labour, and the instruments of
production are obtained (at least in part) through the investment of
capital. Through the availability of kinship and neighbourhood-based
networks of exchange labour, at least a portion of the cash input needed
can be subsituted with labour. In this chapter, I shall examine the way
peasants obtain access to cash and the way they utilise it in the process
of cotton production.
8.1 Cash Requirements in Cotton Production
Apart from land and labour, the bulk of cash investments for long-
term use are connected with the purchase of implements and the improvement
of land. The monetary costs of these inputs are often so high that peasant
producers are unable to obtain the necesary cash. However, the rental
market, the system of lending/borrowing equipment among friends and
neighbours, hire-purchase deals offered by the manufacturers and merchants
of Ske, and long-term credit systems provide these producers the means of
access to needed implements. Among all the instruments of production, the
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tractor, which, under present technological conditions, is indispensible to
cotton production, represents the single largest item of cost. Although the
cost of a tractor varies according to its horse-power, its age and make,
the average cost of a new tractor in 1984 was about 1,000,000 TL. ($2500
approx.), or the gross income obtained from twenty five decares of cotton.4
The equipment needed to accompany the tractor can be divided Into two
categories: Items that are used continuously and that have to be purchased
by producers and those that are used sporadically and can be hired. Steel-
bladed ploughs, disk-harrows, Inter-row cultivators, seed planters,
electrical water pumps, and trailers must be counted among the former and
amount to a total expenditure of 150,000 TL.
The second type of equipment is used less frequently In the production
process and is also more expensive: land levellers (180,000 TL.), ridge
builders used in preparing the field for irrigation (310,000 TL.), land
rollers (200,000 TL.), modern seed-planters (90,000 TL.) and pesticide
sprayers (150,000 TL.) belong Into this group. Compared to the implements
listed above, few farmers own these larger machines. Xost of these more
expensive implements are time- and labour-saving devices which have been
developed and introduced among Söke farmers within the last seven years.
Every year, new advances in the design of these implements are made and
these are promptly adopted by the peasant farmers of Söke, 6 The most
important effect of technological improvement is to alter the labour-cash
balance of the peasant farm. Once these improvements are made available,
peasants have the option of subsituting cash for labour or labour for cash
depending on their specific needs. However, since for peasants cash rather
than labour is the scarce resource, these improvements do represent a load
to the poorer farmers who are forced by competitive conditions into large
cash outlays.
Costs Incurred for improving the land are also considerable. Digging
draining canals on the perimeter of a thirty-decare field requires the
labour of five men for a period of seven days and represents a cost of
61,250 IL. The cost of hiring a leveller (Including the tractor) amounts to
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90,000 TL. (3000 TL/da.), the total coming to more than 150,000 TL. which
equals the total cost of the more 'traditional' tractor-drawn implements
referred to above.
The establishment of a new household through marriage represents
another form of long-term cost. This cost is partly of an economic nature,
in the sense that the abligation to marry off children is the precondition
for the availability of the latters' labour to the household enterprise. It
is through the staging of marriage ceremonies that the personnel of a
household enterprise can increase and reproduce itself over time. The cost
of marrying off a son amounts to more than 1,000,000 TL., a sum that cannot
be covered by the income of a single year's production. 7 Even when spread
over a period of two or three years, few Tuz households can shoulder such
costs without borrowing.
For the majority of peasant producers in Tuz, circulating costs are
composed of money spent for seed, fuel, pesticides, fertilisers, and labour.
These costs vary greatly according to each particular case involved.
Labour costs, as I explain in the following chapter, change according to the
number of workers (male and female) available within the household. The
amount spent for pesticides depends on the situation in each field; fuel
expenses increase according to distance of the field from the village and
the number of separate plots cultivated. Below is a hypothetical cost table
for a tractor-owning producer who pays only for unmechanised labour:
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Table 8.1 Expenditure Per Decare for Annual Inputs in Cotton Production
Iteit
	
TL/da.
Seed
	
1000
Fuel
	
3000
Fertiliser
	 2500
Pesticide
	 1000
Irrigation
	 5501
Labour
	 80001*
Total
	
16050
* This represents the cost of hiring an additional tractor required to pump
water into the main irrigation canal. The landowner's tractor Is used to
divert the water from the canal into the field. Distance and position of
the field may make a third tractor necessary.
**Labour costs include hoeing (3000 TL/da.) and harvesting (5000 TL/da.)
costs on a field where yields average 200kg./da. The cost of harvesting
would increase to 6250 TL./da. if the yields were to reach 250 kg./da,
The table indicates that labour costs (excluding mechanised labour)
amount to one half of the costs of production. Supposing that all this
cash is borrowed at current market rates, interest would account for an
additional 12,800 TL. (16,000 x 80 % ), bringing the total cash costs to
28,800 TL,/da. Cash Is In fact a larger cost than labour and accounts for
about 44 % of total costs. Having to hire a tractor also doubles the
monetary production costs. According to these figures, a total of about
480,000 TL is required to cultivate a thirty-decare field. Thus, the fixed
and circulating cash costs of an average cotton producer in Tuz who owns
thirty decares of land are as follows:
Table 8.2 Total Fixed and Circulating Costs .Needed to Cultivate 30 Decares
of Cotton
Tractor
Implements (minimum)
Land Improvements
Circulating Costs
TOTAL
1,000,000 TL.
150,000 IL.
150,000 TL.
480,000 IL.
1,780,000 TL.
Farmers in Tuz often need to borrow In order to meet short-term cash
requirements as well as long-term commitments. Small to medium-sized
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farmers cultivate between 30 and 60 decares of cotton on land which in
general yields 200-250 kilogrammes of cotton per decare. By 1984 sale
prices, this amounts to a gross income of 34,000-42,500 TL. per decare.
About 16,000 TL. per decare is required to meet circulating costs; this
leaves a 'net' income of 18,000-26,500 TL. per decare, excluding rent,
interest, the cost of machinery, and depreciation. 9 For a 30-decare field
this would put the cash income to 540,000-795,000 TL. Out of this income,
the producer must provide for daily reproduction; moreover, s/he needs
money to buy new implements and begin the next agricultural cycle. With
only 30 decares of land, this is clearly impossible. Yearly subsistence
costs vary between 500,000 TL. and 800,000 TL. according to the degree of
saving on consumption or subsistence production undertaken by each
household. 1 ° A farmer planting 60 decares of land, can, on the other hand,
meet consumption needs as well as circulating costs.1 1 11. 60 decares x 200
kg./da yield = 12,000 kg. x 170 TL./kg. = 2,040,000 TL. gross income -
960,000 (16,000 TL./da x 60 decares) TL. circulating costs = 1,000,000 TL.
'net' income. After consumption expenditures, 200,000-500,000 TL. will be
available to this farmer for investment in land and machinery.> Whether
such a farmer can invest in improved equipment depends primarily on the
price that cotton fetches relative to the price of inputs.
Circulating costs may be covered by the income obtained from the sale
of cotton. As I have shown above, cash inputs for the duration of one
cycle of production constitute less than 50 % of the gross income, But
producers rarely have that cash ready before they enter into the production
process. Even the medium-sized farmer cultivating 60 decares of land needs
450,000-750,000 TL. before the harvest in order to meet production
expenditures as they arise. Therefore, most farmers In Tuz are indebted by
the time their crop is ready to be sold. As a result of these debts,
farmers sell their produce immediately after the harvest, when the price is
lowest. The following year, they need to borrow once again to begin
2
Since production decisions are closely related to conditions within
the household, there is a great deal of variation in the amounts that
peasants borrow each year. Attempts to enlarge the scale of production
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depend on the needs of the household and new investments may be necessary.
For example, in 1984, one farmer cultivating 70 decares stated that he had
borrowed about 500,000 TL., while another planting 45 decares of cotton had
borrowed one million. In the latter instance it was the first time that the
farmer was undertaking land improvements. Chance factors such as an
above-average yield, or a more than normal rise in the selling price of
cotton may allow farmers to accumulate enough savings to enter into
production without having to borrow. In 1987, after the declaration of an
early general election in Novenber, the government offered 600 TL./kg., a
rise of over 100 %. A favourable international price and subsidies offered
by the government to cotton exporters allowed merchants to raise the price
by 100 TL. Thus, many farmers will be able to pay their debts and start
the new cycle of production without having to borrow. Many farmers also
use a 'good' year to enlarge their farming enterprise by buying (or renting)
land and/or machines; they also profit from a good income to finalise
marriage transactions. Thus, the extent of indebtedness may in fact
increase at the end of a successful cycle of cultivation.
The relationship between the rate of investment in agriculture and the
price of cotton shows that the two are interdependent. In table 8.3 below I
show the effect of a good price for cotton (calculated as a more than
average increase in the yearly price of raw cotton) on capital investment
represented by the first tractor the farmer buys. 13 But, since the factors
that influence the timing of the purchase are too numerous, the correlation
is not perfect:
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Table 8.3 Number of First-Ever Tractors Purchased According to Year of
Purchase and Increase in the Pr-ice of Raw Cotton
Tear
	
Jo. of	 Price of	 % Increase
Tractors	 Cotton (TL.)
1971	 2	 3.30*	 20*
1972	 5	 3.6
	 11
1973	 7	 5.8
	 59
1974	 5	 7.8
	 34
1975	 10	 7.8
	 0
1976	 9
1977	 4	 11
1978	 6	 15
	 36
1979	 10	 28
	 87
1980	 2	 52
	 86
1981	 5	 65
	 25
1982	 1	 78
	 20
1983	 3	 120
	 54
1984	 4	 170
	 42
*The prices of cotton for the years 1971-1975 are the figures declared by
the government (See Merkez Bankasi, n.d.) I have no Information on the
price received by Söke producers. The later figures, on the other hand,
represent the price obtained by Söke producers.
8.2 Sources of Cash
The cost structures examined above indicate that cotton producers in
Tuz require large sums of cash both for long-term Investments and for the
short-term Inputs needed for one cycle of production. The majority of the
producers In Tuz have to resort to borrowing in order to meet these cash
requirements. While in a good year, it may be possible to enter production
without contracting any debts for circulating costs, indebtedness for long-
term fixed costs Is usually inevitable. In the Söke region, there are
various sources of credit available to village producers. These sources
range from the state-backed Agricultural Marketing Cooperative (Tans), and
the state-owned Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) to the various private
banks and traders established in Sbke and in Tuz Itself. Borrowing from
kin and neighbours is also possible. The basic strategy used by producers
is to borrow In small quantities from as many different sources as
possible. In other words, the cash required for each task Is considered
separately and the funds needed to undertake the task at hand are obtained
as the need arises.
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8,2.1 Sources of Cash for Long-Term Investments
In order to undertake long-term investments, the majority of small to
medium farmers need to borrow money. There are a number of exceptions to
this general statement which need to be considered. Firstly, as I have
already indicated, the semi-nomadic yuruk have had the possibility of using
the income obtained from the sale of their flocks of sheep and goats to set
up an agricultural enterprise. Thus, for example, the first tractor in Tuz
was bought by a wealthy eski yiirük family who had been raising more than
200 head of sheep. As I have shown in the previous chapter, it was the
late-settling yeni yiiriik who obtained most of their land through purchase
financed by the sale of their flocks. For the muhacir, on the other hand,
olive groves and hill-side gardens received from the government constitute
accumulated wealth which may be transformed into capital through sales.
But since these gardens constitute means of saving cash by reducing cash
expenditure on food, not too many farmers are prepared to take the risk of
selling them to invest in the commodity sphere. In these different ways,
assets accumulated through forms of production current in the past have
been capitalised during the process of transition to cotton production:
Table 8.4 Land and Tractor Ownership According to Ethnicity
ey	 yy	 0
No. of landowners	 34
	
35	 52	 2
Amount owned (da.)	 1743
	
1845	 2899	 64
No. of tractors owned 25
	
31	 37	 0
Secondly, capital accumulated in other branches of production can be
transferred to agriculture. The transport sector has, in recent years,
functioned as an important source of accumulation. Instead of buying land
and tractors, newly married men have been buying minibuses which were
available at relatively cheap prices. State banks, in particular the
People's Bank (Halk Bankasi), have also been extending credit at relatively
good terms to small investors in the transport sector. After working as
minibus drivers for a few years, many of these men have sold their
minibuses and invested in land and tractors. 14 Xovement in the opposite
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direction is also possible. A Tuz man who had attempted to enlarge his
farm by renting land from Tan in 1984, lost his crop and had to sell his
tractor and a twenty-decare plot. After settling his debts, he bought a
minibus and has entered into an association with a firm of cloth
manufacturers who sell door-to-door. For a fixed monthly salary (including
the cost of the fuel), he now drives the travelling saleswomen who sell
their wares to (female) customers.
Other income generating activities can be carried on in conjunction
with cotton production. Raising cattle for sale as meat is one possible
option, since it can be carried out during the winter months in the village
and uses the labour available within the household. Women, usually older
and married, tend the animals. The difficulties of finding grazing land in
the winter and the increasing cost of animal fodder limit the extent to
which this activity can be undertaken. Fishing (in the fish pond managed
by the village cooperative, or on the open sea) is another alternative way
of increasing income. The income generated in this way is not very large,
and is often used to finance daily consumption, thus allowing producers to
use the income derived from the sale of cotton for investment in
agricultural production.
Savings can to some extent, be used in the purchase of tractors and
other expensive implements, since these are often sold through hire-
purchase arrangements. Thus, if the selling price of cotton yields an
income above the amount of debt, producers immediately use the cash to buy
a new machine (or to pay for its first installment). Another form of
savings with which land and/or machines can be purchased is the gold
received as part of the transfer of property from one generation to the
next. In other words, marriage practices create a form of forced savings
that can be used to acquire capital goods needed in cotton production.1 S
The state and local private merchants and banks are the two main
sources of long-term credit. Due to the development of capital markets,
there is no shortage of credit, although it is neither abundant nor cheap.
The Agricultural Bank, has until recently, been the main source of credit
needed to purchase tractors. Using his/her land as collateral, the small
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producer has been able to barrow from the bank up to 75 % of the cost of a
tractor. Tractors are purchased from private dealers who are the local
agents of the manufacturers. The farmer pays the initial 25 % of the cost
to the Agricultural Bank; the bank then pays the total cost to the dealer.
ks a result, the farmer becomes indebted to the bank which offers loans up
to five years at a low interest rate.
Many of the Tuz farmers (84 %) , however, did not buy their tractors
with funds supplied by the bank. Rather than buying new tractors, Tuz
villagers first buy a second-hand tractor from someone they know in the
district. The close social contact that can be established between
villagers serves to adjust the terms of the purchase to the needs of the
two parties involved. Modes of payment other than cash can also be used.
For instance, in one case, a man gave a part of his olive grove in return
for a relatively new tractor. After using it for a few years, farmers sell
the out-dated tractor through a town dealer, who accepts the old tractor as
a down-payment for a new one. Private dealers usually extend credit to
producers through hire purchase arrangements. The extent of the initial
down-payment, and the terms of the loan are negotiated; connections and
other social mechanisms can always be activated. Although the interest
rate paid to dealers is higher than the Bank's rate, many producers who can
not show a land title have no choice but to use the dealers. Since 1985, a
new manufacturer trying to capture a share of the market offered tractors
to producers on very favourable terms.
Once the initial down-payment is made (whether to the Bank or to the
dealer), the farmer is able to put the tractor to productive use
immediately. His aim is to repay his debt over a few years by producing
cotton. Under average conditions, this is possible by reducing monetary
expenditure for labour. This can be achieved in two ways: by using unpaid
labour and by reducing yearly cash expenditure for consumption. Moreover,
in spite of the increased wear and tear sustained, many farmers in this
situation rent their tractors out for cash in order to pay their debts. It
is also in order to pay the debt for a new tractor that producers enlarge
their scale of cultivation by renting and sharecropping more land than they
own or normally farm. Thus even to cover the cost of a large investment,
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farmers substitute labour for cash: by using their own and their family's
labour, farmers are able to pay their debts. This strategy is not always
successful. A bad harvest, undue increases in the costs of production, or a
low cotton price may prevent farmers from meeting the yearly Instal,iments
and the tractor has to be returned to the dealer.
Other fixed Investment goods are bought by producers in much the same
fashion. Neighbours, friends, connections, local manufacturers and the
state provide the money and/or the implement. As indicated above, the
amount of cash necessary to buy these goods is substantially smaller than
in the case of tractors, a fact which makes buying that much easier. The
state agency that supports these purchases is also the Agricultural Bank.
But rather than extend credit to producers directly, it provides funds to
State Credit Cooperatives (Tarlm Kredi Kooperatifi) established in various
parts of the country.	 Credit Cooperatives extend low-Interest credit to
its members to enable them to purchase agricultural equipment such as
trailers, ploughs, seed-planters, and electric pumps. They also extend
credit for fishing and animal husbandry. To become a member of the
cooperative, producers have to buy shares and are then entitled to credit
up to ten times the value of the share. Noreover, as with the Agricultural
Bank, producers have to prove their farming status by showing land deeds
or a two-year sharecropping or leasing contract. This limits the extent to
which Tuz farmers with their complicated patterns of access to land can use
this facility.'7
Although there are institutionalised channels for obtaining credit to
help farmers purchase tractors or other agricultural implements, obtaining
long- or medium-term cash loans is more difficult. And yet, it is this
type of loan that producers need in order to undertake land improvements
and to marry off their children. It is easier to obtain these loans from
within the village, whether through kin and neighbours or from
moneylenders. The distinction between moneylenders In the village and
friends is often not clear, since every long-term cash loan carries some
from of interest with it. From the villager's point of view, the
moneylender Is as much a friend and a neighbour as the trader whose main
income is derived from moneylending. Individuals who have accumulated cash
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over and above their immediate needs frequently lend money. 18 Especially
where small sums (eg. 50,000 TL.) are concerned,lending money yields a
higher rate of return on capital compared to bank interest rates. Moreover,
demands from neighbours and kin may create an obligation to lend money.19
Transactions involving cash are therefore subject to the realities of the
social intraction between the parties concerned. As the social relationship
between the creditor and debtor decreases, the interest rate also falls
regardless of the occupation of the creditor who may be a village
trader/moneylender. Close kin and/or neighbours end up by borrowing from
each other, sometimes for considerable lengths of time, without calculating
any interest. Since established moneylenders in the village, like their
counterparts in town, prefer to extend short-term circulating credit,
producers resort to informal social ties to obtain loans of about fifty to
one hundred thousand Turkish liras. For example, when Mehmet needed 80,000
IL. to set up a grocery shop in the village, it was to his elder brother Isa
that he turned for a loan.
However it is very difficult to obtain information about the frequency
and magnitude of cash transactions between villagers.20 In many of these
cases, previous relations of exchange and indebtedness further obscure the
nature of the transaction. A loan may really be the settling of a previous
debt, or (especially between close agnates) seen be to couched in the
language of obligation and duty. In Isa and Xehmet's case discussed above,
Mehmet later claimed that Isa had not been lending him money but paying
for a 1 .5-decare plot the former had sold to the latter. Isa, by contrast,
claimed that the plot was really their mother's and therefore not Mehmet's
to sell. The money, therefore, was a loan. In any case, Mehmet never paid
back the money he had received from his elder brother.
Apart from labour and social obligations, land can also be used to
obtain credit. The most frequent method used by Tuz villagers who do not
have the necessary cash to undertake land improvements is to rent their
land to individuals who have the means to improve the land. In these cases
the landowner leases his/her land for a longer-than-average time period
(usually four to five years). The rent is usually lower than the prevailing
rates and increases only minimally over the period covering the contract.
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This allows the tenant to recuperate some of his/her Investment. Renting
land at a cheap rate for a fixed period of time Is also used by villagers
to obtain cash for marriage. For example, in 1985, All, Isa's elder brother,
rented his 15-decare plot for 600,000 TL. to Isa for a period of four
years.2 ' With this, and the sale of about fifty olive trees for a sum of
800,000 TL, Au was able to finance his son Yakup's wedding. By using a
combination of all these different ways of obtaining cash or goods, peasant
producers short of cash are able to finance fixed capital investments.
As a result of these mechanisms, many of the smaller farmers in Tuz
have been able to purchase tractors and other basic farming equipment. As
table 8.2 indIcates, tractors constitute the largest fixed expenditure item
that is required from cotton producers in Tuz. For this reason, ownership
of tractors can be used as an Indication of accumulated cash. The limited
effect of land ownership in this context is demonstrated by the fact that
it Is not an Important determinant of tractor ownership: 26 households do
not own any tractors nor any land, while 56 landowners do not own
tractors. Fishermen and older couples with no labour available within the
household make up the majority of these fifty-six landowners (see chapter
7). Their land is cultivated by tenants and/or sharecroppers. Four
households hold joint ownership in tractors.22 Land becomes important in
determining tractor ownership only above the 100 decare mark. Farmers who
own more than 100 decares own at least one tractor. Of the three farmers
who own more than 150 decares of land, two own two tractors each and one
owns five tractors.
The table below shows that most farmers try to buy at least one
tractor regardless of the amount of land owned. As a result, the average
area cultivated by one tractor Is well below maximum tractor capacity.
Moreover, it is worth noting that most of the small landowners seem to be
able to purchase tractors.
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Table 8.5 Distribution of Tractors According to Landownership
Area	 HI!	 Land	 Tractors Area per
(da.)	 no.	 (da.)	 owned	 tractor
0	 30	 0	 3
	
0
1-10	 10	 70	 2.5*
	 28
11-30	 49	 1137	 21.5*
	 53
31-60	 54	 2514	 33
	 76
61-90	 15	 1104	 14
	 79
91-120	 8	 830	 10
	 83
121-150	 1	 130	 1
	 130
150+	 3	 766	 8
	 96
Total	 170	 6551	 93
	 70
* Halves indicate shared tractors.
The table Indicates that a little over half of Tuz households have
been able to accumulate enough cash to buy tractors and to engage In cotton
production. About 42 % of families who do not own tractors cultivate
cotton by renting tractors and hope to able to accumulate enough savings to
buy tractors In the future. 2 The relative ease with which producers are
able to find land through sharecropping and renting arrangements has meant
that many newly married men have now the option of Investing their gold
either in land or In tractors. In both ways savings can be productively
utilised and more savings can be generated.
8.2.2 Sources of Cash for Short-Term Circulating Capital
The role of state institutions in providing for the yearly cash needs
of peasants is larger than their role in financing long-term needs.
Nevertheless, Tuz villagers resort to private as well as state institutions
in order to obtain the money needed to cover operating costs. In this
instance as well, villagers meet cash needs in a piecemeal fashion and cast
the net of borrowing as widely as possible. The three main sources of cash
and credit, apart from neighbours and kin, are state Institutions such as
the state-backed Agricultural Bank, private merchants, banks and traders In
Söke, and traders and moneylenders in the village Itself. Farmers are
provided with assistance both in cash and In kind. Seed, fertilisers and
pesticides are, In general, received in kind; cash is used to pay for fuel,
wages, and daily consumption.
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The Agricultural Bank is able to help producers meet their short-term
cash needs in two different ways. Firstly, direct cash loans in the form
of yearly credits up to 50,000 TL. are extended to farmers who can produce
a land deed. This cash Is often far from sufficient to cover all
expenses.' In Tuz, only 19 farmers (all cultivating more than 100
decares) are able to borrow regularly from the bank. The Agricultural Bank
also provides assistance by subsidising other agencies which extend loans
in cash and in kind. Marketing cooperatives, the Zirai Donatim Kurumu
(Agricultural Supply Instititution), and Credit Cooperatives function as
subsidiaries of the Agricultural Bank.
The state provides for the cash needed for circulating capital by
backing credit cooperatives. As mentioned above, membership and degree of
assistance received depend on the amount of shares owned (and therefore on
the amount of savings a producer can accumulate). About half of the Tuz
producers use the cooperative to obtain all or a portion of their cash
requirements. Not all people who borrow from the cooperative are members.
Borrowing is also possible by using a friend or kinsman's (or kinwoman's)
membership, or simply by being on good terms with the cooperative
officials. The amount of cash obtained from the cooperative depends on the
amount of muscle the producer can muster and the funds available at the
cooperative. The latter are rather limited due to insufficient backing from
the agricultural bank and the small numbers of producers who can provide
funds.25 The cooperative also gives assistance in kind, and about thirty-
five producers in Tuz state that they regularly use this channel to obtain
fertillsers and pesticide.
The institutions that receive the largest support from the
Agricultural Bank are the marketing cooperatives.25 Although the main
function of these institutions is to offer the producer a stable market
price throughout the year, these cooperatives also act as the small farmers'
main creditor. Instead of extending credit in cash, Tans supports farmers
by providing them with the inputs (seed, fertlilser, and pesticide) they
need.27 To join the cooperative, farmers have to show a title deed, or a
sharecropping contract. Each year, farmers declare the amount of cotton
they hope to sell to the cooperative and receive loans in kind in
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proportion to this amount. A farmer who consistently defaults on this
pledge loses his/her membership (Soral 1981:24).2B Debts accumulated
during the process of production are deducted from the price of the cotton
sold by the producer.
A number of structural features have hampered the ability of the
marketing cooperatives to function adequately. The Insufficiency of cash,
bureaucratic procedures and bad management have produced deficits in the
cooperative's budget and resulted in long delays in paying the producer.
Many of the inputs have not been available on time and producers have had
to obtain many of their Inputs on the free market. Moreover, the
cooperative which buys cotton at the price declared by the state has to
compete with merchants. When the subsidy price is higher than market
prices, producers try to sell most of their crop to the cooperative. This
creates shortages of cash. By contrast, when the market is above the
subsidy price, Tans is not able to make enough purchases to sustain itself.
Since 1982, when the government began to subsidise cotton exporters, Tans
prices have been substantially lower than market prices, and many producers
have stopped using the cooperative altogether.
Farmers in Tuz, in an effort to spread risks as widely as possible,
borrow from and sell their crop to merchants as well as Tans. Because the
cooperative does not extend cash loans, the producer always needs other
sources of credit as well. The necessity to settle these (and other long-
term) debts immediately after the harvest means that the farmer cannot
afford to wait for Tans to effect payments. Thus, the majority of the
farmers pledge only a portion of their crop to Tans. Since producers
receive seed and fertiliser on the basis of this pledge, and since these
loans carry a minimum of interest, many continue to maintain relations with
the cooperative. If merchants offer a higher price, or Immediate cash, they
normally default on these pledges. In this way, producers try to make use
of the low-interest loans in kind offered by the cooperative as much as
possible, without jeopardising their chances of obtaining better prices on
the free market. The table below indicates the relationship between amount
of cotton pledged and amount produced:
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Table 8.6 Amount of Pledges to Tans According to Amount of Cotton Produced
Average
	 hh no.	 Average
	
Pledge	 Pledge/Yield
land
	 yield.*
	 (tonnes)
(da.)
	 (tonnes)
350	 1
	 87	 30	 34
247	 1
	 62	 40	 64
220	 1
	 55	 15
	 27
150	 1	 37
	 2	 5
110	 1
	 27	 7	 26
105	 13
	 26	 10	 38
100	 1
	 25	 20	 80
90	 2	 22
	 9	 41
80	 5
	 20	 8	 40
79	 18	 19
	 6	 31
78	 13	 19
	 5	 26
77	 4
	 19	 4	 21
62	 5	 15
	 3	 20
38	 1	 9
	 4.5	 50
20	 2
	 5
	 1.5	 30
*These figures do not reflect the actual amount of cotton produced by
farmers but are only probable figures calculated on the basis of average
yields (250 kg./da.) in the region.
Tuz farmers pledge anything between 20 and 80 1 of their total
produce to the cooperative. On average, all producers pledge about one
third of their produce to Tans. There is no visible correspondence
between amount of cotton produced and amount of cotton pledged to Tans.
Scale of activities does not influence the proportion of cotton pledged to
the cooperative either. Moreover, the table only shows the pledges, and not
the amount of cotton actually delivered. 30 There is a high rate of default
on the pledges, a fact that further reduces the amount of cotton received
by Tans.
Nevertheless, the data indicate that the majority of small to medium
farmers in Tuz do not pledge cotton to and therefore do not borrow from
Tans at all:
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Table 8.7 Use of Tans According to Amount of Land Cultivated
Area	 Jo of	 Farmers	 % of	 Total	 Average
farmers Pledging total	 pledged pledged
(tonnes) (tonnes)
1-10
	 8	 1	 14
	 3	 3
11-30	 41	 14
	 34	 55	 4
31-60	 36	 15
	 42	 86	 6
61-90	 17	 14
	 82	 83	 6
91-120	 11	 11
	 100	 91	 8
121-150	 11	 9
	 82	 58	 6
150+	 7	 6
	 86	 104	 17
Larger farmers all pledge a certain amount to Tans, but keep the
bulk of their produce for merchants.	 In this way, the larger farmers
have the possibility of taking as much advantage as possible of the cheaper
loans available at the state cooperative as well as enjoying the higher
cotton prices offered by merchants. The smaller farmers, by contrast, are
less likely to use Tans. The fact that many of these cannot produce land
deeds is also an important factor that prevents them from using the
cooperative.	 Their dependence on merchants for credit as well as for
marketing their crop is therefore proportionally higher.
Pledges indicate the amount of circulating credit farmers obtain from
Tans. The tables show that, in spite of the higher rate of Interest
charged, all Tuz producers rely on merchants to a larger extent than they
do on state Institutions. The majority of the small cultivators In Tuz
obtain credit from the merchants/moneylenders in the village. Larger
producers, by contrast, have better access to private Individuals as well as
institutions in Söke. The greater volume of activity of these larger
farmers links them to many traders in Söke. Furthermore, it is these
producers who are able to buy the more expensive modern machines and who,
by virtue of the amount of land at their disposal, own more than one
tractor. The private agencies active in the area supply these producers
with credit both in cash and in kind.
Many of the large banks have branches in Söke and provide credit to
applicants with good collateral and sound references. These charge a
yearly rate of interest that varies between 72 and 80 %.	 Only the three
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large producers of Tuz are able to use these sources of credit, since it is
they who have the necessary contact and enough land to be credit-worthy.
Owners of gin-mills, tractor dealers, and others trading in cotton, in
agricultural inputs, or in machines in Soke make up the majority of the
sources of credit for Tuz farmers. Good relations established as a result
of trade over long periods of time provide the basis for confidence. Some
of these traders allow producers to buy on credit and are paid after the
harvest. Cotton traders, for example, also trade in seed and fertiliser: the
producer buys the inputs s/he needs from the trader and pays back when
s/he sells the produce. The interest charged by these traders varies
considerably. The large numbers of individuals who set up as cotton
traders serves to create a competitive market and keep interest rates in
line with those obtaining in the economy at large.
Village moneylenders also have important links to town banks and
merchants. Three individuals are operating as cotton traders in Tuz,
providing farmers with cash, seed and fertiliser and buying the produce at
harvest. These traders buy cotton produced in Tuz as well as in three
other villages in the vicinity. They also extend cash loans that vary in
size according to the capital at their disposal. The majority of these
traders obtain seed on credit from various traders and gin-mill owners in
Söke and distribute them to farmers. Interest on the amount of the loan
(whether in cash or in kind) and transport costs are deducted when the
producer sells his/her crop. As a result, the price at which producers sell
their crop in the village may be lower than that prevalent in Söke. As
with town merchants, competition between village merchants is an important
factor that keeps interest rates below usurious levels.34
While the older, more established traders in the village are able to
operate on their own capital, newcomers with limited capital act as agents
of Söke traders. 3 The only profit that the latter can make is the
commission that their bosses (patron) in SSke offer them. After a while,
these individuals try to find credit in Söke which they distribute in the
village at a slightly higher rate of interest. In this way, they hope to
accumulate enough capital in order to set up as independent traders . 	 But
villagers in Tuz prefer to deal with one of the more established merchants
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since their trading practices are more reliable. The source of profit for
these merchants is the higher selling price they can obtain by waiting and
watching market trends. The larger capital stock they have accumulated
allows these traders to obtain an average return on capital without
engaging in usurious practices. Some of them sell directly to traders in
Izmir and others can afford to wait for the highest bidder. 37 The demand
for cash and the amount of cotton produced in the village exceed the
capacities of the more established traders; this creates the space filled by
the newly emerging moneylenders.38
The more established village traders also extend loans in cash and in
kind needed to meet daily consumption needs. One of the traders is also
the owner of a grocery store from which villagers can purchase goods on
credit. As I showed in chapter 2, while some villagers are able to repay
these debts after the cotton harvest, others have to settle their debt by
working as cotton pickers on the shopowner's fields. Labour Is the poor
farmer's main form of payment for most of the circulating capital s/he
needs. Between kin and neighbours, short-term credit is extended in the
form of a loan in kind, These loans are part of the system of reciprocity
that links the various households in the village to one another. Cash, an
item which is part of the commodity sphere is not an integral part of
these exchange mechanisms.39 Thus, from a close neighbour a farmer can
borrow a plough without having to make any payment. The only obligation
contracted would be an unspoken agreement to return such a favour when
needed. Items which are more capitalised require a direct return. Seed,
fertiliser's and tractors all have a price attached to them and the return
can only be effected by advancing an equivalent. Thus a tractor can be
rented in return for seed, for labour, or for cash. The close social
relation between villagers means that Interest on these loans Is rarely
calculated .°
In 1984, 19 producers In Tuz received all the cash they needed from
village merchants, while another 23 farmers combined credit obtained from
village merchants with other sources. About 40 farmers, most of whom
cultivating less than 30 decares, received all their seed from village
traders, and another 36 obtained seed from other sources as well.
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Depending on the amount of cash at their disposal at the beginning of the
cultivating season, producers decide who to borrow from and how much. On
this basis, they revise their pledges to Tans and establish links with
village traders. As the season progresses, new needs arise.41 In general,
an average farmer cultivating between 30 and 60 decares, will obtain the
bulk of his/her seed, half of his/her fertilisers from Tans, pesticides and
cash for fuel from the credit cooperative and cash for wages and other
needs from an established village trader. Smaller farmers cannot be so
flexible since they do not have enough accumulated cash. Therefore, they
obtain all their requirements from one of the village traders to whom they
subsequently sell all of their crop.
Large farmers, by contrast, receive the bulk of the credit they need
from Söke banks, traders and gin-mill owners. These farmers need more
cash than smaller producers since costs increase with area cultivated. The
largest cash need of these farmers occurs during the harvest, for as the
size of the farm increases, the possibility of using unpaid village labour
decreases and wages become an Important cash item. )tost of the large
farmers maintain links with Tans and other state institutions to whom they
sell only a small portion of their harvest.42 Due to the larger amount of
land and capital available to them, these farmers have frequent contacts
with the various town merchants and dealers, buying new equipment, spare
parts and receiving repair services. This allows them to build up long-
term business links and to establish their credit-worthiness. Thus,
compared to small farmers, they are in a better position to obtain credit
in town.
8.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to determine the role and magnitude
of cash in peasant production in Tuz. Regardless of the scale of
operations involved producers must have access to a certain amount of cash
before they can begin cultivating cotton. They need to obtain cash
regularly in order to reproduce themselves and their means of production.
This necessity links them to capital markets In the region and in Turkey as
a whole.
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Capital markets in Turkey are composed of state-backed institutions
which are supposed to extend credit to farmers at a relatively cheap rate
and of private traders and banks trying to realise the normal rate of
return to capital. The resulting structure of the market is an outcome of
this co-existence. As long as state policy provided farmers with loans and
credit on good terms, farmers could obtain cheap credit. Following new
economic policies progressively adopted since 1983, the withdrawal of state
assisstance had the effect of increasing the role of private institutions
and individuals. At the moment, the recent dominance of private interests
in the agricultural credit sector has not affected peasant production
negatively because competition among the various private agencies keeps
interest on credit within normal limits. In either case, the role of usury
in the process of production has been quite minimal.
The national economy, to a large extent, determines the rate of return
on investment in various sectors of the economy. Tuz farmers, particularly
those with small capital resources, are quite responsive to these changes:
investment in the transport sector in the early nineteen-eighties and in
the moneylending sector since 1985 attests to this mobility. Large farmers
are able to accumulate enough cash to enable them to diversify: the three
large landowners of Tuz have all invested in trading by setting up grocery
shops in the village as well as investing in other agricultural pursuits
such as raising much cows. Nevertheless, the conditions of cotton
production have remained such that many small landowners in Tuz and In the
Söke plain as a whole still find it an acceptable form of making a living.
Medium-sized farmers are able to Invest In improved machinery and
therefore keep abreast of developments that Increase land productivity In
spite of the additional cash burdens incurred. Many of the landowning
fishermen In the village have been trying to find ways of switching to
cotton production. In the last five years, many fields which In 1978 were
lying Idle have been turned over to cotton production.
To a considerable extent, these developments have been possible as
credit Is readily available in capital markets and mechanisms of exchange
within the village by-pass the use of cash. Both long- and short-term cash
needs can be met through careful management of these channels. The
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interesting point is that village-based producers in Söke have in general
been able to shoulder the financial burden caused by involvement in capital
and commodity c1rcuits while many of the large-scale town-based producers
have withdrawn from producing cotton. It is impossible to understand how
village producers are able to operate under the conditions of production
prevalent in the region unless the role of unpaid household labour is
considered. I shall therefore turn now to the mechanisms by which Tuz
producers secure a more or less dependable supply of labour without
resorting to major outlays of cash.
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Notes to Chapter 8
1. See Kahn (1980, chapters 5 and 7) for an analysis of the role of capital
in peasant-based petty commodity production.
2. Land and labour can also be considered as representing both long-term
and short term investments: wages are consumed within one cycle of
production and yet household labour is a longer-term asset. Similarly land
when purchased is a long-term investment but rent Is not.
3. The distinction drawn between production and consumption in studies
assessing the extension of credit by the state to agricultural producers in
Turkey does not take Into account the extent to which production and
consumption are linked In household-based enterprises (Aydln 1980:331; Hale
1981:180). These studies argue in my view mistakenly that the extension
of credit by the state has not been beneficial to the small farmer because
s/he uses short-term credits to buy 'consumption' items.
4, In 1984 S 1TL. 400. 25 da. x 250 kg./da. x 170 TL./kg. = 1,062,500 TL.
In 1986, new tractors cost more than six million TL, or the gross income
obtained from 85 decares of cotton (85x250x285). Including Interest, the
total cost of a tractor in 1986 amounted to about 10 million TL. Unless
indicated, all cash costs refer to 1984 prices.
5. The cost of hoes, harvesting aprons and jute sacks for packing cotton is
minimal.
6. Since 1984, new inter-row cultivators have drastically reduced the
amount of (mostly female) labour necessary to hoe cotton fields.
Xechanlcal ridge makers cut the amount of male labour required in the
construction of irrigation dams. See chapter 6.
7. About half of this sum is spent for building a new house and the other
half is needed to purchase gold.
8. In 1984, a tractorless landowner paid 17,000 TL/da. to have his field
ploughed and irrigated; as a result of this added expenditure, his cost per
decare would amount to 29,500 TL. The rate for hiring tractors was 1000
TL/da. to plough the field and 1000 TL/da. to have it irrigated. Another
producer who has to hire a tractor maintained that his net income would
more than double If he were to buy his own tractor.
9. As indicated in chapter 6, small farmers do not include the latter in
their costs of production nor do they calculate labour costs.
10. Because of the variation in consumption and subsistence production
patterns, obtaining household budgets proved to be a very difficult task.
Moreover, villagers do not like to discuss money unless it is to prove
their largesse. The figures quoted above were provided by two household
heads who apart from production costs, had also roughly calculated what
they had spent in food, clothing and recreation in 1984. Both of these
heads of households did not own hill-side gardens and olive groves and
were therefore largely dependent on the market for food.
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12. The difference in price obtained in October and in January of the
following year can be staggering. For example, in 1985, most producers
sold their crop for 285 TL./kg. Three months later, the price had gone up
to 450 TL./kg.!
13. I chose to use the first tractor ever purchased by a farmer as an
indication of capital investment since this constitutes an essential means
of producing cotton under present conditions and since it constitutes, after
land, the single largest cost item.
14. An emigrant from a village in the Soke district, has been able to buy
31 decares of land with the money he obtained from the sale of his minibus.
He could not, however, buy a tractor until 1987.
15. In 1986, Isa bought 15 decares of land and registered it in the name of
his married son, Ibrahim. He paid 1,600,000 TL, and to make available the
money he needed, he sold the gold bracelets and chain he had bought for his
daughter-in-law.
16, The Söke Credit Cooperative was established in 1931 with the financial
backing of large landlords as well as the state. In 1960, another was
established in Bahçe, a large village fifteen kilometres east of Tuz.
17. Nevertheless, at least ten farmers I knew had bought a part of their
equipment through such loans. One of them was not even a member and had
used 'connections' to obtain a loan. Since the officials at the cooperative
proved as uncooperative as some of the Tuz farmers, I could not find out
the exact number of transactions effected through the cooperative.
18. It is very difficult to find out the number of individuals who engage in
this type of trade as a side activity.
19. For example when Sefer needed to buy gold for his son's marriage in
1985, he turned to Nesut, an elderly man without any children. Mesut owns
70 decares of cotton which he turns over to a sharecropper and the income
he obtains is well above the needs of his two-person household. Sefer had
the right to ask him for the loan because he and his children had been
helping Aesut with small services. For example, it was Sefer who opened a
well in Mesut's garden in 1978, and who also delivered him fish on a
regular basis.
20. In spite of my close relation with both Isa and Mehmet, it was through
mere chance that I found out about the loan.
21. This puts the yearly rent at 10,000 TL/da., at a time when land rents
were a little above that 12,000-15,000. TL/da.
22. In only one of these cases does inheritance account for joint tractor
ownership. In the other three, it was lack of sufficient cash and/or land
that necessitated the joint purchase of a tractor. Households that invest
in a Joint tractor purchase are also involved in joint land cultivation and
are often related through kinship ties. In one case, the men in question
are father-and-son, in another case, the joint owners are brothers, and in
the third instance, they are brothers-in-law (ZH-WB). Moreover, many of
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the producers who now own tractors state having purchased their first
tractor jointly with others.
23. 34 % rent their land or give it to sharecroppers and 23 % obtain their
income from non-agricultural pursuits.
24. In certain circumstances, these loans can even work to the peasants'
disadvantage. Aydin (1980:337-44) shows the ways in which big landlords
and various merchants in the Ergani district of southeastern Turkey make
use of these inadequate funds to enlarge their own capital fund as well as
to further peasants' indebtedness,
25. As I shall explain below, competition from the private sector also
limits the number of producers willing to depend on the credit
cooperatives.
26. Between 1975 and 1982, over 50 % of all the new loans provided by the
Agricultural Bank were distributed to producers via marketing cooperatives
(DIE:1983b). These cooperatives were established in 1914 by merchants
exporting agricultural produce. Since 1935, they have acquired the status
of semi-state organisations that are supervised by the Xlnistry of
Commerce. Their main function is to buy crops from the direct producer at
the subsidy price which the government has declared every year since 1966.
The cooperative is then supposed to process the raw product (e.g. gin
cotton) and market it in Turkey or export it overseas. Profits are to be
shared among members. Fourteen such cooperatives exist in various parts of
Turkey and provide speclalised assistance to the producers of various
export crops such as figs, cotton, hazelnuts, olives, grapes and others
(Soral 1981). The marketing cooperative active in the Aegean region is
called Tans and subsidises olives, figs as well as cotton grown in the
region.
27. The Agricultural Supply Institution also sells seed, pesticide and
insecticide to producers at subsidised prices. There is no credit involved
in these sales. The necessity to pay cash on purchase drastically hampers
the ability of producers to take advantage of the lower prices it offers.
28. Tans also accepts cotton from non-members at a slightly lower price.
29. The Imposition of a selling tax of 7 % has reduced considerably the
amount of cotton sold by producers to Tans. The Tans General Director
declared to a daily newspaper in 1988 that the cooperatives were able to
purchase only 10 % of the total cotton crop in Turkey (Cumhuriyet,
30.1.1988).
30. I do not have figures showing the rate of default. A few scattered
examples show that it can be as much as 100 1.
31. Of the 29 producers cultivating more than 90 decares of cotton, only
four have nothing to do with the cooperative.
32. Many farmers in the smaller brackets cultivate land via
renting/sharecropping arrangements, or land that is disputed or held
jointly.
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33. In 1984, government efforts to tap the savings of the small earner
resulted in these rather high rates of interest. Some banks, however,
charged as low as 50 %.
34. By 1987, three more villagers have been able to set up as cotton
traders, thus Increasing the competition even further. As long as market
prices for cotton are above those offered by the state, there Is still room
for more traders in the region, since the volume of cotton produced exceeds
the buying capacity of all the traders taken together. The contraction of
Tans activities in cotton production means that even members of the
cooperative rely to some extent on village traders.
35. In 1983, a landless man set up as a cotton buying agent without any
capital at all. Low cotton prices in 1984 forced him to leave trading. By
1987, however, he had reestablished himself as a respectable trader.
36. The Interest rates charged by moneylenders can be as high as 100 %.
37. The majority of the villagers in fact preferred one of these traders
because he consistently charged borrowers bank rates. Furthermore, he
worked with a fixed profit margin and shared with the producer any
unexpected increase in the selling price of cotton. Thus, when in one
instance, he sold at 220 TL./kg. cotton which he bought at a rate of 92
TL./kg, he paid the producer an extra 110 TL./kg.
38. Since 1982, the private sector has been handling a larger portion of
trade in cotton as a result of government policy. The increase in the cash
costs of cotton production as a result of the introduction of new
technology is another factor that makes the emergence of moneylenders and
the increase in their numbers possible.
39. Cash is borrowed from other villagers, as I showed in the previous
section. But, this cash Is part of long-term borrowing structures and
involves calculation of interest.
40. Usually such debts are settled by the end of the harvesting season.
Individuals who consistently put off payments find that fewer people are
prepared to help them out.
41. Farmers do not buy pesticide until they know how much they they will
need. In some years, they may even not need to buy any. Similarly, they
only borrow cash for wages when the harvest has already begun.
42. Other state institutions such as the credit cooperatives cannot usually
provide the amount of credit needed by these producers, thus forcing them
to rely on the private capital market.
43. Aydin shows that crops other than those destined to be exported
overseas, notably wheat, receive little government subsidy and that in the
East of Turkey, usury Is still widespread In those branches of agricultural
production (1980:348,369).
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CHAPTER 9: ACCESS TO LABOUR
Forms of labour recruitment have constituted an important aspect of
the debate on modes/forms of production in agriculture. Although the
existence of wage labour has been identified as the characteristic
distinctive of capitalist production, the complexity of such relationships
in the agricultural sector has led many of the protagonists of the debate
to reject the use of wage labour as a means of identifying the capitalist
nature of rural production. However, in most of the theoretical approaches,
the absence of wage labour still remains as one of the basic features
characterising family labour farms, peasants, or petty commodity producers.
Most approaches to the subject are based on the often implicit assumption
that these producers meet their labour requirements from within the
boundaries of the household. Although various theorists admit the
prevalence of wage labour in peasant farms, they interpret it as a
demographic corrector rather than a 'normal' (in the statistical as well as
the structural sense) feature of these households (cf. Chayanov 1966,
Friedmann 1978). Recently, Smith (1984d) has attempted to specify the
characteristics of wage labour within petty commodity production. After
noting the high incidence of wage labour in petty commodity forms of
production, she argues that "the absence of a fully proletarianised, self-
reproducing labour force," rather than a lack of wage labour should be seen
as the "defining feature" of PCP (Smith 1984d:82).
An analysis of production systems in Söke shows that, under
conditions of time constraints, use of hired labour can be a 'normal' aspect
of household based production. However, as Smith argues, wage labour does
not necessarily indicate the existence of a fully developed labour market,
and the fragmentation of the labour force prevents the full mobility of
labour. Although peasants in Söke produce commodities within a larger
capitalist context, the wage relation is modified by a number of factors
associated with systems of exchange inherent within a small peasant
community, rather than determined by the logic of commodity exchange. In
other words, under conditions of a non-capitalist production process, the
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existence of a wage should not be taken as establishing a self-evident
relationship between the parties concerned, nor to say anything about the
nature of the production system under consideration.
In order to substantiate these claims, I shall analyse the conditions
under which different forms of labour are supplied to the farming
enterprise, the forms of recruitment and the patterns of remuneration. In
Tuz, two basic sources provide the critical manual labour needed for hoeing
and harvesting: village labour (including members of the landowning
household), and migrant labour. As I already argued, the use of these two
different forms of labour produces distinct structures of control and modes
of labour organisation, which, in turn, have important consequences for cost
structures. In other words, the type of labour used becomes one of the
main variables that peasant producers can control in order to reduce cash
costs. To understand the different mechanisms used to obtain labour at the
lowest cash cost possible, it is necessary to consider the magnitude and
determinants of the demand for manual labour on Tuz farms.
9.1. Peasant Production and Xanual Labour
To a large extent, the technical requirements of cotton production set
the limits for the demand for manual labour. Under conditions of manual
hoeing and harvesting, the magnitude of output which is a function of area
under production, determines the amount of labour necessary for these
operations.	 In other words, area under production is one of the most
important variables that affects the amount of manual labour used by
peasant farmers. A look at the amount of labour spent in the various farms
of Tuz village will serve to demonstrate the extent to which the input of
manual labour is linked to area sown. The figures showing the number of
days of manual labour expended in any one farm were obtained in the course
of an interview with all the farmers of Tuz (see Appendix 8). Farmers were
asked the number of days spent in hoeing and in harvesting in the course
of the previous season. Additional adjustments to the figures obtained were
made on the basis of previous knowledge of the farm in question.
Jo. of
fares
39
8
41
36
17
11
11
7
Average
days/da.
0
3
3.7
4.8
5.7
5.3
5,3
6.3
Area Sown
(d)
Ave. land
(da.)
Total Labour
(days ) *
1. 0
2. 1-10
3. 11-30
4. 31-60
5. 61-90
6. 91-120
7. 121-150
8. 150+
0
7.69
23.44
45.94
74,65
105.18
142
238.14
0
23
86.4
220.3
423.4
560.1
746.7
1495
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Table 9.1 Average Expenditure of Manual Labour Days Accoriing to Farm Size
* Total labour shows the number of days spent hoeing and harvesting in a
particular farm. Labour spent on the manual processess of cotton
production are for the duration of one cotton planting season only.
The need for manual labour on Tuz farms increases with area sown, but
the increase is less than proportional as table 9.1 shows. Average labour
spent per decare of land is, for all farms, 4.9 days. While large farmers
spend more labour per decare than the average, small farmers spend less.
It is nevertheless interesting to note that middle range farmers' needs are
comparable regardless of area sown. The reason for the higher expenditure
of labour per decare on the larger farms can largely be explained by the
use of migrant labour in harvesting cotton on farms larger than 30 decares.
These labourers, as argued in chapter 6, work more slowly and less
efficiently than local labourers.
Peasant producers in Tuz are able to rely on two different sources of
labour to meet these needs. The first of these resources, unpaid household
labour, Is ultimately limited by the labour power available within the
household. However, through various forms of labour exchange mechanisms
described below, neighbours and kinsmen within the village (or in
neighbouring villages) are transformed Into an important source of unpaid
labour. In this way, the labour resources of the household are somewhat
extended. The second type of labour used is based on paid labour and
therefore necessitates the outlay of cash. Use of paid labour Increases the
monetised costs of production and the amount of accumulated capital and/or
credit required by the enterprise. To the extent that peasant producers
rely on paid labour, their production strategies approximate that of
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capitalist producers. Although a certain proportion of village labour can
also be obtained on the basis of a wage, the main source of this form of
labour power is seasonal migrants. The use of these different sources of
labour varies according to area under production, as the breakdown of the
category 'total labour' used in table 9.1 shows:
Thble 9.2 Type of Labour Used by Tuz Farms (In average number of days)
Pam
	
Total
	
RH
	
Exch.	 Hired
	
Hired Total
Size
	 Vill
	
Jig.	 Hired Lab
0
5.2
21.9
28.6
30
38.7
23,1
22.8
0
1-10
11-30
31-60
61-90
91- 120
121- 150
150+
0
23
86.4
220.3
423.4
560.1
746.7
1495
0
15
27.1
35.6
61.9
64.5
83.6
268,6
0
1.5
25.4
55.9
137.9
147.3
159.1
414.3
0
1.2
11.9
100.2
193.6
309.5
481.8
789.3
0
2.7
37.3
p56.1
331.5
456.8
640.9
1203.6
Except for exchange labour, the number of work days in all the categories
of labour increases in absolute magnitude with area sown. Exchange labour,
on the other hand, is most important for the middle categories of Tuz
farms. The amount of land sown affects firstly the amount of hired labour
utilised, particularly the use of migrant labour; the amount of labour
provided from within the household is also affected , but to a lesser
extent. Given these circumstances, farmers have to consider both the
number of workers they will have access to and the amount of cash they can
control, before they decide on the amount of land to cultivate. Households
lacking both labour power and capital are obliged to find tenants for their
land. In order to make the relationship between area sown and type of
labour employed clearer, it is necessary to convert the absolute number of
labour days worked on the different categories of Tuz farms into percentage
values based upon the total of days worked on each category of farm:
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Table 9.3. Type of Labour Used by Tuz Farms (as percentage of total farm
labour)
Farm	 t	 RH
	
Exch.	 Hired
	
Hired Total
Size	 of
	
vii'
	
Jig	 Hired
Fanis	 %
	 S
	
S
	
S
0
	 22.9	 0
	
0
	 0
	
0
	
0
1-10
	 4.7	 65.3	 22.8
	 6.6	 5.3
	 11.9
11-30
	 24.1
	 31.4	 25.4
	 29.4	 13.8
	 43.2
31-60	 21.2
	 16.2	 13
	 25.4
	 45.5	 70.9
61-90	 10
	 14.6	 7.1
	 32.6	 45.7
	 78.3
91-120	 6.5
	 11.5	 6.9
	 26.3	 55.3
	 81.6
121- 150
	 6.5	 11.2
	 3.1
	 21.3	 64.4
	 85,7
150+	 4.1
	
18
	 1.5
	 27.7
	 52.8	 80.5
The table shows that, with the exception of the largest farmers, the
amount of hired labour utilised increases steadily as area sown increases.
The main reason why farmers sowing more than 150 decares use less hired
labour lies in the fact that they are able to employ a larger amount of
household labour, a fact which shall be explained in the following section.
Furthermore, the share of migrant labour in total hired labour also rises
as area sown increases. It is interesting to note that on the smaller
farms sowing less than 30 decares of cotton, labour provided from the
household (hh + exch.) accounts for more than half of all labour employed.
Over this limit, the need for hired labour both migrant and village-based
is much greater, and the differences between the different categories become
less important. In other words, beyond this limit, hired labour becomes a
'normal' aspect of cotton production.
The magnitude of wage labour employed by peasant producers is a
function of area sown and number of workers in the household. Labour
needed beyond the limit of the household (including labour that is obtained
on the basis of exchange labour) can only be acquired by paying a wage.2
As the figures in table 9.2 show, the larger farmers obtain more than half
of their labour requirements from seasonal migrants rather than from the
village itself. Compared to local labour, to employ migrant labour means
higher cash costs. Farmers employing migrant labourers have to pay for
the services of a middleman, cover half of the costs of transport, provide
shelter, and advance an important sum of money to prospective workers
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(proportional to the number of workers he employs). Certain factors limit
the number of wage workers that can be locally obtained. Households which
are not involved in cotton production do not rely for subsistence on
agricultural wages. They, therefore, cannot be drawn into the agricultural
labour force simply by offering them a wage. Cotton producing households,
on the other hand, have their own harvest to consider. Therefore, only the
promise of wage labour in return can be used to secure an adequate number
of village workers. Moreover this offer is only attractive to households
which are also farming cotton. Consequently, beyond a certain limit, the
employment of migrant labour, that is of workers which are not involved in
the production .of cotton, becomes imperative despite the higher costs
involved.
As can be seen from the tables, Tuz farmers only use a relatively
small amount of exchange labour. The category of exchange labour includes
only formal arrangements which last for at least one cotton planting season
(see section 9.3) and therefore excludes occasional agreements to exchange
labour. The important aspect of formal arrangements is the fact that
records are kept in terms of kilogrammes of cotton (or days' labour for
hoeing) rather than in money terms. Although any outstanding labour debt
is settled in cash at the end of the harvest, the wage level adopted at
that time is not affected by the daily fluctuations of the wage rate which
may occur in between. Occasional exchange labour agreements, by contrast,
are always reciprocated in kind and as quickly as possible. Cash payments
are therefore totally excluded and many of the producers consider this
labour as spent on their own fields.
Within labour arrangements among co-villagers, the boundaries between
wage labour and exchange labour are quite fuzzy indeed. To obtain wage
labour within the village, a farmer has to be prepared to offer wage labour
in return. When cash is paid immediately after the completion of the task,
peasants consider it to be wage labour. But, it is often possible to find
that the same amount of money is exchanged in a reversed direction a few
days after the first exchange when the original employer(s) now become(s)
employed on the former employee's fields. During the harvest there often is
a slight difference In the wages paid since, the price at which cotton is
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picked steadily increases as the season wears on. Therefore, in order to
calculate the labour bill of any enterprise, it is necessary to deduce from
it the number of days the members of the farm spend working as wage
labourers themselves. Formal exchange arrangements are undertaken on the
basis of a system of shadow pricing, whereas waged work is predicated on a
recuperation of the original wage expenditure. Thus, if we consider hired
village labour as one of the non-market ways of obtaining labour, we find
that, at most, 64.4 % of the labour is obtained through wage mechanisms
alone:
Table 9.4 Percentage of Labour Obtained Through Village Nechanisms as
Opposed to Through the Vage Labour Narket
Farm
	
Exch+ Own+
	
Hired Migrant.
Size
	
Hired Vill.
(%)
	 (%)
0
	
0
	
0
1-10
	
94.7
	
5.3
11-30
	
86.2
	
13.8
31-60
	
54.6
	
45.5
61-90
	
54.3
	
45.7
91-120
	
44.7
	
55.3
12 1-150
	
35.6
	
64.4
150+
	
47.2
	
52.8
In households where there are large numbers of workers, the use of
wage labour in one's own field does not preclude an overall positive labour
balance. Acar, who has two sons and five daughters of working age, is in
such a position. In the summer of 1984, Acar hired 42 village workers and
86 migrant workers to undertake the manual tasks of his 70-decare farm.
He was able to acquire a further 100 days' exchange labour, and his
children worked on the household farm for 200 days. That season, the Acar
household spent a total of 540 days doing manual labour. As a result, the
Acars closed the 1984 cotton season with 112 days' work over and above
their own requirements, a figure which represents the number of days for
which the household received a wage (540 - (100+200+42+86) = 112).
Looking at the same relationship in all Tuz households, we see that, on
average, only non-farmers and the smallest farmers (cultivating at most 30
decares of cotton) have a positive labour balance and that households from
all groups, depending on area sown and number of workers within the
household, hire a certain amount of labour out to other village households:
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Table 9.5 Balance of La bow- Days Bought and Sold
Farzi	 no.* of total total	 balance Labour
Size	 workers hh	 fare	 0th- 	 Hired
in hh
	
lab
	
lab
	 far&	 out
1.9
2,6
2.8
2.9
3.4
3.5
3,3
4.3
66.8
92.9
78.4
39.7
60.3
42.2
28.2
42.8
0
1-10
11-30
31-60
61-90
91- 120
121- 150
150+
66.8
113.1
127.4
104
152.2
145.4
134.9
334.3
0
23
86.4
220.3
423.4
560.1
746.7
1495
+66.8
+90
+4 1.4
-116.4
-270.6
-414.6
-612.7
-1160.7
* All the figures represent the average for the said category of farmers.
It should be immediately noted that labour in cotton fields can, to
some extent, be reciprocated with labour in other commoditised areas of
life. On the other hand, labour spent on subsistence gardens or even in
olive groves can not be used as a means of paying back for manual labour
on cotton fields. However,labour spent in the production of commodities
such as cotton and, to a lesser extent, olive oil can be used to pay for the
rental of machinery such as tractors. For example, a man who had three
unmarried daughters had his 30-decare field ploughed by his eldest
duaghter's husband. In return, his unmarried daughters worked for two
weeks collecting olives for their brother-in-law. In addition, they
received forty kilogrammes of olive oil. Thus, a certain proportion of the
labour hired by small farmers is in fact a return for renting tractors.
Small farmers or even households who do not undertake the production of
cotton can also pay back cash debts by performing labour on the creditor's
farm. These mechanisms explain to a certain extent how large farmers can
hire a large number of labour hired from within the village while providing
only a very small amount of wage labour to their fellow villagers:
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Table 9.6 Participation in the Village Labour Market According to Farm Size
Farm
Size
0
1-10
11-30
31-60
61-90
91-120
12 1-150
150+
Wage Lab.
Hired
(days)
0
1.5
25.4
55.9
137.9
147.3
159.1
414.3
Wage Lab.
Provided
(days)
Ezch. Lab.
Provided
(days)
	
66.8	 0
	
92.9	 5.2
	
78,4	 21.9
	
39.7	 28.6
	
60.3	 30
	
42.2	 38.7
	
28.2	 23.1
	
42.8
	 22.8
9.2 Labour and Cash Costs on Peasant Farms
As the tables above show, labour supplied to Tuz farms Is drawn from
a variety of sources. The three basic sources are: the household itself,
other households within the village, and migrant labourers who come to the
region every summer to seek work. As I have already indicated, each type
of labour employed necessitates a different way of organising the labour
process (see chapter 5) and implies a different pattern of cash
expenditure. The timing and magnitude of each payment are the two tactors
which vary according to the type of labour force employed. Labour drawn
from within the household requires no immediate cash expenditure, although,
as I show below, this does not mean that household labour has no 'cost'.
Although village workers are paid in cash, the sums involved are often
small, the timing of the payment can, to certain extent, be controlled, and
finally equivalents other than money can be offered. Migrant labour, on the
other hand, represents an absolute cash expenditure which cannot be
transmuted into other terms and which has to paid in two large Instalments.
In order to guarantee the supply of migrant workers, a bulk sum of money
has to be advanced. A second payment amounting to the total migrant
labour minus the sum advanced has to be made at the end of the task,
before the workers return to their villages. Thus, the employment of
migrants necessitates the outlay of two large sums of money at specified
dates. For these reasons, migrant labour can only be used by farmers who
are able to control cash.
Mode of
payment
Timing of
payment
Cash ezp.
to farmer
subsistence
inheritance
delayed
none
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Table 9.7. The Structure of Labour Costs According to Forms of Labour
HE
	
Village	 Regional	 Migrant
Labour	 Labour	 Labour	 Labour
Duration	 Variable,	 Daily 1 at	 Daily, at	 Seasonal
of Contract seasonal
	
most one week most one week
lab. equiv.
settlement of
prior debts
machinery
immediate &
delayed
variable cost
variable wage
levels
cash,
settlement
of prior debts
immediate
variable cost
variable
wage levels
cash
advanced &
immediate
absolute
cost
single
wage level
Apart from village and migrant labour, there are also other people
within the Söke region who regularly sell their labour power, particularly
inhabitants of the mountainous areas surrounding the Meander plain and
permanent settlers from other parts of Turkey, especially the East. Tuz
villagers occasionally employ members of these different groups. Even
though in 1978, only two farmers hired Kurds settled in the nearby village
of At, Tuz farmers do enter into labour exchange relationships with locals
living in villages around Tuz. The conditions under which these exchanges
are made are so similar to those that obtain within the village, that I
consider them under the category of village labour, It is the larger
farmers settled in Söke who are able to make use of the labour power of
permanent settlers or of mountain villagers.
9.2.1. The Labour Market and Wage Levels
As the table above shows, the pattern and magnitude of labour cost
changes according to the type of labour used. These differences indicate
that we are not dealing with a pure case of a labour market. The different
wage levels that obtain in the region, the various modes of recruitment
that prevail, and the manner in which wages are set indicate the imperfect
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nature of this market. These differences are related to the type of
enterprise, that is, to the extent to which producers are able to utilise
non-market exchanges in obtaining labour power. For village-based
producers, who rely on communal relations to recruit labour, the money paid
in wages is a variable sum. Not only does the wage rate change from day
to day, but these farmers are also able to retrieve a certain portion of the
wage bill by having members of their own household work as wage labourers.
Furthermore, through various exchange mechanisms, the effectivity of labour
power available within the household is extended considerably. As a result,
each year, the total wage bill depends on the state of village networks,
that is on who owes whom what, and the state of the household, that is, on
marriages, on the incidence of illness and child-birth, and a host of other
factors which influence the availability of household labour. For town-
based producers, on the other hand, the wage bill is known in advance since
it is a function of the amount of cotton produced. This difference, as I
have already argued, alters significantly the forms of calculation and the
strategies of production pursued.
A number of different wage rates obtain in the Söke region at any one
time. Moreover, there are two different ways according to which wages are
calculated. Hoers receive a daily wage, while during the harvest a piece
rate is applied. The hoeing wage is equivalent to the minimum daily wage
that obtains for all agricultural labour in Söke (digging canals, irrigation,
etc.). Women and children get about 25 to 30 % less than the male wage.
The harvesting wage, on the other hand, is paid according to a piece rate
which is the same regardless of age and gender. While the wage for hoeing
is stable for the duration of a hoeing season, the piece rate received at
harvest shows considerable variations over time as well as in any point in
time. This results in different wages received by different groups of
workers for the same amount of labour time expended. I shall now turn to
consider the factors that produce these different wage levels.
A combination of local, national and international factors produce the
different wage levels in cotton production since the average piece rate
corresponds to the selling price of seed cotton, 9 This rate is often set at
about fifteen percent of the average price received by farmers.
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Fluctuations in this rate reflect government attempts to control wages, as
can be seen In the substantial cut in wages after the military coup of
1980:
Table 9.8 Proportion of Wages to Price of Seed-Cotton
Years	 Piece Rate	 Price of Seed	 Vage as Percent
(Average)	 Cotton (Ave.)	 of Price of
(TL/kg.)	 (TL/kg.)	 Cotton
1978	 2.50	 15	 16.6
1979	 4.00	 28	 14.1
1980	 5.00	 52	 09.6
1981	 7.00	 65	 10.1
1982	 10,00	 78	 12.8
1983	 14.00	 120	 11.7
1984	 23.00	 170	 13.5
1986	 43.00	 285	 15.1
In general, agricultural wages are below the minimum wage prevalent in
the economy. However harvest wages are a special case: calculating the
average amount of cotton picked per labourer per day at 80 kilogrammes, we
find that wages paid to harvesters often considerably exceed the minimum
wage rate:4
Table 9.9 Variation in Wage Rates: Agriculture and General
All Industries
(md. Agric.)
Agriculture
(Average Turkey)
Soke: lalel
Söke Female
1978	 1979
208	 294
138	 217
150
	
190
100
	
130
1980	 1981	 1982
427	 544	 691
376	 521	 651
250	 350	 600
200	 300	 450
Harvesting	 200	 320	 400	 560	 880
Source: State Statistics Institute, Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
* The figures of agricultural labour provided are rough averages of the
various rates received during the said year.
Apart from the market price of cotton and wage levels in the national
economy, the level of labour supply and the conditions of work also
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influence wage levels. At harvest, wages are set for two different
categories of labourers: on the one hand, there are rates that apply to day
workers. These rates Increase as the cotton picking season proceeds. On
the other hand, workers that are employed for the duration of the harvest
are paid according to a single wage rate, the level of which Is often an
average of the varying daily rates:
Table 9.10 Approximate Vages Obtaining in the Cotton Harvest
Years
	 Early	 liddle	 Late	 Seasonal
(TL)	 (TL)	 (IL)	 (TL)
1978	 1.50	 2.50	 4.00
	
3.50
1979	 3.00	 3.50
	
4.50
	
4.00
1980*	 5.00
1981	 5.50	 6.00	 9.00
	
7,50
1982*	 8.00	 10.00	 12.00
	
11.00
1983*	 11.00	 14.00	 18.00
	
17.00
1984	 25.00
1986*	 30.00	 40,00	 55.00
	 41.00
* The figures pertaining to these years are the result of enquiries made at
a later date rather than the product of direct observation.
The seasonal wage Is set by the Söke Chamber of Agriculture, a public
institution dominated by local large landowners. Depending on the yearly
supply of labour, assessed on the basis of advance contracts made with
migrant workers, these producers are able to Increase or decrease wage
rates. The wage set by the Chamber of Agriculture Is declared towards the
end of the picking season, and workers and employers alike have only a
rough Idea of what it is going to be. Once the price is announced, the
bigger landlords in the different parts of the valley also meet to decide
what their wage rate is going to be. When asked who sets the wage rate,
the family farmer in Tuz Invariably replies: agalar, the landlords. As a
result, within the plain, and sometimes even within one village, there are a
number of different wage rates that obtain at any one time.5
The different rates that apply to the successive pickings also add to
the diversity of wage rates. The Increase in the daily wage rate is due to
the fact that early in the season, labour is relatively plentiful and
conditions of work In the fields relatively easy. Since soil conditions
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influence rate of maturation considerably, the amount of labour needed at
the beginning of the harvest period is relatively small. As the season
progresses, however, all the fields become ready for the harvest so that
competition for labour increases with time. The pressure set by imminent
rainfall is another factor that encourages this competition. The
productivity of labour in terms of kilogrammes picked per day decreases at
each picking as a result of the progressive reduction in the number of
mature bells and the increasing impediments to the free movement of the
workers. At the second picking, the workers are slowed down by the drying
cotton bushes and the muddy terrain resulting from early rains. Thus, an
experienced worker who can average 125 kg./day at the first harvest, is
able to pick about half that amount at the last picking. The result is, of
course, that take-home pay may even decrease in spite of the rise in the
piece rate.
As a result of the progressively increasing wage rate, it becomes
advantageous for the farmers to ensure an early maturing crop. Daily rates
rise according to the growing scarcity of labour and the progressively more
difficult conditions of work in the fields. But local variations are also
due to the wage level prevalent in the region and the state of the
particular field to be harvested. Therefore the formation of an unambiguous
or uniform wage level becomes impossible. The variations in question allow
room for bargaining and lead to frequent conflicts between workers and
employers. In this way, we can see that the wage rate depends on
relations between employer and employee as much as it depends on national
and international factors. The variable wage rate means that farmers with
comparable amounts of land under production may end up with different wage
bills. The existence of social ties between the parties concerned becomes
the key factor that determines the difference in the amount of cash
different producers pay for wages. I shall now turn to a consideration of
these different types of labour according to the social ties that are used
to recruit them.
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9.3 Types of Labour and Modes of Recruitment
In the sections above, I tried to show that the category of 'wage' has
to be considered carefully when we look at family farmers whose main
strategy of production is the substitution of 'unpaid family labour' for
cash. Under conditions where household labour does not suffice to
undertake the manual tasks required by the production process, the
mechanisms that are used to reduce cash costs are extremely complex. A
system of shadow pricing linked to an ever-changing market price for
labour and the formation of labour exchange systems are only possible
within the context of a village community where labour is exchanged under
the dominance of non-market principles. The importance of these non-market
principles is further demonstrated by the fact that, In their efforts to
reduce cash costs, village producers try to extend these principles even to
migrant workers who are, by definition, situated outside the boundaries of
this community and who, therefore, represent the most 'expensive' form of
labour power.
The existence of social conventions regulating access to labour and
its remuneration Is the most important factor that allows village farmers
the possibility of reducing cash costs. Under conditions of an imperfect
labour market, different 'pools' of labour are created as a result of the
operation of these social factors, As I showed in table 9.7, a different
structure of payment corresponds to each of these different pools. As the
social distance between labourer and employer increases, payment becomes
immediate and requires the expenditure of cash. Social distance is a
function of the Importance of multi-stranded rights and obligations between
worker and employer. Thus, this social distance which Is at a minimum
when household labour is concerned, steadily increases with geographical
distance. Kinship, neighbourhood, and community ties are the main factors
that reduce social distance. As geographIcal distance increases, the
mediating role of community relations decreases and the importance of
market mechanisms in determining labour availability increases.
Nevertheless, factors such as common ethnic origin, language and religion
can also be used to bridge the social gap between otherwise 'unrelated'
people. The structure of labour supply can best be pictured as a series of
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concentric circles ranging from household labour to migrant labour; the
distance from the core to the outer periphery indicates the increasing
dominance of the market, accompanied by an increase in the money cost of
labour recruited, and a decrease in its productivity.
Each of the different groups of workers are recruited through the use
of different mechanisms. The main problem for the producers is to ensure
an adequate number of labourers at a specific time and without having to
pay the costs fully in cash. The fact that a pure market for labour is not
established means that the process of contacting sufficient numbers of
workers and making sure they turn up at the promised time, is difficult and
frought with uncertainty. But, an imperfect labour market also allows
village producers to make use of non-market principles in the recruitment
of labour, thereby reducing cash expenditures. I shall now consider the
characteristics of each of the pools of labour mentioned above and describe
the mechanisms through which they are recruited and remunerated.
9.3.1. Household Labour
Household labour is the most important characteristic that
distinguishes peasants from other producers in the region and allows them
to reduce money costs of labour. As I have argued in chapter 4, most of
the mechanised processes of cotton cultivation are undertaken with 'unpaid'
labour available within the household. The nature of these tasks and the
use of the tractor allows a single individual to perform all the tasks
required in the process of cultivation. The same is of course not true for
manual labour. Although certain households cultivating small amounts of
cotton are able to undertake manual tasks by themselves, the time-schedule
of cotton farming forces the majority of households to find more workers
than is available within the household. 7 Nevertheless, those households
which can supply their own labour are clearly at an advantage. Therefore,
a consideration of the exchange relations internal to the household is now
called for, in order to understand the conditions under which household
labour is made available, not only to the household entreprise itself, but
also to the village as a whole.
0
13.2
21.3
34.3
40.7
44.3
62.2
80.3
0
5.2
21.9
28.6
30
38.7
23.1
22.8
0
4.6
17.2
27.5
19.5
26.6
17.1
6.8
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The main factor which determines the amount of household labour
available for agricultural work is the amount of land under production.
Households which earn their income from activities other than cotton
production (for example, fishing, truck-driving, small-scale trade, animal
husbandry), do not, by any means, supply the bulk of the agricultural labour
needed by the farming households of the village. The absolute amount of
labour (in terms of days worked) provided from within the household
increases as area under production grows. This labour is used in three
possible ways: on one's own field, on someone else's field in return for a
money wage, or on someone else's field in return for equivalent labour. The
larger the area the household is able to put under production, the larger
the proportion of household labour days spent on one's own field:
Table 9.11 Average Use of Household Labour According to Farm Size Groups*
Area
	
Jo.	 Total	 Labour on
	
Exchange	 Labour
Sown	 of	 Labour	 own field
	
Labour	 Hired out
(da.)
	 has	 (days)	 (days) S	 (days) 5 (days) S
39
8
41
36
17
11
11
7
0
1-10
11-30
3 1-60
61-90
91-120
121-150
150+
66,8
113.1
127.4
104
152.2
145.4
134.9
334,3
0
15
27.1
35.6
61.9
64.5
83.6
268.6
66.8
92.9
78.4
39.7
60.3
42.2
28.2
42.8
100
82.1
61.5
38.2
39.7
29
20.9
12.8
* The labour days calculated in this table reflect the number of days both
men and women of the household spend performing manual work on village
fields. It excludes the number of days spent working with a tractor.E
The allocation of household labour is organised at the level of the
household and at the level of the village. It is intra- and inter-
household relations that determine the nature of the arrangement under
which household labour will be supplied to other farms. The amount of
labour spent on household fields, or on other fields as part of village
exchange mechanisms, depends upon the amount of labour that the household
enterprise needs for its own production, on the number of agricultural
labourers available within the household, and on the amount of cash
available to hire wage labour (usually from outside the village). In
addition, obligations towards other households make it necessary to supply
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fellow villagers with labour. The most important of these considerations
is the absolute magnitude of the labour power needed to undertake the
manual tasks on a given family farm. This magnitude will determine the
number of labourers from outside the household the enterprise will need,
and the amount of labour necessary to enter into reciprocal arrangements
with other households, As table 9.11 clearly shows, the number of days a
household works on cotton fields grows as the area sown Increases.
Considerations such as indebtedness, or lack of any other means of
earning a livelihood are much less important In determining the amount of
labour a household supplies to other households. Of the 39 non-farming
households, only five regularly worked for the large landowners of the
village. In addition, these households worked for the two shop-owners of
the village in order to pay debts accumulated during the winter. None of
the 39 households in question depended for subsistence only on agricultural
wages, which were a supplement to the other income generating activities.
The total number of wage labour days expended by this category of
households Is less than that spent by middle farmers who need labour
themselves (see column 6, table 9.11).
Compared to other forms of labour, household labour is the type of
labour that is most easily available to the enterprise. This, however,
should not be taken to mean that labour from within the household is
automatically offered to the farming entreprise. Nevertheless, household
labour has no immediate monetary cost. There is no question of paying
wages to household members nor is an immediate return expected or
calculated. This characteristic of the circulation of labour within the
household is In marked contrast to the way it circulates outside this unit,
be It within a kin or neighbourhood group or within the village. But
neither is labour within the household simply 'pooled'. The labour of the
incumbents of the different statuses within the household is only obtained
on the basis of expectations In the long term as well as on notions of
'proper' behaviour. In other words, long-term self-Interest (based on
knowledge of what begets what) as well as structures of authority and
ideologies of 'correct' behaviour (ideas that must be shared throughout the
village in order for them to operate even within one household) constitute
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the basis on which labour (as well as produce) circulates within the
household. It is in this sense that we have to think of costs of household
labour that cannot be measured on a monetised scale. It is also in this
sense that we can understand how notions of fair and unfair remuneration
can develop with regard to allocation of labour within the household.
Right to shelter and subsistence is the basic principle that makes the
labour power within the household available to the household enterprise.
The fact that members of the household derive their subsistence from
activities where the household Is collectively engaged (rather than where
the individual works separately from the rest of the members) means that
everyone's contribution to the labour process and therefore the degree of
everyone's right to subsistence can be calculated. 9 This does not mean
that everyone can only eat as much as s/he works. It simply means that
the obligation to work at a common task is the argument put forward by
people in order to extract labour from others within the household. This
calculation Is based on considerations that derive from the division of
labour based on gender and age. The right to subsistence of a young child
Is unquestionable. But, by the time the child reaches the age of thirteen,
It Is no longer so unquestionable. Once out of primary school, children of
both sexes are encouraged to contribute labour within the home and on the
fields. By the time they reach the age of about fifteen, such contributions
become compulsry. Older members of the household repeat this maxim often
so that everyone learns it: one has to earn one's keep: (çallsmayana
= no food to the idle)
A very important consideration which makes the labour of sons and
daughters available to the household enterprise Is the question of
inheritance. Although land Is often divided equally between all the
children, parents can deprive them of their Inheritance by selling land. In
this way, reticent children are encouraged to see the parental enterprise as
their 'own in a more immediate sense. Children receive a certain portion
of their Inheritance on marriage: boys In the form of gold and a house, and
girls In the form of a trousseau (see chapter 3). Boys may also receive
'help' from their parental household with regard to cotton production: they
may get access to their father's tractor, or use part of his seed and
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fertiliser and so on. 1 ° Children of both sexes are aware of their input in
the parental enterprise and often argue in these terms in cases of a
dispute. Such disputes often arise as a result of unequal treatment between
children, especially between Sons who depend on their father's help in order
to set up a proper household themselves.1 1 In households where the amount
of land to be inherited is insignificant, it becomes much more difficult to
make children work as cotton hoers and pickers, even when the family has
to repay debts (see table 9.11).
Short term calculations also affect the offer of labour within the
household. Both male and female children need cash for a number of
expenditures which have to do with 'keeping up with the Joneses'.
Unmarried boys spend cash for clothing and entertainment, while girls spend
it for their trousseaux. Both of these forms of expenditure amount to
considerable sums, and a father who wants to live in a household where
conflict is kept at a minimum has to be prepared to meet these demands.
Children whose requests of cash are not met by their fathers are less
willing to undertake farming tasks. The nature of the relationship between
parents and children is an important factor determining the labour that
sons and daughters will be willing to supply. The more sensitive parents
are to chuldrens' demands, the more will the children be willing to work
for them. For example, young girls prefer to work on other people's fields
where they feel freer to joke and exchange Information with close friends,
than working in their own fields where they are under the constant
surveillance of their mother or brother. They will work with more
enthusiasm to the extent that their parents are able to acccmodate this
wish.
The division of labour according to age and gender regulates the
distribution of household labour between the various agricultural tasks. As
I have argued in chapter 6, the tasks required by the process of cotton
production are associated with particular positions within the household,
and the men and women in question perform many of these activities as a
way of demonstrating (and achieving) status and identity. Gender-linked
status operates to allocate the labour of the (usually male) household head,
as well as that of his wife, his sons, and his daughters. The head of the
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household (hane reisi) is the manager of the farming enterprise, his wife
recruits and organises the manual labour force, his unmarried daughters are
cotton pickers par excellence, and his son Is the tractor driver. The
labour of all the members of the household is thus necessary in the process
of cotton production. A son (married or not) may stop driving and start
giving orders to his younger brother(s) as a move to change his status
within the household. Similarly, a woman, wife of the head of a household,
may stop working In the fields as a means of expressing her authority
within the household.
However this division of labour Is by no means rigid, and context
more than anything else determines which job Is undertaken by which member
of the household. Thus, for example, sons may be forced to pick cotton as
labourers in other peoples' fields as well as their own, the head of the
household may drive a tractor if he does not have an adult son, a woman
may undertake the management of the farm if her husband is dead, and
daughters may help the setting of Irrigation pipes, or the spraying of
insecticide if male labour is lacking. Two things never happen: a woman
(or a young girl) never ploughs a field with a tractor and the head of a
household never picks cotton for a wage In someone else's field. Not that
to be seen picking cotton will necessarily demote a household head from his
position, nor in the short term elicit a negative response from fellow
villagers. But, a household head who Is not able to feed his family
properly, and picking cotton for a wage Is seen as an indication of such a
situation, will lose quite a bit of respect in the long run.
The difference between yöriik and muhacir households illustrates the
role played by intra-household authority structures In the allocation of
labour. Ybrük households, where agnatic kinship is more Important have a
more hierarchical structure. Therefore, the labour power of all the members
is more easily controlled by the household head. In muhacir households, on
the other hand, the bargaining between the household head and his children
(both eons and daughters) is much more open and verbalised. For example,
Sefer's (a muhacir) two sons had to almost plead before they were allowed
to use their sisters' wages to purchase a TV set. Even their father's
Intervention did not rest on the 'normal' authority that he, as their father,
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could exercise over them. 	 Compared to yörük girls, the muhacir work more
often for wages and In groups that do not Include their kin, and change
employers more frequently, another Indicator of the looser authority
structure within the household.
Apart from gender, age also affects status, and therefore, the
distribution of tasks between household members. The job of tractor
driving is as much associated with a married young man as with an
unmarried youth working under his father's orders. In fact, tractor driving
is one of the major means of earning a livelihood for men who find
themselves landless on marriage. As the head of the household gets older,
he often finds means of acquiring land, has children and slowly withdraws
from the active work in the fields, adopting a position of supervision. The
same process marks the cycle of a woman's working life. Thus, women over
the age of 35 and men over the age of 40 are less frequently found
undertaking physical work In the fields. Physical labour in the fields
beyond this point has a negative value attached to it. In the case of a
man It Indicates his inability to achieve an independent farming position,
or-, his inability to have a son, or his Inability to discipline his son, if
he has one. In the case of a woman, it also has similar negative overtones:
it Indicates that she belongs to a household which does not have the means
of independent existence, a fact for which she Is seen to be almost as
responsible as her husband. By the age of forty, a woman should have
daughters and/or daughters-in-law to whom she should delegate most of the
agricultural tasks. In any case, by the time men and women reach middle
age, they are supposed to have access to sufficient land, labour and/or
capital to allow them to 'retire' from field labour. If they have labour,
that is children, It is the latter who are supposed to undertake
agricultural tasks. If man and wife have capital, they can hire labour and
simply deal with management. If they have land and no labour or capital,
they can rent out their land or find themselves sharecroppers.
Children begin agricultural labour on cotton fields at an early age.
When girls and boys finish compulsory primary education (usually by the
age of twelve), they are taken to the cotton harvest to 'help' their mothers
and/or sisters, However they are not systematically forced to work.
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Children of ten to twelve can harvest at least twenty kilogrammes of cotton
per day. Hoeing, which requires the wielding of a heavy implement, does
not begin until the age of fourteen. Boys of tractor owning-households are
encouraged to carry out the simpler operations by the age of twelve. At
fifteen, a boy is often an accomplished tractor driver. 13 Skills necessary
for cotton production are gradually imparted to children, a fact which
explains the superior quality of the work performed by local manual
labourers compared to migrant workers. Children are not obliged to work
regularly in cotton fields until about the age of fifteen. Agricultural
labour is not seen as a satisfactory form of employment for boys,
particularly if they belong to households owning little land. Boys are
often urged to find an alternative occupation (such as going on for higher
education or working as an apprentice in the many workshops of the village
or of Söke), and the threat of agricultural labour is used as a 'stick' to
encourage better performance in these areas of work. For girls, on the
other hand, the skills of cotton hoeing and picking are seen as a
concomitant of their status in life, a task which they will have to do.
Thus, for many of these girls, work in cotton fields is a consequence of
their gender identity.
Labour allocation within the household is based on notions of
reciprocity and therefore cannot be seen simply as a 'pooling' mechanism
even though many social scientists have argued otherwise.1 d Within the
household, the allocation of labour between work on household fields and
work on other peoples' fields Is a constant source of conflict. As shown
in chapter 6, women, especially unmarried girls prefer to work outside and
preferably for a wage. To the extent that these girls accept the authority
of their father and internalise values regarding the unity of the household,
they supply their labour without resistence. Young men also prefer to work
for wages rather than for their parents' households, especially if they
cannot hope to gain much in the way of wedding expenses and inheritance.
It is only through a consideration of when and how labour is remunerated
within the household that we can begin to have an idea of the non-
monetised costs of family labour.
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Household labour is not only available for the farming processes
undertaken by the family itself, but it is also made available to other
households as well. While part of this labour is made available as a
result of the household's own production calculations, there are other
considerations which affect the circulation of labour between households.
Relations with individuals from other households, considerations of
friendship and cooperation, as well as the stigma attached to 'laziness' are
among the factors that emanate from community pressures. It is to these
relations that I now turn.
9.3.2 Village Labour
The basic unit through which village labour is organised is the
household. Therefore, Intra-village labour exchanges are a very important
component of the totality of inter-household relations that together make
up what I have been calling 'village social structure'. Within the totality
of inter-household relations, there are areas such as the arrangement of
marriages, which can be regulated only by women, at least where the most
decisive stages are concerned. The recruitment of labourers for the
harvesting and the hoeing of cotton is another such area where women
figure as the main actors. The inter-household labour exchange networks
are predicated on the already existing pattern of rights and obligations
that define relations between specific households. These rights and
obligations are re-defined, and re-calculated within the dynamic of every-
day interaction, of which labour exchange is an important part. The
pattern of inter-household cooperation that Is exhibited on cotton fields
reflects current alliances and therefore undergoes constant transformation
from year to year. Nevertheless, there are certain ties, such as kinship
and neighbourhood, which allow more durable patterns of cooperation. In
short, the mechanisms of recruitment that I shall consider below are based
on a rationality that significantly differs from the rationality of the
market: I call this 'the rationality of the communIty.J&
In the sphere of cotton production, two contradictory factors define
the conditions under which labour circulates within the village, namely the
partial commoditisation of labour and the total commoditisation of its
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product, cotton. The existence of various social ties between households is
only effective with regard to the recruitment of labour, not where the
allocation of the product is concerned. It is mlargfely market mechanisms
that determine the latter. Through the activation of ties of kinship and
neighbourhood, households in need of labour can be sure to find at least a
few workers within the village. The effect of social ties on forms of
remuneration is less direct. An equivalent of some sort is sought in all
cases. Social ties can intervene to determine what the equivalent will be,
in a way and at a time that will satisfy all parties concerned. While the
bonds that guarantee 'outside' labour for any one household can be
established in areas of life that have little to do with cotton production
(such as kinship, or neighbourhood), the return of manual labour in cotton
production can only be made within the same branch of production. In other
words, a woman may successfully solicit the labour power of an unmarried
girl whom she 'helps' with her trousseau, but the young girl will have to be
paid in cash, or the woman must pledge that in return she will work on the
fields of the girl's family.
Exceptions to this general 'rule' show that the separation of the
sphere of commodity production from other areas of village life is not
absolute. In this sense, transactions between 'spheres of exchange', or
'conversions' to use Bohannan's term, can be interpreted in two ways: either
to show that commodity relations have penetrated all spheres of village
activity, or else to argue that exchange systems characteristic of non-
monetised areas of village life can affect the sphere of commodity
production. One can argue that commodity relations are so dominant In the
village that labour has lost all its specific qualities and acquired an
'abstract' character. The market price for any of the items that make up a
trousseau is known, and so is the price of agricultural labour. Thus, in
1981 an embroidered scarf costing 300 TL. on the market could have been
exchanged for one day's hoeing labour on cotton fields. This can be taken
to Indicate that labour Is divorced from its fruits and exchanged as pure
labour power. But on the other hand, the same exchange can also be used to
demonstrate the importance of village ties in decreasing the money cost of
labour. To secure labour by promising a scarf is only possible within
village boundaries. Between strangers, no one would be willing to pledge
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labour in exchange for an item belonging to another sphere of relations.
The fact that both interpretations are correct shows that incomplete
commoditisat ion of labour allows considerable flexibility.
Within the sphere of cotton production, payments for labour are often
restricted to services performed within the same branch of production or to
cash. Labour can be exchanged for cash (wage), for an equivalent amount of
labour, or, for access to means of production, especially tractors. Payment
in kind, a very important way of remunerating labour In other, less
commoditised, branches of agricultural production, is almost absent within
cotton production. After all, the use value of cotton is limited compared
to that of wheat, beans, or olive oil. 	 The form of payment actually
adopted depends on the relations between the households concerned and the
mechanism through which labour is recruited.
The type of labour that is most frequently subject to these exchanges
is the manual labour needed for the hoeing and the harvesting of cotton.
This labour is predominantly female (see table 9.12 below). However,
mechaulsed labour, that is, male labour Is also exchanged according to the
same principles that govern the exchange of female manual labour, Yet
there Is an important difference between the two categories: to the extent
that male labour, whether manual or not, is divorced from its social
context, the household, it is treated as a commodity and payment is always
in wages. Compared to female labour, male labour is commoditised to a
larger degree, and thus this separation occurs more frequently. Where It
has occurred, the recruitment of male wage labour is divorced from any
consideration of social obligation. All-male hoeing and digging teams are
never made part of reciprocal exchange arrangements in the same way that
all-female or mixed work teams are.
The exchange of mechanised labour between households can take place
without the intervention of wage relations in contexts where Inter-
household exchange relations rather than pure wage relations domInate. '
But, in this category the situation is ambiguous, because men can (and many
in Tuz do) earn a livelihood as waged tractor drivers. Other facts also
prove the lower commoditisation of female labour. Women from households
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that are not cotton producers are paid wages, but the level of this wage is
lower compared to the male wage. These women are recruited through the
deployment of the same social channels that govern the exchange of labour
between cotton-producing households. Women's agricultural labour cannot
provide (and is not considered as capable of providing) a subsistence
income. This view of women's labour is reinforced by the fact that none of
the women in the village work for a wage outside of agriculture (except for
a few 'educated' women who become nurses or teachers).
Since patterns of remuneration and recruitment are so intertwined, it
is useful to concentrate on the latter to understand the operation of the
former. The degree of cooperation between households in social as well as
economic areas of life affects the nature of labour exchanges that may
exist between them. In many cases, cooperation in economic life brings in
its wake closer interaction in social life. Within the confines of cotton
production, close cooperation between households extends further than the
exchange of household labour. It also involves exchanges of cash and/or
implements, detailed information about each other's cultivation process, and
joint action in relations with townspeople and officials (often for the
purposes of obtaining seed, fertiliser, or other inputs). These forms of
cooperation take place between men. In cotton production, cooperative
relations established between men may or may not extend to encompass the
women's sphere of activity, namely exchange of labour in kitchen gardens,
exchange of domestic labour (such as the preparation of winter supplies),
or ceremonial labour (preparing food to be distributed on festive occasions
or in the case of mourning). Interaction between women also includes the
circulation of produce and the labour of children, as well as involving a
complex pattern of visiting, the pre-requisite of all relations that are
established among women (see Figures 9.1 and 9.2). Unless cooperation
takes place in the sphere of women, the exchange of labour on cotton fields
is doomed to remain undeveloped.
Cooperation and interaction between women in the different contexts
listed above is only roughly correlated with ties of agnatic kinship, the
male sphere. Women play an important role in determining the course of
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inter-household interactions. Therefore it is relations of mutual help and
support among women that appear to be stronger than male-male relations in
recruiting labour, even where the two men of the household cooperate
intensely during the mechanised processes of production. After all, it is
very difficult for men to recruit female labour. The fact that unmarried
girls are under the supervision of their mothers and that a man from a
given household has little chance of contacting a woman from another
household, means that women dominate recruitment procedures. Thus,
neighbourhood (mahalle) relations which are voluntary and which are formed
as a result of mutualistic ties between women are more Important for
recruitment purposes than any other tie that may exist between men, Labour
from neighbourhood households is organised in overlapping pools, within
which labour circulates more often and with less cash changing hands.
These pools do not have absolute boundaries and some of the households
within the pool may also have strong cooperative links with other
households outside the neighbourhood, usually with agnatic kin. Since these
pools do not often encompass more than three to four households, within any
one area that can be designated as a neighbourhood, there may be more
than five or six separate groups exchanging labour.
Within thesq neighbourhood groups, labour is recruited on the basis of
already existing strong ties of mutual help. These ties between households
are established outside the sphere of cotton production and constitute the
channels through which labour and produce circulate on a regular basis.
Unless there is a more pressing obligation that can be justified within the
norms of reciprocity, it is not possible to refuse labour when It is
solicited by members of the mutual aid group. To do so, would be one of
the ways of breaking the relationship. The circulation of labour ensures
that the relationship between the women of the households in question will
continue.
Informality characterises the circulation of labour between households
linked through women's cooperation. The time span over which labour
circulates is very short. Payments are effected in cash or in equivalent
labour. In the former case, the payment Is made immediately after the task
is terminated: a day to a week depending on the size of the field, and
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according to the current wage level. Once payment has been made, the
households in question are free to allocate labour in any way they choose,
unless the original arrangement requires additional reciprocal labour. In
cases where labour is to be reciprocated in its exact equivalent, cash
payments may or may not be made after the first Job has been completed.
Hoeing wages are stable for the duration of the hoeing season and
therefore, payment is easily waived. At harvesting on the other hand, the
constantly increasing wage requires farmers to make the payment according
to the level current at the time the labourers are engaged. Therefore these
wages will often be paid out rather than delayed until all labour
transactions between the households are terminated. What social relations
guarantee is only that wage labour will be available from certain
households when needed. After the paymnt of the wage, labour may
circulate in the opposite direction. Thus, the payment of the wage does not
necessarily end the circulation of labour: the relationship between the
households is carried on through other exchanges that are part of areas of
village life that have nothing to do with commodity production.
If, on the other hand, wages are not paid, labour has to be
reciprocated immediately. When work on the fields of one household is
completed, members of the landowning households start work on their former
worker's field. Since the fields in question are rather small (at most 60
decares), manual work will take at most three days for a group of 10
workers (which may include members of two or three different households
with which the landowning family may have entered into very different
contracts). At the end of these three days, work commences on the fields
of another member of the mutual aid group: thus payments take at most one
week to be effected. Hoeing labour is never reciprocated with harvesting
labour and labour debts are always closed by the end of the agricultural
year, that is at the end of the harvest. The circulation of labour based on
female networks is temporary in the sense that it allows for the existence
of other demands on household labour. Xale networks can always override
obligations established between women: after all this is a patriarchal
system. Even in such cases women try to 'help out' by offering other
alternatives: either by locating other workers or finding another time to
execute the task themselves. After all, these networks are extremely
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valuable for the households in question; women's networks are the most
reliable forms of securing an adequate supply of labour. They originate In
cooperative relations between women and not in the sphere of commodity
production. The activation of these ties for commodity production makes
labour exchange in the latter sphere flexible, durable, and able to sustain
long periods of reduced cooperation.
Unless the head of a household is a woman and can as such offer the
use of agricultural machinery, cash and equivalent labour are the only ways
of paying for manual labour recruited through women's networks. Male
networks are characterised by the circulation of labour in return for the
rental of a machine, especially a tractor, in addition to cash and household
labour. These are also informal exchanges of short duration. As in the
case of women's informal networks, payment, whatever its form, is made as
quickly as possible. A man can pay back for the rental of a tractor needed
to transport workers to the field by offering the labour at his disposal,
namely household labour. The market-set rent for the tractor and the
market-set price of labour constitute the basis on which reciprocity is
calculated. 19 Men enter into cooperative relations with agnates and
cognates, or with heads of households whose fields are contiguous and who,
due to inheritance patterns, may often be kinsmen. More often, men, like
women, prefer to cooperate with non-kin of equivalent farming capability.
But, as already stated In another context, since the majority of the manual
workers are the women of the village, cooperative links between men have
limited effect in securing manual labour. Hostility between the women of
two households can, in fact, be quite effective in terminating inter-
household relations whether of kin or non-kin.19
Seasonal wage increases and the wage level as established by the
market play an important role in calculations of reciprocity. This
situation often leads to serious disagreements. When the households
concerned are non-kin, it seems that the settlement of disputes is less
problematic: the relationship can be broken off completely if other issues
point in the same direction. On the other hand, since the relationship is
voluntary and mutually advantageous, settlements are also more easily
reached than among kinsmen. Between close kin, particularly agnates, the
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situation is more complicated. Many ideological factors dictate close
cooperation, but at the same time there are quite powerful forces which may
pull two brothers apart, the most important of which is the fact that
cooperation between agnates is by definition a relationship between men who
are not equals (see chapter 4). One example of the labour exchange between
two households whose heads are half-brothers will illustrate the way in
which differential wages can lead to serious disputes between agnates.
Hasan and Saffet began cooperating in cotton production when their
father, Mustafa, died in a traffic accident in 1977, leaving his family
without an adult male. His oldest son Saffet was away at the time, doing
his military service. Hasan was Mustafa's son by a prior marriage and had
long since established a separate household and farming enterprise. He
took charge of his father's widow and his half-siblings and managed their
farm until Saffet returned. After that, the cooperative relations between
the two households continued, but Saffet was increasingly unhappy with the
realtionship since he thought Hasan was being unfair. The main problem was
that Saffet who was trying to establish himself as an independent household
head, was finding Hasan's interventions degrading. Saffet's fields were
located on higher ground where cotton matures faster. In 1979 Hasan's wife
and children had worked at Saffet's first harvest when the village piece
rate was set at 1.00 TL/kg,. They worked for seven days. Hasan's fields
were ready to be harvested when the rate had gone up to 1.50 TL/kg.. A day
before Hasan's work was due to start, Saffet sent him the cash for the
cotton picked by Hasan's family, who, outraged, promptly returned the money.
Saffet grumbled but accepted the cash and the reprimand. By 1981 all
cooperation between the two households had ceased. By sending the cash,
Saffet had hoped to Increase the money income that his family could earn.
In 1979, he had been growing less cotton than Hasan, but had more labourers
within his household. Hasan, on the other hand, was hoping to minimise his
cash costs by using the labour in Saffet's household. Being the elder
brother, he had hoped to do this by relying on his authority over Saffet.
When the attempt failed, toning down the relationship seemed the only
alternative.
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This example shows how the level and the timing of the wage can be
used by producers to minimise cash expenditure. But at the same time, the
relations of authority or equality between household heads determine the
extent to which this can be achieved. Given the fact that kinship
relations include elements of authority relations between households, they
will be important in determining the timing of the payment. The closer the
relation of kinship between the two households, the more frequently will the
payments be deferred. Between households of equal standing, either exactly
equivalent amounts of labour are exchanged, or else the wage rate will
constitute the basis for reciprocal exchanges. The relative amount of land
cropped to cotton and the number of labourers within the households
concerned also affect the way labour is exchanged. The example also shows
that the way these payments are effected is a negotiated process and the
result not necessarily determined In advance. In consequence, entering Into
such relationships does entail a certain risk factor.
More formalised ways of organising the circulation of labour between
households also exist. These are of three kinds. One of the more formal
labour exchanges is associated with sharecropping. Since the landowner's
share depends on the size of the harvest, s/he will supply labour when
needed, and thus both the landowner and the sharecropper involved equally
regard the enterprise as their own. Strictly speaking, this type of labour
recruitment cannot therefore be termed 'exchange'. Both parties being
peasants, try to cut money costs as much as possible by substituting
household labour. As a result labourers available in both households
cooperate regularly on the fields subject to the sharecropping contract.
Moreover, relations of cooperation are often transferred to work on fields
which each household may cultivate independently of the other. To the
extent that these exchanges are regular, they take the guise of more formal
and therefore reliable ways of obtaining labour.
The establishment of exclusive labour-sharing groups constitutes the
most formalised and the most reliable way of allocating labour between
households. In this type of labour exchange, four to five farming families
pool the labour available in their households for the duration of the whole
farming season. These groups, which people sometimes refer to as firms
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(sirket) order the various plots of the households according to the state
of the crop and hoe (or harvest) each of them in turn. These labourers
rarely work for other farmers. Exclusive labour-sharing groups are often
composed of the eons and daughters of neighbours or close kin, who farm
approximately the same amount of land. Farmers with over 100 decares of
land under cotton cannot enter into these labour-exchange systems, since
their needs often exceed the number of labourers that four to five
households can provide. The maximum number of workers that these groups
are able to organise is about fifteen. Fifteen workers are able to
undertake the manual work necessary for about 200-250 decares of land, on
average, the total amount farmed by all the households of the 'firm'.
Labour is shared between these households on the basis of a strict
accounting system where exact reciprocity is always maintained. Each
household keeps a record of the number of days worked for or the amount of
cotton delivered to each of the households within the group. Until the end
of the hoeing (or har'esting) period, cash payments are excluded from the
relationship. At the end of this period, the work performed is compared
and any outstanding debt is settled by cash payments. Shadow pricing is
also operative here, since the magnitude of the debt is calculated on the
basis of the average wage rate received by village workers. Labour is not
transferred from one household to another as a result of these labour-
sharing firms.2° 'Labour firms' are found only among certain yiirUk
households. The special nature of the relationship between these households
as described in chapter three provides the social cement necessary to do
away with cash payments over long periods of time. Even among these
households however, the desire by the women workers to change workmates
frequently and the need to maintain links with as many households as
possible curtails the stability of exclusive labour-exchange groups.
The allocation of labour between households that are tied through
sharecopping or labour—pooling mechanisms exhibits certain similarities.
Compared to the informal mechanisms described above, they result in much
longer-lasting exchange arrangements between particular households.
Although accounts are often settled at the end of hoeing and harvesting, it
is implicit that the relationship shall continue until the end of the
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harvest, if not longer. Many of these arrangements last over a period of
two to three years, or until conditions change so much that new
arrangements have to be devised. Another similarity between these two
types of labour exchange is the limited extent to which money changes
hands. Rather than the sum of money involved, it is the amount and kind of
labour expended that constitutes the basis of the exchange. The third
point of similarity is that these relations are often established between
households of similar status.
Between households of unequal status on the other hand, labour may
circulate on account of debts which the poorer partner has contracted.
Labour circulation of this kind is also formalised and thereby relatively
predictable. Debts can arise for a variety of reasons; some of them
originate within the process of production. Thus a small farmer without a
tractor but with a large family may, on the basis of the surplus labour
power at his disposal, risk cotton production. Debts may also be
contracted in the sphere of consumption. Many of the less well-to-do
households buy consumption items on credit from the three large grocers in
the village. Since these grocers are also cotton farmers, the debtors
attempt to pay back their debts by working on their creditor's fields for
the larger part of the hoeing and harvesting periods. These workers are
often paid cash by their employers according to the current rate. It is
then left to the household members to decide when the original debt is to
be settled. Thus the wage relation in this case conceals a debt relation
that is settled by providing labour. In this way, within village
boundaries, labour can be used in exchange for means of production as well
as means of consumption.
Within the village, labour available in households is therefore
allocated between these households according to relations of cooperation
established primarily by women. The long-term viability of these exchanges
depends on the successful establishment of relations of equality and mutual
advantage between the households concerned. However, it is noteworthy that
women organise the circulation of labour only as long as the relationship
remains one between equals. In exchanges between equals cash is paid and
shadow pricing dominates. As the relation becomes more unequal, women's
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networks lose significance in obtaining labour, while cash payments
decrease and labour is increasingly used to obtain scarce goods and
services needed for production and consumption. Thus, demands on household
labour stemming from sharecropping or debt obligations, apart from men's
cooperation networks, interfere with the short-term labour networks
activated by women. Nevertheless, given the tendency for people to
cooperate with fellow villagers of equal status, the dominant means through
which labour is recruited within the village is through women's networks.
The reliability of the labour acquired through these networks is predicated
on relations of cooperation and support that characterise patterns of
inter-household interaction and competition. Since the recruitment of
village labour Is primarily based on an Identical return of labour, It is
logical that women of non-producing households participate in these
exchanges to a much lesser extent. It is the obligation to help out a
neighbour, rather than the need to earn a wage that explains the circulation
of labour between village households. Non-producing households in need of
cash supply manual labour to non-village producers rather than to fellow
villagers. Conversely, village producers resort to outside labour, regional
and migrant, as the amount of land put under cotton production increases.
9.3,3 Regional Labour
Inhabitants of the Söke region who do not cultivate cotton make up
what I have called the regional labour pool. Although some villagers of the
plain region such as Tuz participate in this pool, the majority of these
workers come from the mountaineous areas that mark the periphery of the
Sóke plain. Although social relations between these villagers and their
employers are still effective in regulating recruitment and forms of
payment, it is the wage relation that plays the dominant role.
On the mountain ranges surrounding the Söke plain, animal husbandry
and the cultivation of olives provide the subsistence base. The cycle of
work in both of these branches of agricultural production fits in well with
the cycle of the cotton crop. In Guney, one such village that I visited In
1979, a few of the wealthier villagers rent (and subsequently may even buy)
land on the plain In order to cultivate cotton. The remaining of the
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villagers spend the months of July, October, and November hoeing and
harvesting on the plains. According to Gökalp (1980), who, in 1968,
conducted research in Sofular, a mountain village close to Guney, some
village men also work for a wage in irrigating cotton fields. Gökalp
calculates that a man working in cotton fields as a wage labourer for four
to five months was able to earn up to $280, that is, about a third of the
total income he would have acquired by selling, if that had been possible,
the whole of his olive harvest.
Social relations play a non-negligible part in the recruitment of this
regional labour force. This Is illustrated by the fact that there are
distinct geographical areas from which day labourers are drawn by farmers
In a particular district. These labourers come from villages within a
radius of at most twenty kilcmetres and with whom Interaction is not
limited to the wage relation. Thus, villages around Sari rely on day
labourer-s from the Milas region. Sari villagers often own large tracts of
olive groves In near Xilas and are therefore In close economic cooperation
with those villagers. When the labour available within Sari is
insufficient, it Is these villagers they turn to for extra labour.
Similarly, Tuz villagers obtain cxtra day labourers from the tobacco
producing villages of Batnos, Yeni, Balat and Ak that lie to the southeast
of the plain within a radius of twenty kilometers. These are also villages
whose inhabitants are linked to their neighbours of Tuz by multiple
relations. It is also through channels of affinity that Tuz women are
recruited to work In these villages as agricultural wage earners. The Gtiney
cotton farmer mentioned above not only obtained his own labour force from
within his own village, but also provided labour from among his affines in
Giiney for his 'neighbours of the field' (tarla komsusu).
The intensity of Inter-village relations decreases with geographical
distance. Consequently, even when neighbouring villages were concerned, the
number of labourers that farmers can establish contact with Is much more
limited. This problem is solved through the Intervention of labour
recruiters, or middlemen, who are able to organise a large number of
labourers from within their village. These middlemen, dayibasi, operate
only in villages where there is a large number of landless labourers.
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This is the case in the large villages of the region where recent settlers
from the East find that cotton is their only source of cash income. Thus,
in At and Sari the large Kurdish population, which, due to the ethnic
barrier, has rather tenuous social relations with the local population, can
only be mobilised through the mediation of such a middleman. 22 The same
situation also obtains for the smaller gypsy (çingene) population in Balat
and Ak, the çepni of Sofular, and the Tahtaci of Gilney and other mountain
villages. These middlemen are able to compensate for the imperfect
operation of the regional labour market.
Regional labour organised through the agency of a middleman is largely
used by medium to large producers in major villages or in Söke. These
producers, even those residing in Soke, do have links with villages where
face-to-face interaction aids labour recruitment.23 It is the large numbers
of hoers and harvesters necessitated by the increased scale of production
that induces the more important employers to use middlemen. In these
cases, village networks are not adequate to secure the required number of
workers when needed. Major producers contact the middlemen themselves by
going to the village from which they habitually recruit labour. They then
provide tractor-drawn trailers to transport the agreed number of workers to
their field at the appointed time. Middlemen receive about 10% of each
labourer's wages in return for their services. This amount is deducted
from the wage, which, nevertheless, is always a little above wages paid to
fellow villagers. Since the number of workers obtained through this method
is large, the hoeing and/or harvesting of a 200 decare field does not take
more than a week. Wages are calculated according to the rate that obtains
at the time the work is performed and payment is made as soon as the task
is completed.
The role of non-commodity ties in recruiting regional labour becomes
apparent in the relations between labourer and middleman, and between
middleman and landholder. These relations may be based on social as well
as economic obligations. Vis-à-vis the workers, the middleman is first and
foremost a co-villager, someone they have known all their lives, and a
close kinsman. The word dayibasi expresses this closeness, as well as the
power component involved in the relationsh1p. 2 But, even so the worker-
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middleman relation is often exploitative. Workers are frequently dependent
on the dayibasi in more than one way: he finds them work, and lends money
when needed. As moneylenders, many middlemen are assured of an adequate
supply of workers whenever they need them. However, not all middlemen are
in this position: many are in fact simply the most articulate among a group
of workers. Their position as middlemen depends on their previous relation
with the landowner (they are in fact often affines) and their ability to
organise a large group of workers.25 Therefore, the particular context
within which middlemen recruit manual labourers affects the nature of the
relationship that obtains between all three parties involved. The economic
structure of the area from which the workers are drawn, and the role
agricultural wage labour plays in generating income are important factors
in determining this relationship. These factors, in turn, influence the
duration of the contract, the reliability of the work-force, and the
organisational and supervisory structure of the work.2
Regional labour can also be recruited without the intervention of a
middleman. Such recruitment procedures depend on social ties established
between individuals living in different villages. The most important of
these are affinal ties. In other words, the role of women in obtaining
labour can also be observed within boundaries that exceed the village
setting. The flow of labour between neighbouring villages is reciprocal and
depends on the agricultural activities of the affines.27 These exchanges of
labour are more frequent if labour demands do not coincide, that is, if not
both households are involved in cotton production. Labour exchanges
between villages through affinal channels are also possible in branches of
agricultural production that are less commoditised than cotton or tobacco
(eg. animal husbandry or olive cultivation). Nevertheless, compared to
village labour, these regional poois of labour constitute a small portion of
total labour expenditure.
Reliability is the main problem associated with regional labour. Many
middlemen are not even able to provide the same number of workers from one
day to the next. The availability in Söke of non-agricultural and longer-
term work that pays higher wages makes agricultural labour less desirable.
As a result, many producers In the area employ regional labour only for the
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hoeing of cotton, a process where timeliness is less critical compared to
harvesting.28 Migrant labour, which, for reasons that I shall explain in
the following section, is more reliable, is increasingly becoming the major
source of labour during the cotton harvest. At harvest time, regional
labour is used in emergency situations, or for the third picking after the
migrants have already left.
9.3.4 Migrant Labour
Towards the end of September, large numbers of seasonal workers
arrive in Solve to undertake the major part of the cotton harvest. Although
the majority come from inland provinces immediately to the east and south
of the region (Denizli, Afyon, )!ugla), the number of Kurdish workers from
kdana, Bitlis, and even Kars, travelling a distance of more than 1500 km. is
also high (see map 6). According to the Solve Agricultural Extension
Officer, the population of the region more than doubles with the arrival of
these workers. According to a questionnaire administered in 1981, most of
these labourers come from villages, rather than semi-urban or urban
settlements, and, are consequently involved in agriculture themselves .
This agricultural activity, which may concern commodities such as tobacco,
or else subsistence products, is of a small-scale, non-irrigated, low
technology type that does not yield adequate income to the producer. Often,
a few of the members of the workers' households stay behind to tend crops
or animals. The composition of the migrant labour force displays
interesting features when compared with local labour:'°
The table below shows that in both groups, unmarried women make up
the largest section of the work force. The proportion of men in the
migrant group is only slightly higher than the proportion of men in the
local work force. The latter, moreover, includes a higher proportion of
older men and women. Both of these facts can be explained by the nature of
the relationship of the local work force to the land: they are in large part
owner-workers harvesting cotton on their own land. Within each group,
married women and women over the age of 35 are more numerous than men of
comparable status, showing the relationship between gender/age position and
agricultural labour. Slightly less than half of the workers are married
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(47.5 % of the migrants and 45.2 % of the locals). Although the married
men in the migrant teams are cotton pickers, local men are occupied with
supervisory tasks. 1 The fact that no regional work teams have been
encountered in this limited survey is indicative of the lower incidence of
such work groups.
Table 9.12 Percentage Composition of Nigrant and Local Vork Teams
len	 Women Xarr.* Iarr. Men
	
Women	 Total Jo.
len	 Women 40+
	
35+
Migrants	 40.4
	
59,6	 20.9	 26.6	 5.4
	
7.2	 851
Locals	 39.5
	
60.5	 21.1	 24.1	 7.4
	
9.6	 365
Source: Raw data from the METU Seasonal Migration in Agriculture Project,
1981.
* Percentages are calculated separately for each work team. Thus, of all
the migrant male workers, 20.9 % are married.
With the development of agriculture and industry in the Soke region1
the periodic shortage of labour felt in the area has became more and more
acute. Consequently, the number of migrant labourers arriving in the region
has been increasing over the years. In the absence of regional statistics,
it is very difficult to illustrate this point. However, the increase in the
use of migrant labour within Tuz is quite indicative of the trend. Until
1976, village and regional labour was employed in Tuz. In 1979, six
households were employing about 100 workers from the nearby province of
Denizli. By 1984, 49 households stated that they had contracted migrant
labour for the coming harvest. Moreover, five farmers had, for the first
time, also employed migrant labourers for hoeing. The trend in Tuz shows
that migrant labour is being increasingly employed by village-based
producers. Although, the employment of migrant labour is closely
associated with the amount of land under production, many of the medium-
sized Tuz farms are able to utilize migrant labour by forming groups within
which labour as well as recruitment costs are equally shared. At most
three households join resources to bring in one group of workers, of about
20 individuals, who then pick cotton according to a strict system of
rotation. In this way a farmer cultivating 60 decares of land is able to
have access to a relatively reliable source of labour. The system works
even to the advantage of small farmers not part of these 'employers'
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cooperatives'. When there is no work on the employers' fields, the migrant
workers are free to offer their labour to small farmers in need. As a
result of these mechanisms, the employment of migrant labour has ceased to
be a characteristic of large-scale capitalist producers,32
As with regional labour, the recruitment of migrant labour is
generally, although not necessarily, effected through the agency of a
middleman. Those middlemen who can form large teams often come to the
plain in Nay or June to contact large landowners in Söke. By contrast,
village producers who need smaller amounts of labour often have to
undertake themselves the trip to the villages where they recruit labour.'
Work teams employed by small farmers are often made up of two or three
related families and one of the household heads acts as middleman. Whether
a middleman is involved or not, all producers have to advance a sum of
money in order to make sure that the agreed number of workers will arrive
when the time comes. The amount of money advanced varies considerably. In
1981, middlemen demanded on average, 5000 TL per person (about one fifth of
the total earned by a person in forty-five days), and the actual sums
varied from as little as 1000 TL (just enough to cover transport costs) to
as much as 7000 TL. J'Eiddlemen who brought labourers to the region without
having made a specific arrangement with any of the landlords did not
receive any advance, Having brought workers before, many of the middlemen
know the area and the landowners quite well and come for the specific
reason of obtaining advance cash which they, in turn, use to build up a
following of workers. This is done by strategically distributing cash in
the guise of short-term loans, to be repaid after the harvest is completed.
Thus, the sum of money received as advance payment varies enormously from
worker to worker: from as little as 5000 IL to as much as ten times that
amount.
Nigrant labourers are contracted for a period of 45-60 days at most.
This usually covers the time needed to harvest a large holding twice.
During this period, the farmer provides shelter, drinking water and wood;
food and bedding are provided by the labourers themselves. Additonally,
the farmer has to cover half of the costs of transporting workers from
their homes to Söke, a sum which may amount to 5 % of the total wage
340
bill.	 Wage payments are divided into two parts: apart from the initial
sum advanced before the workers arrive, payment is effected upon departure
according to the amount of cotton delivered. 7 Bulk payments (often at
times when cash is scarce) and the extra transport and accomodation costs
make migrant labour a more expensive labour force compared to local
workers.
The level of the wage paid to migrants is another factor that
increases the cost of migrant labour. First of all, a single wage rate
applies, making it difficult to reduce costs by taking advantage of a
changing wage rate. Secondly, this level often turns out to be slightly
above local wage rates (see table 9.10). The middleman's share is usually
about 6-10 % of the total wage rate.3E4 In 1985, migrant wages were set at
41 TL/kg., out of which only 35 TL (about 85 %) accrued to the cotton
pickers: 3 TL went to the packer and the remaining 3 TL was the
middleman's wage (about 7 % of the total). If there is no packer in the
team, the wage level is correspondingly lower. The distribution of the
wages among the workers is carried out by the middleman.
The higher costs of employing migrant labour are to a certain extent
compensated by the security involved in the contract. But under conditions
where the labour market cannot be formally organised and controlled, there
are also serious risks involved. Middlemen can go back on their word and
not bring the agreed number of workers, or worse, they may not turn up
after having accepted the cash advanced. Conversely, the landowners may
also refuse to uphold part of their contract, by not paying their share of
transport costs or not providing proper housing, or else the cotton crop
may be lost to some disease, leaving the workers stranded. Certain
sanctions do operate to ensure predictable behaviour on the part of all
parties. The impossibility of bringing labour to the area after a serious
breach of contract is the most important consideration that affects the
behaviour of middlemen.ao Large farmers who have a bad reputation also
find it difficult to establish long-term relationships with any one labour
team. These landlords have to cast their nets wider in order to recruit
labour. Tan, who puts his labourers up in tents, was therefore the first
landowner to bring workers from the East.
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The role of non-market relations is much reduced in the process of
recruiting migrant labour. Rather than playing a part in the relation
between worker and landholder, non-market relations are only important in
determining the composition of the labour teams. Moreover, strong social
ties may bind workers to middlemen (or team leaders). Village farmers are
an exception to this rule. In an effort to reduce the difficulties and the
cash costs of obtaining migrant labour, they attempt to reduce the social
distance between worker and employer. In a sense, this is an effort to
'villagise' migrant labourers. Certain characteristics of the labour teams
employed by village producers attest to this tendency. There is no
middleman involved, each year the same group is sought, the workers are
housed in the village and made to take part in village social occasions.
Repeated visits to the home village of the workers, visits which include
the wife and children of the landholder, are even more effective in bridging
the social gap. The most successful way of converting migrant labour into
village labour is through the establishment of affinal ties. Already three
young men in Tuz have married migrant women whose families and neighbours
are then recruited by many of the Tuz landholders. Two villages in the
province of Denizli have by now established such close links with Tuz, and
it is these people who account for the majority of the migrant labourers
that work on Tuz fields.
The mechanisms of recruiting manual labour depend on the type of
labour employed, and this in turn, is a function of the amount of land
under cultivation and the amount of cash available to producers. As a
result, there is a definite pattern governing the distribution of these
different types of work teams among Söke farmers. Large capitalist farmers
employ nothing but migrant labour to undertake both hoeing and harvesting.
Large to medium farmers who still retain ties with a particular village (by
still residing there or, after having moved to Soke, by regular visiting)
complement migrant labour with regional labour. Medium village farmers
also employ migrant labour for the bulk of the harvest, but rely on village
networks for hoeing and some of their harvesting. They may also on
occasion use regional labour. Small farmers depend on village labour
almost exclusively. With the movement from village labour to migrant
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labour 1 the role of social relations in recruiting labour decreases, but is
not totally supplanted by market mechanisms.
9.4 Conclusion
The extent to which cotton producers can manipulate monetised costs
of agricultural production Is a major factor that explains the different
forms of production observed in the Söke region. Labour is the most
malleable of all the factors of production considered so far. It shows the
most variable monetised cost. This variability stems from the existence of
the category of household labour which, due to the nature of the social
relations In which it is embedded, has no monetary costs. Furthermore,
inter-household networks of cooperation, predicated on concepts such as
kinship, neighbourhood and affinity, can be used to extend the amount of
work that is carried out by 'unpaid' household labour. In this way, wage
labour within the village becomes one of the ways of reducing cash outlays
within cotton production. As a result of the nature of village social
relations, abstract labour on which the existence of wage labour is
predicated, Is converted into 'social' labour. The extension of village ties
to cover migrants, Is another factor that adds to the malleability of labour
drawn from another social group, with whose members social links are
initially absent.
Within the confines of the village, money is not the main means by
which labour Is remunerated. Labour prestations are more important as a
way of obtaining labour in return, and In addition, a means of consolidating
existing relations of cooperation and mutuality. Refusing to work for a
fellow villager Is a way of cutting off all social exchanges. However, as
the social distance between worker and employer Increases, cash becomes the
sole manner in which labour is remunerated. Regardless of the scale of
their operations, capitalist producers In town are, therefore, linked to the
sphere of commodity relations to a much larger extent than village
producers. But, under conditions where a market for labour has not fully
developed, even capitalists have to resort to mechanisms of recruitment
that involve more than simply the circulation of commodities. Nevertheless,
unpaid labour is not available to these producers. Calculations of
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profitability can be made by capitalist famers since labour is a category
to which a definite monetary value is attached. By contrast, under
conditions where household labour still pays an important role, such
calculations are not possible.
The foregoing has, I hope, shown firtsly that 'domestic labour', which
is often used as a gloss to depict allocation of labour within the
production unit (Harris 1981), is predicated on the existence of complex
relations of authority and reciprocity that constitute the household.
Secondly, I hope the present chapter also has indicated the extent to
which 'unpaid' household labour in the circuits of production depends on a
wider set of social ties that bind such similar units together. As G. Smith
argues, domestic labour is not the only source of unpaid labour: the
community ".. ,is a source of 'unpaid' labour through a myriad varieties of
labour exchange institutions" (1986:101). Labour which, within village
boundaries, may not be a commodity, may nevertheless circulate as a
commodity outside the boundaries of the community (which may include a
group of interacting villages, rather than just a single village such as
Tuz). Even Tuz production of cotton is marked by the use of both
commoditised as well as non-commoditised labour, and the distinction
between the two is not always immediately apparent. Commoditised labour
has high money costs, and producers constantly attempt to convert it into a
non-commodity. It is on the basis of the utilisation of non-commoditised
labour that peasant production of cotton persists.
Many approaches to peasant and/or petty commodity producers rest on
the distinction drawn between cases where labour is commoditised and
others where it is not. If labour is commoditised, it is argued, then we
have a situation where the universal categories of political economy apply.
But, PCP seems always predicated on the existence of some form of labour
(as well as other inputs) that is not commoditised. This reliance on non-
commoditised labour is even inherent in the definition of PCP. The problem
that I would like to pose is the following: 'if we conce of PCP as "a
class of combined labourers and property owners within a capitalist
economy" (Friedmann 1980:162), what kind of relation are we positing
between labour and property except one of unity? This notion of unity
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between labour and property may be an accurate way of depicting the
American farmer driving sophistacted agricultural machinery, and,
undertaking all productive activities on his own, although even that is
doubtful since his wife's and children's labour may still be important,
Unless the owner and the labourer are one and the same person, the question
of labour recruitment will remain problematic in terms of the limits
imposed by the categories derived from political economy. The variations
that can exist in the labour-property relationship will always put into
question the notion of predictability, and produce a situation where non-
commodity circuits will be crucial in reproducing the conditions as well as
the units of production. In other words, by Friedmann's criteria, all
commodity producers can only be peasants. As G. Smith argues (1986), the
effort to create a universal category of simple commodity production is as
problematic as the universalisation of the concept of 'peasantry'.
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Notes to Chapter 9
1, There is a high correlation between area under production and magnitude
of output (0.94) as well as between total manual labour used and area under
production (0.92) These are results of simple correlation tests, and are not
very reliable. Using a Time Series Program, where total household labour
(THL), number of consumers (GO) and area under production (A) were included
as variables that may determine output (Y), the latter emerged as the one
variable that explained output:
Y=-910.44 + 198.171 A + 0.568 THL + 195.50 GO
(-0.76)	 (27.38)	 (0.05)	 (0,825)
R2 = 0.88
F = 314.3
The only variable for which a reliable T-Statistic is obtained is A.
2. Exchange labour is simply a way of extending the use of household labour
beyond the limits imposed by the time schedule.
3. As indicated in chapter 8, international as well as national factors
affect the price at which producers sell their cotton to merchants as well
as the state cooperative.
4. The high wages received by cotton pickers in 1979, were compared to
wages earned by Turkish workers in Germany, and called 'Germany Money'
(Almanci Parasi).)
5. See Soysal (1976) and Seker (1986) for descriptions of a similar
situation in the Adana region.
8, For example, in 1978, the first harvest on early maturing fields was
picked at 1 TL/kg.. The same employer then paid 2 TL/kg. for the second
pickings on the same field, at a time when most of the first boils on other
fields were being picked at 2 TL/kg., thus equalising the rate for the first
and second picking. The workers objected and the rate for the second
picking on the early field was Increased to 2.5 TL/kg. It Is important to
take note of the fact that It was the young girls and not their fathers who
voiced the objection. The latter, employers themselves, were In two minds
about the Increase.
7. See table 9.3. which shows that only farmers sowing land between one and
ten decares are able to manage largely with household and exchange labour.
Moreover, even these small cultivators hire about 12 % of the labour they
need.
8. The number of households in table 9.11 equals the number of farms in the
earlier tables because of the way I have defined households. See chapter 3
for a fuller explanation.
9. According to Scott, 'right to subsistence', is a peasant maxim that
characterises relations of exchange between all peasant households
(1976:167). In this way, Scott wants to show that peasants give produce
and/or labour to one another without waiting for an immediate or an
equivalent return. But in Tuz, I find that, even within the household, such
346
a 'moral' principle does not necessarily apply. Xoreover, I do not think
that the difference in degree of commoditisation between the peasants
observed by Scott and the villagers of Tuz is sufficient to explain the
differences between the two cases.
10. It Is often observed that one of the mature sons already established in
a separate household undertakes some of the manual operations on his
father's field in return for the free use of a tractor.
11. The case of Fikret, muhacir fisherman, is quite instructive as to the
way this process works. In 1978, he eloped with his elder brother's wife's
sister (BWZ), a form of marriage which, since the two parties were already
kin, is very much frowned upon by the muhacir. One of the main reasons
which prompted Fikret to elope , that is marry without the permission of
his as well as the bride's parents, was his suspicion that his brother,
Ismet, would drag his feet about arranging a marriage for him. Their
father had died about eight years earlier, and the household had continued
to exist under the uniting influence of their mother, Sabahat. Ismail and
Sabahat opposed the marriage violently. As a result, Fikret and his young
bride, Asiye, had to leave and set up a household on their own. This he
had to do with nothing, no gold, no house, no flour to tide them over until
the cotton harvest when both husband and wife could find work. Fikret
soon started to work as a fisherman in the cooperative. Until his mother
dies, he expects to receive nothing from his brother with whom he is not on
speaking terms. A year after Fikret's marriage, he 'sold' the family
tractor to a man from another village (who did not know the circumstances
of the family). He based his action on the following reasoning: he had
worked just as hard as Ismail to purchase the tractor (it was purchased
before Fikret's marriage), and since he had received nothing when he was
married, and Ismail lived in the parental home, he was its legitimate owner.
The tractor, could, of course, not be sold: it was registered in the name of
the mother Sabahat, who from the beginning had sided with Ismail.
12. When the eldest brother later attempted to prevent the younger, more
independent-minded sister, from working with a girl of questionable
reputation, she immediately pointed out that the TV was for the family, in
other words that she could not take it with her when she married, and that
he therefore could not tell her who she should or should not work with.
13. Labour in other agricultural tasks (such as food gardens) begins even
earlier than that. Children are taught to plant and harvest vegetables, to
recognise weeds and pests, and to clean out stones and other debris from
the garden. These skills will also be helpful in cotton fields later.
14. Sahlins (1974), Wallerstein et. al. (1982). For a criticism of these
points, see Harris (1981) and (1982).
15. I have deliberately avoided the term 'moral economy'; especially since
Scott's influential book on the subject (1976), this term has acquired a
specific meaning thought to be applicable universally to all peasantries:
the norm of reciprocity and the right to subsistence (Scott 1976:167). I
am using the concept of 'rationality of the community' to indicate that
labour and produce circulate within the boundaries of the village according
to considerations that are not simply economic. I do not wish to impute a
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moral (in the sense of 'ethical') nor a universally valid content to these
considerations. I certainly do not think that either of the principles
stated by Scott is shared by Tuz villagers.
16. However, cotton is widely used In the village for bedding and
upholstery. Before marriage, brides of households with no access to cotton
may work for a return in cotton.
17, The example of the man obtaining the use of his son-in-law's tractor in
return for supplying him with olive pickers Is a case In point.
18. It is this kind of demand on the labour of the household that may
override arrangements entered into by women.
19. The exchanges of labour between Meryeni and Sevim and those between
Xeryem and Emine were completely stopped in the course of their disputes,
even though close relationships persisted between their husbands (see
chapter 3).
20. See Donham (1981) for an account of the ways in which labour sharing
systems may result in transfers of labour between households.
21. Until 1981, there were such middlemen in Tuz organising labour for
larger landholders In neighbouring villages such as At and Yuva. With the
increase of productivity In cotton farming, local competition for village
labour has increased to such an extent that village producers are able to
employ all the floating labour available within the village. This has meant
that the dayibasi in Tuz found It Increasingly difficult to form an adequate
labour team, and finally, in 1981, he totally gave up on the idea. Larger
Tuz farmers rarely use a middleman to get access to regional labour: they
prefer the more reliable, albeit more expensive method of recruiting migrant
labourers.
22. One At landholder had married a Kurdish woman whose kin then regularly
worked on his fields. When asked why they hoed and harvested for him with
such regularity, the labourers said that he was their brother-in-law
(eniste).
23. Xany villagers try to move to the town when they can afford It. The
move, however, does not necessarily prevent agricultural production. See
chapter 10 for an analysis of the mechanisms Involved.
24. The word Itself means chief or most Important mother's brother
(dimother's brother;	 j=head, chief, most important). 	 yi, in the
urban context, is also used to designate a powerful street leader and
fighter. In the Adana region, the middlemen are called 1ç1, representative
or ambassador.
25. This is the method through which Tuz villagers are occasionally
recruited to work for one of the large landlords in the nearby village of
At or in the tobacco fields of Balat.
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26. As the disapperance of middlemen in Tuz shows, under certain
conditions, technology and state credit policies affect the availability of
wage labour on a permanent or temporary basis.
27. The fact that women and men inherit equally means that many households
have fields in other villages than their place of residence. These fields
are usually leased or turned over to sharecroppers, a situation which
increases the likelihood of cooperation in manual tasks. On the other hand,
disputes that arise between siblings over inheritance issues reduce the
chances of this form of labour circulation.
28. Technological improvements have recently begun to reduce the amount of
manual labour needed for hoeing.
29. The questionnaire was administered by a team of social scientists,
including myself, from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara as
part of a project funded by Meawards on Seasonal Migration in Agriculture.
During a period of 8 days, a total of 67 questions were asked to 1242
workers while they were picking cotton in the fields. I would like to
thank the participants, especially Dr. Tosun Aricanli, for allowing me the
use of the yet unpublished results.
30. Since no sampling was involved in the administration of the
questionnaire from which these numbers are drawn, the proportion of local
to migrant labour indicated in the table should not be taken as an adequate
represenation of the composition of the labour force in the Söke plain.
31. Unfortunately the questionnaire is misleading on this issue. The main
reason for this is the fact that men who were not picking cotton stated
that they were working, and this was recorded as though they were picking
cotton.
32. Of the 21 migrant labour teams encountered in Söke fields during the
course of the 1981 survey, 6 were working for employers other than the
farmer who was accomodating them, and only 8 were working for town-based
capitalist producers.
33. A few workers also attempt to come to the region without having
previously secured employement. That they are able to find work shows the
extent to which labour is scarce In the whole region at this time of the
year. An unattached worker in Adana, where landlessness is much higher,
would not be able to find work in spite of the large number of extensive
farms there (Soysal 1976:113).
34. The amount of money received by the worker as an advance is a good
indicator of the extent to which the worker Is economically 'bound' to the
middleman. Many of the more established middlemen loan money
independently of what they obtain from the landlords. For these men,
labour contracting can be a full-time job that brings In a good Income.
35. After the second picking, gleaning (basakçilik) Is often allowed. Women
and children of the outer nelghbourhoods of the town, and migrants living
in large villages glean fields in the vicinity, selling the cotton directly
to gin mills.
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36. Xost of the labourers are brought in to the region on open lorries, a
dangerous form of transportation which is officially banned. The longest
journey may take two days and two nights.
37. Xigrants who work on the odd day for other farmers are also paid at
this time. On the other hand, migrant workers who come to the plain
without prior arrangement, and therefore without having received any money
in advance, are paid according to local rates when they finish a particular
field.
38. This rate is similar to the one described by Sosyal for Adana (Soysal
1976:113).
39. Middlemen pay these wages after deducing individual debts.
40. There is a large turnover of middlemen who bring labour to the region.
Many labourers begin to operate in their own after coming to the area under
the supervision of a middleman for a number of years, during which they
establish contacts with landholders and learn the 'ropes'.
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CHAPTER 10: DIFFERENTIATION ABD CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AMONG TUZ PRODUCERS
The problem of differentiation among peasant producers confronted
with a capitalist economy has been one of the most thorny questions faced
by students of agricultural change. According to Marxist orthodoxy, small-
scale producers would dissapear in the face of increasing commoditisation.
For the majority of small producers, this transformation was to entail
proletarianisation. The persistence of independent commodity producers in
many regions of the capitalist periphery (Smith 1984b), as well as in
Turkey (Keyder 1983b), has put this assertion into question. Attempts to
formulate a general theory regarding the conditions of reproduction of
small-scale producers have stressed the inability of petty commodity
producers to enter into expanded reproduction (Friedmann 1980), This form
of production has therefore been associated with branches of production in
which capital requirements are low (Kahn 1980). Recently several
investigators have shown that under certain circumstances, small-scale
producers may transform into capitalists and that differentiation through
accumulation is possible (Bernstein 1986:21). In the case of Turkey, it has
been shown that in certain branches of non-agricultural production, small-
scale commodity producing enterprises have proliferated as a result of
their flexible organisational structures (Ayata 1982). The argument put
forward by Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985) to the effect that places for petty
commodity production are continually created/destroyed within the
capitalist social division of labour, has even led Bernstein to the
conclusion that "petty commodity production will exist as long as
capitalism exists" (op. cit.:25).
Questions regarding the accumulation of capital by small commodity
producers are closely linked to questions concerning the presence or
absence of wage labour and problems of economic calculation and/or
rationality. Accumulation based on the systematic extraction of surplus
value is not considered by most authors to be a feature of petty commodity
production (Scott 1986:6). This does not mean that small producers do not
employ any wage labourers. As has been shown by Kahn (1980) and Smith
(1984b), there are different reasons that account for the inability of small
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producers to enter into expanded reproduction on the basis of the small
amounts of labour power employed. While Smith stresses high wages and the
competitiveness of the market to explain low profits (and correspondingly
low investments in improved technology), Kahn looks at the place of wage
labour in the structure of the production system. He argues that the logic
of petty commodity production differs from that of capitalism, and that
wage labour in the former case cannot yield surplus value (1980).' Kahn
and Smith both argue that it is necessary to take into account factors that
are external to the production unit: these factors are in addition to wage
levels, input and output prices.
Other writers, by contrast, have indicated that increasing the scale of
production by investing cash can be a feature of small commodity producers.
Cook (1984) maintains that capital accumulation is possible within petty
commodity production. In the case of Oaxaca valley producers, wage labour
according to Cook is a systematic feature of production and provides the
basis of 'simple capitalist accumulation'. In conjunction with this form of
accumulation, Cook shows that family labour can also provide the basis for
expanded reproduction ('endo-familial accumulation'). Smith also argues
that expansion within certain limits (determined by the use of wage of
labour) is possible (1986:33). In his later writings Kahn has also allowed
the possibility of accumulation for small scale producers (1982:15).2
Many of the problems associated with the dynamic aspects of petty
commodity production stem from treating petty commodity producers as a
homogeneous group. )Lost of the writers stressing the viability of
peasant/small-scale production have not looked into the differences that
may exist between these producers. 3 In contrast, authors who are inclined
to regard differentiation as the more dominant trajectory in the
countryside have studied variations among producers In more detail. A good
example is provided by Harriss's work (1982) among the rice producers of
Tamil Nadu. Harriss identifies at least four separate classes of producers:
capitalist farmers, rich peasants, dependent middle peasantry and semi-
proletariat. By showing that all agricultural producers do not face the
same constraints, especially with regard to their relationships with
merchants and moneylenders, Harriss is able to argue that an unstable class
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of independent middle peasants can exist under capitalism as a result of
the external economic structure and the internal organisation based on
kinship (1982:264), Above all 1 he warns against general statements about
the peasantry 1 showing that different reasons may account for the
'persistence' of the different classes of producers (1982:289).
Similarly, Tuz farmers do not constitute a homogeneous group with
regard to access to resources and scale of production. In previous
chapters, I have alluded to these differences and indicated that differences
between producers can be conceptualised in terms of their strategies of
production and factors that limit their operations (table 6.1), The main
distinction presented at that stage was in terms of the labour contribution
of the owner/manager of the enterprise. All village-based producers meet
(varying portions of) their labour requirements by using non-wage (usually
household) labour. By contrast, town-based producers do not themselves
contribute any labour. This, I argued, leads to important differences in
production constraints and hence in modes of calculation. A more
systematic analysis of these differences is however required in order to
pose questions about accumulation and change. As Harriss argues, the
different producers are not necessarily locked into the production
strategies they pursue. Movement of Individual producers across class
lines is possible. What factors account for the fact that some producers
try to enlarge their scale of production by renting land, while others sell
land or turn it over to sharecroppers? A more dynamic approach can show
that some of the town-based capitalist producers come from the ranks of
the small peasant cultivators, and others from the ranks of the non-
capitalist enterprises. In order to understand these dynamics, it Is
necessary to investigate the forms of calculation on which producers base
their productive decisions (Kahn 1981:553).
In order to answer some of these questions, I shall look at the
divisions that exist between producers within the village. I shall try to
show the circumstances under which these producers can expand production
and the mechanisms that account for this expansion. I shall show that the
explanations advanced by the authors mentioned above can provide clues to
understand the activities of some but not all of the producers. Thus,
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Friedmann suggests that producers can only expand through fission, that is
undertake generational reproduction without being able to concentrate
capital (1978:88). But in Tuz, it turns out that this only applies to a
certain category of producers, namely the middle peasants. Similarly, as
Cook suggests, endo-faniilial reproduction can lead to expansion, however in
Tuz this Is a feature of the small producers rather than the medium ones.
Finally, only the large farmers are able to enter into petty capitalist
forms of calculation. However In Tuz, it seems that the transition to petty
capitalist tus is not possible on the basis of agricultural production
alone, Other capital generating activities are usually required to keep
providing cash to the agricultural enterprise so that the latter can expand
on the basis of wage labour.
Bearing in mind those distinctions that apply to small producers, I
shall finally investigate the strategies of production of town-based
producers and see the extent to which they are able to continue to
reproduce themselves as cotton producers. An analysis of the options open
to theni will help assess the role played by kinship and community and by
the structure of the national economy in delimiting the conditions of
production under which these various producers operate. Furthermore, it is
by contrasting peasants with town-based producers that ways in which small
peasants manage to reproduce themselves can best be understood.
10.1 Village Based Producers
A number of points regarding the conditions and strategies of cotton
production within the village have already been made. Firstly, all village
producers have access to unpaid labour, regardless of the scale of
operation. Secondly, all producers need to have a certain amount of cash
before they can begin to produce cotton. Increases in scale serve to raise
the amount of cash and hired labour required in production. Thirdly, all
village producers try to obtain as many of the inputs as possible without
having to pay a cash equivalent. Ties of kinship (used broadly here to
include household relations) and community allow village producers to
construct networks of exchange through which labour power, land,
subsistence goods and some of the inputs Including cash can be secured.
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Fourthly, the economic context within which cotton production is undertaken
has also been delineated. To recapitulate, this context can broadly be
defined as a capitalistic national economy in which cash, land and labour
have been largely commoditised. As has been shown by Kahn (1g81),
commoditisation of all factors of production does not proceed
simultaneously, a fact which Is also characteristic of the Söke region.
While markets in improved inputs and cash have largely been established,
markets In land and labour have been developing at a slower pace.4
Similarly, a market In labour is so developed that shadow pricing Is a
characteristic feature of the calculation of labour expended in the
production process. Nevertheless, the mobility of labour is still
restricted, a fact which leads to the existence of different wage levels In
the cotton harvest (see chapter 8). Since 1980. increases in Input prices
and the retraction of state subsidies in credit and output markets have
been counterbalanced by a rise In output prices.5 As a result of these
recent changes, a larger number of Tuz villagers have been able to enter
into cotton production for the first tlme.e
Before the possibilities of enlarging the scale of production and/or
accumulation within the context summarised above can be analysed, a clear
distinction between the different types of producers present In the village
must be drawn. Many different criteria can be used to differentiate
between Tuz producers: area under production, amount and type of labour
employed, extent of cash investment, level at which the production unit
reproduces itself and finally strategies of production that determine
production decisions. At the outset, It will be useful to delineate three
broad categories of producers according to the Income they obtain from
cultivation: small, middle, and large farmers.
On the basis of average output levels and costs of production, it has
been shown that a thlrty-decare field barely sufficed to cover annual
subsistence costs. As I demonstrated In chapter 8, such a field yields a
net income of 540,000 TL, while average annual subsistence costs are at
least 500,000 TL. for a family of four. This shows that if the cultivator
has to rent land, or if in order to cover production costs, s/he needs to
borrow cash at the current interest rate, s/he will not be able to make
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ends meet. By contrast, if the land is his/hers, and s/he can cut
subsistence expenditure, obtain his/her commodity inputs from Tans and
from other sources in the village, and cut cash expenditure on labour, s/he
will be able to continue farming his/her thirty decares and even save some
cash. Below this mark, we can safely assume that savings are not possible
and that moreover, additional income-generating activities are necessary to
meet subsistence requirements.
Another important turning-point can be discerned around the 100-120-
decare limit, Farmers cultivating on this scale are able to save about one
million TL. per annum after deducting interest rates, costs of production
and subsistence. This cash serves to enable these farmers to keep up with
the changing technology and/or marry off sons (Friedmann's generational
reproduction through fission), Farmers in this category usually try to
consolidate their holdings through investments in land improvements and/or
machinery rather than expand scale of production by increasing area under
production. When the economic conjuncture allows it, these farmers also try
to buy land and thereby leave their children a larger patrimony. In 1987,
more than five farmers in this category bought land varying between 30 and
45 decares, while the larger farmers chose to invest in trade. In between
the large and small cultivators a large middle category comprising farmers
cultivating between 30 and 120 decares of cotton can be identified.
Above the 120 decare limit, hired labour becomes the most important
factor limiting production.7 In order to obtain the cash needed for wages
and continue producing cotton, the large farmers of Tuz need to enter into
other income-generating activities. In other words, diversification of
productive activities is a feature of both small and of large Tuz farmers.
The difference between them lies in the ways in which diversification
occurs. While small farmers often sell their labour, large farmers invest
cash in other activities such as trade or transport.
For most Tuz farmers income is a function of output and ability to
reduce expenditures of cash, whether for subsistence or for production. The
single most important factor that accounts for output is area sown.B Other
variables such as supply of labour within the household, or level of demand
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(number of consumers within the household) are less important in
determining output:
Table 10.1 Output in Tuz Cotton Farms According to Yield (Y), lumber of
Consumers (C), Number of Workers (W), Total Household Labour Actually
Supplied (THL) and Average Area Sown (A)
Output
	
Jo. of
	
Y
	
£
	
TilL	 C	 V
(000 kg.)
	
farms
	 kg/da	 da	 days no.	 no.
0
	
39'
	 0
	
0
	
66.8
	
3.8
	
1.9
1-5
	
36
	
191
	
18
	
114
	
5
	
2.8
6-10
	
40
	
202
	
38
	
122
	
5
	
2.75
11-15
	
21
	
192
	
73
	
152
	
6.2
	
3.5
16-20
	
8
	
245
	
81
	
101
	
6.4
	
3.1
21-25
	
10
	
206
	
114
	
100
	
5,9
	
3.1
26-30
	
5
	
225
	
135
	
134
	
6.2
	
3.4
31-35
	
3
	
249
	
141
	
172
	
5.7
	
2.7
36-40
	
4
	
268
	
158
	
262
	
7.2
	
3.75
40+
	
4
	
216
	
262
	
414
	
8.75 5
* Since I have defined households according to whether or not they are
independent from other groups with regard to earning an income, the number
of farms corresponds to the number of households in the village. Given
this definition, there are 39 households whose members do not undertake
independent farming activities.
As can be seen from the table, the majority of Tuz farms are either
small cultivators producing just below the subsistence margin (6000 kg.), or
medium farmers producing less than 26 metric tonnes of cotton. There is
thus a large middle range of producers, the majority of whom cluster at the
lower end of the spectrum. The table does not indicate a significant or
systematic increase in the values of the variables except for area sown and
number of consumers. In spite of the increase in number of consumers
accompanying rising outputs, other tests show the latter variable not to be
too reliable,9 Nevertheless, it seems as though demand does influence
output at least to certain extent.
Total household labour actually expended in cotton production, as well
as the number of household workers increase steadily until the 15 tonne
mark, after which variations in these variables do not seem to correlate
with increases in output. Once this threshold is crossed, hired labour,
that is the expenditure of cash for wages becomes a more important
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variable than labour available within the household. Nevertheless, it is
the most important producers with the largest number of workers who
contribute the greatest number of work days to the labour process.
Increases in the scale of production do not necessarily entail a reduction
in the use of unpaid labour in the manual processes of cotton production.°
The same relationship can also be observed with regard to mechanised
labour. Both large and small farmers hire tractor drivers only when a
suitable labourer cannot be found within the household. The large number
of workers and consumers within the richest households does to a certain
extent explain their success: although workers and consumers cannot account
for levels of production under present conditions, in the past they
certainly were an important determinant of success. Thus accumulation can
only be understood in the context of a longer-term perspective which takes
into account the histories of these large producers as landowners, in
addition to their ethnic identities.11
The table also indicates that scale of operations does not affect
yields very much. On average, Tuz farmers are able to produce about 220
kg./da. The smaller farmers produce just under this limit while the larger
farmers exceed it at most by 40 kg./da. 12 This shows that unless producers
are able to procure the right input mix, production of cotton becomes
impractical. And, furthermore, if yields fall below a certain level (or if
costs rise too much), production of cotton ceases altogether.13
The cost structure and the competitive market therefore force
producers to operate with an approximately similar input mix. Contrary to
most cases of small production described in the literature, it is not
possible to increase yields (or output) significantly by increasing labour
inputs (Kahn 1981; Harriss 1982). As the table below shows, the Inputs of
manual labour are proportional to area sown; if anything, it is the larger
landholders who contribute more labour (hired labour as well as household
and village labour) per decare compared to small farmers:
0.4
1.6
3.4
4.4
4.3
4.5
5.1
61.5
941
1655
1269
1157
1562
1667
2.6
2.2
1.4
1.3
1.0
0.8
1.2
3
3.8
4.8
5.7
5.3
5.3
6.3
184
3543
7932
7198
6161
8214
10465
1-10
11-30
31-60
61-90
91-120
121-150
150+
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Table 10.2 Inputs of Labour According to Area Sown
	
Area Sown Total	 Total Labour	 Unpaid L. Hired
Farmed Labour per land Uth+exch) Labour
	
(da.)	 (days)
	
(days/da) (days/da) (days/da)
Under these conditions, producing cotton in and of itself represents a
labour-intensive activity. Use of labour thefore separates village farmers
from town-based capitalist farmers, rather than indicating differences
among village farmers themselves.
Unfortunately, lacking consistent data regarding the cash invested by
every single farm, I cannot demonstrate the role of cash investment in
determining output. However,a few general points can be made on the basis
of the available information. Excluding labour, cash costs in production
increase in proportion to area sown. Ownership of land and other means of
production, such as tractors and other machinery, serve to reduce short-
term cash outlays and thus make production of cotton easier, but at the
same time limit the farmer's choices: producers who have invested in land
and machinery are firmly locked to the production of cotton. The most
effective way of increasing output through cash investments is to enlarge
the area cultivated. This can be done by sharecropping, renting, or buying
land; each of these activities requires successively larger cash
investments. Land improvements, the proper application of fertiliser and
pesticides, adequate and timely irrigation all have cash costs which, if
foregone, will reduce yields. Thus, we can assume that cash will not only
affect output, but will also be an important factor determining the
variation in yields reflected in table 10.1.
As area cultivated increases, the monetary costs of labour grow more
than the costs of other inputs. This increase is accounted for by the
necessity of depending on migrant labour. As I showed in the previous
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chapter, advance payments and the cost of transport constitute a large cash
expenditure for which farmers usually have to borrow money. Borrowing
entails payment of interest and therefore adds on to production costs. Yet
in Tuz it is not only the very large farmers who employ migrant labour.
As can be seen from table 9,3, farmers planting more than 30 decares of
cotton employ migrant labourers for approximately half of their manual
labour requirements. The added cash burden represented by the use of
migrant labour can be reduced by forming 'employers' cooperatives' and/or
'villagising' migrant labour (see chapter 9). Household and village labour
serves to alleviate the cash burden of labour for middle peasants (30-120
decares), while for small farmers it constitutes the main input of labour.
In the case of larger farmers (120+ decare), unpaid manual labour is less
important from the point of view of saving cash than mechanised labour
obtained within the household or through village exchange mechanisms.
10.1.1 Small Farmers
The division outlined above delineates three categories of producers,
the first of which is comprised of part-farmers, part-workers and for
fishermen, who, on the basis of the limited cash available to them, produce
but small amounts of cotton. 14 Some of these part-time farmers own land
(through inheritance or government distributions), while others obtain it
through renting or sharecropping. 15 The majority of these farmers-cum-
workers own very few farming implements. 15 As was shown on table 9.10,
they spend most of their labour working on other people's farms for a wage.
But in general they spend much less time working on cotton fields than do
other cotton producers. 17 Most of these households hope in the long run to
switch to cotton production on a more permanent basis. But, before they
can do so, they need to accumulate cash and transform it into means of
production. The sale of their labour power, other productive activities, and
village networks provide the means through which such accumulation can be
effected. As tables 3.6 and 3,7 show, the majority of small farmers are
made up of newly married men and women and particularly of men and women
who have to separate from the parental household within the first year of
their marriage.
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For this category of farmers accumulating cash is only possible if
they can invest income earned from other pursuits into cotton production.
The case of Huseyin can serve as an illustration of the way such
accumulation is possible. Hiiseyin has five children between the ages of 5
and 18. He owns no land and works as manager/tractor driver for a large
village-based producer in another village. 1	His eldest son works as an
apprentice with the village blacksmith and Hüseyin himself receives a
monthly wage of 25.000 TL. In addition, he has the use of his boss'
tractor. Hiiseyin rents 25 decares of land for 4000 TL/da. He used to own
a flock of twelve goats which he sold in order to pay the 100,000 TL he
needed for rent. He obtains his seed and his fertiliser from his boss who
often does not charge him interest for the credit extended, and he hoes and
harvests the land which he farms by using his family's labour. At the end
of the harvesting season, he has enough money to allow him to rent land for
another year, and, provided that he can sell his cotton at a good price,
even save some cash. 9 But, as Huseyin's case exemplifies, accumulation for
this category of producers is dependent on ability to reduce costs.
Huseyin's relationship with his boss allows him to cut the costs of
machinery, seed, and fertiliser, while the large number of labourers within
his household helps him to keep labour costs at a minimum. He uses his
and his son's wages to meet daily subsistence costs, and, by producing
cotton, is able to to use productively the labour available within his
household. Woreover, it is unpaid family labour which allowed him the
possibility of entering into cotton production in the first place: it was
his wife and daughters' labour spent in looking after and enlarging the
herd of goats that helped him accumulate the initial 100,000 TL he used to
rent land.
Other circumstances provided Mustafa a similar chance. After working
as a labourer and a fisherman for nine years, Mustafa inherited eleven
decares from his mother. His elderly father opted to live with him, which
meant that Nustafa could farm his father's land without paying any rent.
He paid the first installment of his tractor with the gold his father had
given his wife on the occasion of her marriage to Nustafa, and was hoping
to enter into a sharecropping arrangement with his father-in-law the
following year.2° He was also renting out his tractor in order to pay the
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next installment of the purchase price. Huseyin's and Mustafa's cases
represent two of the most typical trajectories whereby small farmers
accumulate capital and establish themselves somewhere, depending on their
luck, In the middle peasant category. The frequency with which small
farmers In Tuz try to enlarge their scale of activities is shown In the
table below. It Is the small farmers who attempt to farm more land than
they own by renting and/or sharecropping:
Table 10.3 Amount of Cotton Farmed in Tuz According to Area Owned
Lr	 hh	 Ar	 Ar	 hh
	
Differencel
Do.	 Owted
	
Farmed	 no.
* This diffrerence shows the amount of land farmers obtain through renting
and sharecropping arrangements. A negative value indicates that farmers in
the said category farm less than they own. In total, Tuz farmers share or
rent out a total of 1063.5 da. of land, and they share/rent in a total of
2825 da. The difference of 1761.5 is the amount of land Tuz farmers obtain
from landowners residing In other villages in the neighbourhood.
Nevertheless, for the majority of households with no land nor capital,
this trajectory remains only a hope. Many of the fishermen of Tuz, for
example, rent out their land, even when (both male and female) labour power
is available within the household. Fishing cannot provide them with an
income that allows the accumulation of savings to be Invested in cotton
production.2 Some fishermen have been able to become full-time farmers by
forming sharecropping alliances with close kinsmen. Salaried work which
does not offer the special opportunities enjoyed by Huseyin will not allow
capital accumulation either.22 For people In this situation, entering into
cotton production is dangerous and may not even yield the returns that can
be obtained by selling labour power and/or engaging in other income-
generating activities. HüseyIn's good luck may also not hold out forever,
since It depends on the balance between input and output prices. If the
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balance continues in favour of cotton producers, rents may increase to such
levels as to make it impossible for Huseyin to rent land.
	 A change of
the balance in the opposite direction may reduce returns to labour to such
an extent that it may no longer be rational for Huseyin to continue to
produce cotton.
Another case illustrates the precariousness of depending on cotton
production at very low levels of capital accumulation. A man who owns 30
decares of land and a flock of 200 sheep has been trying for more than six
years to switch to full-time cotton production,2d He sold part of his
flock and paid the initial investment for a tractor, entering into a
sharecropping arrangement with another villager. Since he could not be
sure of the success of cotton production, he and his wife kept a part of
the flock and left agricultural activities to their sharecroppers. Having
limited capital, Ahmet could not improve his land, and at the end of the
season the yield was so low that he had to return his tractor, which means
that he has to wait until he can enlarge the flock to the original size
before he can think of trying again.
Small farmers in Tuz, therefore, can only reproduce their farms and
their households on the basis of their own and their family's labour.
Enlarging productive capacity is dependent on the accumulation of cash, but
such accumulation is not always possible. Accumulation is a function of
the labour power available within the household and opportunities for
reducing circulating costs. A relationship that allows the small farmer
some chance to save cash, such as Huseyin's ties with his boss, or
Mustafa's inheritance (and his father's helping hand), may establish these
small farmers in the category of middle peasants providing the economic
conjuncture is favourable. These small farmers, as well as middle peasants,
keep producing cotton since, this is the best way to utilise productively
the labour of all the members of the household, which would otherwise be
idle.
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10.1.2 Middle Peasants
The category of middle peasants has been defined by the fact that
these producers are able to subsist on the basis of the cotton they produce
without having to undertake other income-generating activities. In terms
of life style and status, it is these farmers and their households which
set village standards. These are the 'farmers' (çiftçi) who, according to
the villagers define the state of being a villager. Compared to the
previous category, these farmers have larger amounts of cash at their
disposal. In the hope of consolidating their farms, they usually invest
this cash in means of production. By contrast, extending area put under
production plays a less Important role. 25 The majority of the local female
labour force employed in Tuz fields come from the households that comprise
this category of producers. Furthermore, it is these producers who most
depend on unpaid labour found within the household in order to be able to
meet production costs. Between 19 and 27 % of total household labour is
expended as exchange labour; thus exchange labour Is much more important in
the life of the middle peasants than In the productive activities of either
small or large farmers (see table 9.11). The relatively high Incidence of
exchange labour also shows that the farmers In this category depend on
links with other villagers in order to find labour.26
As in the case of small farmers discussed previously, middle peasants
engage in cotton production in order to take advantage of the rather high
returns to labour this form of production allows. The actual level of
returns varies each year according to input and output prices, and
especially according to the cost of credit. Many of the producers
themselves maintain that if they were to calculate their own labour as
costs, they should stop producing altogether. The returns obtained through
cotton production, are comparable to wages in other sectors. 27 Although
short-term seasonal work is abundant, stable waged work is scarce in Söke,
and at most it is the heads of the households or their adult Sons who are
able to find such employment. Cotton production, by contrast, allows all
members of the household to contribute to the generation of income. In
other words, peasant strategy consists of tapping all the labour available
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within the household, and, by using exchange networks, extending Its use as
much as possible.
Work In cotton production Is limited to about six months. Most of the
remaining 'free' time Is spent In finding ways of either decreasing cash
costs for the reproduction of labour, or In Increasing cash Income itself.
Other forms of productive activities that can be carried out within the
village serve In both of these ways. Thus, a number of these middle
farmers profit from the relatively idle winter months to fatten calves to
be sold as meat, to fish, or to tend olive groves. The first and last of
these activities also utilise the labour of women and children within the
household: women feed and milk animals, children take them out to pasture,
while everyone can harvest olives. In contrast to the cash-generating
activities of small farmers however, these pursuits are secondary, and the
heads of middle peasant households rarely work for a wage.
However, not all of the farmers in this category are able to reproduce
themselves at the same income levels. The differences In their incomes
mean that while some of them are just able to eke out enough of an income
to allow them to resume cotton production for another year, others can
increase the size or quality of their land, and invest in farm equipment.
For the majority of the farmers in this category, successful farming means
generating enough cash to cover all monetary costs of production and enter
into the following productive cycle without having to borrow. At the lower
end of the scale, farmers simply repay their debts, while at the higher end,
accumulation of capital on the basis of wage labour may even be possible.
As a result, the uses of savings differ according to the producers' income
levels. While some can think of buying more land, and thus allow their
children to begin with a larger and better endowed farm, the farmers in the
lower Income bracket attempt to secure the cash needed to obtain the
technology necessary for current productivity levels. Accumulation for
middle peasants is dependent on the same strategy that Is used by small
farmers: saving on monetary costs, especially where labour is concerned.
But, having access to more land, the ability of middle peasants to
transform Income into investment is greater that that of small farmers.
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Expanding productive activities for many of the middle farmers
towards the lower end of the scale is a way of financing investments.2
The timing of expansion often corresponds with demand in the household for
a larger income or the possibility of taking advantage of extraordinary
favourable circumstances.29 The production decisions taken by Osman, the
son of a rather impoverished yeni yuruk family illustrate the calculations
involved in this type of expansion. Osman married in 1978 and continued to
live with his elderly parents, two unmarried sisters and one brother.2°
For many years before his marriage, Osman worked as a shepherd and as a
waged fisherman in the cooperative, while his family cultivated cotton on
the 33 decares of land given to them by the government. His yüruk
neighbours often helped in undertaking the mechanical aspects of
production, while the labour of his brother and sisters was used to pay
back these debts. After his marriage, Osman used his wedding gold to buy a
minibus. He worked as a driver for four years, at the end of which he sold
his minibus and paid the first installment for a tractor. In 1984, he
obtained 150 decares of land from Tan, who, as the owner of the village his
wife comes from, offered him better terms than usual: Osman had to pay
8000 TL./da. but could also use the field in the winter to plant wheat. As
it happened, Osman was unsuccessful. He had hoped to obtain at least 40
metric tonnes of cotton (approx. 250 kg./da.), instead of which he barely
made 28 tonnes. In order to pay his debts, Osman had to return his
tractor, but managed to buy his minibus back.
What Osman had hoped to do, was to establish himself more securely as
a cotton producer, using his good relations with Tan in order to obtain
more land slightly below the market price. In this way he hoped to utilise
productively the large number of labourers within his household and the
cash he had accumulated driving his minibus. Many farmers in the middle
peasant category have used this strategy to consolidate and enlarge their
holdings. Starting with the government-distributed 30 decares, these
farmers have been able to buy between another 30 to 50 decares of land, as
well as purchase the basic agricultural equipment. Isa is a good example
of the way in which such accumulation is possible. In 1971, he and his
brothers split their flock of goats and decided to settle as cotton
producers. Having married in 1959, he already owned 30 decares distributed
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to all heads of households in 1960. He bought another 6 decares by selling
his wife's gold. In 1974, a year after the 50 % rise in the selling price
of cotton he bought a further 15 decares of land, and another 15 decares
the following year.3
	In 1976, Isa bought his first tractor, taking
advantage of the good terms offered by the Fiat company in an effort to
capture the Aegean market. For a ten years, he farmed his 60 decares and
even managed to exchange his tractor for a more expensive one in 1985. In
the meantime 1
 he married of his daughter and son; but his wife fell Ill, and
he had to spend considerable money for her treatment. In 1986, he bought
another 15 decares for his son by selling the bride's gold. 32 Unexpectedly
good yields In 1987, coupled to the above average Increase in the selling
price of cotton, allowed him to buy another 15 decares for his younger son
as well.
By contrast, Xehmet, Isa's younger brother is a landless grocer
earning about 20.000 TL. per month. The difference in their economic
postion is mainly due to the fact that Mehmet did not have access to the
land distributed by the government since he was yet unmarried in 1960.
For a few years, he rented his brother All's 15 decares and planted cotton.
But, having very little interest or cash to help him along, he soon became
a salaried worker for the Ministry of Forestry. However, his contract
expired within a year and he found himself without a job or prospects. For
a while, the family's only income was his wife Xeryem's labour on other
people's cotton fields and olive groves. In 1983, Mebmet borrowed some
money from Isa and opened a grocery shop in Tuz. His is the fifth grocery
shop in the village, and, as a result of his limited capital, his volume of
trade remains small.
As the difference between Mehmet and Isa illustrates, it often proves
difficult to procure a socially acceptable standard of living by producing
cotton without relying on previously accumulated capital. This capital can
take the form of inheritance, government distributions, and income generated
through other kinds of productive activities. Given the accumulated land,
Isa's Sons will be able to enter into Independent cotton production with a
similar advantage as that enjoyed by Isa himself. By contrast, it is often
difficult though not Impossible, to establish oneself as a cotton farmer
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without such capital. The larger the intial capital, the greater the
possibility of expansion. The large farmers of Tuz are all individuals who
had considerable amounts of accumulated capital at their disposal. For the
eski yiiriik, this capital was often in the form of land which they had
appropriated prior to the penetration of commodity relations. For the 	 j
yiirük, it took the form of large flocks of sheep and goats, which at a time
when land was relatively cheap, could be converted tino means of
agricultural production.
Isa is a typical middle peasant in many other ways. Although he
employs migrant labour during the harvest, his daughter-in-law and his sons
regularly work on the farm.	 He brings in migrant labourers by pooling
resources with two other farmers and neighbours who cultivate approximately
similar amounts of land. He also exchanges labour with the same people
labour during the hoeing season and the third cotton picking. He rarely
borrows money to pay for labour, but tries to make do with savings from
previous cycles of production to meet these costs. This is facilitated by
the fact that he is a member of Tans which supplies him with a large
portion of his inputs. He tries to keep borrowing from village traders
only under special circumstances, for instance when buying a piece of
agricultural equipment, building a house, or marrying off a son. Whenever
possible, he tries to convert his savings Into some form of productive (and
sometimes reproductive) Investment, In this way, he can keep abreast of
technological advances and maintain the average productivity of labour and
land predominant in the region. His wage bill amounts to about ten percent
of his gross earnings from cotton, but makes up a high proportion of his
circulating costs. He earns a minimum net Income of 1,500,000 TL., or the
equivalent of the annual wages of five salaried tractor drivers. This
income includes the labour expended by his two sons and his daughter-in-
law. Moreover, by breeding cows and producing olives, he can increase his
cash income and decrease the monetary costs of subsistence.
For most of the peasants in this category, levels of accumulation are
only sufficient for the consolidation of the enterprise; at best, such
accumulation allows the establishment of more than one equivalent
enterprise in the next generation. Behaving like petty capitalists by
368
expanding production in order to increase money incomes and investment, at
best serves to marginally increase returns to labour. The 'profit' of a
farmer cultivating 120 decares of cotton amounts to 2,820,000 IL., or a
daily income of 7800 TL.	 Assuming that this figure comprises the labour
of four individuals within the household, daily wages per person amount to
just under 2000 IL. By contrast, a harvester who picks 100 kg. a day earns
2500 TL. at the current wage rate.36 But cotton picking is possible only
for at most 60 days a year, thus yielding an annual income of 150,000 IL.
Production of cotton, by contrast, yields an income with which it is
possiblle to live comfortably for more than a year, depending on the area
under production. Thus, to remain petty commodity producers, Tuz peasants
have to accumulate, but this accumulation does not necessarily allow them
to become petty capitalists.
10.1.3 Large Farmers
Variations among large farmers producing more than 25 metric tonnes
of cotton each year and farming more than 130 decares of land, are as
marked as those existing among the small and middle peasants of Tuz. Only
four of the total of sixteen producers in this category actually own more
than 120 decares of land; the rest obtain the land they cultivate on the
basis of various renting and sharecropping contracts.37 The four largest
landowners own 350, 220, 196, and 130 decares of land each, while the
remaining twelve own between 20 and 100 decares. To the extent that
ownership of land reflects levels of capital accumulation, a number of these
producers may very well be middle peasants trying to consolidate their
holdings by taking on an extra 100-150 decares of land to farm. Osman, a
man whose efforts to establish himself as a cotton farmer were described
in the previous section, is clearly a case in point. As I have already
mentioned, it is the amounts of capital they command and the type of
diversification these farmers are involved in which confers them the status
of rich peasants. Diversification through investment in other branches of
production can also be a way of consolidating middle peasant status. This
is the strategy followed by Osman, firstly to enlarge his scale of
production, and after his failure, to accumulate enough capital to begin
once again. Other households heads who stand to lose from the imminent
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death of an elderly parent also invest as large a proportion of their
income as possible into other forms of wealth which they hope will not be
subject to division between heirs,3e A closer look at the activities of
those producers whom I consider large peasants will help to clarify these
distinctions.
The four largest farmers are individuals who have been able to
transfer to cotton production wealth accumulated prior to the full-fledged
coinmercialisation of agriculture.	 Two of these farmers are the
descendants of the Delibas and the Akilli, eki yiiriik families who settled
in Tuz towards the end of the nineteenth century and lived on sheep
herding, camel driving and agriculture.40 The agriculture that they
practiced was small-scale and limited to the growing of summer millet on
state-owned land that, during the winter, served as pasture. This land was
situated on the high ground surrounding the present site of Tuz and was
thus protected from the annual floods. Apart from opening up land on the
plain, these families also appropriated mountain land which they turned
into olive groves. Until the first land distribution of 1952, most of the
available land around Tuz was therefore held In usufruct (zilyedlIk) by
these families. 41 By the early fifties, two of the men in these families
had already risen to economic prominence by investing wealth in trading
activities and thereby converting it into capital.
One of them, Au Mehmet Akilli, managed to appropriate about 600
decares of land. He subsequently sold this land for cash which he invested
in various business ventures ranging from trade in grain to cattle
breeding. In twenty years he had reduced his holding to 200 decares and
his ten children inherited about 10 decares each. But In the meantime he
had established his eldest son, Osman, as the first and only village grocer,
starting him In the business in 1957. It was the money he earned from his
trading (and probabaly moneylending) activities that made Osman prosper.42
His siblings all maintain that their father had been unfair and had helped
Osman more than he helped them. Thus, although they are not as wealthy as
Osman, they nevertheless are able to cultivate cotton as comfortable middle
farmers.
370
Krnil Delibas accumulated his original capital by trading in sheep and
goats. His father was also an established sheep drover and as such had
been able to appropriate large tracts of pasture land. By the time KAmil
came of age, much of this land had been divided among the men of the large
Delibas family. Nevertheless, with the income he derived from sheep
trading over a period of twenty years, K&mil bought a total of 350 decares
of land.44 In 1966, K&mil and his children left the village to settle in
Söke where they began to run a transport firm comprising two lorries. The
business prospered and today KAmil is a rich town-dweller whose children
have received higher education.45 In order to pay for this education, Kâmil
sold about 230 decares of his land and today owns 220 decares of cotton
land as well as a 55-decare olive grove. At present, Kâmil is an eighty-
year-old rich man who owns a number of shops in Söke where he trades in
agricultural machinery and spare parts for tractors.
Both of these men combined agriculture with commerce, investing income
earned from the latter in expanding and modernising the former. It was
these men who were the first in the village to purchase tractors, Being
the older males of large and established families, they managed to channel
the productive capabilities of their households for their own personal gain.
The Akilli family depended on land for their initial accumulation,
registering pastures in their own name, a process which had turned them
into large landowners by the time agricultural production became an
important source of income. The Delibas, by contrast, rose to economic
prominence through the trade in sheep which their large family could raise
at very little monetary cost. At present Osman Akilli who is seventy years
old and the father of four daughters and six sons, is the owner of about
200 decares of land, and farms about 247 decares each year. For a long
time, Osman was the only moneylender of the village, an activity which is
now carried on by his eldest son, himself also a cotton farmer. 45 Another
of his sons became a high a high-school teacher and he and his wife, a
muhncir girl from Tuz, now reside outside the village. A third married son
who finished a higher education course in management has been running
Osman's grocery shop. In 1987, Osman had also opened a grocery shop for
his son in SSke and was himself contemplating the move, leaving his
agricultural concerns in the hands of his as yet unmarried younger sons.
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KAmil has already left agricultural production In the hands of his one son
who did not go on to higher education. This son married a yeni. yiiriik girl
from Tuz where they both reside at present, farming the 220 decares of land
belonging to the father, and using the latter's links in Söke to obtain
cheap credit from banks.
Agriculture, for both of these producers, is a side activity entered
into on the basis of income earned from commercial activities during the
fifties and early sixties. At present they are investing in commerce
rather than agriculture. 47	In terms of their farming activities, it is
these farmers who employ the highest numbers of migrant workers. In the
last couple of years, they have even begun to hire migrants for the much
shortened process of cotton hoeing. They are among the ten or so farmers
who own the most advanced farming equipment available in the region. In
both of these households, it is male labour expended in mechanised
processes that constitutes the bulk of the unpaid labour used. 	 Because of
the limited amount of household labour expended in cotton production, net
income for these farmers constitutes more a return to capital, than a
return to labour.
The yeni yiiriik households who have enriched themselves during the
past fourty yaers followed a rather different trajectory. Because they were
late-corners In settling in the area, they did not find free pasture land
which they could appropriate. On the contrary, they had to pay for the use
of pasture, the recipients often being the two families described above.
Most of the land they own at present was purchased over a period thirty-to
thirty-five years.49 Hasan Kara and his father's father's brother's son,
Ismail, were among the yiiriik who opted to settle in Tuz. Starting in 1948,
Osman Karadayi began to invest all his income in land, often purchasing
small quantities of about 15-30 decares. &o Today, he is the largest
landowner of Tuz with 350 decares in his name alone.	 Ismail, an orphan
with less labour available to him, managed to buy only a total of 130
decares of land.
Both }Jasan and Ismail have, during the past ten years, diversified
their economic activities and Invested outside of agriculture. Ismail's
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younger son Abdi has not established an Independent household and has used
the cash accumulated from cotton production to buy a minibus. After
working in the transport sector for five years, he has also been able to
open a grocery shop in the village, which, contrary to local practice, is at
present run by his young wife. 52 Similarly, Hasan and his two sons have
opened a shop themselves in 1979, where, as all large shop-owners, they
sell an assortment of goods to the villagers on credit. Xoneylendlng was
not, at least In the past, an Important economic activity for either of
these yeni yiiriik. Hasan Kara has only recently begun to buy olive oil and
milk from villagers, an activity which for a long time has been an
Integral part of Osman Akilli's trade. Thus, In contrast to the men
described above, it is on the basis of their agricultural activities that
Hasan Kara and Ismall have been able to accumulate cash to invest in
commerce. They both obtained the capital needed to expand their
agricultural production and then diversify into trade by using unpaid
labour available within their households. They both have eight children
each, and have added the labour of their sons' wives (and in the case of
Hasan, his older son's children as well) to the pool of unpaid labour they
can depend on. It is these households which account for the high number . of
consumers, workers, and household labour available to the category of large
producers, namely those whose output exceeds 40 metric tonnes In table
10.1.
All sixteen producers in this category of large farmers are also among
those who use the largest numbers of hired labourers, the majority of whom
are migrants.53 Wage labour accounts for more than 80 % of the manual
labour employed in hoeing and harvesting cotton (see table 9.3). The
extraction of surplus labour through the wage relationship is therefore an
important aspect of the j.chest peasants' productive process. Like other
'I	 village producers, they also attempt to employ household labour productively
through the cultivation of cotton. Very few of these farmers employ hired
tractor drivers; but their need for hired male labour during Irrigation can
often only be met by hiring village men. The net yearly income of these
producers exceeds 2,000,000 TL., a sum that, under conditions of village
life, allows substantial savings. The larger the area put under production,
the larger the net income that the producer can use for investments. But
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without more capital, it is not possible to enlarge production beyond the
level characteristic of middle peasants. And it is only by using capital
accumulated in other economic activities that the limits of the middle
peasantry can be surpassed.
Accumulation of capital only on the basis of commerce is rare, but
possible. Two men in Tuz who own little or no land have been able to
establish themselves as cotton traders and during a relatively short period
of time enlarge their scale of activities. One of them, Osman Akilli's
father's brother's son Ahmet, acted as trader and moneylender in the village
for a period of ten years or more, at the end of which he had accumulated
enough capital to set up as a tractor dealer in S5ke, The other has begun
lending money in 1983 when the volume of cotton production in the village
had reached considerable proportions. The much smaller amount of capital
that this man has accumulated has only allowed him to plough back his
profits Into agriculture, and by 1987 he had bought 60 decares of land.
Thus using commercial profits, he has been able to establsih himself as a
middle peasant. If the return to capital in moneylending holds constant, he
may enlarge his landholding, or invest in commerce; if not, he may continue
as a peasant farmer.
The final point of the trajectory of expansion through accumulation in
commercial activities is movement to town and urbanisation of life
styles.s4
 As was shown above, agriculture plays an Important, if not
dominant role in the accumulation that allows urbanisation. It enables the
entrepeneur to utilise as much as possible the relations of kinship and
community to facilitate capital accumulation. Ties in the village also
serve accumulation processes outside agriculture, as in the case of
moneylending and commerce. Even after migration to town, agriculture can
continue to supplement income in an important way. For example, in 1984
Ahmet, the tractor dealer in Soke, has rented 150 decares of land from Tan
with a view to increasing his capital. He plans to buy a couple of cotton
gins and establish a ginning mill with the approximately 2,000,000 TL-
prof It he hopes to make from the cultivation of cotton. As was illustrated
by K&mil Delibas, In the long-term the move to town Is accompanied by the
restriction rather than the expansion of agricultural activities. 	 The
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persons able to undertake this move are the ones who no longer need to
rely on household labour in order to earn income and make profits. Their
sons and daughters can now be sent to school to acquire a profession and
in this way become sources of expenditure rather than labour.
As the discussion above has hopefully demonstrated, capital
accumulation through the production of cotton mainly serves to consolidate
middle peasant status. Intensification of production is rarely possible
under the present conditions and any increase in output can only be
obtained by extending area under production. This expansion is undertaken
mostly by middle peasants in order to meet pressing needs, or in order to
consolidate their holdings, Even large peasants, those who already have
considerable cash reserves, undertake expansion to leave their children a
larger patrimony, or to start a new business venture. After a certain
level, increases in income (which are rarely observed from agriculture
alone) serve to remove the individual from village life altogether. At the
same time, migration to cities from the other end of the spectrum,
described by Kandiyoti for central Anatolia, is infrequent in Tuz. 	 The
possibility of securing adequate levels of subsistence in the village,
coupled with prospects of inheritance and/or accumulation make outmigration
too risky for the majority of Tuz villagers.
10,2 Conclusion: Comparisons With Town-Based Capitalist Producers
As a way of concluding the discussion on capital accumulation and
differentiation among cotton cultivators, I would like to point out some of
the production strategies pursued by town-based capitalist producers. In
this way, I hope to show more precisely the special characteristics of
village producers.
Compared to villagers, town-based producers have less access to non-
commoditised inputs, especially labour. Since they undertake production In
order to obtain a certain level of return on capital rather than labour,
their mode of calculation is very different. Each input has a cash
equivalent and therefore a calculable opportunity cost. As a result, cost
per decare is often double that calculated by village producers. In 1978, a
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farmer cultivating 500 decares of cotton calculated his costs per decare in
the following way:
Fuel	 180.25 TL.
Seed	 36
Pestcide	 120
Fertiliser	 105
Driver, Guard, Cook	 120
Land Improvements	 50
Depreciation of Implements	 150
Land Tax and Protection	 37
Irrigation	 120
Hoeing	 400
Harvesting	 1000
Rent	 800
Total	 3118.25
In the same year, a village producer cultivating 50 decares of land put his
total costs at 70,000 TL. (1400 TL/da.) and a man hiring a tractor to
cultivate 36 decares and who only used household labour said his total
costs had come to about 1100 TLfda. Many items in the large farmer's list
such as rent or depreciation, are not calculated as a cost by village
farmers, and others such as taxes do not represent a cash cost for village
producers. The sale price of cotton in 1978 varied between 13.25 to 14
TL/kg. Thus, for the capitalist farmer, net profit per decare was just
above 380 TL.Sa
As the cost list above shows, labour constitutes more than half of the
production cost for town producers. The difficulties the latter face In
finding a secure labour force for hoeing and harvesting and the limited
returns to capital in cotton production mean that many of these producers
are turning away from the cultivation of cotton. Sunflowers are rapidly
replacing cotton among these producers, since this crop can be mechanically
harvested. Cattle breeding and the growing of fodder crops are among other
alternatives which capitalist producers find more profitable.
Many of these town-based capitalist producers are in fact former
villagers who have settled in town as a result of successful capital
accumulatIon.	 The rest of the town-based capitalists are descendants of
large farmers such as Tan who have tried to rationalise their holdings by
selling large portions of land.° To the extent that they can retain their
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links with their former villages, these former peasants try, as the case of
Ahmet illustrates, to cultivate cotton at a relatively low cash cost. They
do not employ farm managers, but use male household labour for these as
well as mechanised tasks. As they become more settled in town and can
begin to undertake commercial activities without needing the added security
provided by landownership, they often divorce themselves from agricultural
production altogether. In this way, we can see that the distance between
village producers and capitalist producers is not too great and that in
reality, they represent a continuum whose gradations are not too clearly
demarcated. The only way of differentiating between them is to consider
their levels of capital accumulation and the production strategies they
pursue.
Village-based petty commodity producers are small-to-middle peasants
who use household labour and ties of kinship and community as a means of
limiting monetary costs of production. The proportion of wage labour used
in the process of production Is small in comparison to the total amount of
labour expended; nevertheless, labour still represents the largest item of
cash costs. Peasant producers try to obtain other inputs, which are also
commoditised, outside commodity circuits. Land and agricultural machinery
are among such Inputs. Access to these Inputs without payment of a cash
equivalent Is largely made possible through the kinship and community
networks of exchange that constitute 'villageness'. Another class of Inputs
such as seed, fuel, fertilisers, and pesticides can be obtained at a reduced
cash cost as a result of state InterventIon. 1 Under these conditions,
small producers can keep up with technological improvements and maintain
the normal level of land and labour productivity.62
Under these conditions, the accumulation of capital mainly results in
the consolidation of a class of middle peasants. Contrary to the case
described by Harris (1982), the position of these middle producers has not
been precarious over the last ten years. Political factors, as much as any
others, are responsible for this state of affairs. The fortunes of middle
peasants are tied to state economic policies which regulate the price of
cotton and the price of inputs. As argued by Smith (1986), the speed and
nature of differentiation among peasant producers thus emerges as a process
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that can largely be constrolled by the state. G3 Many of these middle
peasants combine 'endo-familial' accumulation, that is savings that result
from the use of familial labour power with simple capitalist accumulation
based on the use of varying levels of wage labour. Without such
accumulation, it is difficult to enter into the production of cotton. For
middle peasants, cotton production represents a labour-intensive branch of
agricultural production in which returns to labour make the expanded
reproduction of village households possible. To the extent that
capitalistic accumulation takes place, it is largely outside the agricultural
production process, and it leads to the migration of the entrepreneur from
the village and ultimately from the production of cotton itself. At the
lower end, on the contrary, agricultural production combined with other
pursuits (such as fishing and agricultural wage labour) allows a steady
income without transforming the individuals In question into full-time
agricultural wage labourers.
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Notes to Chapter 10
1. The surplus that it does yield (in the form of the 'share of the
workshop (p)) is in any case too small to invest in improved technology.
2. Scott (1986) sums up the different positions of the debate.
3. This may not in fact be an omission, but may reflect the actual case as
the examples from Indonesian blacksmiths and Guatemalan craftsmen suggest
(Kahn 1980 and Smith 1984b).
4. Land has been bought and sold in Soke for a long time, but as was shown
in chapter 7, many village producers take kinship considerations into
account when allocating land.
5. The latter results from national export policies and the movement of
international cotton prices.
6. One indication of this trend is the slight decrease in the Gini
coefficient of land farmed in 1984, compared with that obtaining in 1978.
In 1978, this figure was 0.5884, while in 1984, it had gone down to 0.571.
7. A farmer cultivating a 200-decare field that yields between 40 to 50
metric tonnes of cotton will need 1,000,000-1,250,000 TL. merely to hire
cotton pickers.
8. See note 1 of chapter 9,
9. The T-statistic for C is below 1.0 in regression analyses and this
variable on its own only explains 16 % of the cases.
10. See also tables 9.2 and 9.3. The largest farmers provide more manual
labour in absolute numbers than any other category of farmers, while in
terms of percentage of total labour employed, they supply more labour than
farmers cultivating between 60 and 150 decares of cotton.
11. The largest four farmers of Tuz are all from yuruk households.
12. One farmer in the penultimate category maintained that he could obtain
yields reaching 400 kg./da. Having no way of verifying this statement, I
have Included it in the table. Without this figure, the average yields in
the said category is 223 kg./da. The farmer in question farms 100 decares
of land that is his own property and explains the above-average
performance In terms of the effort he spent in improving his land. His
fields are moreover contiguous and are situated by the main irrigation
canal.
13. Thus, for example, distance from the irrigation canals may determine
whether or not a particular field will be cropped to cotton or left fallow.
Similarly, as I shall show below, large producers may limit the area
cropped to cotton if harvesting costs become unmanageable.
14. Since many of the people who did not farm land in 1984 either did so
in the past, or hope to do so in the future, I also include them in this
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category. On this basis, only the immigrant craftsmen can be excluded from
the category of 'farmer'.
15. Some farmers in this category may own larger amounts of land but are
unable to turn all of it to productive use as a result of a lack of cash
and/or labour.
16. As table 8.3 shows, only 29 % of these own tractors. Tractor owners
usually have a plough, a planter, and a rake, and have to borrow the other
implements.
17. The women In the households which make up this category do not
regularly work on other people's farms since they do not require much
labour in return. The men of the household, by contrast, are the main
income earners.
18, HIs father owns 80 decares of land, which on his death will be divided
between his seven children. Thus, HUseyln can expect to receive at most 10
decares from his father and another 20 from his wife's father.
19. Hüseyln's cost are at about 8000 TL/da since he pays no Interest nor
any wages. At the end of the first year, he will sell at most 850,000 TL's
worth of cotton (200kg/da. x 25 da. x 170 TL./kg.) for which he will have
spent 200,000 IL. This will leave him 650,000 TL. with which he may rent
land for another year and/or enlarge productive activities by buying
implements. His wages bring him about 300,000 TL per annum (25,000 TL
12), while cOtton production yields 550, 000 IL.
20. His brothers maintained, of course, that It was their father who had
paid for the tractor, since, they argued, Jiustafa had already sold his gold.
21. Kany fishermen, however, argue that it Is temperament rather than lack
of cash that keeps them from becoming farmers. Sefer and his two sons
spend all their time at sea and their 21-decare field is leased out to
Sefer's brother's son every year. Every year Sefer maintains that this will
be the last year he leases out his land, but the necessity of marrying off
his sons and his own high consumption levels, largely due to drinking, have
not yet permitted him to farm his own land.
22. One man who works as a truck driver for the fishing cooperative has
neither the time nor the opportunity to enter into cotton production. His
wife does not work in cotton fields, and his two daughters who do, spend
most of their income on building up their trousseaux.
23. As it happened, Hiiseyin proved successful. In 1987, he was renting 45
decares of land and was hoping to buy his own tractor. He had left his
boss and was working as a tractor driver for Tuz farmers on an ad hoc
basis. He maintained that planting cotton earned him 50,000 TL per day,
while as a salaried worker, he would only receive 2,000 TL. per day. What
he forgot to mention, of course, is that it is not only his own labour that
earns him 50,000 TL., but that the labour of his wife and children Is also
needed to secure this income.
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24. Looking after sheep means living a semi-nomadic life. Members of this
family, composed of Abmet, his wife, and their 10-year-old daughter, have to
look after the sheep themselves since they cannot employ full-time
shepherds. At a time when village life Is becoming the norm, living in
tents at the margins of the Söke plain, as well as at the margin of village
society, is quickly losing its attraction.
25. As table 10.3 shows, middle peasants farm 519 decares of land in excess
of the land they own, while the small farmers cultivate 1221.5 decares more
than is registered as their property. In contrast to small farmers
however, the courtyards of middle peasant houses often boast a covered
garage in which the tractor and some of the more expensive agricultural
implements are kept. Seventy-four percent of the farmers in this category
own a tractor.
26. Although I cannot illustrate It numerically, it Is also this group which
obtains most of the other means of production, cash and land, through
kinship and village networks. Moreover, the highest Incidence of village
endogamy is found among this group.
27, Average wages per annum are about 300,000 TL. Average Income on a 30-
decare field varies between 500,000 TL. to 800,000 IL.; this is equivalent to
the wages of one and a half to almost three person.
28. These investments may comprise buying a tractor or some other
expensive implement, buying more land, or buying gold needed to marry off a
son.
29. For example, the addition of extra land through the residence of an
elderly parent or labour as the result of the marriage of a son.
30. The fact that his brother is mentally retarded means that the latter
may never marry and thus Osman may never separate from the parental
household since he is the only able-bodied male who can provide income.
The fact that his brother and mother are not normal reduces his sisters'
prospects of marriage considerably.
31. The land he bought was a 75-decare field sold by a muhacir from Dogan
who had become rich during the 1950s and moved to town. His elder brother
All bought 30 decares of the same field, and his wife's father's brother
Ismail whose career is described In the following section bought the
remaining 30 decares. They paid 2000 TL/da. A year later, his wife's FB
decided to sell half of his field and allowed Isa to pay in installments.
32. This field was bought in his son's name, but is farmed jointly since the
latter Is still part of the parental household. On paper, Isa still owns 60
decares of land.
33. Melimet also made certain decisions that did not prove to be judicious.
After the division of the flock, he decided to try his luck in Germany and
left as a tourist without job security. In order to meet the expenses of
his trip, he used the money that accrued to him from the sale of the flock
of goats. A year later his wife joined him and this time, to finance her
trip, they sold the olive grove that they had Inherited from Mebmet's
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father. When in 1974 Germany repatriated illegal workers, all Xehmet came
back with was a black-and-white television set!
34. After her long illness, Isa's wife Sevim stopped working in the fields.
See Appendix 5, for a kinship chart explaining the relations between these
individuals.
35. I am employing the term 'profit' here in a way similar to that used by
Smith in her study of the Guatemalan weavers referred to above (1984 b:
75), that is by dividing net daily income to the number of individuals
within the household who have spent any amount of time working for the
product. This is a very rough measure of profit and I include it only as a
guide to the argument.
36. In Isa's case described above, the daily 'profit' is about 1000 TL.
These calculations exclude fixed costs and land rent. Thus, as Smith argues
(ibid.), the wage rate in cotton production Is high in relation to the rate
of profit.
37. Three of these producers farm the land of their father and/or mother
who reside in their households and thus pay neither rent, nor a share of
the product.
38. Apart from minibuses, these people try to purchase land or agricultural
machinery in their own name.
39. As I explained in chapter 2, the involvement of SSke inhabitants in the
production of commodities, was, until the nineteen fifties, restricted to the
exportation of grains from the region and its hinterland to the Greek
islands, and to the production and export of valonia, licorice and animal
products.
40. According to local oral history, these two families who now have
numerous descendants living in many of the villages of the lower Meander
plain were the sons of two brothers. One of them was aggressive and
quick-tempered and was therefore called 'mad-head' (d1imad; h.s=head),
while the other was calm and respectful. Akilli in modern Turkish means
'intelligent', but in the villages, the usage is more akin to 'responsible
person'. Thus, two opposites, namely the mad-blooded and the responsible
are considered to be the founders of the village.
41. Three other eski yiiriik families, the Savran (cattle driver) and the
Akgül were also among the founders of Tuz, but it seems that they were
smaller groups. The kinship identity of the eski yiiriik households in Tuz
reflects this situation. While ten of the household heads in Tuz are
Delibas, and ten are Akilli (see Appendix lila), there are only two Savrans
and three AkgUls. Moreover, these two families own only about 100 decares
of land each. The Kor, another eski yiiriik family, that never managed to
appropriate pasture land, make up seven households.
42. Kandlyotl (1975) describes a similar trajectory in the consolidation of
large wheat-producing farms in the Central Anatollan plateau.
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43. During the fifties, Osman's younger brother, also called All Xehmet,
managed to buy 100 decares of land which for a long time he used as
pasture. But, because he has not been able to accumulate the cash necessary
to turn it into a cotton farm, his wife's brother farms it as All Mehmet's
sharecropper. Another brother had for a long time been cultivating cotton
on his 30 decares distributed by the government. It was not until the mid-
seventies that his land on the outskirts of the village became valuable as
a result of the expansion of the village towards the southeast. This land
became the new village square surrounded by shops and coffeehouses. By
selling a small portion of his estate to village shop owners, he managed to
acquire some capital and invest it in tractors and other agricultutal
equipment. This man's widow is now the owner of 80 decares of cotton land
and is able to rent 150 decares, thus farming a total of 230 decares of
cotton.
44. During the course of the 1952 and 1960 land distributions, the Delibas
family was dispossed of much of the land they held in usufruct since it had
not been officially registered. Hence, Kámil's agnates in the village, (his
brother's son and his brother) are in a worse economic position compared to
KAmil.
45. One of his sons is an industrial engineer living in London.
46. Osman bought his son a 30-decare field a year after his marriage.
Otherwise his children will inherit only about 18 decares of land each.
47. Osman maintains that he takes in more land than he owns in order to
help his eons who will have to remain agricultural producers. KAmil, by
contrast, does not attempt to expand agricultural production since he and
most of his children are well established in town. They, in fact, no longer
consider themselves 'villagers'.
48. Only two of the Akilli women work as cotton pickers, while in the
Delibas households no female labour is available for work on cotton fields.
49. As was described in chapter 2, the yeni yliruk of Tuz lived as
transhumant sheep and goat herders who travelled more than 300 kilometres
to the east to find summer pastures and spent the winter in the
mountainous terrain of the Söke-Xilas area. It was not until the mid-
sixties when the government restricted access to the Samsun ranges that
these families permanently settled in villages. Nany of these yeni yüriik
began to purchase land in their winter pastures (kislak).
50. His younger brothers maintain that they have a right to some of this
land since it was their labour which contributed to the growth of the herds
that were sold to buy land. Hasan, as the oldest of eight children, could,
after the early death of his father, control and allocate income as he
pleased. His mother and his brothers have for a long time refused to even
speak to him. See Appendix Ilib for kinship relations among this group of
yeni yiiriik of Tuz.
51. Villagers maintain that he owns more than this amount, but has
registered it in the name of his two married eons who still have not
separated from him to establish their own independent households.
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52. His father is too old and too ill to work and his children are too
young.
53. Unlike middle peasants, these farmers on their own account bring in
more than thirty migrant workers each and are able to offer them
uninterrupted work for a period of 45 to 60 days.
54. See also Kandiyoti (1975:215.)
55. It would be interesting to speculate whether K&mil would have sold all
his land if his youngest son had not been willing to resume cotton
production. One yeni yuruk man who was able to move to Söke after having
sold his flocks, has in fact totally cut himself off from any agricultural
activity.
56. Only 13 Tuz men who at present reside outside the village earn their
living by working as manual labourers. I suspect many of these to be
temporary migrations since many of them have left as a result of disputes
with their father and are working as fishermen in various fisliponds in the
region. A total of 34 men live outside the village out of which 22 work as
civil servants following an education or are engaged in trading and other
commercial activities. These make up the total number of outmigration from
Tuz.
58. The farmer calculated his profit in terms of cost per kilogramme of
cotton produced. Thus, with a yield of 250 kg./da, he calculated that he
produced one kilogramme of cotton for 12.47 TL (3118.25/250). This gave him
a profit rate of 11 % (100-12.47/14x100), or 1.53 TL/da.
59. Tuz villagers explain this capital accumulation in terms of widely-
circulating myths about hidden treasures. Treasure hunting (define
avciligi) is a very important part of rural folklore in Turkey (Uysal 1985).
In the Aegean region, peasants maintain that departing Greeks buried their
gold and that many of the successful entrepreneurs owe their initial
capital to such finds.
60. As I have shown in chapter 2, large holdings in the Söke plain have
also diminished in size as a result of inheritance.
61. The policies that guide state intervention also are intricately linked
to the nature of Turkish society within which the rural-urban divide
remains a crucial consideration in development plans as well as in the
political process.
62. As argued by Kahn, even where labour power is not fully commoditised,
the drudgery of labour inputs experienced directly by producers helps to
establish a standardised level around which returns to labour will fluctuate
(1982:12).
63. Thus, as Margulies argues for Turkey as a whole (1985), the emergence
of a class of petty commodity producers may itself be the result of state
intervention. But see Keyder (1983b) for an alternative explanation.
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COJCLUS IONS
The study of cotton cultivators in a village of the Söke plain in
Western Turkey shows the number of different factors that have to be taken
into account in order to account for the continued existence of a class of
'independent' agricultural producers. Economic relations dominant at the
level of the wider economy in Turkey have increasingly taken on a
capitalist character. Especially after the 1950s, a growing national market
and the production of commodities have characterised much of rural Turkey
(Singer 1977, Aydin 1980, Keyder 1983b). As I show in chapter 5, since the
early 1960s the state has been a major agent in shaping generally the
development of capitalism In the country and specifically, in determining
the conditions under which cotton has been produced in Turkey. The state
has also been instrumental in the consolidation of village communities,
Extension of roads, education, and electritification, especially in the Vest
of Turkey have helped the integration of these communities into the social,
economic and cultural life of the nation as a whole. Contrary to the
experience of other similar communities in Turkey where change has produced
massive upheavals, especially large-scale outmigration (Stirling 1974;
Keyder 1983b:37-8), or extensive dispossession of land (Aydin 1980;
Hinderink and Kiray 1970), transition to commodity production in the Söke
region has been rather smooth and has not destroyed the fabric of social
relations within the community.1
Peasants in the Söke region have increasingly been drawn into the
circuits of commodity production. The dominance of the cultivation of
cotton shows the extent to which wider economic forces shape the
production decisions of these villagers. In this context, 'independence' is
a concept that has to be treated with care. As the preceding chapters have
demonstrated, these producers are independent in so far as they own or
control their means of production, especially land and labour. Due to the
high levels of return to labour that it provides, cotton production has
emerged as the only option open for producers to remain independent
agricultural cultivators. The amount of income they obtain is largely
determined by input and output prices which they normally do not control.2
The process of production necessitates the establishment of credit
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relations with the state and with private merchants. In many studies of
the Turkish peasantry, the latter have been identified as the major agents
through which peasants are exploited (Aydin 1980; Boratav 1980; Margulies
1985). But as Friedniann maintains (1980:169-70), in conditions where
factors of production are mobile, exploitation by merchants, banks, and
landowners becomes a theoretical impossibility. As I showed in chapter 8,
competition among merchants and banks in the region and in the village
have largely produced uniform prices for land, credit and other inputs. It
is in this sense that I consider Tuz cotton producers to be independent.
If Tuz farmers are not themselves exploited, do they exploit others?
Many of the participants in the debates on the nature and persistence of
petty commodity producers have stressed 'self-exploitation' as an important
factor in explaining continuity (Bernstein 1986:18). It is nevertheless
still necessary to look carefully at who it is that carries out the bulk of
the tasks involved in production. In this respect, two categories of
labourers employed by Tuz farmers have to be considered, namely the
seasonal migrant labourers used to harvest cotton and the unpaid family
workers who undertake both manual and mechanical tasks during the course
of the production process. On the basis of his fieldwork among small tea-
producers in the East Black Sea Coast, Hann maintains that sharecroppers
inhabiting the poorer inland regions where they own non-viable farms, do
constitute a separate class "best described as a rural proletariat"
(1985:106). According to Hann, class cleavages may emerge within a system
of petty commodity production, especially when, as is the case in Tuz,
seasonal labour migration is an integral aspect of the production process.
It would indeed be Impossible to deny the existence of exploitation in
cases where the wage form dominates. And to the extent that Tuz producers
employ wage labour, they certainly extract surplus labour. But the extent
to which this surplus is transformed Into capital ready to be invested in
production depends on the amount of total labour they employ during the
production process, a variable that in turn depends on the amount of land
put under production. For middle farmers, as I showed In chapters 9 and
10, wage labour represents a small but regular part of the total labour
needed for production. The productive cycle with its peak labour demand
during the harvest makes the employment of wage labour an integral part of
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the process of production. Accumulation of capital on the basis of this
surplus may to varying degrees be a feature characterising Tuz cotton
producers.
Nevertheless, as argued by Smith (1984:62), wages in cotton
production are high compared to the farmers' profit margins. Thus, the role
of the wage relation in accounting for accumulation may be limited.& It is
probably more relevant to look at the unpaid labour used by these producers
in order to explain accumulation. Yet, many of the attempts to explain the
nature of commodity producers within the agricultural sector have, until
recently, failed to consider relations of exploitation within the production
unit. As argued by Harris (1981), the tendency to view households as
units within which economic relations take the form of pooling rather than
exchange have led to the neglect of conflicts and divisions that are
internal to the household. Many of the theories that try to define petty
commodity production identify the productive enterprise as an
undifferentiated whole without distinguishing the relations of power that
structure it, Whether the productive unit is constituted by individuals or
by households/families has no relevance within the terms of political
economy. Recently, however, Friedmann (1986) and Roseberry (1986) have
tried to analyse petty commodity production as a combination of relations
of class and patriarchy, a point also taken up by Bernstein (1986).
Conflicts within Tuz households and the ways through which they are
verbalised and resolved does point to the extent to which appropriation of
labour within these units is an important part of the process of
accumulation in cotton production. Young girls try as much as possible to
work for a wage rather than for exchange labour, sons try to divert as
much of the income as possible to their own (future) households, and
fathers threaten to cease supporting dependents within the family.
Struggles regarding the division of income within the household show that
as long as the owner/producer is not a single person, subordination if not
exploitation will continue to be an important feature of petty commodity
production. Therefore the concept of 'self-exploitation' which, beginning
with Kautsky and Chayanov, has been used to explain the persistence of
family farms, has to be reconsidered. In the case discussed here, it is
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clear from the differences in the access of individuals within a given
household to cash and other items of consumption that the enterprise
product is controlled by the (often male) head of the household. Gender
and age, the two most important criteria according to which power relations
within the family are structured, serve to allocate control over the product
and labour of the family enterprise. Conversely, the central role played by
women and young men within the productive process of the household also
allow the 'juniors' (young men and women) the possibility of struggling for
a larger share of the product.
Nevertheless, it is largely the dependence on unpaid labour that makes
the peasant farm more viable as a cotton producer than capitalist
enterprises which depend solely on wage labour. The latter find on the one
hand that the wage bill is too high to yield adequate profits, and on the
other hand, they do not have the means of securing the necessary work
force. In spite of the peak time labour shortage experienced during the
harvest, finding labour is less of a problem for peasant producers. Ties of
kinship and community, often extended to cover complete strangers (such as
seasonal migrants) mean that peasants can count on a more reliable work
force. Thus, the shortage of labour at harvest time is more of a crisis for
capitalist producers than for village-based peasant enterprises.7
Xoreover, not all of the seasonal labour employed by peasants (whether
obtained within the village or through migrant workers) is paid in cash, a
factor which is very important for cash-poor producers. By deploying
mechanisms that are oniy available to peasants, the latter succeed in
obtaining labour without an immediate payment of cash. Thereby peasant
producers are able to turn to their own advantage a situation that limits
capitalist production.
Under conditions where accumulated cash constitutes a major factor of
production, ability to enter into production with a minimum outlay of cash
is crucial. Survival and accumulation are based on reducing monetary costs.
Village life, by making possible the production of a number of subsistence
items outside market relations, allows producers firstly to reduce the cash
necessary to reproduce labour. As argued by G. Smith (1 g86), labour
constitutes only one of the inputs that are obtained through non-commodity
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relations. As I showed in chapter 3, within the village a number of
exchanges involving labour and produce that serve to satisfy daily
consumption requirements also take place outside the market. Secondly,
many of the commoditised inputs necessary for agricultural commodity
production, among which land and labour figure most prominently, are
obtained without requiring cash outlays. Thus, in order to explain the
viability of peasant production, it is necessary to take into account
structures that are larger than the individual production entreprise. In
the case of cotton producers in Tuz, the village community provides the
context within which enterprises can continue to operate. Moreover, the
role of the community in reproducing relations of authority within the
household cannot be overlooked. It might even be possible to transform the
term of 'endo-familial' accumulation used by Cook (1984) to describe the
process of accumulation among petty commodity producers. Instead of 'endo-
familial', one might in the case of Tuz, speak of 'endo-communal'
accumulation. Kahn (1980) and Friedmaun (1980) stress the dissolution of
community ties under petty commodity production. The evidence presented
here suggests that if we take into account the ways in which producers get
access to productive inputs, we find that such ties are an integral part of
the process of petty commodity production.
The inclusion of kinship and community within a consideration of
petty commodity production brings immediately to mind various conceptions
of 'moral economy'. As used by Scott (1976), the term simply implies the
existence of a tendency among peasant producers to secure adequate
subsistence levels, a tendency which often leads them to forgoe higher
incomes that can be obtained through other less secure strategies. 9 But
the term has come to denote a set of social relations rooted in a pre-
capitalist past that allows peasants to resist the penetration of capitalist
relations.9 My usage of the term relates to the type of relationships that
are supposed to characterise intra-village exchanges. The absence of money
in a large part (but not all) of these transactions allows peasants to
reduce expenditure of cash in production as well as in consumption. Far
from implying a resistence to involvement in market relations, these
exchanges for many farmers in the village in fact make such an involvement
possible. As stressed by Friedmann (1986) and Roseberry (1986), existing
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intra-village as well as intra-household relations should not be seen as
relics of a pre-capitalist past; quite to the contrary, these relations
respond readily to pressures from the wider capitalist context. To cite an
example, as land acquires a different meaning under commercial production,
relations between husband and wife in Tuz, may have undergone a significant
change, a fact that I have pointed to in chapters 4 and 7. Furthermore, the
relations between agnatic kin as well as those between neighbours within
the village may very well be reshaped through the changes that have
affected the region within the last thirty-five years.° Only a more
detailed historical analysis can reveal the particular nature of this
change, a task that has not been undertaken in the present study.
Tuz producers live in rural areas where an ideology of 'peasantness' is
still operative in regulating social interaction. Many of their inputs are
obtained outside commodity relations as well as a part of their
subsistence. At the same time, they produce commodities in a largely
capitalist context within which the major inputs have largely acquired the
character of a commodity, and they depend primarily on household labour for
the production and reproduction of their farms. The theoretical
implications of the different concepts developed to analyse peasant
production help us on the one hand, to analyse various relationships that
are observed in the course of empirical research. On the other hand, the
lack of a complete fit between hypotheses derived from theoretical
contructions and data produced by fieldwork encourages the production of
new questions and new data.
The importance of peasant ideology, or the system of meaning which
imposes limits on behaviour, for the study of peasant economics also points
to areas of further study. As much as analyses of economic conditions of
production, this sytem of meanings will provide clues to the forms of
political action taken by peasants. One of the implications of this study
is that notions of identity as constructed within the context of a
community may provide important clues for a study of peasant ideology. As
indicated in chapter 1, many theorists try to explain the persistence of
peasant/simple commodity forms of production in terms of struggles between
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different classes. Such struggles involve the operationalisation of
specific systems of meaning according to which producer-s who occupy
'contradictory class positions' live out their daily lives as well as
formulate long-term aspirations. To the extent that political economy
strives to conceptualise the forms and determinants of political action
that various rural producers may adopt, it cannot ignore the grammar that
guides daily interaction, nor the shape that these long-term aspirations
may take.
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Notes to Conclusion
1. Although Stirling maintains that as a result of changing attitudes
regarding land among the young people "village society is no longer self-
reproducing" (1974:222), he also notes the continuities that accompany
change and even concludes that after a period of twenty years or more, "the
village is the same village" (1974:229),
2. The importance of Aegean producers in the 1987 general elections in
Turkey has shown that at certain times, peasants may influence prices.
According to newspaper reports, the very high cotton price offered during
the course of the elections, coupled with the subsidies received by
exporting merchants has raised the price of Turkish cotton above world
prices and this has, in turn, led to drastic falls in cotton exports.
3. The fact that many of these seasonal migrants are also owners of
subsistence farms, may, as has been argued by Aydin, lower the value of
labour power in agriculture, and even in industry. Bazoglu (1984) offers a
good description of the economic activities of seasonal migrants.
4. Thus, contrary to Friedmann's arguments, wage labour is not simply a
result of demographic variations within the household. Almost all cotton
producers have to hire some labour at harvest time. The number of female
workers within the household determines the extent of wage labour needed.
5. The second part of Smith's argument which links the lack of
differentiation among producers to the low level of technology that serves
to reduce entry costs, itself a product of the low profit margins, does not
hold in the case of Tuz cotton producers. Land and technology represent a
high cost which producers in Tuz are able to meet on the basis of non-
commodity relations defining the village community.
6. For example, Glavanis (1984) limits her analysis to the relations of
cooperation between households in explaining the persistence of small
commodity producers. She furthermore maintains that exploitation within
the household is impossible and that the family as a whole is exploited by
the dominant capitalist relations (personal communication). Aydin (1980)
constitutes an important exception with regard to Turkey.
7. See Taylor (n.d.) for a similar case In Egypt.
8. As adequately shown by Moise (1982), Popkin's (1979) characterisation of
Scott's position as imputing an anti-market mentality to all middle
peasants distorts Scott's views considerably.
9. See for example, Taussig (1980).
10. SimIlarly, Bazoglu (1984) indicates that the structure of households
and, in particular, the role of women in the southeastern province of
Adlyaman may have changed as a result of seasonal migration.
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In the diagramnte above, each capital letter represents a named group
of close agnates who, at present, share the same last name. Four
generations, of which only the last two are still live are depicted.
Individuals who have married outside the mahalle are not indicated. The
genealogical relationships between these groups are no longer clear to a
great many of the individuals themselves. It is possible that, in the past,
they may each have constituted a separate, sister-exchanging mahalle. The
diagramme shows five cases of direct sister exchange; the other forms of
ecchange marriage illustrated involve a wider group of agnates and take
place over a longer period of time. For example, in group E, a man who
obtained his wife from father's brother, reciprocated in the following
generation, by giving his daughter's hand in marriage to the son of another
of his father's brothers. Two points have to be mentioned, Firstly, this
chart only indicates the marriages that were known to me and that took
place in Tuz. Only one of the groups, group F, is resident in a Söke
village other than Tuz. Marriages with members of the yeni yüriik groups
who settled in the Izmir region are therefore excluded. Secondly, only the
third and fourth generations represent individuals who are active heads of
households in Tuz; members of the third generation are, on average, over the
age of fifty, while the last generation is composed of married couples in
their late thirties. The majority of the children of the third generation
have married into other ethnic groups within the village or outside, and
the boundaries of the wife-exchanging unit is broadening to include
sometimes a whole village.
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Appendix II shows the extension of affinal ties across villages and
across ethnic boundaries. Some of the marriages contracted by members of
four families living in three neighbouring villages, Tuz, At, and Yuva are
indicated. The yeni yiiriik family of Tuz shown on the left hand side of the
diagramme has affinal links with eski yuruk from Tuz and Yuva, and with
muhacir from At. Only one exchange marriage has taken place among these
families: that between the muhacir of At and the eski viiruk of Yuva. This
marriage is unusual since muhacir do not like to repeat marriage alliances.
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Appendix III compares the genealogies of three families belonging to
each of the ethnic groups of Tuz. In general, the heads of households
belong to the last generation Indicated in the charts. These individuals
are over the age of fifty and In most cases have grandchildren themselves.
The eski yiiriik family In appendix lila is All Xehmet Akilil's whose carrier
as a landowner has been described In chapter 10. His is the family with
the largest number of Inter-ethnic marriages. The marriages of the 	 i
yuruk family (appendix IlIb) are shown in appendix I. The yiiriik can trace
their genealogies to at least the fourth ascending generation, while for
many of the muhacir, the third ascending generation is the limit. For the
latter, the Individuals of the third ascending generation are shadowy
figures who have little significance In the conduct of everyday life. As
appendix Ilic shows, genealogies among muhacir extend laterally rather than
vertically and affinal relationships link many village households. Starting
with the marriages contracted by one muhaclr household in Tuz, it Is
possible to link almost all the muhacir of the village. I have only
included twenty-six households which belong to twelve separate families
(represented in the chart by capital letters). Because of lack of space,
children who reside outside the village, particularly married women resident
in other village have been excluded.
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